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ABSTRACT 
The common wisdom about the struggle for foreign policy power between the US 
Congress and President is that the making and conduct of foreign policy are likely to 
be dominated by the Executive. A review of the literature in this field reveals that 
this wisdom is largely based on historical studies on issues like declaring war, 
ratifying treaties or recognising foreign governments. Many other foreign policy 
issues such as foreign economic policy and human rights policy are much 
understudied. Available studies also show more interest in documenting Congress' 
role in certain policies with less attention to the internal dynamics of how Congress 
came to behave as it did. 
Classical political science theories on the behaviour of Congress in policy making 
identify one focal point as the basis of analysis (interest groups, ideology, 
partisanship, constituency, committee, public opinion, media, or institutional 
constraints). The thesis proceeds from the fairly obvious presumption that foreign 
policy making is a complex process which cannot be fully explained by any single 
theory. It therefore adopts a more expansive approach and pays special attention to 
three factors which might loosely be termed structural factors: partisanship, 
constituency and committee. This thesis concerns itself primarily with a comparative 
evaluation of these three factors but concludes with some comment on the broader 
context which includes other factors, such as ideology, interest groups and 
Presidential leadership. These other factors are no less important than the three 
structural factors. 
The thesis takes as case studies the issues of China's most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
trade status and US policy towards Taiwan under two administrations - that of 
George Bush and the first Clinton Administration. This period (1989-1996) was not 
only a time of considerable change in the global strategic environment but also a 
time of instability in US-China relations. The thesis shows that at a theoretical level, 
Congressional behaviour can be best explained if it is understood as the sum of a 
variety of often incongruent actions and compromises, each one of which might have 
its roots in one or other of the motivations identified by classical political science 
theories. Essentially, a theoretical explanation of Congressional behaviour must take 
into account the fact that Congressional decision making involves 535 individual 
members and a large number of committees. This thesis found that while 
partisanship is generally more influential in shaping Congressional intervention in 
foreign policy, this is only true when interests of constituency are not heavily 
involved. As for committees, although their actions are central to Congressional 
outcomes, those actions are largely determined by partisanship and constituency. 
PREFACE 
On 22 May 1995, the Clinton Administration broke a firm commitment to 
China that it would not allow Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to enter the United 
States for a "private" visit in June of that year. This decision contributed to China's 
decision to apply substantial military pressure on Taiwan by conducting ballistic 
missile tests and military exercises in July and August 1995 and again in March 
1996. The Administration broke its commitment to China because of pressure from 
Congress. The Chinese government subsequently intensified its lobbying efforts on 
Capitol Hill. But if China's analysts wanted to understand why or how Congress 
had so successfully derailed US foreign policy, scholarly literature provided little 
help. Scholars of US-China relations have paid little attention to the internal 
dynamics of Congressional behaviour. 
This thesis aims to analyse the influence of domestic politics on 
Congressional intervention in US policy towards China with special reference to 
three factors which might loosely be termed structural factors: partisanship, 
constituency and committee. The analysis is conducted by examining two issues: 
China's most-favoured-nation (MFN) status and the Taiwan issue during the 
Republican George Bush Administration (1989-1992) and the first Democratic Bill 
Clinton Administration (1993-1996). 
The Introduction of this thesis gives a brief account of Congress' 
constitutional powers in foreign policy and outlines previous "struggle" between 
Congress and the Executive. The Introduction sets out the importance of the study, 
its assumptions, theory, hypothesis, background information of the cases to be 
studied, methodology and sources of evidence. 
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Part I (Chapters 1 to 2) outlines the theoretical framework of the thesis and 
reviews the scholarship on Congress in China policy. Chapter 1 critiques the 
rational-actor model and interbranch politics model, then introduces the theories to 
be used in this thesis - the political process model and, under it, constituency 
theory, committee theory and partisanship. Chapter 2 reviews scholarly work on 
Congress' role in US policy towards China since the late 1940s and factors which 
have influenced Congressional members' decision-making behaviour in China 
policy. 
Part II (Chapters 3 to 6) is a narrative examination of Congress' role in the 
policy-making processes of the four cases. Chapter 3 focuses on Congressional 
behaviour in China's MFN status during the Bush Administration, with Chapter 4 
looking at the issue in Clinton's first term. Chapter 5 examines Congressional 
actions regarding Taiwan policy under Bush and Chapter 6 discusses Congressional 
intervention in the issue during the first Clinton Administration. 
Part III (Chapters 7 to 8) offers explanations of why Congress behaved as it 
did during the period. Chapter 7 presents structural explanations for Congressional 
behaviour in the four cases, with partisanship, constituency and committee 
examined separately and comparatively. Chapter 8 places these structural factors in 
a broader context in an effort to obtain a balanced understanding of the influence of 
structural and non-structural factors on the decision-making behaviour of members 
of Congress. 
The conclusion summarises the main arguments. 
The thesis uses Australian English conventions in spelling and expression. 
For example, while American English uses "organize" and "January 1, 1989", 
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Australian English uses "organise" and "l January 1989". However, American 
spellings are kept unchanged in quotations and in book and article titles. 
Secondly, to avoid confusion, all Chinese names are rendered in the Chinese 
way, with family names first unless the name bears an English first name. But 
Chinese authors' names remain unchanged because family names are identified in 
the bibliography. No effort is made to convert Chinese names from Wade-Giles 
system into pinyin system or vice versa. Any conversion will only make more 
confusion since readers are already familiar with the names as they are. Normally, 
the Mainlanders' names are in pinyin system and Taiwanese names in Wade-Giles 
system. 
I would like to thank the staff and my fellow students in the Department of 
International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, the 
Australian National University (ANU), for their critical comments and suggestions. 
I especially benefited from Professor Stuart Harris' and Mr. Michael Thomas' 
comments. Mr. Thomas also proofread the thesis. 
While doing my fieldwork during the period of April-June 1997, Mr. Reita 
Miyoshi, a student at George Washington University and Miss Rika Amano, a 
student at Georgetown University helped me get in touch with China scholars at the 
two universities. A number of prominent scholars and Congressional staff kindly 
accepted my request for an interview. In sequence, they are: Edward A. McCord, 
David Shambaugh, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Robert G. Sutter, Bruce J. Dickson, 
Harry Harding, David M. Lampton and Daniel Shapiro. I should especially 
mention Mr. David M. Lampton, then President of the National Committee on US.-
China Relations and Mr. Robert G. Sutter, senior specialist in International 
Relations with Congressional Research Service. Not only did they spend a long 
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time in talking to me, they also handed me some very useful material and Mr. 
Sutter gave me his latest research on interest groups and China policy. I also met 
several Chinese scholars while in the United States, including Miss Xiao Rong of 
the Institute of American Studies, China Academy of Social Sciences, Ms Sun 
Aqing of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs and Dr. Wang Jianwei of 
the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point. Their suggestions and comments are 
very helpful. 
I am particularly grateful to Dr. John Hart and Dr. Denny Roy, members of 
my supervising committee, for their guidance and valuable comments in the 
developing stages of the thesis and for reading several drafts. Dr. John Hart's 
critical comments were especially useful in shaping the final draft of the thesis. 
Most of all, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Greg Austin, my 
mentor at the ANU and chairman of the supervising committee. Having supervised 
the thesis for my second Master's degree, Dr. Austin then provided vital help, 
enlightening criticism, timely advice and enormous encouragement throughout my 
four-year Ph.D. study. He also readily devoted much time to reading all drafts and 
offering line-by-line editorial suggestions. His personal friendship and his family's 
support to me and my family have been crucial. Without the Austins' guidance, 
encouragement, support and friendship, this thesis would have been impossible. 
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Introduction 
The making of US foreign policy used to be considered different from that of 
domestic policy as was made plain in Senator Arthur Vandenberg's famous statement 
in the 1940s that "politics stops at the water's edge". What Vandenberg meant was 
that it was acceptable to play politics with domestic issues but in the realm of national 
security, where vital interests are affected, it was too dangerous and risky to permit 
party political considerations to intervene. 1 Today, many still believe that foreign 
affairs are sufficiently distinct from domestic issues to require different processes for 
policy formulation.2 But this is no longer the dominant view. As a former member of 
the House of Representatives noted in 1971, "foreign and domestic policy have 
merged into a seamless web of interlocking concerns".3 Indeed, for many members 
of Congress "the once clear line separating foreign and domestic policy is blurred".4 
The end of the Cold War has only strengthened the argument. Firstly, it has 
greatly lowered the perception of external threat and, along with it, the political costs 
to members of Congress who choose to challenge the President. s Indeed, the end of 
the Cold War has brought a dilemma for the White House. As Ross observed in 1992 
in respect of US China policy, the end of the Cold War meant that US approaches to 
1 Howard J. Wiarda, American Foreign Policy: Actors and Processes (HarperCollins College 
Publishers, 1996), pp. xiv-xv. 
2 See Ole R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 1996), p. 6. 
3 John V. Lindsay, "For a New Policy Balance", Foreign Affairs, (50, 1971), p. 1. For a more recent 
view in the same vein, see Richard G. Lugar, Letters to the Next President (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1988). See Cecil. V. Crabb and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President 
and Foreign Policy, 3rd ed., (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1992), p. 299, note 8. 
4 Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, "Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress: An Overview 
and Preview" in Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay (eds.), Congress Resurgent: Foreign and 
Defense Policy on Capitol Hill (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993), p. 13. 
5 James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US. Foreign Policy (Baltimore and London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 32. 
2 
China lacked "the urgency required to sustain a domestic consensus". 6 To achieve its 
policy objectives, the Bush Administration had to be sensitive to the policy 
preferences of important domestic actors, including a Democrat-controlled Congress. 
Thus, the Administration actually pursued two objectives simultaneously -
"maintaining a working relationship with China aimed at securing U.S. interests and 
securing domestic support for its China policy".7 
Secondly, with the end of the Cold War, economic, ethnic, and moral issues 
like human rights have risen to the top of the foreign policy agenda. In 1995, Joan E. 
Spero, then Under Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, stated: 
"It's no longer just about war and peace. We have new constituencies, and business 
is one of them".8 Some analysts observed that in the world after the Cold War, the 
"driving force in foreign policy is econopolitik!'.9 
Ripley and Lindsay have noted yet another factor which is blurring the line 
that once separated domestic policy form foreign policy. That is global 
interdependence. 10 In the post-Cold War world, there are more and more 
"intermestic" issues. 11 One example is global warming. To solve the problem 
requires both international co-operation and substantial changes in domestic policy. 
These changes will cause conflicts of interests among different domestic groups. 
Thus, the involvement of domestic politics is almost inevitable. Ripley and Lindsay 
predicted that members of Congress would feel "increasingly comfortable rewriting 
6 Robert S. Ross, "National Security, Human Rights, and Domestic Politics: The Bush Administration 
and China" in Kenneth A. Oye et al. (eds.), Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy in the 
Post-Cold War Era (Harper Collins Publishers, 1992), p. 289. 
7 Ibid., p. 290. 
8 Amy Borrus, et. al, "Peddlers in Pinstripes: At the new State Department, trade is taking center 
stage", Business Week, 1May1995, p. 42. 
9 Ibid., p. 43. 
10 Ripley and Lindsay, "Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress", p. 13. 
l 1 Bayless Manning, "The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals", Foreign 
Affairs (55, 1977), pp. 306-24. 
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presidential proposals on intermestic issues, regardless of the foreign policy 
implications" .12 
Indeed, the long-held distinction between domestic policy and foreign policy 
is under unprecedented challenge. Having observed the influences of domestic forces 
in US China policy from 1989 to 1996, Lieberthal re-emphasised an argument which 
has long been held by many foreign policy analysts: "Political leaders are naturally 
sensitive to domestic pressures and concerns, and they develop their policies within 
the constraints of the structures and styles of their own political systems".13 He 
agreed that during periods of national crisis, or even of the "sustained crisis" created 
by the Cold War, such internal factors might exert less influence on policy making. 
"But in more normal times, such as the post-cold war era", Lieberthal argued, "a 
'billiard ball' model of the international system, which sees each country as a solid 
object and all pressures resulting only from external contacts with other countries, is 
inadequate".14 
The making of China policy has been one area of US foreign policy in which 
domestic politics has been heavily involved. Early in 1960, Koen observed that 
"United States policy toward China is more deeply involved in domestic politics than 
any other aspect of American foreign affairs".15 Koen further noted: 
It was the one area specifically excluded by Senator Vandenberg in 1947 
from the scope of bipartisan agreement. Partly as a result of this exclusion 
from bipartisan consideration, contention over China policy has virtually 
become a permanent feature of Republic-Democratic party battles and, at 
l2 Ripley and Lindsay, "Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress", pp. 13-14. 
l3 Kenneth Lieberthal, "Domestic Forces and Sino-U.S. Relations" in Ezra R. Vogel (ed.), Living with 
China: US/China Relations in the Twenty-First Century (New York and London: W. W. Norton & 
Co., 1997), p. 254 .. 
14 Ibid., pp. 254-55. 
l5 Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1960), p. 
vii. 
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least smce 1953, of somewhat less intensive battles between the 
conservative moderate wings of the Republican party. 16 
In 1983, Sutter noted that while the American people generally showed little 
interest in foreign policy, "China policy was reportedly one of the few foreign policy 
issues ... that had a strong impact on local constituencies". 17 Heated China policy 
debates in the United States in the late 1940s and the early 1950s have often been 
cited as examples that Congress does not always show deference to the executive 
branch on foreign policy issues. 18 China policy debates became intense again after 
the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. 
Harding noted in 1995 that the struggle between the Bush Administration and 
Congress over China policy was perhaps the most intense, and "certainly the most 
politically salient" cleavage over China policy in the United States.19 Richard C. 
Bush pointed out that during the period from Tiananmen to the November 1992 
election, China policy was subjected to "the dynamics of divided government".20 It 
largely became a partisan issue with the Democrat-controlled Congress, supported by 
some conservative Republicans, determined to use the issue to embarrass a 
Republican Administration for political gain.21 
The new willingness of Congress to challenge the Executive on foreign policy 
in respect of China was based in part on the view that vital US strategic interests 
would not be put at risk. There was a "growing belief' that "China needs the United 
16 Ibid. 
l 7 Robert G. Sutter, The China Quandary: Domestic Determinants of U.S. China Policy (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 92. 
18 Ripley and Lindsay, "Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress", p. 4. 
19 Harry Harding, "The Sino-American Relationship Today" in David M. Lampton and Alfred D. 
Wilhelm, Jr. (eds.), United States and China Relations at a Crossroads (Lanham, MD and London: 
University of America, 1995), p. 56. 
20 Richard C. Bush, "Domestic Political Considerations That Shape U.S. Policy toward China, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan" in Lampton and Wilhelm, United States and China Relations at a Crossroads, p. 
149. 
21 Ibid., p. 150. 
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States more than the United States needs China".22 In the wake of the collapse of 
Leninist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Tiananmen Square 
crackdown became a symbol of the whole moribund communist regime. Indeed, up 
to 1993, it was a popular prediction in the United States that the Communist regime in 
Beijing would not last long. In addition, with the Cold War coming to an end, 
China's strategic importance declined and even disappeared.23 
Equally important, Congress formed a view of China that it was pursuing a 
foreign policy that was contrary to US interests anyway. Congress could point to the 
Chinese government's export of the material, equipment, and/or technology for 
weapons of mass destruction and of delivery systems for those weapons, and 
Beijing's pursuit of trade policies inconsistent with the principle of mutual benefit.24 
Congress came to see its hostile actions towards China as serving, not undermining, 
US vital interests. 
The Constitution as an Invitation to Struggle 
The division between Congress and the Executive over foreign policy in 
recent decades represents a new contest between the two branches of the US 
government for constitutional authority in the field of foreign policy. The 
Constitution actually divides foreign policy powers between the President and 
Congress.25 In doing so, it created "an invitation to struggle" for the two branches of 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 151. 
25 Distrusting concentrations of power in any one branch or level of the government, the framers of the 
US Constitution divided foreign policy between the executive and legislative branches. They gave the 
President relatively few specific powers in foreign policy but allocated considerable such powers to 
Congress. According to the Constitution, the President is "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy 
of the United States"; the President, with the approval of the Senate, has the power "to make Treaties" 
and "appoint ambassadors" and "shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers". In contrast, 
Congress is empowered "to provide for the common Defense", "to regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations", "to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas", "to declare war'', 
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government.26 Nevertheless, there is a big gap between Congress' formal powers and 
actual influence. As Dahl pointed out constitutional prerogative is not the equivalent 
of power. 27 In fact, the making and conduct of foreign policy are likely to be 
dominated by the Executive. Congress' role in foreign policy tends to be confined to 
one of "legitimating, amending, or vetoing executive proposals"28 or "accepting, 
modifying or rejecting executive policies".29 Dahl concluded, "the President 
proposes and the Congress disposes". 30 Spanier and U slaner went even further by 
offering a reversed version they regard as more apt: "The President proposes, the 
President disposes". 31 
The President may easily outmanoeuvre Congress. For example, one of the 
President's most influential powers in foreign policy is his position as Commander in 
Chief of the armed forces. Yet the Constitution does not make clear how the 
functions of the position are to be reconciled with a number of functions explicitly or 
implicitly fall to Congress. For example, successive presidents have interpreted their 
authority as Commander in Chief so broadly that Congress' power to declare war has 
been frequently ignored. Crabb and Holt noted in 1992 that of more than 125 violent 
"to raise and support Armies'', "to provide and maintain a Navy", and "to make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces". The Constitution also specifies that the 
Senate must give its advice and consent to all treaties and ambassadorial appointments. In addition, 
"Congress's more general powers to approve government spending and cabinet officials give it 
potentially great influence over foreign policy". Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US. Foreign 
Policy, pp. 12-13 
26 Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1948, 1st ed. (New York: New York 
University Press, 1948), p. 208. 
27 Robert Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy (New York: Norton, 1950), p. 107. 
28 James A. Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and 
Initiative, rev. ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 14 
29 John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, How American Foreign Policy Is Made (New York and 
Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 69. 
30 Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy. Dahl's conclusion might be drawn from Corwin's observation. 
Corwin noted that "actual practice under the Constitution has shown that while the President is usually 
in a position to propose, the Senate and Congress are often in a technical position at least to dispose". 
See Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, p. 208. (Italics original) 
31 Spanier & Uslaner, How American Foreign Policy Is Made, p. 69. 
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encounters in which the United States had been engaged, only 5 had involved a 
declaration of war by Congress. 32 
In the case of the treaty-making power, it is true that a treaty needs the 
approval of the Senate and the Senate can change a treaty by attaching amendments, 
reservations and understandings to it. But it is the President who retains the initiative 
throughout the entire treaty-making process, including deciding to enter negotiations, 
appointing negotiators and monitoring their work, approving the treaty's provisions 
and submitting it to the Senate and proclaiming the treaty as law. At any stage in the 
process, the President may withdraw the treaty from Senate deliberation. The 
President may also refuse to proclaim a treaty that has been approved by the Senate.33 
The President could use Executive Agreements instead of treaties to formulate 
foreign policy with other countries. These agreements do not require Senate consent. 
According to one estimate, between 1946 and 1976 the United States entered into 
7,201 Executive Agreements with foreign countries, a figure much higher than the 
number of treaties signed during the same period.34 Between 1980 and 1990 the 
executive branch concluded 3,851 Executive Agreements but only 170 treaties. 35 
Constitutionally, Congress controls the purse and this power has been its 
"most potent weapon in shaping public policy". 36 Yet Congress has been reluctant to 
stop funding a foreign policy initiative already under way, especially if that policy 
32 Crabb and Holt, Invitation to Struggle, p. 50. 
33 Ibid., pp. 14-15. Between 1789 and 1982, only nineteen treaties were rejected by the Senate, out of 
some 1,400 submitted to it. 
34 Loch Johnson and James M. McCormick, "Foreign Policy by Executive Fiat", Foreign Policy (28, 
1977), pp. 118-124. 
35 Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics (Washington, D.C.: 
CQ Press, 1992), p. 278. 
36 Crabb and Holt, Invitation to Struggle, p. 49. 
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involves the support of US armed forces in combat. This was especially case 
before the 1970s.37 
As both Head of State and Chief Executive, the President has unequalled 
access to the information sources although Congress has been increasingly making 
efforts to acquire its own sources of information.38 Also, the President's activities 
and utterances are of much more interest to the media than those of any member of 
Congress. The President can therefore communicate much more effectively and thus 
outdo Congress in many respects, such as mobilising public opinion and manipulating 
perceptions of reality. Indeed, as Dahl claimed, it is not impossible that presidential 
supremacy might be transmuted "into a peculiarly American form of modem 
dictatorship". 39 
According to some scholars, Congress is far from the core structure of foreign 
policy decision making. Hilsman has identified four concentric circles in the 
structure. The innermost circle contains the President and his closest advisers, who 
actually make the decisions on most foreign policy questions. Each of the next three 
circles has successively larger numbers of people and successively less impact on 
foreign policy. The second circle consists of lower level bureaucrats, the military 
community and scientists. Congress, along with interest groups and the political 
parties, belongs to the third circle. The press and public opinion stand at the periphery 
of the foreign policy decision-making circle.40 
3? Since the Vietnam War, Congress has become more determined to stop funding a foreign policy 
which is under way if it considers necessary, such as the Iran-contra affair. But there is not enough 
evidence to suggest that this is also the case when that policy involves the support of US armed forces 
in combat. However, Congress has been more active in policy-making process when a policy involves 
American combat troops. See Crabb and Holt, Invitation to Struggle, pp. 39-40. 
38 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
39 Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy, p. 116. 
40 Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy-Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1971 ), pp. 118-20. 
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Wildavsky argued the United States has one president, but two presidencies: 
one is concerned with domestic matters and the other with foreign and defence 
policy.41 In the domestic area, the President has many rivals, such as Congress, 
political parties, the media and interest groups. They are able to negotiate with the 
President in the making of public policy. To successfully conduct domestic policy, 
the President has to consider all these political players when making policy. In the 
field of foreign policy, however, concern for national interests and security 
"inevitably" places the President above all other competing forces, including 
Congress. The reason is that the concept of national interests is more evident in 
foreign policy affairs than in the domestic policy area.42 Wildavsky summarises: 
The President's normal problem with domestic policy is to get 
congressional support for the programs he prefers. In foreign affairs, 
in contrast, he can almost always get support for policies that he 
believes will protect the nation - but his problem is to find a viable 
policy.43 
Another factor which puts the President in a favourable position m his 
struggle against Congress to control foreign policy making is the reluctance of the 
Supreme Court (the arbiter of disputes on constitutional interpretation) to hear cases 
on issues of foreign policy. One of the oft-used doctrines in the Court is the political 
question doctrine. The argument is that foreign policy is inherently a political 
question, and therefore cannot be adjudicated by the Court. As Justice Marshall 
noted in 1803 in Marbury v. Madison, "Questions, in their nature political, ... can 
41 Aaron B. Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies" in Aaron B. Wildavsky (ed.), Perspectives on the 
Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), pp. 448-461. 
42 D. D. Nimmo and T. D. Ungs, American Political Patterns: Conflicts and Consensus, 2nd ed. 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1969). 
43 As quoted in Spanier and Uslaner, How American Foreign Policy Is Made, p. 26. 
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never be made this court".44 More than one century later, in his influential 1 7 
ruling over the case of Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., Justice Clarke held: 
The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed 
by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative-'the 
political'-Departments of the government, and the propriety of what 
may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to 
judicial inquiry or decision.45 
When the Court has heard cases of a foreign policy nature, it has usually ruled in 
favour of the President. For example, in 1936 in United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp., the Court named the President the "sole organ" of government that 
deals with foreign policy. It proclaimed that "In this vast external realm, with its 
important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the 
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation".46 
Despite a general view that the Executive could dominate foreign policy 
making, scholars like Alton Frye note that even if Congressional influence occurs 
only at the margins, such influence should not be dismissed as unimportant. Frye 
argued that "in complex questions of foreign policy, the margins are frequently the 
vital edges, and Congress's ability to shape them is ofreal importance".47 
Moreover, it appears that the President's dominance in foreign policy making 
does not exist on all foreign policy issues and Congressional deference to the 
executive branch has never been complete. 48 There is actually a continuous shift of 
44 As quoted in Gordon Silverstein, "Judicial Enhancement of Executive Power" in Paul E. Peterson 
(ed.), The President, the Congress and the Making of Foreign Policy (Norman and London: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1994), p. 28 
45 U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: Detjen v. Central Leather Co., 1917, 302. The political question 
doctrine was applied again in Goldwater v. Carter, 1976. See Victoria Marie Kraft, The U.S. 
Constitution and Foreign Policy: Terminating the Taiwan Treaty (New York et al.: Greenwood Press), 
pp. 83-113. 
46 U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
47 Alton Frye, "Congress: The Virtue of Its Vices", Foreign Policy, (3, 1971), pp. 108-21. 
48 Ripley and Lindsay, "Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress", p. 4. 
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political power between the legislative and the executive branches, and "the swing of 
the power pendulum is most visible in the field of foreign policy". 49 
Bax in 1977 identified five successive phases in legislature-executive relations 
smce World War II. In chronological order he labelled these the phases of 
accommodation, antagonism, acqmescence, ambiguity and acrimony. 50 In 1992, 
Crabb and Holt also divided Congress' foreign policy role in the twentieth century 
into five stages. These five stages include first, an isolationist era (until World War 
II); second, an era of bipartisanship or close executive-legislative cooperation (the 
decade after the war); third, an era of imperial presidency (during the Vietnam War); 
fourth, an era of the assertive Congress (post-Vietnam War). The fifth and the final 
stage began with the Reagan presidency. At this stage, Crabb and Holt noted, many 
concluded "Congress had gone too far in efforts to gain a dominant position in the 
decision-making process".51 
Generally speaking, the period from the early 1940s (American involvement 
in World War II) to the late 1960s (the increase of anti-Vietnam war sentiment) 
"clearly represented a high point of Congressional deference" to the President.52 
There were a few reasons for Congress' deference during this period, including the 
nuclear threat to US national security, America's emergence as the leader of the free 
49 David M. Abshire and Ralph D. Nurnberger (eds.), The Growing Power of Congress (Beverly Hills 
and London: Sage Publications, 1981), p. 7 (Preface). 
50 Frans R. Bax, "The Legislative-Executive Relationship in Foreign Policy: New Partnership or New 
Competition?", Orbis, Winter 1977, pp. 885-892. 
51 Crabb and Holt, Invitation to Struggle, pp. 262-65. 
52 John Dumbrell, The Making of US Foreign Policy (Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 1990), p. 116. Ripley and Lindsay say that from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s, 
"the list of who mattered in the realm of foreign and defence policy stopped with the president and the 
national security bureaucracy". [Ripley and Lindsay, "Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress", p. 4.] 
Some scholars may point out that in certain years Congress played a rather active role. Rourke, for 
example, argues that "Congress played an important part in the formulation and conduct of American 
foreign policy from 1945 through 1948. Most importantly, it was a prime factor in establishing the 
general context of United States policy. See John Rourke, Congress and the Presidency in US. 
Foreign Policymaking: A Study of Interaction and Influence, 1945-1982 (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1983), p. 77 
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world, the national consensus on an increased Soviet threat, the perceived need for 
immediate and decisive action, as well as Congress' lack of information and inability 
to research complex issues thoroughly.53 The 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution is 
considered "the pinnacle" of Congressional support for the Executive in foreign 
policy.54 The Resolution, which passed the House with a unanimous vote and the 
Senate with all but two votes, gave President Lyndon B. Johnson "virtually a free 
hand" to conduct the war in Indochina.55 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, things started to change swiftly, 
and Congressional deference came to a "crashing halt".56 Surveys showed that 
Congressional members' attitudes towards Congress' role in foreign policy changed 
dramatically in the 1970s. In a 1976 survey, 191 of 228 members (84%) contended 
that Congress should assume a more active role in foreign policy than it had in the 
past.57 
The Vietnam War provoked the realisation that the "constitutional system 
itself must be insulated from the perils of an overweening Presidency".58 The Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution was repealed in 1971, and in 1973 Congress mandated American 
disengagement from Vietnam. In the same year, Congress defied the veto of President 
Nixon and enacted the historic War Powers Resolution. The Resolution requires the 
President to terminate any use of US armed forces 60 to 90 days after they are 
deployed, unless Congress has either declared war or specifically authorised the 
53 Abshire and Nurnberger, The Growing Power of Congress, p. 7. 
54 Ibid., p. 8. The Resolution approved the President's use of armed forces in responding to threats to 
US security interests in Vietnam. 
55 Ibid., p. 8. 
56 Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 24. 
57 Rourke, Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policymaking, p. 250. 
58 A. Frye, A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1975), p. 225. 
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continuing use of forces. 59 In 1974, Congress cut off military aid to Turkey, a 
decision which would have formerly been left to the Administration. In 1975-1976, it 
voted to prevent the United States from covertly aiding any faction in the Angolan 
civil war. In 1978, it cut off all US trade with the regime ofldi Amin in Uganda. 60 Put 
simply, the 1970s witnessed a newly "complex pattern of interaction" between the 
Legislature and the Executive.61 This pattern was certainly characterised by 
Congressional activism, demonstrated by the increase in size between 1964 to 1982 
of the congressional compilation of Legislation on Foreign Relations from one 659-
page volume to three volumes totalling in excess of 3,000 pages.62 
In the 1980s, Congress asserted its power by playing an active role on a series 
of issues, including development of the MX missile, a nuclear freeze, and aid to 
Nicaraguan rebels. 63 
Congress' role has varied according to the types of policy. Lindsay and 
Ripley have classified three types of policy: crisis, strategic, and structural policy. 
Crisis policy is "the least common type". It deals with an immediate threat and 
59 The War Powers Resolution states that before introducing US armed forces into hostilities or into 
dangerous situations, the President must consult Congress whenever possible. Within 48 hours after 
introducing these forces, the President, in the absence of a declaration of war, must report to both 
Houses the action he has taken. Unless there is a declaration of war or Congress has authorised an 
extension of the use of troops, the President must terminate US involvement within 60 days. This may 
be extended for 30 days to ensure the troops' safe removal. At any time, Congress may direct the 
President to withdraw the forces by adopting a concurrent resolution, which is not subject to 
Presidential veto. Abshire and Nurnberger, The Growing Power of Congress, p. 9. For a debate about 
the War Powers Resolution, see Albert A. Lakeland Jr., "The War Powers Resolution: Necessary and 
Legal Remedy to Prevent Future Vietnams" and Monroe Leigh, "The War Powers Resolution: 
Unconstitutional, Unnecessary, and Unwise" in Steven P. Soper (ed.), Congress, the President, and 
Foreign Policy (American Bar Association, 1984), pp.153-163, 164-174. 
60 Abshire and Nurnberger, The Growing Power of Congress, pp. 9-10. 
61 Steven J. Baker, "Evaluating Congress' Foreign Policy Performance" in Hoyt H. Purvis and Steven 
J. Baker (eds.), Legislating Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 1-24. See also Crabb 
and Holt, Invitation to Struggle; F. 0. Wilcox, "Cooperation versus Confrontation" in Louis W. 
Koenig, James C. Hsiung and King-Yuh Chang (eds.), Congress, the Presidency and the Taiwan 
Relations Act (New York: Praeger, 1985), pp. 37-62. 
62 Soper, Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy, p. v. 
63 Dumbrell, The Making of US Foreign Policy, p.116. 
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involves the use or potential use of force. Strategic policy includes specifying the 
goals and tactics of defence and foreign policy, such as recognition of a foreign 
government, entering treaties with foreign countries, trade policy and cutting nuclear 
weapons stockpiles. Structural policies relate to the use of resources, including 
foreign aid, immigration and money to international organisations.64 The degree of 
legislative influence tends to vary considerably across these types of foreign policy. 
In the case of "crisis policy", Presidential power is at a maximum. 65 Decisions are 
made by the small number of actors at the very top of the executive policy-making 
machine. 66 The President may make some "peremptory and belated consultation" 
with a few specially selected legislators. 67 
In the case of strategic policy, Congressional impact on the actual decision-
making process is greater although the President's power remains substantial. The 
President's strength lies in the fact that he makes initiatives. But Presidential power 
over strategic policy is checked by Congress as the President needs Congress' 
approval in some cases, such as treaties and trade policy. 
It is on structural policy that Congress can use its power of the purse to 
impose the greatest influence. There are two important reasons. The first is that 
in this sphere decisions are dominated by subgovernments composed of bureaus, 
Congressional committees, and other interested actors. 68 The second reason is 
64 James M. Lindsay and Randall B. Ripley, "How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy" 
in Ripley and Lindsay (eds.), Congress Resurgent, p. 19. Scholars may differ in naming these policies. 
For example, Spanier and Uslaner would call the above mentioned strategic and structural policies 
"program policy". See Spanier and Uslaner, How American Foreign Policy Is Made, p. 20. See also 
Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress, the Bureaucracy and Public Policy, 3rd ed., 
(Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1984), ch. 7; Dumbrell, The Making of US Foreign Policy, p. 116. 
65 Lindsay and Ripley, "How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy", p. 19. 
66 Spanier and Uslaner, How American Foreign Policy Is Made, p. 20. 
67 Dumbrell, The Making of US Foreign Policy, p. 116. 
68 Lindsay and Ripley, "How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy", p. 20. 
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that in this case inertia usually works to Congressional advantage because 
structural policy requires appropriations.69 
Congress and China Policy: Much Discussed, Little Investigated 
A review of the large literature on Congress' role in foreign policy in general 
reveals that a vast majority of the works are historical studies on issues like declaring 
war, ratifying treaties or recognising foreign governments. Not surprisingly, 
Congress' successful override of President Nixon's veto on the War Powers 
Resolution in 1973 was widely regarded as a milestone in the struggle for foreign 
policy power and has been a principal preoccupation of scholars working in this area. 
Less attention has been paid to other foreign policy issues, such as foreign economic 
and trade policy. Where trade policy is analysed, it is seen as an extension of the 
President's overall foreign policy goals and it is often concluded that US trade policy 
"begins and ends with the executive branch".7° Congress' role in US human rights 
policy also deserves more study. Although Congress elevated human rights policy to 
a prominent position in US foreign policy,71 human rights as an issue for 
Congressional intervention in foreign policy is seldom analysed in depth. 72 
69 Ibid. 
70 Sharyn O'Halloran, "Congress and Foreign Trade Policy" in Ripley and Lindsay (eds.), Congress 
Resurgent, p. 283. Major efforts in this area include Robert A. Pastor, Congress and the Politics of 
U.S. Foreign Economic Policy: 1929-1976 (Berkeley & London: University of California Press, 1980), 
I. M. Destler, American Trade Politics: System under Stress (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1986) and Sharyn O'Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy 
(Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993). 
7! Hebir noted that "In the 1970s human rights principles became the method by which a frustrated 
Congress, unable to restrain the executive in Vietnam and defied by Remy Kissinger's resort to 
realpolitik in Chile during the 1973 coup, struck back. Human rights were tied to the congressional 
power of the purse, the surest way for Congress to gain a point of leverage in the foreign policy 
process". J. Bryan Hebir, "The United States and Human Rights: Policy for the 1990s in Light of the 
Past" in Oye, Eagle in A New World, p. 237. 
72 Increasingly, there are more studies in this area although studies with more in-depth analysis are 
needed. A major effort is made by Forsythe. See David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign 
Policy: Congress Reconsidered (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1988). Efforts were also 
made in David Zweig, "Sino-American Relations and Human Rights: June 4 and the Changing Nature 
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Study of theoretical approaches to Congress' role is far from adequate. 
Dumbrell found a "virtual silence" in this field. 73 Lindsay made the following 
comment as late as 1994: "Relatively few studies of congressional decision making 
on foreign policy have been published, and the ones that do exist do not develop 
explicit theories of congressional behavior".74 
Despite the voluminous and diverse studies on US-China relations, Congress' 
role in China policy is seldom a focal point of study and Congressional behaviour in 
China policy is rarely investigated. The neglect may be rooted in traditional 
theoretical approaches to the study of foreign policy. Classical international relations 
theory emphasised the rational-actor model in which the state or government is 
regarded as a unitary decision maker. Domestic influences are generally neglected. 
At the domestic politics level, one important reason for this gap in the literature is that 
many scholars tend to speak of Congress as an institution vis-a-vis the Executive.75 
They argue Congress has an institutional interest in enhancing its image and status in 
making foreign policy and that to an extent unity can be achieved by the cue-taking 
members following their colleagues with recognised expertise on specific issues.76 
Congress Investigated 
This thesis attempts. to redress the lack of detailed investigation of the role of 
Congress in contemporary China policy. It examines the influence of domestic 
of a Bilateral Relationship" in William T. Tow (ed.), Building Sino-American Relations: An Analysis 
for the 1990s (New York: Parago House, 1991); Ross, "National Security, Human Rights, and 
Domestic Politics"; Hehir, "The United States and Human Rights"; Alan Romberg, "The Role of 
Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy and the Implications for Relations with China" in Lampton and 
Wilhelm, United States and China Relations at A Crossroads. 
73 Dumbrell, The Making of US Foreign Policy, p. 57. 
74 Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy, p. 35. 
75 Tan Qingshan, The Making of US. China Policy: From Normalization to the Post-Cold War Era 
(Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p.19. 
76 Ibid., p. 9. 
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politics in Congressional behaviour regarding China policy from 1989 to 1996. Not 
only does it try to demonstrate that influence, it also explains how domestic politics 
was involved the making of China policy during this period. The thesis believes 
that while it is important to assess the role that Congress is playing in foreign policy, 
it is even more important to understand how and why Congress is playing that role. 
Such studies will lead to a better understanding of not only the role Congress has 
played but also to a better capacity to anticipate or predict its role in future China 
policy and in US foreign policy in general. 
When we talk about domestic politics in China policy, a number of factors 
may come to our mind, including ideology, interest groups, partisanship, public 
opinion and mass media. These are major domestic factors which have been most 
cited by journalists and scholars although often without in-depth analysis. This 
thesis, however, intends to study the working of Congress at a more mechanical or 
structural level. It pays special attention to three areas of influence: partisanship, 
constituency and committee, which for ease of reference are called "structural 
factors". Factors such as interest groups, ideology, public opinion and mass media 
can be seen as non-structural factors, that is not relating to how Congress is 
assembled. 
To be sure, structural and non-structural factors are sometimes integrated. For 
instance, constituency itself can be regarded a kind of interest groups and partisanship 
often embodies ideology, but these influences are one-step removed from the inner 
mechanics of Congress. 
In focusing on the three structural factors, the thesis by no means implies the 
structural factors are the most important factors influencing members of Congress in 
China policy. It simply believes the structural factors relating to Congress are among 
18 
the many different factors - international, domestic personal - influence 
foreign policy making. 
The thesis believes that the "classical" or "traditional" rational-actor model, 
which treats a state as a unitary decision maker, is especially weak in explaining US 
foreign policy because it is the product of a policy-making environment characterised 
by "fragmentation".77 This was remarked by Sir Nicholas Henderson, former British 
Ambassador to Washington when asked about the US Administration view of the 
situation regarding the Falkland Islands. He responded: "When you say the U.S. 
Administration, I am sorry to be pedantic but there is the Pentagon view, the State 
Departmental view and the White House view".78 
This observation about the administration is even more relevant when one 
considers that the US system of government consists of three branches: the 
legislative, executive and judicial. Making foreign policy is a business in which the 
legislative branch does have some role and the judicial branch is sometimes involved. 
To make things even more complicated, there are many views within the legislative 
branch, the Congress, which consists of 535 members and a large number of 
committees and subcommittees. People may well argue that to speak of "the 
Congress" as a decision-making entity is to begin by assuming too much.79 
In addition, US government decision-making processes are subjected to the 
influence of various domestic factors, including public opinion, interest groups, 
constituency, media, political parties, think tanks, private and regional power and so 
on. It is estimated that fully 80 percent of US foreign policy derives from domestic 
77 Dumbrell, The Making of US Foreign Policy, p. 2. 
78 Ibid., p. 1. Henderson made his remarks in his testimony to a House of Commons Select Committee 
in April 1984. 
79 Pastor, Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Economic Policy, p. 41. 
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political considerations. And President Bush's secretary of state James Baker, 
the percentage rose to perhaps 90 percent. so As observed by Wiarda, "very often the 
domestic political considerations overwhelm the rational choice among policy 
alternatives considered on their own merits".81 He further pointed out that "now that 
the Cold War is over and there is no serious threat anymore to push these other 
factors aside, the domestic political pressures playing on US foreign policy are likely 
to be even stronger than before".82 
In the light of this fragmented environment and the focus of the thesis on 
mechanical or structural factors shaping Congressional behaviour, the primary 
analytical approach is the political process model. It assumes that foreign policy, like 
domestic policy, is shaped by a variety of forces, interests, and actors in the political 
system. To influence the outcome of a certain foreign policy, different groups either 
compete with each other or build coalitions. A more detailed account of theoretical 
approaches to the study of Congress from the perspective of the three nominated 
structural factors is undertaken in Chapter 1. The following discussion briefly 
previews these issues. 
The basic theme of constituency theory is members of Congress are single-
minded seekers of re-election. Their decision-making behaviour is therefore shaped 
by their constituencies. They are likely to be more active on issues in which the 
interests of their constituencies, mainly economic benefits, are involved. But 
sometimes constituents' support for moral issues or values may prevail over 
economic benefits. On these issues, members of Congress may reaffirm values and 
positions held by constituents, namely "position taking". They may also show their 
80 Wiarda, American Foreign Policy, p. xiv. 
81 Ibid. Italics original. 
82 Ibid. 
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interest foreign policy grandstanding; is, to attract media coverage of their 
public statements and behaviour. 
Partisanship as a theory predicts that members of Congress will follow a 
policy or position once it is firmly agreed by the Party leadership. 
The committee theory asserts that committees are central to Congressional 
policy making because they handle the details of legislation. Indeed, committees 
have the virtual power of life and death over bills introduced to them. Committees 
are important also because committee members normally serve as cue-givers to their 
colleagues. 83 
The analysis in the thesis accepts that the relationship between these factors in 
shaping Congressional intervention in foreign policy has not been static. In the 
1970s, Congress underwent significant reforms and adopted a series of dramatic 
changes. The relationship has been evolving even in the 1990s and have resulted in 
further division of labour and specialisation; in greater opportunity for a larger 
number of legislators to secure leadership positions and to exercise power and 
influence; more specific targets for interest groups; and further decentralisation of 
Congressional policy making and influence. 
83 The "cue-taking" and "cue-giving" suggest that the legislators' voting decisions are best explained 
by an analysis of the cues-e.g. colleagues, outside groups, Committee Reports-which guide him. 
Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, pp. 39-40. James M. Lindsay and 
Randall B. Ripley, "Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress: A Research Agenda for the 1990s'', 
Legislative Studies Quarterly (vol. 17, no. 3, February 1992), pp. 432-433. See also Lewis Dexter, 
"Congressmen and the Making of Military Policy" in Raymond Wolfinger (ed.), Readings on 
Congress (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 371-387. Richard Fermo, "The Internal 
Distribution of Influence: The House" in David B. Treman (ed.), The Congress and America's Future, 
2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 63-90; John Kingdon, Congressmen's 
Voting Decisions (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); David C. Kozak, "Decision-Making on Roll 
Call Votes in the House of Representatives", Congress and the Presidency (vol. 9, 1982), pp. 51-78. 
David C. Kozak, "Decision Settings in Congress" in David C. Kozak and John D. McCartney (eds.), 
Congress and Public Policy, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1987); Donald R. Matthews and James 
A. Stimson, Yeas and Nays: Normal Decisionmaking in the US. House of Representatives (New York: 
Wiley, 1975). 
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The thesis relationship the three factors, and 
proceeds from a preliminary hypothesis that Among the 
constituency, committee - the most 
important role except on issues in which interests of constituency are heavily 
involved. Committee actions are largely determined by partisanship and 
constituency''. 
The reasoning here is that most foreign policy issues do not have a direct 
impact on constituencies in a sufficiently variegated way for this to be a dominating 
influence. It is also important for members to be loyal to their parties in order to win 
support within the party. To vote along party lines may also win members of 
Congress support from voters who are firm party identifiers although very often 
members try to win support from both sides. But when a specific constituency 
interest does arise, the support of constituency has the strongest influence on 
decision-making behaviour of members of Congress because the "supportive 
constituents" are "lifeblood" of members of Congress. 84 Whatever a Congressional 
member wants to achieve, he/she must be re-elected first. Therefore, on issues 
which interests of constituency are heavily involved, the influence of constituency 
will prevail over party loyalty. As for committees, since they are formed principally 
according to party "membership" and constituency interests, committee actions may 
even be seen as secondary influences after partisanship and constituency. 
This study focuses on a crucial period in the history of US-China relations, the 
period from 1989 to 1996. This period covers two Presidential administrations, that 
of George Bush and the first term of Bill Clinton. During this period, Congress was 
84 Eileen Burgin, "The Influence of Constituents: Congressional Decision Making on Issues of Foreign 
and Defense Policy" in Ripley and Lindsay, Congress Resurgent, 69. 
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highly active evidenced its role in Taiwan President Lee Teng-
hui's landmark "private" visit to the United States 1995. After Lee's visit, 
China's President Jiang Zemin condemned US permitting Lee to visit United 
States as "a hegemonious act". Responding to Jiang's remarks, US Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher said "if there was a misunderstanding, it was China's lack of 
understanding of the role Congress plays".85 
China, for its part, has come to know the importance of Congress. In fact, one 
year before Lee's visit, China decided to upgrade its lobbying efforts to counter the 
"Taiwan lobby" in US politics, particularly in Congress. 86 Yet, as acknowledged by 
Jiang, the efforts were inadequate. 87 It was reported that after Lee's visit, the 
Chinese Embassy in Washington increased its number of parliamentary liaison 
officials from two to five. 88 More importantly, according to another report, a special 
standing committee of the Chinese leadership, called the Central Leading Working 
Group on the US Congress was formed late 1995, with Jiang as its head. The 
group would answer directly to the Communist Party's Politburo Standing 
Committee. 89 
This thesis offers case studies on two central issues of US China policy where 
Congress was directly interventionist: China's most-favoured-nation (MFN) trade 
status, which was renamed normal-trade-relations (NTR) in 1998, and Taiwan policy. 
China's MFN status was the central issue in US-China relations during most of the 
85 Reuter News Service "USA: China Accuses US of Double-Cross - Report", Reuter Business 
Briefing, 15 October 1995. 
86 South China Morning Post, "China: Official Outlines Opposition to Murkowski Amendment", 
Reuter Business Briefing, 2 May 1994. 
87 Theresa Tan, "USA: China Beefs up Its Lobby Group in US", Straits Times, Reuter Business 
Briefing, 7 November 1995. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Benjamin Kang Lim, "China: China Forms High-Level Group Eyeing US Congress", Reuter News 
Service, Reuter Business Briefing, 18 January 1996. If the Group does exist, it is likely to play a 
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two administrations. The Taiwan issue came to a prominent position in US-China 
relations in May 1995, when the Clinton Administration decided to grant Lee Teng-
hui a visa to visit the United States. 
MFN status basically refers to "beneficial" low tariffs on imports from a 
certain country or region by the United States. This "beneficial" treatment is actually 
"nondiscrimitory" treatment since, as of April 1994, only eight countries did not have 
MFN status. Even Iraq and Libya have MFN status. Many developing countries 
qualify for even lower tariffs under a program to give them preferential access to the 
US market. 90 
According to Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, the so-called Jackson-Yanik 
amendment, the US President has the authority to decide each year whether to renew 
MFN status granted to nonmarket economies, such as China. The amendment was 
devised to pressure the Soviet Union to allow Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel. 
Unless renewed, the President's waiver authority expires on 3 July each year. The 
renewal procedure requires the President, if he determines that waiver-authority 
extension will substantially promote freedom-of-emigration objectives, to submit to 
Congress no later than 3 June a recommendation for a 12-month extension, together 
with his reasons for the recommendation. The President may, at any time, terminate a 
waiver by Executive order. The extension of the waiver authority for an additional 12 
months is automatic unless a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted into law by 3 
crucial role in making policies towards the United States. But the report has not been confirmed by 
other sources. 
90 See David S. Cloud, "As China Deadline Approaches, Many See No Win on MFN", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (52:17, 30 April 1994), p.1055. 
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September. To be enacted into resolution must able to sustain a 
Presidential veto. 91 
MFN status was first granted to China on l February 1980. Until 1989, 
Presidents Reagan and Bush met no serious challenge from Congress when they 
waived the freedom-of-emigration requirements in extending China's beneficial trade 
treatment annually. 
Withdrawal of MFN status would be a severe blow to Chinese trade. It would 
raise US tariffs on Chinese products from an average of 3.5 percent to an average of 
nearly 40 percent, pricing some goods out of the market. Without MFN, the 6 percent 
tariff rate on sweaters, shirts and other apparel would rise to 60 percent. Tariffs on 
footwear, a major US import from China, would increase from 6 percent to 35 
percent Tariffs on toys would go from 6.8 percent to 70 percent, and those on 
cordless telephones would increase from 6 percent to 35 percent.92 
As for Taiwan policy, it has been one of the most sensitive issues in US-China 
relations. Basically, there are four principal documents which are supposed to serve 
as a guide for US-China relations, namely the "three communiques" and the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA). 93 The three communiques are the Shanghai communique of 27 
February 1972, the normalisation communique of15December1978, and the joint 
9l See US Congress, United States-China Trade Relations, Hearing, before the Subcommittee on 
Trade of Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, (1st Sess. 103rd Congress, 8 June 
1993), p. 2. See also, John R. Cranford, "MFN: Not Just for Favorite Nations", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (48:23, 9 June 1990), p. 1774. Extension ofMFN status has been used since 
to buttress America's defence of human rights around the world. In 1982, the President suspended 
Poland's MFN status after its government outlawed Solidarity. In 1987, Poland's MFN status was 
restored in recognition of positive political changes. Similarly, in 1986 the President revoked 
Afghanistan's MFN status. See Congressional Record, 14 January 1991, p. S673. 
92 US Congress, United States-China Trade Relations, Hearing, before the Subcommittee on Trade of 
Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, p. 4. 
93 All citations of official documents regarding US-PRC relations are from Yufan Hao, Dilemma and 
Decision: An Organizational Perspective on American China Policy Making (Berkeley, CA: Institute 
of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1997), pp. 301-319. 
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of 17 August 1982. was signed 
President Richard Nixon's trip to China, the United States "acknowledges" and "does 
not challenge" the position maintained "all Chinese on side of Taiwan 
Strait" that "there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China". The 1978 
communique not only reaffirmed the principle but also stated that the United States 
"recognizes" the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) "as the sole 
legal Government of China". In the third communique, signed by the Reagan 
Administration, the United States promised to phase out arms sales to Taiwan by 
some unspecified future date. The United States stated in the communique: 
it [the US government] does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of 
arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either 
in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent 
years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United 
States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to 
Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution. 
As it turned out, the explanations for the communiques made by Washington 
and Beijing have not been always the same. In fact, on the same day the 
nonnalisation communique was signed, Washington and Beijing each issued a 
unilateral statement. While the Chinese statement clearly stated that "As for the way 
of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and reunifying the country, 
it is entirely China's internal affairs", the US statement stated that "The United States 
continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and 
expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves". 
The US government indicated that it would continue sales of defensive anns to 
Taiwan despite the objection of the Chinese government. 
The US statement also explicitly stated that in the future peoples in the United 
States and Taiwan "will maintain commercial, cultural and other relations" but 
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"without official government representation and without diplomatic relations". It is 
understood that China does not object to the commercial and cultural contacts of 
"unofficial" nature. But different explanations of official or unofficial nature often 
lead to conflicts. 
Complicating US-China relations is the TRA, passed by Congress only a few 
months after normalisation with China.94 The Act, which has since been denounced 
by the Chinese government, includes the following provisions: 
It is the policy of the United States ... to provide Taiwan with arms of a 
defensive character; and ... to maintain the capacity of the United States 
to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would 
jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people 
on Taiwan. 
Scholars do not necessarily regard the TRA highly for its merits and power.95 
However, the significance of the TRA to US-China relations should not be 
underestimated. "The act virtually assured the Nationalists in Taiwan of U.S. 
protection for the island and promised continued arms sales to Taiwan indefinitely", 
an analyst noted. "It was a clear signal to Beijing and to the world that the United 
States hoped that the PRC would leave Taiwan alone".96 
94 For an analysis about the TRA and US China policy, see John F. Copper, China Diplomacy: The 
Washington-Taipei-Beijing Triangle (Boulder et al.: Westview Press, 1992). See also, Ramon H. 
Myers (ed.), A Unique Relationship: The United States and the Republic of China Under the Taiwan 
Relations Act (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989). 
95 Jones, for example, points out that "As an attempt to establish some sort of legal guarantee of 
Taiwan's security, ... the TRA would seem to be something of an embarrassment. ... The mandate 
contained in the TRA that directs the President to follow a certain policy towards Taiwan, and thus the 
PRC, may constitute an unconstitutional congressional infringement upon the foreign policy powers of 
the executive branch. Although codified in law, the TRA addresses political issues, the nature of 
which seem to preclude a court from ever reaching the merits of this separation of powers question. 
Given the constitutional support for the executive branch, therefore, it would seem that the President 
can use his own judgment with respect to Taiwan". [Colin P. Jones, "United States Arms Exports to 
Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act: The Failed Role of Law in United States Foreign Relations" 
in Connecticut Journal of International Law (9:51, 1993), p.66.] Richard Bush believes that "It is easy 
to exaggerate the arms sale provision of the TRA as law". He argues that the provision is "less 
important as law than as an expression of a fundamental political commitment". See Richard Bush, 
"Helping the ROC to Defend Itself' in Myers, A Unique Relationship, pp. 106-07. 
96 Hao, Dilemma and Decision, p. 2. 
have asserted of 
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the 
communiques and the TRA, thus causing a series of conflicts its dealings 
Beijing and The conflict reached a crisis point the early 1980s when 
President Ronald Reagan expressed his willingness to "faithfully observe" the TRA 
by selling advanced weapons to Taipei.97 The crisis was resolved and an 
understanding reached after a year of negotiation, resulting in the third communique 
of 17 August 1982. 
As will be reviewed in Chapter 2, the TRA was largely shaped by Congress. 
The same chapter also shows that Congressional support for Kuomintang (KMT) or 
the Nationalist Party can be traced back to World War II when the KMT government 
ruled the whole of China as Republic of China (ROC) and was an ally of the United 
States. In 1949, the KMT was routed in China's civil war by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) and the ROC government fled to Taiwan. The US government, partly 
under pressure from anti-China forces Congress, chose not to recognise the PRC, 
established by the CCP in October 1949, instead siding with the anti-Communist 
ROC on Taiwan in the following years. 
Congressional support for the ROC on Taiwan contributed to prolonging the 
process of normalising US-China relations. In the early 1970s, most members of 
Congress were convinced that to improve US relations with China was in the interest 
of the United States and therefore supported President Nixons' China trip and the 
Administration's China policy. But at the same time, they opposed a break in official 
ties with Taipei, demanded by Beijing. 
That the Carter Administration, without openly and widely consulting with 
Congress, basically accepted Beijing's demands and normalised US-China relations 
97 Ibid. 
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enraged members of Congress.98 Congress soon passed TRA to express its 
displeasure and to reassure Taiwan. Ever since, Taiwan remained a central issue 
in US-China relations. But after joint communique of 1982, the US-China 
relationship experienced a period of steady progress. Sutter noted that from 1983 or 
1984 to mid-1989 there was a "general consensus over United States policy towards 
China" which "prevailed in Congress, and between Congress and the executive 
branch". 99 
This period of relatively smooth development in US-China relations was 
partly because no really testy issues arose and because China's economic reform and 
political liberalisation were at a high point. 
Things started to change in the late 1980s as a result of changes on both sides 
of the Taiwan Strait in both economic and political domains. 100 US-Taiwan trade 
more than tripled over the eight years after the TRA, with the US share of Taiwan's 
foreign trade increasing from 29 percent to 35 percent. 101 Under US pressure, Taiwan 
sharply lowered tariffs and made heavy purchases of foreign goods, with imports 
jumping to $49.6 billion in 1988, a 42% increase from 1987.102 Special efforts were 
made to narrow Taiwan's trade surplus with the United States which peaked at 
98 Beijing imposed three conditions for normalisation, namely withdrawal of US recognition from the 
ROC on Taiwan, withdrawal of US military personnel and installation from Taiwan, and termination 
of the mutual defence treaty with Taiwan. Ibid., p. 1. 
99 Robert Sutter, "China and the U.S. Congress: Policy Determinants and Constraints" in Tow, 
Building Sino-American Relations, p.37. 
100 For an analysis of the changes and their consequences in US-Taiwan relations, see Gary 
Klintworth, New Taiwan, New China: Taiwan's Changing Role in the Asia-Pacific Region (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1995); Martin L. Lasater, "U.S. Interests in the New Taiwan", Obis (Spring 1993, 
37:2), pp. 239-57; and Copper, China Diplomacy. 
101 Copper, China Diplomacy, p. 106. 
102 Doris Jones Yang and Dirk Bennett, "The Other China Takes Wing", Business Week, 6 November 
1989, p.19. Taiwan cut tariffs on 3,803 items of imports in 1988, and had stated its determination to 
shrink by 1992 its average nominal import tariff rate to 7% and its average effective import tariff rate 
to 3.5%. Congressional Record, 31January1989, p.1214. 
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$16.037 billion in 1987. As a result, the surplus was sharply reduced to $10.460 
billion in 1988.103 By 1988, Taiwan had become the fifth largest US trading partner. 
As a result of its "economic miracle", Taiwan became a much sought after 
global investor, including in the United States. Its foreign exchange reserves 
amounted to $74 billion at the end of 1988, the world's second-highest after Japan. It 
was also noted that Taiwan was likely to become a prominent investor in the United 
States. A report commissioned by the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the US 
office in Taipei, estimated that investment flowing to the United States would 
increase steadily, reaching $1.25 billion a year by 1991.104 
Many members of Congress have been highly impressed by Taiwan's political 
liberalisation, which began in the 1980s. On 6 December 1986, 12 million voting-age 
citizens in Taiwan were allowed to cast ballots for an organised political opposition, 
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). On 15 July 1987, martial law, imposed in 
1949, was lifted. 
Tucker observed that members of Congress "were particularly prone to 
becoming involved in efforts to shape the development of political and economic 
affairs in Taiwan".105 In late 1987, Congress voted an amendment to the State 
Department Authorisation Bill to "encourage" movement towards democracy in 
Taiwan. Senators Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, and Edward M. Kennedy joined with Representative Stephen J. Solarz, 
Chairman of the East Asian Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
103 In 1988, Taiwan imported from the US a total of $13.007 billion, or an increase of 70% over the 
1987 figure of $7.648 billion; exports to the United States amounted to $23.467 billion, or about one 
percent decrease compared with the 1987 figure of $23.685 billion. Council for Economic Planning 
and Development, Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1996 (Taipei, June 1996), p. 194. 
104 Evelyn Richards, "Taiwan's Latest Export: Money", Washington Post, 9 April 1989, p. H9. 
105 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992 (New York: 
Twayne Publishers, 1994), p. 182. 
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and his ranking Republican counterpart, Representative James A. Leach, to form a 
Committee for Democracy on Taiwan.106 The four congressmen had long been active 
supporters ofTaiwan.101 
Against the background of Taiwan's economic reform and political 
liberalisation, the bloody June 1989 crackdown on student-led protests in Tiananmen 
Square showed Beijing in a very poor light.108 
Dramatic changes on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, along with changes in 
world politics, overshadowed US-China relations during the period 1989 to 1996. In 
the years after June 1989, Congress used renewal of China's MFN trade status as a 
major vehicle to express its disagreement with the White House's policy towards 
China. It tried repeatedly to revoke or attach conditions to renewal. Congress' 
challenges to Taiwan policy during this period resulted in the biggest crisis in US-
China relations since the two countries normalised relations in January 1979. 
Methodology and Sources 
It has been widely acknowledged that "case studies can play an invaluable 
role in theory construction"l09 as the method "encompasses an in-depth chronological 
106 Ibid. 
107 Xinhua quotes Zhongguo Shibao (Taipei) in Xinhua, "U.S. Shows Interest in Taiwan Elections'', 
FBIS Daily Report, China, 1December1989, p. 50. 
l08 In 1978 China started its economic reform which resulted in a very high economic growth rate, first 
in agriculture and then in industry. At the same time, however, new problems emerged, including 
growing corruption, widening inequalities and surging inflation. Towards the end the 1980s, these 
problems became more apparent. On 15 April, 1989, former General Secretary of the Chinese 
Collllllunist Party Hu Yaobang died in Beijing. In the eyes of many Chinese students, Hu was a 
defender of political and economic liberalisation and a victim of conservative forces. Subsequently 
after Ru's death, student protesters began daily demonstrations in Beijing. On 13 May, some students 
launched a hunger strike at the heart of Beijing - the Tiananmen Square. The students then gained a 
widespread support throughout the country. On the night of 3-4 June, soldiers equipped with tanks and 
automatic weapons forcefully suppressed the demonstrations and retook Tiananmen Square. An 
unknown number of people were killed or injured. Harding, A Fragile Relationship, pp. 216-224. 
l09 Leonard A. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China Policy, 1949-1979 
(Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1984 ), p. 17. 
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narration and analysis of those events, options and actions which impact upon policy-
makers decisions". 110 In conducting case studies, this thesis uses two strategies. One 
is the "process-tracing" strategy which "seeks to examine and explain the 
decisionmaking process by which various initial conditions are translated into 
outcomes". m The initial conditions are the stimuli to which decision makers 
respond, including the effect of institutional factors on actors, processes, and 
outcomes; and the influence of other variables of interest on actors and outcomes. 112 
The other strategy is the "focused comparison" strategy. 113 The intention is, based on 
the focused comparison analysis of the four cases, to find their similarities and 
dissimilarities. By doing so, this dissertation will be able to put forward some notions 
about Congress' role in China policy making. 
This thesis takes the Congressional Record as an important source of evidence 
for its investigation in motivations of Congressional members' decisions and actions. 
While the statements in the Record should be treated with caution, they are 
nonetheless useful in helping understand the voting behaviour of members of 
Congress. As Burgin noted, "While not a scientifically valid measure of the impact 
of various influences, floor statements are at least somewhat reflective of a member's 
thinking" .1 14 Other sources of evidence include analyses of Congressional actions in 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report and major newspapers. 
I IO Philip J. Briggs, Making American Foreign Policy: President-Congress Relations from the Second 
World War to Vietnam (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1991), p. 1. 
I I I Tan, The Making of U.S. China Policy, p. 11. See also Alexamder L. George and Timothy J. 
McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organisational Decision-Making", Advances in Information 
Processing in Organisations, 2 (1985), pp. 34-41. 
112 Tan, TheMakingofU.S. China Policy, pp. 11-12. 
113 Ibid., p.11. See also George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, 
Focused Comparison", in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, 
and Policy (New York: The Free Pressm 1979), pp. 61-62. 
114 Burgin, "The Influence of Constituents", p. 82. 
Efforts were originally made to get evidences 
But it is difficult to obtain convincing evidences 
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campaign contributions. 
reports of contributions 
because contributions are made by individuals whose interests are to 
identified. 
PART I 
1 
A Framework 
study of foreign policy was once dominated by a "traditional" or 
"classical" approach, namely the rational-actor model. 1 Under this model, the US 
government, which consists of three branches and many departments, is regarded as a 
unitary decision maker. Domestic influences, including the influence of Congress, 
are generally neglected. 
Since the mid-1950s, out of the growing disaffection with the rational-actor 
model, a number of new approaches have arisen. It might be inaccurate to assert that 
the rational-actor model is "not favoured by modem students of foreign policy".2 
Most would agree, however, the model has limitations and other approaches have 
provided valuable insights and opened new avenues. 
Broadly speaking, the overall environment in which decision-makers operate 
is divided into the "external" (or "international"), the "internal" (or "domestic"), and 
the "psychological" environrnents.3 This thesis examines domestic factors and 
1 Dumbrell lists three reasons, namely "a resolute determination to eschew the normative dimension of 
explanation; an implicit embrace of elite-based, secretive decision-making" and "a metaphysical 
despair about prospects for improvement". See John Dumbrell, The Making of US Foreign Policy 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1990), p. 57. 
2 Christopher Hill and Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Analysis" in Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom 
(eds.), International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory (London: Pinter Publishers, 1985), p. 
157. 
Hill and Light, "Foreign Policy Analysis", p. 156. The "external/international" and the 
"internal/domestic" approaches will be introduced in the following sections. For "psychological" 
approach, see J. de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles 
E. Merrill, 1968); R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J. 
and Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1976); I. L. Janis, Victims of Groupthinking (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1982); I. L. Janis and L. Mann, Decision-Making: A Psychological Analysis of 
Conflict, Choice and Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1977); N. F. Dixon, On the Psychology of 
Military Incompetence (London: Johathan Cape, 1976, Salem, N. H.: Merrimack, 1984); R. W. Cohen, 
Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case-Study (London: Feffer & Simons and 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); Donald R. Kinder and Janet A. Weiss, "In Lieu of 
Rationality: Psychological Perspectives on Foreign-Policy Decision Making'', Journal of Conflict 
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calculations us making, focusing on the US Congress' role m 
formulating policy towards China. 
This chapter provides the theoretical framework for the thesis. The 
section discusses the rational-actor model, the interbranch politics model and other 
models. The discussion aims to provide a better background for understanding the 
approaches this thesis will take. The second section introduces the theoretical 
framework of this thesis. 
The Rational-Actor Model and Beyond 
Up to the 1970s, the rational-actor model was believed the model most 
frequently used by analysts to explain foreign policy.4 The model is based on two 
related assumptions. Firstly, states can be regarded as the most important actors in 
international politics and, therefore, relations between states constitute the prime 
object of study. Secondly, governments, which operate on behalf of states in the 
international arena, can be analysed as if they were unitary, monolithic actors. 5 
Analysts can view the state as assessing and responding to external events as if it 
Resolution, (Vol. XXII, No. 4, December 1978), pp. 707-35; M. G. Hennann, "Explaining Foreign 
Policy Behaviour Using The Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders", International Studies 
Quarterly (Vol: 24, 1980); M. G. Hermann (ed.), Political Psychology (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 
1986); E. Singer and V. M. Hudson (eds.), Political Psychology and Foreign Policy (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1992); N.J. Dressel (ed.), Political Psychology: Classic and Contemporary Readings 
(New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1993); M. G. Hermann and T. W. Milburn (eds.), A 
Psychological Examination of Political Leaders (New Yark: Free Press, 1997). 
4 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 10-13. See 
also Joseph S. Nye, "Transnational and Transgovernmental Relations" in Geoffrey L. Goodwin and 
Andrew Linklater (eds.), New Dimensions of World Politics (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 36. 
Classic works of this model include Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (N. Y.: Alfred A. 
Knoft, 1950); Norman Palmer (ed.), The National Interest -- Alone or With Others? (Philadelphia: 
American Academy of Politics and Social Science, 1952); Robert Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in 
America's Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); Harold Lasswell, World 
Politics and Personal Insecurity (New York: Free Press, 1965). 
5 Joseph S. Nye has summarised these assumptions more formally under the label of "state-centric 
realism". See Joseph S. Nye, "Transnational and Transgovernmental Relations", p. 36. Some writers 
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were a single no to delve 
organisation, domestic politics, or personalities in trying to why a policy 
was selected. The state can be treated as a "black , responding with one voice to 
the challenges and opportunities confronting 
The influence of this traditional state-centred method of analysis has been 
strengthened by the realist conception of international relations. In the view of 
realists, as summarised by White, "international relations, because of mutual 
insecurity and the absence of a superior political authority, is characterised by anarchy 
and, therefore, the ever constant danger of war between states".6 Consequently, "the 
first and most difficult task of government is to ensure the survival of the state in a 
hostile, violent, Hobbesian environment".7 Therefore, the rational-actor model takes 
"external" rather than "internal" factors as the important determinants of state 
behaviour. The model suggests statesmen have little choice but to respond to 
international events. 
According to Allison, rationality refers to "consistent, value-maximising 
choice within specified constraints". 8 The components of the rational-actor model 
include goals and objectives, options, consequences, and choice. In a rational 
decision process, (1) goals are clearly stated and ranked in order of preference, (2) all 
options are considered, (3) the consequences of each option are assessed, and (4) a 
value-maximising choice is made.9 
encompass both these assumptions by employing a "state-as-billiard-ball" analogy. See, for example, 
A. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 4ff. 
6 Brian P. White, "Decision-Making Analysis" in Trevor Taylor (ed.), Approaches and Theory in 
International Relations (London and New York: Longman, 1978), p. 142. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 30. 
9 Glenn P. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall, 1991), p. 164. See also Allison, Essence ofDecision, p. 33. G. Smith and D. May, "The 
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Although the model has its virtues, it has been widely 
criticised. 10 It is attacked primarily for being too narrow simplistic. Michael 
Clarke points out that: 
any study of a state's foreign policy over a given period quickly 
reveals that rather a series of clear decisions, there is a continuing 
and confusing "flow of actions'', made up of a mixture of political 
decisions, non-political decisions, bureaucratic procedures, 
continuations of previous policy, and sheer accident. 11 
The model is criticised for neglecting the range of political variables which limits the 
extent of choices available. Given the interdependent characteristics of the present 
world, governments are not unitary actors. 12 
There is also the problem of drawing sharp distinctions between ends and 
means, values and decisions, and facts and values. Critics point out that in actual 
policy decisions, "means and ends are not isolated from each other and handled 
independently. A policy choice is usually a choice of a set of means as well as a set 
of ends" .13 Furthermore, foreign policy decisions represent collective decisions. This 
Artificial Debate Between Rationalist and Incrementalist Models of Decision Making" in Anthony G. 
McGrew and Michael John Wilson (eds.), Decision Making: Approaches and Analysis (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1982), p.112. John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, How American Foreign 
Policy Is Made (New York and Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 103-105. 
10 See, Smith and May, "The Artificial Debate Between Rationalist and Incrementalist Models of 
Decision Making", pp. 117-118; See also Tan Qingshan, The Making of US. China Policy: From 
Normalisation to the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 
13; Dumbrell, The Making of US Foreign Policy, p. 38. 
11 Michael Clarke, "The Foreign Policy System: A Framework for Analysis" in Michael Clarke and 
Brian White (eds.), Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach (Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, 1989), pp. 27-59. 
12 Smith and May, "The Artificial Debate Between Rationalist and Incrementalist Models of Decision 
Making", p. 117. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), Chapter 1. 
13 Sidney Verba quotes Charles E. Lindblom. See Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and 
Non-Rationality in Models of the International System" in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International 
Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 227. 
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fact makes means-ends calculations even more as decision-makers do not 
always define and share foreign policy goals. 14 
The model is also believed impractical. It is difficult to assess consequence 
of each option and choose the most effective. 15 In fact, "individuals do not consider 
all possible alternatives and, what is more important, make no attempt to do so". 16 
Smith and May note that "even with the aid of computer technology a review and 
evaluation of all possible answers to a problem in order to select the optimal solution 
is seldom plausible". 17 Finally, each decision can not be a separate entity, but an 
"incremental" policy. A decision-maker "operates within a structure in which there 
has been previous commitment to policy and organisational vested interests in 
policy". Therefore, the criterion of choosing a policy will not be "Is it the best 
possible action?" but "Is it better or, at least, no worse than the present policy?"18 
According to White, the most 
"has come from the application of a decision-making approach to the study of foreign 
policy". 19 White noted the approach was initially applied to foreign policy analysis 
by Snyder and his associates, who wrote a seminal article 1954.20 As pointed out 
by Rosenau, the Snyder scheme "served to crystallize the ferment and to provide 
14 Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System", 
p. 227. 
15 Tan, The Making of U.S. China Policy, p. 13. 
16 Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System", 
p. 228. 
17 Smith and May, "The Artificial Debate Between Rationalist and Incrementalist Models of Decision 
Making",p.118. 
18 Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System", 
pp. 228-229. 
19 Brian White, "Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches" in Michael Clarke and Brian 
White (eds.), Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach (Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, 1989), p. 11. 
20 Ibid. Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and B. Sapin, "Decision-making as an Approach to the Study 
of International Politics" in Foreign Policy Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Series No. 
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guidance-or at least legitimacy-for those become disenchanted a 
world composed of abstract states and with a mystical quest for single-cause 
explanations of objective reality". 21 
The essence of the Snyder scheme is that "State X as actor is translated into its 
decision-makers as actors". 22 Unlike abstract states, human beings can be observed. It 
is therefore possible that "the relevant political behaviour can be accurately observed 
and rendered amenable to scientific analysis".23 
As summarised by White, the significant "elements' of the Snyder scheme 
include: (a) since foreign policy consists of "decisions", made by identifiable 
"decision-makers'', the making of the decisions is the behavioural activity which 
requires explanation; (b) the decision-maker's "definition of the situation" is central; 
( c) the domestic or societal sources of foreign policy decision should be considered; 
and (d) decision-making process itself may be an important, independent source 
of influence on decisions. 24 
Element (a) represents a very different approach to the study of foreign policy 
in that it tries to avoid a "basic analytical quandary" - explaining the external 
behaviour of the state in terms of a supposedly objective, environmental situation 
which could only be assessed by analysts in subjective terms. 25 Snyder and his 
colleagues avoid the "quandary" with element (b ). They assert that "the key to the 
3, 1954). Reprinted in Snyder et al. (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the 
Study of International Politics (New York: Free Press, 1962). 
21 James N. Rosenau, "The Premises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis" in James Clyde 
Charlesworth (ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 202. 
22 Snyder et aL, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, p. 65. 
23 White, "Decision-Making Analysis", p. 144. 
24 Ibid., p. 145. 
25 Ibid. 
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of why state behaves way it decision-
makers define their situation".26 
The notion of the decision-maker's "definition of the situation" has stimulated 
a considerable amount of research. As observed by White, 
The attempt to reconstruct the subjective "world" of decision-makers 
has produced research from a foreign policy perspective into a range of 
psychological and sociological variables that condition and motivate 
individual and group behaviour. As a result, a number of concepts, 
research techniques and insights borrowed from Psychology and 
Sociology have enriched foreign policy analysis. 27 
Element ( c ), namely the consideration of domestic or societal sources of 
foreign policy decision, also represents a "significant departure" from traditional 
foreign policy analysis which has long discouraged the penetration of the "hard shell" 
of the state.28 Traditional analysts believe that in an international environment 
perceived to be anarchic, individual interests and opinions have to be subordinated to 
the state's survival. As noted by Kissinger, the traditional conception, ... the 
domestic structure is taken as given; foreign policy begins where domestic policy 
ends".29 The emphasis on domestic sources of foreign policy has brought about a 
26 Snyder et al., Foreign Policy Decision-Making, p. 65. 
27 White, "Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches", pp. 14-15. For more information, see 
note 6. See also James N. Rosenau (ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press; 
London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1967), which includes Herbert McClosky, "Personality and 
Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation"; Milton J. Rosenberg, "Attitude Change and 
Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era"; Johan Galtung, "Social Position, Party Identification and Foreign 
Policy Orientation: A Norwegian Case Study"; and Scott Greer, "Urbanisation, Parochialism, and 
Foreign Policy". 
28 White, "Decision-Making Analysis", p. 145; White, "Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and 
Approaches", p. 14. 
29 Kissinger argues that "this approach is appropriate only to stable periods because then the various 
components of the international system generally have similar conceptions of the 'rules of the game."' 
See Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy" in Rosenau, international Politics 
and Foreign Policy, pp. 261-275. 
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to 
factors and foreign policy behaviour.30 
The most "subversive" aspect of decision-making approach as applied to 
the study of foreign policy has undoubtedly been element ( d), the focus on the 
decision-making process. It is argued that "the most important contribution of the 
approach has been to instil a general awareness that foreign policy is, to a greater or 
lesser extent, a product of the way it is made".31 
As correctly pointed out by White, it is problematic to assume all foreign 
policy behaviour is a product of specific identifiable decisions. But White also noted, 
"the clear implication is that anyone who wants to understand foreign policy must be 
as concerned with the making of policy (the decision or policy process) as they are 
with the substance of that policy".32 
In the two decades after the publication the Snyder scheme, a large body of 
literature analysed foreign policy in various approaches different from the rational-
actor model. Kinder and Weiss declared 1978 that for a generation social science 
30 See for example, James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: An Operational 
Formulation (New York: Random House, 1961); Rosenau, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy; 
Leonard A. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China Policy, 1949-1979 
(Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1984); Eugene R. Wittkopf, Faces of 
Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1990); David A. Deese, The New Politics of American Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1994); Ole R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1996); Simon Serfaty (ed.), The Media and Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Macmillan 
in association with Foreign Policy Institute, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International 
Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, 1990); Patrick O'Heffeman, Mass Media and American 
Foreign Policy: Insider Perspectives on Global Journalism and the Foreign Policy Process (Norwood, 
N.J.: Ablex Publishing, 1991); Tsan-Kuo Chang, The Press and China Policy: The Illusion of Sino-
American Relations, 1950-1984 (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1993); Richard B. 
Craig, The Bracero Program: Interest Groups and Foreign Policy (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1971); David Howard Goldberg, Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups: American and Canadian 
Jews Lobby/or Israel (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990). 
31 White, "Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches", p. 15. 
32 Ibid. 
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literature on decision making "been into two work premised on 
rational models of choice and work designed to discredit such models". 33 
Understandably, scholars have also tried to find an explanatory general theory 
of foreign policy behaviour. The hope was "engendered" by Rosenau's 1966 article 
"Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy".34 The article called for a "normal 
scientific", quantitatively-based and behaviourally-oriented study of foreign policy.35 
But more than a decade later, Rosenau could only say that results had been 
disappointing. 36 Dumbrell therefore believes that study of foreign policy "does 
have room for different approaches, and pleas for intellectual tolerance should be 
heeded".37 
This thesis will start with the basic assumption that foreign policy is the result 
of the interaction of many different factors, international, domestic and 
psychological, the influence of these factors is not equal. Foreign policy 
making is therefore a complex process which cannot be fully explained by any single 
theory. As pointed out by Hastedt: "The scope of activity involved in making US 
foreign policy is so vast that no single model can hope to capture all of and few 
models try". 38 All existing approaches have their strengths and weaknesses and 
different cases may need different approaches. 
33 Kinder and Weiss, "In Lieu of Rationality", p. 707. 
34 Dumbrell, The Making of US Foreign Policy, p. 40. 
35 James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in Robert Barry Farrell (ed.), 
Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1966), pp. 27-92. See also Steve Smith, "Theories of Foreign Policy: An Historical Overview", 
Review of International Studies (Vol. 12, No. 1, January 1986), p. 18. 
36 James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Frances 
Pinter Ltd. and Nicols Publishing Co., 1980), pp. 231-9. 
37 Dumbrell, The Making of US Foreign Policy, p. 41. 
38 Hastedt, American Foreign Policy, p. 174. 
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theory is the 
used, consciously or unconsciously, analysing the relationship between the 
legislative the executive branches. Among numerous books articles 
analysing struggles between the two branches, there are good studies of their 
competition over foreign policy.39 Most of the studies, however, do not attempt to 
develop a theory. 
It was Robert Pastor who tried to put forward the interbranch politics as a 
theoretical model. In his study about US foreign economic policies from 1929 to 
1976, Pastor concluded that the most useful and accurate explanation for US foreign 
economic policies during that period came by focusing on the interactive relationship 
between the executive and the legislative branches. 
Pastor's theory is built upon the "ideas and insights from the literature on 
bureaucratic politics and on Congress".40 A major contribution was made by Arthur 
Maass, who set up a simple "organic" model. The model reflects the US 
governmental system of separate institutions sharing powers. the model, there are 
39 These studies do not necessarily see the two branches as unitary institutions. See Dan Caldwell, The 
Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1991); Thomas M. Franck (ed.), The Tethered Presidency: 
Congressional Restraints on Executive Power (New York: New York University Press, 1981); Loch 
Johnson, The Making of International Agreements: Congress Confi'onts the Executive (New York: 
New York University Press, 1984); James McCormick and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "Bipartisanship, 
Partisanship, and Ideology in Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947-1988", Journal 
of Politics (vol, 52, 1990), pp. 1077-1100; Thomas E. Mann (ed.), A Question of Balance: The 
President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1990); 
Edmund Muskie, Kenneth Rush, and Kenneth W. Thompson (eds.), The President, Congress, and 
Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986); John Rourke, Congress and the 
Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policymaking: A Study of Interaction and ll~fluence, 1945-1982 (Boulder, 
CO: Westview, 1983); John Spanier and Joseph Nogee (eds.), Congress, the Presidency and American 
Foreign Policy (New York: Pergamon, 1981); James Thurber (ed.), Divided Democracy: Cooperation 
and Conflict Between the President and Congress (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1991); Gerald 
Warburg, Conflict and Consensus: The Struggle Between Congress and the President over Foreign 
Policymaking (New York: Harper & Row); Daniel Wirls, Build-up: The Politics of Defense in the 
Reagan Era (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992); 
40 Robert A. Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy: 1929-1976 (Berkeley 
& London: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 52-53. 
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two the Executive; two processes, legislative the 
The general rule is 
Executive plays an initiating role both the legislative and the 
processes, while the Congress oversees both processes. 41 
While acknowledging its usefulness m helping conceptualise the 
governmental process, Pastor argues "the model does not take us very far toward 
explaining or predicting policy content".42 He then integrated Friederich's "rule of 
anticipated reactions". The "rule" was originally developed and subsequently applied 
to the manner in which the Executive alters administration of policy in anticipation of 
likely Congressional response. To Pastor, Friederich's rule is "eminently 
transferable" to analysing the legislative process. He believes "the question 
Friederich's rule is helpful in answering is the extent and manner of cross-branch 
influence".43 
According to Pastor, the interbranch politics model assumes US foreign policy 
is the "resultant of a sometimes subtle or tacit, sometimes forceful or conflictual, 
always interactive process between two branches of institutions, the Executive and 
Congress".44 The interactive process can be best understood from the perspective of 
"two institutions with distinct sets of institutional biases or predispositions".45 These 
biases are responsible for each branch ranking its foreign policy objectives 
differently. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., p. 52. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., p.53. 
45 Ibid. 
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It is indeed essential to study the interactive relationship between the 
executive and the legislative branches. The importance of understanding this 
relationship lies in the fact that "it is only then that we can make intelligible the 
continuities and vicissitudes that characterise the formulation of foreign policy".46 
The interbranch politics model, however, has a fundamental problem. That is 
the premise of treating the Executive and Congress as two unitary institutions. As 
mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the executive branch is :fragmented with 
different foreign policy agencies competing with each other to advance their own 
interests. As for the Congress, it is even more decentralised and :fragmented than 
the Executive. The "conventional wisdom" is that the very much decentralised and 
uncoordinated Congress can hardly be assumed as a decision-making entity.47 As 
noted by Rieselbach: 
the central feature of the legislative system is its fragmented or 
decentralised character. There exist in Congress multiple centers of 
power, authority, and influence, relatively independent of one another, 
that only rarely mesh in a smooth operation. In other words, power is 
widely but not equally shared among the senators and representatives.48 
Over two decades ago, while talking about US policy towards China, Congressman 
Clement J. Zablocki emphasised that "when anyone refers to a 'congressional view' 
on a matter such as this, there is not just a single view. Perhaps one could say that 
46 Philip J. Briggs, Making American Foreign Policy: President-Congress Relations from the Second 
World War to Vietnam (Lanham et al: University Press of America, 1991), p. ix. 
47 Pastor, Congress and the Politics of US. Foreign Economic Policy, p. 41. 
48 Leroy N. Rieselbach, Congressional Politics: The Evolving Legislative System, 2nd ed. (Boulder et 
al.: Westview Press, 1995), p. 77. (Italics original) 
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there are 435 views in House 100 Senate, these may not 
be the same from one week to next". 49 
Nevertheless, argues that "while acknowledging the important 
differences between House and Senate, between various Committees, subcommittees, 
individuals, subgovernments, etc., the Congress as a branch with its own 'internal 
will' reacts to the Executive in a manner which has an overall consistency".50 
Scholars have noticed several elements of this "internal will". Firstly, 
Congress has an institutional interest in enhancing its image and status in making 
foreign policy. 51 Secondly, members of Congress try to stay in touch with prevailing 
sentiment or mood in Congress. "The individual players are not entirely free of a 
collective, yet ambiguous, will". 52 Thirdly, unity is imposed in Congress "by the 
willingness of individual members to follow other Congressmen with recognized 
expertise on specific issues". 53 
Indeed, the "internal will" of Congress should not simply be dismissed. 
Rourke correctly counts "institutional pride" as one of the motivations of Congress to 
contest executive dominance. "When they feel personally or collectively slighted", 
Rourke notes, "they react to reassert themselves". 54 
49 Clement J. Zablocki, "U.S. Policy Toward China--A Congressional View" in The Institute of World 
Affairs, the University of Wisconsin, Domestic Developments in China and the Future of US-China 
Relations: Proceedings of the Wisconsin Conference on China, May 13-14, 1977, p. 125. 
50 Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, p. 54. 
51 Ibid., p. 19. 
52 Frans R. Bax, "The Legislative-Executive Relationship in Foreign Policy: New Partnership or New 
Competition?", Orbis, Winter 1977, p. 884. 
53 Ibid., p. 885. 
54 John Rourke, Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policymaking: A Study of Interaction 
and Influence, 1945-1982 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983), p. 307. 
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Rourke, however, is to point out "The question is one of rather 
than substance".55 More importantly, the past experience suggests that deep 
differences existing Congress often outweigh the "internal will". 
Without discarding the merits of the interbranch politics model, this thesis 
believes that the very much decentralised and uncoordinated Congress can hardly be 
assumed as a unitary decision-making entity. Any analysis of Congress would be 
fundamentally flawed if what happens inside this body is ignored. 
In his study about the making of US foreign policy, Wiarda introduces more 
models which are useful. These include the bureaucratic politics model, the 
organisational process model, the self-aggrandisement model and the political process 
model. 56 Bureaucratic politics model advocates would point out the fragmented 
nature of decision making in a government composed of bureaus, departments, and 
branches staffed bureaucrats with different responsibilities, resources, 
infonnation sources and influence. They would argue that "people inside government 
bargain with one another on complex policy questions". 57 The model therefore 
focuses on the different perspectives and competition among and between the foreign 
policy agencies which have their own roles, practices, and bureaucratic interests. 
Intra-bureaucratic conflicts may become almost as problematic as inter-state 
conflict. 58 In the United States, the main foreign policy agencies in the executive 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., pp. 18-27. 
57 I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 52. Prominent advocates of this model are 
Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin. See their "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some 
Policy Implications'', World Politics (vol. 24, 1972) (supp.), pp. 40-79. 
58 Allison, Essence of Decision; M. H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974). Although the model has provided some important 
insights, it is also criticised for overstating the emphasis upon a fragmented executive. These critics 
believe that "the president does retain a large measure of hierarchical control over the bureaucracy" 
and that "whenever reference is made to the executive branch or to executive policy, it will mean the 
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branch of State, Department Defense, Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), National Security Council (NSC), Department of Treasury, 
Department of Justice, the Office of the Trade Representative, Department of Labor, 
Department of Commerce, the Environmental Protection Agency, and others. 
The organisational process model "regards the government not as a unitary 
and monolithic agent but rather as a constellation of large, complex, semifeudal, 
loosely allied organizations that determine policy outcomes".59 The model emphasises 
the different methods and procedures for doing things in these agencies. Wiarda 
notes that "these are the normal, everyday, standard operating procedures that any 
organization develops over time in conducting its activities".60 He observes that "the 
problem for foreign policy is that one agency's SOPs (standard operating procedures), 
or that the SOPs of a particular agency may conflict with a presidential order, or that 
the SOPs may get in the way of the conduct of the nation's foreign policy".61 
The self-aggrandisement model suggests that the usual campaign rhetoric is 
simply rhetoric which does not really suggest what politicians and public officials are 
going to do. They are in the foreign policy 'game' "mainly to gamer prestige, power, 
perks, career opportunities, and even wealth/or themselves", and the public interest 
presidentially directed executive branch". See Bax, "The Legislative-Executive Relationship in 
Foreign Policy: New Partnership or New Competition?", pp. 883-884. See also Stephen D. Krasner, 
"Are Bureaucracies Important?", Foreign Policy (Summer 1972), pp. 159-179; Robert J. Art, 
"Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique", Policy Sciences (December 1973), 
pp. 467-490. L. Freedman, "Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy Processes: A critique of the 
Bureaucratic Politics Model", International Affairs (vol. 52, no. 3, 1976), pp. 434-49; W. Wallace and 
W. E. Paterson (eds.), Foreign Policy Making in Western Europe (Farnborough, Eng.: Saxon House, 
1978). 
59 Allison, Essence of Decision, pp. 67-100. Cited from Yufan Hao, Dilemma and Decision: An 
Organizational Perspective on American China Policy Making (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian 
Studies, University of California, 1997), pp. 215-216. 
60 Howard J. Wiarda, American Foreign Policy: Actors and Processes (HarperCollins College 
Publishers, 1996),, p. 20. 
61 Ibid. 
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gets served "largely as a of these self-centered 62 
Understandably, "public officials look for policy initiatives serve both 
private interests a notion of the interest". 63 
The primary objective of this thesis is to study the influence of domestic 
politics on Congressional intervention in US foreign policy. As mentioned above, the 
thesis starts with the basic assumption that foreign policy is the result of the 
interaction of many different factors: international, domestic and psychological. This 
assumption excludes the rational-actor model as a theory to be used in the thesis. 
The interbranch politics model has a similar problem in treating Congress as 
an unitary decision-making institution, although the model does recognise the 
struggle or interactive relationship between the executive and legislative branches. 
The bureaucratic politics model and the organisation model are useful in the 
sense that Congress embodies a large number of committees which have different 
roles, interests and perhaps different methods and procedures. Indeed, there is an 
"increased struggle between the two chambers" and "an intensified competition for 
power among committees, both within and across chambers".64 However, the two 
models are more powerful in explaining foreign policy making in the executive 
branch. 65 They have their limitations in studying Congress, which is significantly 
different in structure from the executive branch. For example, Congressional 
committees consist of members representing different regions, interests, ideologies 
62 Ibid. p. 24. Italics original. 
63 Ibid. Italics original. 
64 Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, "Foreign and Domestic Policy in Congress: An Overview 
and Review" in Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay (eds.), Congress Resurgent: Foreign and 
Defense Policy on Capitol Hill (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993), p. 12. 
65 In fact, the advocates of the bureaucratic politics model did not intend to apply the model in 
studying Congress. The model "neglects the important role of Congress in policy making, especially 
since the Vietnam War". See Hao, Dilemma and Decision, p. 216. 
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and parties. Indeed, changes in committee membership may change committee 
decisions. 66 This fact defuses the usefulness of the bureaucratic model. As well, 
unlike administrative agencies, Congressional committees are small in size and may 
not have distinctively different SOPs. 
As for the self-aggrandisement model, while it is recognised that "self-
centered motives ... have become increasingly important", it is also noted that 
"precise relations between psychopathology and politics is often speculative, and how 
much weight to assign self-interests versus public interest motives is not entirely 
clear".67 
The primary analytical approach to be used in this thesis is the political 
process model. 
Political Process Model 
Roger Hilsman developed the political process model in an effort to 
supplement the organisational process and bureaucratic politics models. 68 The 
political process model assumes "foreign policy, like domestic policy, is shaped by 
powerful forces, interests, and actors in the political system generally and cannot be 
separated from them" and that foreign policy is "routinely subjected to the same 
pressures and political trade-offs as is domestic policy".69 
66 Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall, "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why 
Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets", Journal of Political Economy (Vol. 96, No. 
1, February 1988), pp. 225-51. 
67 Wiarda, American Foreign Policy, p. 25. 
68 Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Model 
and Bureaucratic Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1987). 
69 Ibid., p. 23. 
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The model, therefore, sees foreign policy as "emerging from the political 
interactions of hundreds, even thousands, of influences and interest groups operating 
on foreign policy issues".70 The powers of these interests are not equal and may vary 
over time and from issue to issue. These interest groups may compete with each other 
or build coalitions in influencing decisions. 
With regard to Congress, which has constitutional power in making foreign 
policy, the model would emphasise not only the interactive relationship between the 
White House and Congress, but also that Congress consists of a large number of 
committees and subcommittees, as well as 535 individual members representing 
different regions, interests, ideologies and parties. The model expects, as only 
natural, that within this body occur myriad political interactions between a host of 
influences. 
As noted in Introduction to this thesis, a variety of factors can influence 
members of Congress in making foreign policy decisions, including interest groups, 
ideology, partisanship, constituency, committee, public opinion, media, institutional 
constraints and so on. This thesis pays special attention to three loosely defined 
structural factors: partisanship, constituency and committee. The following section 
discusses the three factors as separate theoretical approaches to studying 
Congressional behaviour. Their relationships are explained in Chapter 7. 
Committees 
The importance of Congressional committees has long been recognised. Early 
in 1884, Woodrow Wilson wrote: 
70 Ibid., p. 22. 
the House sits, not for serious discussion, but to sanction the conclusions 
of its Committees as rapidly as possible . . . so that it is not far from the 
truth to say that Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, 
whilst Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work.71 
Wilson therefore referred to the committees as "little legislatures". 72 
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Congressman Clem Miller echoed Woodrow Wilson's observation by saying 
that "Congress is a collection of committees that come together in a Chamber 
periodically to approve one another's actions". 73 
Similarly, Ripley and Lindsay point out that "although it is convenient to refer 
to Congress as an it, in reality the it is a they. The most important actors influencing 
foreign and defense policy in Congress are the relevant committees since these handle 
the details of legislation". 74 
Scholars may have exaggerated the role of the committees by referring to 
them as "virtually autonomous"75 and having "power largely independent of the 
elected leadership of the parent body".76 But it is fair to assert that "committees are 
central to congressional policy making".77 Every two years, members of Congress 
submit more than 11,000 bills to committees.78 The committees may choose to report 
a bill with or without amendments, rewrite the bill, vote to reject it, or take no action 
71 As quoted by Pastor in Congress and the Politics of US. Foreign Economic Policy, p. 38. 
72 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics (Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 89. 
73 Clem Miller (ed.), Member of the House: Letters of a Congressman, with additional text by John W. 
Baker, (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1962), p. 110. 
74 Ripley and Lindsay, "Foreign and Domestic Policy in Congress", p.7. Italics original. 
75 Charles L. Clapp, The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
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whatsoever - tantamount to killing the Therefore, committees have the power 
of life death over bills. It is widely acknowledged, "The vast majority of 
disputes on Hill are resolved before or committee consideration of 
bills, and legislation is seldom considered on the House or Senate floor without a 
committee' stamp of approval"79 For members of Congress, whether they for 
local or national attention, "their chances of getting results depend largely on the 
effectiveness of their committee work". 80 
In his 1973 pioneering study of Congressional committees, Fermo found that a 
committee's decisions were determined by the constraints of its environment 
(including relevant Executive bureaux and clientele groups), decision-making 
processes, and, probably most of by its members' goals. Using these variables, 
Fermo discerned three different types of committees: those, like the House Ways and 
Means Committee House Appropriations Committee, whose members are 
principally "insiders", oriented towards influence in the House of Representatives and 
towards legislative success; those, such as Interior and Post Office, whose members 
were more constituent-oriented; and those, like Foreign Affairs, Labor and Education, 
whose members were primarily interested in public policy. He then compared House 
committees with their Senate counterparts, finding many similarities but an overall 
difference. By and large, the Senate committees were less important as a source of 
chamber influence than their counterpart committees in the House; less preoccupied 
79 Steven S. Smith and Christopher J. Deering, Committees in Congress, (Washington, D. C : CQ 
Press, 1984), p. 1. 
80 Dennis J. Smith, "Committees: Where the Work Is done", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 
(Supplement to 49:18, 4 May 1991), p. 9. 
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with success on the chamber floor; less autonomous within the chamber; less 
personally expert; less strongly led; and more individualistic in decision making.81 
Three points should be noted. Firstly, while the differences of the three types 
of committees are largely valid, they should not be exaggerated. These are relative 
differences because all committees are likely to be influenced, to various degrees, by 
same factors. For example, the influence of constituency does not exist only in 
Interior and Post Office but all committees. Similarly, members who are oriented 
towards influence in the chamber and those who are primarily interested in public 
policy are, like all other members, subjected to the influence of partisanship. Indeed, 
since committees are formed principally according to party "membership" and 
constituency interests, committee actions may even be seen as secondary influences 
after partisanship and constituency. 
Secondly, Fenno's conclusion that Senate committees were less important than 
House committees as a source of chamber influence should be accepted with caution. 
The difference may not be so large. Take the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as 
an example. The Committee used to be extremely influential, not only in the Senate 
but in Congress as a whole. In the early post-war period, "the voice of this 
committee" was "usually the voice of Congress in foreign affairs".82 
The influence of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been decreasing 
since the late 1960s for several reasons. The Committee used to operate in bipartisan 
concert with few subcommittees and a unified staff. The tradition changed in the late 
1960s and early 1970s when an autonomous subcommittee and separate minority staff 
81 Richard Fenno, Congressmen in Committees, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973). 
82 Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age, 5th ed.,(New York: Harper & 
Row, 1988), p. 181. 
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began to fragment power within the Committee. 83 At the same time, the Senate 
Armed Services Committee had taken over much of Foreign Relations' power and 
prestige.84 The Persian Gulf crisis provides a recent example. The Foreign Relations 
Committee held hearings on the crisis but was even less involved than its counterpart, 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in the Congressional decision to authorise war 
against Iraq. Noticeably, the leaders of the Armed Services committees played a 
central role in setting the course of debate. 85 
The Foreign Relations Committee's weakening influence was also due partly 
to weak leadership. After Senator Claiborne Pell took the chair of the Committee and 
Jesse Helms became ranking Republican in 1987, the panel "drifted into a state of 
legislative paralysis".86 While Pell was a "likeable but not very effective chairman", 
Helms aggressively promoted his conservative views and worked to block legislation 
with which he disagreed.87 Subsequently, the Committee had trouble attracting 
members; it operated with one Democratic vacancy during part of the 1 OOth 
Congress. 88 By early 1990s, the "ideologically diverse panel" was "recognised more 
for its failure to gain quorums at meetings than as a force in setting foreign policy" 
and the Committee no longer held the prestige it had even 10 or 12 years ago.89 
83 Rourke, Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policymaking, pp. 251-52. 
84 Rochelle L. Stanfield, "Floating Power Centers", National Journal (1 December, 1990), pp. 2915-
19. 
85 Carroll J. Doherty, "Subcommittee Plan Created to Revive Senate Panel", Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report (49:5, 2 February 1991), p. 306. 
86 Carroll Doherty, "GOP Takes the Reins of Power: Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs", 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (52:44, 12 November 1994), p. 3283. 
87 Janet Hook, "Senate Changes Affect Key Economic Panels", Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report (46:46, 12 November 1988), p. 3257. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Carroll J. Doherty, "Subcommittee Plan Created to Revive Senate Panel", p. 306. 
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Nonetheless, it could be argued the Committee remains a major source of chamber 
influence on foreign policy.90 It also has the potential to play a bigger role.91 
The third point, related to the second, is that "The days when foreign affairs 
were primarily the preserve of the Senate are gone".92 Fenno's 1973 study found 
members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (renamed International Relations 
Committee in late 1994) with little to do and complaining they were only a foreign 
aid committee.93 Traditionally, the House of Representatives was ready to play "a 
subordinate role" in making foreign policy.94 But this tradition has eroded in the past 
two decades or so. In 1979, in connection with the Panama Canal treaties, a 
Congressman made the following remarks: 
We in the House are tired of you people in the State Department going 
to your tea-sipping friends in the Senate. Now you good folks come 
up here and say you need legislation [to implement the treaties] after 
you ignored the House. If you expect me to vote for this travesty, 
you're sorely in error. 95 
Although not as constitutionally powerful as the Senate, "the House increasingly has 
made its voice heard on foreign policy issues".96 
90 Unfortunately, since the dramatic change of Congressional committee structure, little scholarship on 
the Committee has been published. See Lindsay and Ripley, "Foreign and Defense Policy in 
Congress: A Research Agenda for the 1990s", Legislative Studies Quarterly (vol. 17, no. 3, February 
1992), p. 427. 
91 James M. McCormick, "Decision Making in the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees" 
in Ripley and Lindsay, Congress Resurgent, pp. 150-51. 
92 Ripley and Lindsay, "Foreign and Domestic Policy in Congress", p. 12. At least two studies of the 
Committee have been published since the 1970s. See Fred Kaiser, "Oversight of Foreign Policy: The 
US House Committee on International Relations", Legislative Studies Quarterly (vol. 2, 1977), pp. 
255-80; James M. McCormick, "The Changing Role of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the 
1970s and 1980s'', Congress and the Presidency (vol. 12, 1985), pp. 1-20. 
93 Fermo, Congressmen in Committees, p. 108. 
94 Cecil. V. Crabb, Jr. and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President and Foreign 
Policy, 3rd ed., (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1992), p. 44. 
95 Ibid., pp. 44-45. 
96 Ripley and Lindsay, "Foreign and Domestic Policy in Congress", p. 12. See also, Smith and 
Deering, Committees in Congress, 1984, pp. 72-73; McCormick, "Decision Making in the Foreign 
Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees" in Ripley and Lindsay, Congress Resurgent, pp. 115-153. 
57 
Since Fenno's 1973 study, external demands and internal stress have forced 
Congress to undergo significant reforms and adopt a series of dramatic changes. As a 
result, the number and importance of subcommittees have steadily increased, 
especially in the House of Representatives. Until 1974, some committees, including 
Ways and Means, had no subcommittees. In that year, under pressure from rank and 
file members to decentralise committees, the House adopted a rule requiring that any 
committee with more than 20 members must have at least four subcommittees. In 
addition, subcommittee chairmen were allowed to hire their own staff.97 
Today, subcommittees abound. Consider the four committees to which this 
thesis will pay special attention to in the case studies: In the 102nd Congress (1991-
1992), both the House Committee on Ways and Means and the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs had six subcommittees while the Senate Committee on Finance and 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had eight and seven subcommittees 
respectively.98 The independence of subcommittees is protected. In the House, 
subcommittees are permitted "to meet at the pleasure of their members, to write their 
own rules, and to control their own budgets and staffs". 99 
Changes have continued through the 1990s. In 1992, the Republican 
Conference approved a rules change that, beginning with the 104th Congress (1995-
1996), prohibited members from serving as chairman or ranking member of more 
than one full committee or subcommittee. '00 The rules package adopted by the House 
on 4 January 1995 also required that members serve on no more than two standing 
97 David S. Cloud, "GOP, to Its Own Great Delight, Enacts House Rules Changes'', Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (53:1, 7 January 1995), p. 13. 
98 Dennis J. Smith, "Committees: Where the Work Is Done", pp. 21, 22, 48, 75. 
99 Rieselbach, Congressional Politics, p. 85. 
100 See Doherty, "GOP Takes the Reins of Power", p. 3252. 
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committees subcommittees, except for 
could serve ex officio on subcommittees. 101 rules changes also stipulated that, 
beginning with the 104th Congress, chairmen of committees subcommittees 
might hold their positions for no more than three consecutive terms. 102 Senate 
Republicans made a similar change in the l 04th Congress; Republican senators were 
limited to six-year terms as committee chairmen. 103 
Rieselbach has summarised the consequences of these changes. The first 
consequence is further division of labour and specialisation. 104 The second is greater 
opportunity for larger numbers of legislators to secure leadership positions and 
exercise power and influence. In the 103rd Congress (1993-1994), nearly half (113, 
or 43.8 percent) of the majority Democrats the House and a much higher 
percentage (46, or 80.7 percent) of Democrats m the Senate held a position of 
leadership on a full committee or subcommittee. In Republican-controlled 104th 
and 105th Congress, the percentage of Republicans holding positions of leadership 
were even higher. 105 "The power is no longer concentrated in a few members", it was 
101 In the 103rd Congress, the typical Representative served on two committees and four 
subcommittees, while the senators averaged three committees and seven subcommittees each. 
Lineberry, Edwards III and Wattenberg, Government in America, p. 427. 
102 At the same time, claiming that the committee structure had become bloated in the past 20 years, 
the Republicans decided to restrict more committees to no more than five subcommittees and give 
responsibility for hiring staff exclusively to the full committee chairmen. See "Rules Changes Open 
the Process ..... But Strengthen the Reins of Power", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (53:1, 
7 January 1995), pp. 13-14. David S. Cloud, "GOP, to Its Own Great Delight, Enacts House Rules 
Changes", p. 13. 
103 Jackie Koszczuk, "A Full Circle", Players, Politics and Turf of the 105th Congress (Supplement to 
55: 12 of Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 22 March 1997), p.10. 
104 In the field of foreign affairs confusion can emerge as a result of the changes. Most Congressional 
committees are involved in some aspect of foreign affairs, and their jurisdictions over foreign policy 
issues frequently overlap. An examination of the committee structure of Congress during 1989 reveals 
that almost every major legislative committee claimed some jurisdiction in the foreign policy field. 
Crabb and Holt, Invitation to Struggle, pp. 270-271. 
105 In the 105th Congress, for the first time, first- and second-term senators held chairmanship. Six of 
the 20 full committee chairmen had never been chairmen before and some freshman senators held 
subcommittee chairmanships. 
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observed. "It is distributed so that almost everybody is a chairman". 106 Thirdly, the 
proliferation of subcommittees has provided more "specific targets" for interest 
groups. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, subcommittees "contribute to the 
decentralization of congressional policymaking and influence" .107 
Indeed, many observes agree that the primary effect of these changes has been 
to exacerbate the fragmented nature of Congressional decision making. 108 The 
number and importance of subcommittees has increased to such an extent that some 
observers describe Congressional decision making as "subcommittee government". 109 
One argument against the committee theory is that although defence and 
foreign policy committees remain the most important Congressional actors on foreign 
policy, considerable Congressional activity bypasses traditional channels of 
committee influence. Floor debate on defence and foreign policy has grown 
enormously since the 1970s. This is perhaps a by-product of the increasing 
importance of subcommittees as subcommittee leaders have been managing floor 
consideration of more bills. 110 Often challenges are led by junior members with no 
committee assignment in foreign affairs. For example, the effort to punish China for 
the Tiananmen Square incident was led in the House by Nancy Pelosi, a two-term 
member who sat on the Commerce and Ethics committees. 
Despite this argument against it, committee theory remains a useful key to 
understanding the functioning of Congress and its role in foreign policy making. 
106 Jackie Koszczuk, "A Full Circle", pp. 9-10. 
107 Rieselbach, Congressional Politics, pp. 86-87. 
108 For more information about the reform, see Hedrick Smith, "The Power Game: How Washington 
Works (New York: Random House, 1988), Chapter 2; Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress, 
1990, Chapter 2. 
109 Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress, 1984, p. 1. 
110 Ibid., p. 87. 
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Constituency 
David Mayhew, a prominent advocate of constituency theory, believes 
Congressmen are "single-minded seekers of reelection" .11 1 This "electoral connection" 
profoundly affects behaviour, accountability and the structure of Congress, as well as 
the way Congress makes public policy. 112 Congressmen are therefore most active in 
trying to secure and claim particularised benefits for their districts and in taking 
positions which will be popular m their districts. In terms of foreign policy, 
Congressmen are active when benefits to their constituencies are involved. Otherwise, 
their concern with foreign policy may be for publicity or absent altogether. 113 No 
wonder legislators are criticised for tending to see foreign policy as a slightly 
specialised branch of domestic policy. 114 
To put it more clearly, the logic of the constituency school, called "the simple 
electoral explanation" by Lindsay, generates three expectations about Congressional 
behaviour on foreign policy. 115 The first expectation is "extensive deference to the 
administration on the substance of foreign policy". 116 The logic here is that, as most 
111 David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 
p. 5. Other representatives include Morris P. Fiorina, Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies 
(Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1974); Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington 
Establishment, 2nd ed., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and 
Morris P. Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1987). 
112 Ibid., p.13. Mayhew's study focuses on House Representatives, who have to be re-elected every 
three years. The Senators can serve six years before being re-elected. As a result, the constituency 
theory may play out differently in the House and Senate. But it seems scholars tend to ignore the 
difference. 
113 See Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process 
(Houndmills et al: Macmillan Education, 1987), p. 429. 
114 See, for example, Stanley Hoffman, Dead Ends: American Foreign Policy in the New Cold War 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1983), p. 105. 
115 James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy, (Baltimore & London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 35-38. 
116 Ibid., p. 35. 
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Americans have little interest in or knowledge about foreign policy, members of 
Congress can hardly to expect to gain electoral payoffs through detailed legislative 
work in foreign policy. 
On the other hand, foreign policy offers incentives for Congressional "position 
taking and grandstanding". 117 While "position taking" means publicly enunciating and 
reaffirming values and positions held by constituents, "grandstanding" refers to 
members' efforts to attract media coverage to their public statements and behaviour. 
Although position taking and grandstanding may affect the substance of foreign 
policy, that is not their purpose. The payoff lies in speaking rather than doing. For 
this reason, "member interest fades once an issue ceases to attract headlines". 118 
The final and most obvious expectation is the "attention to parochial 
matters". 119 Sustained Congressional interest in foreign policy can be expected when 
an issue involves sizeable constituency interests. Quite often, Congressional 
members find themselves unable to advance parochial interests. Even then they still 
seek to cultivate the impression that they can shape policy to benefit constituents. 
To summarise, constituency theory suggests the principal preoccupation of 
Congressmen is to get elected. This preoccupation constrains their activities in 
Congress. As noted by Allison and Szanton, 
On issues about which particular electorates do not care deeply, a 
Congressman's sense of the national interest may safely prevail. But a 
district dependent on textile production or the manufacture of shoes, for 
example, will not long tolerate a representative unduly devoted to the 
broader virtues of free trade. 120 
117 Ibid., p. 36. 
118 Ibid., p. 37. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Allison, Graham & Peter Szanton, Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection, 
(New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 104. 
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Consequently, "the Congress is composed of people who are not so much interested 
in making national policy as in keeping their constituents happy". 121 And "Even those 
Congressmen genuinely concerned with good public policy must achieve reelection in 
order to continue their work". 122 
Constituency theory has proved popular. Lindsay noticed that "since the 
publication of Congress: The Electoral Connection, political scientists have turned 
out a slew of books and articles based on the assumption that reelection drives 
congressional decision making". 123 
Despite its popularity, constituency theory, or more exactly, the simple 
electoral explanation, has limitations. According to Lindsay, the simple electoral 
explanation is "at odds with the available anecdotal and statistical evidence". 124 This 
is partly because the simple electoral explanation focuses on geographic 
constituencies rather than on the many groups that constitute it. 125 While most voters 
ignore foreign policy, some care passionately. For example, some ethnic groups take 
great interest in their ancestral homelands. Lindsay argues that these people can be an 
incentive for members of Congress to work foreign policy issues, not only because of 
their number but also because of campaign contributions. 126 
121 Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, p. 36. 
122 Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, p. 37. 
123 James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 35. For more literature, 
see Fiorina; Eileen Burgin, "The Influence of Constituents: Congressional Decision Making on Issues 
of Foreign and Defense Policy" in Ripley and Lindsay, Congress Resurgent, p. 67; Eileen Burgin, 
"Congress and Foreign Policy: The Misperceptions" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer 
(eds.), Congress Reconsidered, 5th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1993); Thomas M. Franck and 
Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Charles 
W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, The Future of American Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's, 
1992). 
124 James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy, pp. 40-41. 
125 Ibid., p. 41. 
126 Ibid. 
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The second problem with the simple electoral explanation is that it "takes too 
narrow a view of electoral incentives facing members of Congress" .127 Lindsay 
believes "while some members see legislative work as a cost to be avoided, others see 
it as an investment that will produce electoral benefits in the future". 128 The logic is 
that members can become influential in Congress by working on defence and foreign 
policy. Thereby garnering more media attention and more say over the flow of 
government benefits, two advantages in any re-election campaign. 129 
The above two points do not invalidate the claim that re-election drives 
Congressional behaviour. Instead, they contribute to constituency theory. What 
Lindsay suggests is a more sophisticated electoral explanation. 
A conventional wisdom says "If there is a piece of legislation pending that 
would help a district industry in a direct way, or especially one that would hurt it, 
nearly all congressmen defend this industry". 130 But the conventional wisdom has 
proved to be wrong in some cases. For example, in the 1980s all members of the 
Massachusetts delegation on Capitol Hill opposed the MX missile program although 
the state would have benefited from MX production and most districts in the state 
would have benefited directly. Despite the failure of conventional wisdom in 
explaining this case, analysts still believe that those Congressional members from 
Massachusetts grounded their decisions in constituency politics. Lindsay argues that 
127 Ibid., p. 42. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
130 John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions, 3rd ed. (Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 1989), pp. 36-37. 
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"doves who represent constituencies that benefit from weapons production may . 
[find that] opposition to a weapons system may actually help". 131 
Electoral incentives do not inevitably run counter to members' policy 
preferences. This is mainly because members "share many policy attitudes with their 
constituents" .132 
Finally, the electoral incentive is only "part of the story". 133 While 
acknowledging the usefulness of constituency theory, Lindsay strongly believes "any 
explanation of how Congress handles foreign policy must recognise the non-electoral 
incentives that motivate legislative behaviour".134 These non-electoral incentives 
include personal policy preferences and the desire for prestige and influence inside 
Congress. 135 
Partisanship 
The political parties are the most important and pervasive political 
organisations in the United States in the struggle for influencing either the making of 
decisions within governmental bodies or the selecting of the people who will make 
them. 136 American political parties perform three sets of activities: to select 
candidates and contest elections; to propagandise on behalf of a party ideology or 
131 James M. Lindsay, "Parochialism, Policy and Constituency Constraints: Congressional Voting on 
Strategic Weapon Systems", American Journal of Political Science (34:4, 1990), p. 956. 
132 Lindsay, "Foreign and Domestic Policy in Congress", p. 12. 
133 Ripley and Lindsay, "Foreign and Domestic Policy in Congress", p. 12. 
134 James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 42. 
135 Fermo, Congressmen in Committees. 
136 Frank J. Sorauf and Paul Allen Beck, Party Politics in America, 6th ed., (Glenview et al.: Scott, 
Foresman and Co., 1988), p. 2. 
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program; and to attempt to guide the elected officeholders of government to provide 
particular policy or patronage benefits. 137 
In 1981 one analyst lamented: "Despite there being a quite voluminous 
literature on partisanship as of the 1980s, one looks in vain for any comprehensive 
statement of the theoretical meaning or purposes of the construct" .138 Wattenberg 
believes the major reason for this shortcoming is that "different scholars have used 
some variant of the concept for a wide variety of purposes" .139 This thesis does not 
set it as a task to explore the concept of partisanship. Rather, it accepts partisanship 
as a theory predicting that members of Congress will follow a policy or position once 
it is agreed by the Party leadership. 
Lindsay and Ripley noted in 1992 that "Commentary on Congress' role in 
foreign policy making typically laments the demise of bipartisanship". 140 While 
maintaining some reservations towards such commentary, Lindsay and Repley agreed 
there generally had been greater partisanship in Congress in recent years. Further, 
partisanship was increasing in "both the House and Senate".141 
Scholars have observed that bipartisan co-operation in foreign affairs reached 
its zenith under the Truman and early Eisenhower administrations. By the Reagan 
Administration, "the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives was the center 
of intense congressional activism" in dealing with a series of issues, including the 
137 Ibid., p. 3. Wattenberg has identified 11 functions that parties have been said to perform in 
American society. See Martin P. Wattenberg, The Decline of American Political Parties 1952-1996 
(Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 1-2. 
138 As quoted in Wattenberg, p. 7. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Lindsay and Ripley, "Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress", p. 429. 
141 They note that the greater partisanship is paralleled by a development in Congress, namely liberal 
Republicans and conservative Democrats have become more and more scarce. Lindsay and Ripley, 
"Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress'', pp. 429-30. For a study of the greater partisanship, see 
Samuel C. Patterson and Gregory A. Caldeira, "Party Voting in the United States Congress'', British 
Journal of Political Science (vol. 18, 1988), pp. 111-31. 
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national defence budget, the proposed MX missile system, and political developments 
in Central America. 142 
One major engine of increased partisanship is the House Democratic Caucus. 
For much of its history the caucus was relatively inactive on legislative issues, 
especially foreign policy issues.143 In the mid-1980s, however, the caucus emerged as 
a vehicle by which liberal and moderate House Democrats forced the House 
leadership to turn selected foreign and defence policy votes into party issues. 144 The 
Senate had no analogue to the House Democratic Caucus. It was therefore more 
individualistic in nature. Nevertheless, partisanship was "on the upswing" in the 
Senate as well. 145 
Conclusion 
The rational-actor model regards states as the most important actors in 
international politics and assumes the governments of these states can be analysed as 
unitary, monolithic actors. The intricacies of governmental organisation, influence of 
domestic politics, and role of personalities are ignored. Given the fragmented nature 
of US foreign policy making, the rational-actor model is weak in explaining US 
foreign policy. 
The interbranch politics approach focuses on the relationship between the 
executive and the legislative branches. The fundamental problem with this approach 
142 Crabb and Holt, Invitation to Struggle, p. 286. 
143 Barbara Sinclair, Majority Leadership in the House (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1983), pp. 93-97. 
144 James M. Lindsay, "Congress and Defense Policy: 1961 to 1986", Armed Forces and Society (vol. 
13, 1987), pp. 371-401. James M. Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1991). 
145 Lindsay and Ripley, "Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress", p. 430. 
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is that it treats Congress as a unitary institution. Although it can be argued that 
Congress as a branch has its own "internal will", this "internal will" could be 
outweighed by the decentralisation and fragmentation which characterise Congress. 
The bureaucratic model and the organisation model might be powerful tools in 
explaining foreign policy making in the Executive. But each suffers limitations in 
explaining the role of Congress, largely because of structural differences between the 
two branches. The self-aggrandisement model is weak due to its speculative nature. 
The most powerful model for this study is the political process model. The 
model assumes foreign policy, like domestic policy, is strongly influenced by 
powerful forces, interests, and actors in the political system. It therefore sees foreign 
policy as a product of the political interactions of hundreds, even thousands, of 
influences and interest groups. This model approaches Congress as an institution 
with a large number of committees, subcommittees and individual members. Thus, 
the model enables us to study what happens inside Congress, an essential element in 
understanding Congressional behaviour. 
The approaches which form the theoretical framework of this thesis focus on 
the influences of Congressional committees, constituency and partisanship. While 
committee theory asserts that committees are central to Congressional policy making, 
the constituency approach assumes that Congressmen single-mindedly seek re-
election. Partisanship deserves more attention because it is increasingly influential on 
Congressional members' foreign policy-making decisions. 
Before ending this chapter, a brief explanation is in order. As repeatedly 
stated, this thesis argues that Congress does not speak with a single voice because 
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within this body exist deep differences. Yet, Congress is often mentioned as a 
monolith in the following chapters. This is simply for convenience. 
Chapter 2 
A History and Literature Review 
Published literature on Congress' role in China policy is poor compared with 
the voluminous and diverse studies on US-China relations over the years. We can 
hardly find a book focusing on this topic, although some Ph. D. theses focus on this 
area. 1 Books giving general descriptions of US-China relations since 1949 usually 
neglect the role of Congress. Studies of short periods or specific issues and cases 
usually focus on issues other than Congress, such as the Executive's or strategic 
perspectives. 2 
Some studies conclude that Congress' role has been largely unimportant in the 
history of China policy. For example, after studying the interplay between the press 
and the US government in making China policy from 1950 to 1984, an analyst found 
that 
For the most part, Congress and other nonadministration sources 
are excluded from the dialogue and discourse in the making of 
China policy. When their voices are heard sporadically over the 
course of Sino-American relations, they usually come out 
supporting the actions and decisions taken by the White House.3 
This finding is contentious because the study did not pay much attention to 
Congress. The US government in the study was almost exclusively represented by 
1 For example, Fenton Babcock, Issues of China Policy before Congress, September 1945 to 
September 1949 (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1956); James Alan Fetzer, Congress and China, 1941-
1950 (Ph.D. thesis, Michigan State University, 1969); Ena Chao, The China Bloc: Congress and the 
Making of Foreign Policy, 1947-1952 (Ph. D. thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
1990); Xiaochuan Xie, Congressional Voting and Foreign Policy: Domestic Factors in Sino-US 
Relations, 1949-1990 (Ph. D. thesis, University of Oregon, 1993). This author tried in vain to get 
these theses. 
2 For example, Warren I. Cohen, "Acheson, His Advisers, and China, 1949-1950" in Dorothy Borg 
and Waldo Heinrichs (eds.), Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 13-52; John Lewis Gaddis, "The Strategic Perspective: The Rise 
and Fall of the 'Defensive Perimeter' Concept, 1947-1951" in Borg and Heinrichs (eds.), Uncertain 
Years, pp. 61-118. 
3 Chang Tsan-Kuo, The Press and China Policy: The Illusion of Sino-American Relations, 1950-1984 
(Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1993), p. 244. 
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the executive Congress has quite often expressed its displeasure or 
objection to the actions decisions taken the White House. 
Congress' is better discussed some detailed studies of US-China 
relations. Yet, most of these studies simply describe Congressional actions and their 
effect on US China policy without seriously delving into the details of the interaction 
between the two branches and, more importantly, without offering tightly argued 
explanations of why and how Congress behaved as it did. 4 
This chapter revisits the history and literature of Congress' role in making US 
policy towards China. This review begins in the late 1940s, near the end of China's 
Civil War. The Nationalist Party government or Kuomintang (KMT) was close to 
collapse and the People's Republic of China (PRC) about to be established. The 
review is divided into four sections. The first three sections chronologically review 
the history and literature of US-China relations. The last section focuses on literature 
analysing factors which influenced decision-making behaviour of Congressional 
members regarding China policy. 
From the late 1940s to the late 1950s 
The period from the late 1940s to the late 1950s bears special importance in 
the history of US-China relations. Policies made in the crucial years around 1950 
have had long-term effects. As noted by Sutter, "Quarrels in the United States during 
the late 1940s and early 1950s effectively blocked U.S. ability to communicate with 
the PRC [People's Republic of China] for almost two decades". 5 
4 Their analyses seldom go beyond the obvious reason of anti-Communist ideology. 
5 Robert G. Sutter, The China Quandary: Domestic Determinants of US China Policy (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 2. 
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A close examination reveals Congress played an role 
forming policy towards those years. Indeed, the best scholarship on 
Congress' role in making China policy largely focuses on this This period 
deserves special interest because 
There probably never had been a time in the nation's history when the 
State Department was forced to submit its policy-making process to so 
much raucous public debate or to attempt to carry out policy m an 
atmosphere so rife with fear and suspicion as during the 1950s.6 
Christensen's study on US-China relations from 1947 to 1958 is one 
representative of this scholarship. Christensen argues that Congress' role was 
important and even decisive in some cases. 7 
In 1947-48, China was not a priority for the State Department. During this 
period, "there was a growing sense within the [Truman] administration that the 
United States could not affect political outcomes in the Chinese Civil War". 8 
Therefore, the Administration preferred disengagement and flexible diplomacy 
towards China. But the Administration boxed by the Truman Doctrine, although 
the doctrine was aimed primarily at growing Communist power Greece and 
Turkey.9 More importantly, Congress consistently made the critical link that "Armed 
communists were thriving in an economically devastated postwar environment and 
the recognised government, an American ally in World War II, was threatened by 
6 Lewis McCarroll Purifoy, Harry Truman's China Policy: McCarthyism and the Diplomacy of 
Hysteria, 1947-1951 (New York and London: New Viewpoints, 1976), p. 151. 
7 Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-
American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
8 Ibid., 58-59. 
9 On 12 March 1947, in a broadcast joint session of Congress, President Truman told the legislators 
and the nation: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures . . . . Collapse of free 
institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous . . . for the world .... Should we fail to aid 
Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the 
East". "The Truman Doctrine", in John Norton Moore et al. (eds.), National Security Law Documents 
(Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1995), pp. 31-34. 
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overthrow". 10 As a result, the Administration choice to continue to 
Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the KMT. George Kennan, head of the Policy 
·~"""''h Staff in the State Department, later reflected his frustration: "My speciality 
was the defense of the United States' interests against others, not against our own 
representatives". 11 
In late 1947, Congressional representatives successfully amended a bill 
providing interim aid to Europe to include $20 million in aid to the KMT. What was 
more important, under Congressional pressure, George Marshall promised that when 
the full $1 7 billion Marshall Plan aid package was presented to Congress in early 
1948, a significant China aid bill ($570 million) would also be presented. 12 
By 1948, Marshall was "completely convinced" the KMT's future was 
hopeless. 13 Yet, it was Marshall who brought the China Aid Bill to Congress in early 
1948. Christensen believes that "domestic political constraints were the most 
important factor" behind this bill. 14 
Some scholars argue domestic pressure alone was insufficient to compel the 
Administration to stay involved in the Chinese Civil War, Christensen agrees that "if 
all things had been equal, Truman could have fought off the pro-Chiang forces the 
public and in Congress". But according to him, "all things were not equal. In the 
context of the mobilization drive for Europe, domestic politics played a decisive role 
in the creation of the China Aid Bill". 15 Christensen argues that "Compromises on 
1° Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 61. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p. 64. 
13 Ibid., p. 66. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., p. 64. Italics original. 
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policy had become a used to guarantee the 
administration's grand strategy". 16 
Christensen's .-.~--.-·--- is shared by other scholars. Rourke, for example, 
observed that 
Hemmed in by the nature of their appeal for foreign aid and by 
legislative insistence on tying the questions of aid for Europe and aid 
for China together, the [first Truman] Administration had little choice 
but go against its own better judgment and submit to congressional 
demands for a China aid program. 17 
This situation was maintained into 1949. By April 1949, the term of the 
China Aid Act of 1948 was due to expire before all the assistance had been delivered. 
Having realised that "Further U.S. military aid to the Nationalists will probably be 
ineffectual and would eventually contribute to the Communist military strength and 
solidify the Chinese people in support of the Communists", the State Department had 
no intention of continuing the aid. 18 In March 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the Administration would not seek 
additional funds for China in fiscal year 1950. This decision set the stage for a deeply 
divisive debate in the United States over 'who lost China?' - "a debate so riddled by 
ideology and invective, partisan politics and intense political conviction that it would 
seriously confound US China policy for the next thirty years". 19 
The decision was made unilaterally by Truman and Acheson. 2° Congress 
agam forced the Administration to compromise and continue the aid. For 
the Administration, domestic political support was too important to sacrifice. The 
16 Ibid., p. 68. 
17 John Rourke, Congress and the Presidency in US Foreign Policymaking: A Study of Interaction 
and Influence, 1945-1982 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 76. 
18 Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 80. 
19 Victoria Marie Kraft, The US Constitution and Foreign Policy: Terminating The Taiwan Treaty 
(New York et al.: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 3. 
20 Ibid., p. 3. 
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Administration needed Senate approval of the renewal of Europe Recovery Program 
and the Military Assistance Program (MAP). 21 
points out that constant threats by Senate and House Republicans to 
withhold support for the Administration's pet foreign policy programs was one of the 
three-pronged political strategies employed by the China bloc in its effort to force the 
Truman Administration to change its course. "Although this strategy never resulted 
in any major changes in the administration's hands-off China policy'', Kraft notes, "it 
was effective in getting President Truman to make several token concessions on 
economic assistance to China".22 For example, in August 1949, following a vote in 
the House to reduce by half the administration's proposed $1.5 billion European aid 
package, President Truman, in exchange for Republican support for his full program 
of aid to Europe, "voluntarily" agreed to support the creation of a contingent 
economic aid fund for use in the general area of China. 23 
Another central issue in the Truman Administration's China policy was the 
recognition of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Christensen believes Dean 
Acheson was prepared to recognise the CCP. But under Congressional, media, and 
popular pressure, in 1949 and 1950 Acheson continually rejected this notion.24 
The China bloc adamantly opposed diplomatic recognition of Communist 
China. In June 1949, a group of twenty-one senators, led by Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg, sent a letter to Truman asking him "to make it clear" that recognition of 
the Chinese Communists was not in order. In October, Senator William F. Knowland 
21 Christensen, Useful Adversaries, pp. 81-90 
22 Kraft, The US. Constitution and Foreign Policy, p. 7. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 97. 
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headed a major Congress. 25 
Seeking to relieve some of the pressure from the China bloc, in August 1949 
the State Department "made it unequivocally clear" Truman would not 
recognise the CCP without first consulting Congress.26 Two months later, believing 
Secretary Acheson was "misunderstood" to favour recognising the CCP, the State 
Department announced the President had no intention of even considering diplomatic 
recognition of the CCP. Acheson also revealed the Administration intended to use a 
three-pronged standard to detennine whether diplomatic recognition of CCP was in 
order: namely, the Chinese Communists must actually control the mainland; they 
must rule with the acquiescence of the people; and they must give evidence of their 
willingness to live up to their international obligations.27 
While emphasising the important role Congress played the recognition 
issue, Kraft also points out that during the critical months between October and 
December 1949, "President Truman's ability to recogmse communist China was 
hampered not so much by a lack of congressional support as it was by the standard for 
diplomatic recognition Secretary Acheson had articulated". 28 Kraft lists some events 
which powerfully reinforced the China bloc's argument that the Chinese Communist 
government was an "outlaw regime" intent on flaunting established international 
convention. These events included the detention of Angus Ward and several other 
American officials, a prohibition on news dispatches from foreign correspondents in 
Shanghai, and the seizure of the American consular offices in Beijing.29 
On 5 January 1950, Truman announced that "The United States will not 
25 Kraft, The US. Constitution and Foreign Policy, pp. 9-10. 
26 Ibid., p. 10. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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or to Chinese forces on Formosa not 
pursue a course which will lead to an involvement the civil conflict China".30 
Truman's speech was fiercely attacked by Congress. Even Senator 
Vandenberg, the champion of bipartisanship for Europe, abandoned the 
Administration's ship, causing perhaps the biggest threat to the Administration's 
grand strategy. Vandenberg attacked the Administration's Asia policies for 
undermining any remaining hope for continued bipartisanship in foreign policy. 31 
One week later, however, Acheson reiterated Truman's points in an address 
before the National Press Club. Acheson's speech "set off a torrent of criticism in 
Congress". 32 The State Department was charged with being guided by a left-wing 
group. Senators demanded a vote of censure against the Administration, as well as 
Acheson's resignation. 33 
Scholars believe Congressional anger over the Truman Administration's China 
policy resulted in the defeat of the Administration's Korean Aid Bill in the House on 
19 January 1950.34 This relatively small aid package ($60 million) later passed the 
House, but only after an amendment extending the economic assistance bill to 
Chiang was attached. The aid was reportedly used for weapons. 35 Thus, the 
Administration reversed its hands-off China policy and remained linked to Chiang. 
30 As quoted in Rourke, Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policymaking, p. 131. 
31 Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 111. 
32 Rourke, Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policymaking, p. 132. 
33 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1969), pp. 355-58. 
34 These scholars differ on which element played a vital role. Robert M. Blum said the bill failed to 
pass the House because of the opposition of an overlapping coalition of "economisers, Republican 
partisans, isolationists, and some members of the China bloc". [ See Robert M. Blum, Drawing the 
Line : The Origin of the American Containment Policy in East Asia (New York: Norton, 1982), pp. 
184-185.] But Christensen's argument leads to the conclusion that the China bloc played a vital role. 
[See Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 116.] Rourke tends to emphasise the importance of 
partisanship. He believes that "House Republicans chose to risk losing Korea in order to save 
Formosa". See Rourke, Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policymaking, pp. 132-133. 
35 Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 116. 
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exceptionally examination recognition controversy 
from 1949 to 1950 Tucker does not neglect Congress .36 
Tucker believes Congress was almost completely ignorant about the KMT and 
the CCP. spite of its low degree of enlightenment, Tucker notes, the White House 
and the State Department had to take notice of Congress. A major reason was the 
Congressional China bloc. Despite its small number, the China bloc held a great 
influence in Congress. The bloc was a group of right-wing senators and 
congressmen, mostly Republicans, who "were thoroughly frustrated by Truman's 
unexpected election victory of 1948 and convinced that the Democratic 
administration was soft on Communism at home and Abroad". 37 Some of them might 
also have felt a personal concern about China's civil war and the KMT cause or might 
have had their interest in China aroused by constituency pressures.38 
In line with Christensen, Tucker argues that although Congress exercised little 
formal control over policy determinations regarding China, it possessed an unusual 
degree of influence in the late 1940s in the whole realm of foreign affairs. Since the 
most important post-war American policies required massive funding, Congress 
wielded ultimate authority over several critical issues. The China bloc, in tum, 
managed to ally itself with other dissenters from Administration programs and 
thereby exaggerated its own influence. Truman, Acheson and virtually all of the 
State Department staff dismissed the demands of the Nationalist partisans but found 
that minor concessions helped smooth relations with their Congressional critics. The 
36 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition 
Controversy, 1949-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). 
37 Kraft quotes John K. Fairbank in Kraft, The US. Constitution and Foreign Policy, p. 6. 
38 Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p. 162. 
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Administration, therefore, remained to the KMT long after enthusiasm for 
connection ceased to exist. 39 
Similarly, Kraft attributes the Truman Administration's China policy to 
domestic pressure. Noting the spring of 1950 President Truman not only 
abandoned his policy of "no aid to China" but also did an about-face on the question 
of recognising Communist China and supporting its admission to the United Nations, 
Kraft asserts: 
How and why this policy reversal came about is a classic story in 
domestic politics. The short answer is that two forces were already at 
work in 1949 to undermine the Truman administration's proposed 
China policy. One was the China Lobby, .... The second was the 
China bloc.40 
Focusing on Washington's Taiwan policy from 1949-1950, Finkelstein 
explores how abandonment was turned into salvation,41 
Unlike Christensen, Finkelstein is less assertive on the role of Congress. He 
argues that in December 1949, when policy paper NSC-48 was about to be 
finalised,42 "the most powerful force for reversing Taiwan policy was from within the 
administration itself". And it was Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson who led an all-
out offensive aimed at providing military assistance to the KMT on Taiwan.43 
Finkelstein, however, does believe Congress was important shaping US 
Taiwan policy during this period. In fact, he lists Congress as the first front on which 
39 Ibid., pp. 167-168. 
4° Kraft, The U.S. Constitution and Foreign Policy, p. 6. 
41 David M. Finkelstein, Washington's Taiwan Dilemma, 1949-1950: From Abandonment to Salvation 
(George Mason University Press, 1993). 
42 NCS-48 was written in response to a presidential request for policy recommendations following 
disclosure that the Soviet Union had probably achieved a successful nuclear explosion in August 1949. 
It was never formally approved by President Truman; but the doctrine set forth in the memorandum 
had a great influence on US national security policy - particularly following the invasion of South 
Korea in June 1950. See Moore et al., National Security Law Documents, pp. 35-69. 
43 Finkelstein, Washington's Taiwan Dilemma, p. 208. 
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the State Department faced with its China problem for most of 1949.44 Even in its 
offensive to save Taiwan in December 1949, the Department of Defense had to rely 
heavily on the support of Congress. Immediately after Truman's speech of 5 January 
1950, Senator William Knowland, leader of the China bloc and known as the 
"Senator from Formosa", initiated a five-hour debate in the Senate. The debate 
continued "in a most heated manner" for four more days.45 
As shown above, observers who have paid attention to Congress during this 
period are likely to emphasise the extraordinary influence of the China bloc. Tucker 
points out that in fact the China bloc and its sympathisers composed a minority in 
Congress and its influence was limited before 1950. It was the advent of 
McCarthyism early in 1950 that began the transformation of the China bloc from a 
relatively weak to a frighteningly powerful influence on American foreign policy. 
Joseph McCarthy charged the Truman Administration with harbouring Communists 
and losing China. These charges received lurid publicity. Ignorant of Chinese affairs 
and having no particular interest in the East, McCarthy used the issue to further his 
political career. The China Lobby and the China bloc, in turn, used the senator, 
supplying him with information about his victims and alleged Administration 
betrayals of Chiang Kai-shek.46 
Purifoy writes that for four years McCarthy "stalked unimpeded through the 
legislative and executive branches of the American government, literally setting the 
terms under which they could operate".47 The unbelievable reach of his destructive 
power has been assessed by Rovere as follows: 
He held two Presidents captive - or as nearly captive as any 
Presidents of the United States have ever been held; in their conduct of 
44 Ibid., p. 164. 
45 Ibid., pp. 265-281. 
46 Ibid., p. 167. 
47 Purifoy, Harry Truman's China Policy, p. 154. 
the nation's affairs, Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower, from 
early 1950 through late 1954, could never act without weighing the 
effect of their plans upon McCarthy and the forces he led, and in 
consequence there were times when, because of this man, they could 
not act at all.48 
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Purifoy argues that even the Korean intervention was partly due to 
McCarthyism. It was to be hoped that so great a capitulation would, at the least, 
bring domestic peace. US. News & World Report said the Korean intervention let 
Secretary Acheson "off the hook on the Communist issue".49 
Oksenberg believes the long term consequences of McCarthyism "are hard to 
exaggerate". 50 He points out that 
For over a decade, national debate on China policy was frozen. The 
deep animosities and cleavages in the academic community ... took 
over a decade to heal and effectively prevented the scholarly study of 
Communist China until the 1960s. More important, the State 
Department lost many of its most knowledgeable foreign service 
officers who specialised on China.51 
A similar assessment was made by Rourke: 
His [McCarthy] tactics virtually destroyed the State Department's 
expertise on mainland China and inhibited normalisation of relations 
for two decades. . . . More than twenty foreign service officers, 
representing nearly all the Department's 'China hands,' were fired, 
forced to resign, or transferred to posts in less 'sensitive' areas.52 
Not long after the Korean War, between early September 1954 and late April 
1955, the United States was locked in a harrowing confrontation with China over a 
number of small islands just off the coast of China held by KMT. After studying the 
scholarly literature on US policy during this crisis, Accinelli concludes the literature 
48 Richard H. Rovere, Senator Joe McCarthy (New York: Meridian Books, 1960), p. 5. 
49 As quoted by Purifoy, Harry Truman's China Policy, p. 206. 
50 Michel Oksenberg, "Congress, Executive-Legislative Relations, and American China Policy" in 
Kenneth W. Thompson et al. (eds), The President, the Congress and Foreign Policy (Lanham et al.: 
University Press of America, 1986), p. 214. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Rourke, Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policymaking, p. 134. 
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less 
attention to the domestic setting, particularly the role of Congress".53 Accinelli 
believes "throughout the crisis, Eisenhower Secretary of State Foster 
Dulles charted their course with a watchful eye on Congress and on domestic opinion 
generally". 54 
On 28 January 1955, Congress overwhelmingly approved the Formosa 
Resolution,55 granting the President unprecedented authority to employ US armed 
forces in the area of Taiwan Strait. However, Accinelli points out that "an in-depth 
analysis shows that the administration's relationship with Congress during the crisis 
was more complex than the lopsided passage of the Formosa Resolution would 
suggest".56 Accinelli believes that "Congressional opinion - either actual or 
anticipated - affected their [Eisenhower's and Dulles'] decisionmaking throughout 
the crisis and at several critical junctures helped tip the balance toward moderation 
and restraint". 57 
his thorough study of US policy towards Taiwan during the 1950-1955 
period, Accinelli concludes the influence of the domestic environment on government 
actions relating to Taiwan was "important but intermittent". 58 Due to the 
extraordinary political sensitivity of China policy, the Executive could not easily 
53 Robert Accinelli, "Eisenhower, Congress, and the 1954-55 Offshore Island Crisis" in Presidential 
Studies Quarterly (XX:2, Spring 1990). P.329. In his book, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands 
(Armonk, New YorkJLondon: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), Thomas E. Stolper has a very brief discussion 
about Congress and the Formosa Resolution. He notes that "though virtually everyone in Congress was 
prepared to defend Taiwan, there was great reluctance to become embroiled in the offshore islands". 
The Eisenhower assuaged the doubts of Congress by "giving private assurances". pp. 68-69. 
54 Accinelli, "Eisenhower, Congress, and the 1954-55 Offshore Island Crisis", p. 329. 
55 The House gave its approval on 25 January by a vote of 409 to 3, and the Senate on 28 January by a 
vote of 85 to 3. See Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands, p. 69. 
56 Accinelli, "Eisenhower, Congress, and the 1954-55 Offshore Island Crisis", p. 329. 
57 Ibid., p. 330. 
58 Robert Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950-1955 (Chapel 
Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), p. 260. 
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afford to overlook and Congressional viewpoints. Nevertheless, Accinelli 
argues: 
Even when popular and legislative viewpoints impinge on decision 
making, however, they were nearly always subordinated to national 
security considerations. Also, policymakers guided manipulated 
domestic and congressional opinion through their public statements and 
actions, or in some instances, by cloaking their intentions and activities 
in secrecy .... Congress, though sometimes balky and quarrelsome, ... 
usually followed the lead of the executive branch.59 
Accinelli further states that "for all their [the pro-Taiwan partisans] outspokenness 
and ample capacity for troublemaking, they were by no measure the arbiters of US 
China policy". 60 
The above examination demonstrates that scholars generally agree that 
Congress played an important role in US China policy from the late 1940s to mid-
1950s. In some cases, such as continuous US support for the KMT and the US 
decision not to recognise the CCP, Congress' role might be decisive. Accinelli's and 
Rourke's somewhat similar assessments may represent the view of the majority. 
While Accinelli believes Congress played a "significant, inconsistent and secondary 
role",61 Rourke concludes: 
This accounting of Congress's oppos1t10n to dealing with mainland 
China does not imply that in the absence of Congress the United States 
would have embraced Mao Tse-tung's government with open arms. 
Certainly that would not have been the case. It is difficult to escape the 
conclusion, however, that things would have been different. The gulf 
might not have been so wide; the road to reconciliation might have been 
shorter.62 
After the 1954-1955 offshore islands cns1s, some members of Congress 
suggested new policy proposals towards Beijing. For example, on 18 February 1957, 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., p. 261. 
61 Accinelli, "Eisenhower, Congress, and the 1954-55 Offshore Island Crisis", p. 343. 
62 Rourke, Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policymaking, p. 140. 
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Senator Foreign Relations suggested 
the United States "should recognize Red sooner or 63 June 1957, 
Senator J. Fulbright, second member on the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, said recognition Red China by the United States was 
inevitable in the course of time. 64 The rising sentiment in Congress for a revision in 
US policy towards China was put to an end in September 1958 when Beijing started 
shelling Quemoy Island and initiated the second offshore islands crisis. 
From the Vietnam War to Normalisation 
In the following one and half decades, US policy towards China was 
dominated by containment. Neither Congress nor the Executive offered any serious 
initiatives. 
President John F. Kennedy considered the state of US relations with China 
"irrational" because he believed Communist China was here to stay and was not a 
"passing phase". 65 However, he was hampered by domestic politics and was not 
ready to make any change. In first year of the Kennedy Administration, the tide 
of international opinion was beginning to tum in favour of admitting PRC to the 
UN. Wary of anti-China forces at home, Kennedy reportedly told US ambassador to 
the UN, Adlai Stevenson, a long critic of US China policy, that "if Red China comes 
into the UN during our first year in town, ... they'll run us both out". 66 They put their 
personal preferences aside to keep Communist China out of the UN. 
63 Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, United States-China Normalization: An Evaluation of Foreign Policy 
Decision Making (Denver, Colorado: University of Denver, 1986), p. 130. 
64 Ibid. 
65 William M. Bueler, US China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan (Boulder, Colorado: Colorado 
Associated University Press, 1971), p. 43. 
66 As quoted in Kraft, The US. Constitution and Foreign Policy, p. 27. 
84 
Kennedy's judgement was not without solid basis. Basically, any attempt to 
deal with China was "short-circuited" by Congress.67 In 1961, there was increasing 
pressure from the newly admitted Afro-Asian bloc in the UN to admit PRC into the 
UN. The Kennedy Administration studied the possibility of seating PRC and 
enlarging the Security Council to accommodate a two-China policy. The Committee 
of One Million and its supporters in Congress immediately launched intense 
opposition.68 Against the Administration's opposition, the Senate passed a dissenting 
resolution in July, and the House followed suit in September by a vote of 395 to 0.69 
In his examination of US China policy under the Kennedy Administration, 
Bueler concludes that domestic political pressures on Kennedy "would have made it 
extremely difficult for him to adopt a new policy toward China and Taiwan even ifhe 
had been intellectually convinced that a basic change in the direction of US policy 
was necessary during his term of office".70 
It is believed Kennedy planned to pay more attention to the China problem 
and to attack the problem with greater vigour ifhe were re-elected.71 As it turned out, 
he had no chance to carry out his plan. 
Under the Lindon B. Johnson Administration, China policy did not change 
much. As observed by Bueler, "During the last three years of the administration the 
67 Rourke, Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policymaking, p. 142. 
68 Rourke has a brief introduction to the Committee of One Million: "The Committee of One Million 
was, in part organised and later headed by Representative Walter Judd, a former missionary in China, 
was dedicated to preventing mainland China's admission to the United Nations. Also by extension it 
acted as a lobby for the Nationalist Chinese cause. Initially it included two dozen senators and nearly 
one hundred representatives. . . . Its campaign and effect on Congress was clearly demonstrated by the 
inclusion of anti-Chinese communist statements in the 1956, 1960, and 1964 national platforms of both 
the Republican and Democratic parties. By 1966, a total of 334 members of Congress were on the 
roles of the Committee of One Million. The organisation retained a powerful influence over American 
policy toward China until, ironically, its crusade was defeated by its early supporter, Richard Nixon. 
See ibid., p. 133. For more information see, Stanley D. Bachrack, The Committee of One Million: 
China Lobby Politics,1951-1971 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). 
69 Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 307-10. 
70 Bueler, US China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan, p. 54. 
71 Ibid., p. 55. 
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Vietnam war so dominated Asian scene a senous of the 
foundational of China policy was for intents purposes out the 
question". 72 
But a remarkable change Congressional attitude towards US China policy 
started in the mid-1960s. As noted by Kraft, 
the momentum in Congress began to shift away from the Republican 
right wing . . . and toward a bipartisan coalition of congressional 
moderates and liberals, who increasingly used the Senate Foreign 
Relations committee as a platform from which to make their own 
views on China known.73 
There were several reasons for the change, including "the frustration of American 
military involvement in Vietnam, the emergence of a wide Sino-Soviet rift, and the 
perceived need for American communication with the world's most populous nation 
- a major nuclear power".74 In March 1966, Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, convened his committee for hearings to 
reconsider China policy. Although the hearings had no immediate effect on China 
policy, "they nonetheless evidenced a growing willingness in Congress to 
countenance the 'new realities' in China".75 On 19 May 1966, after a three-week 
hearing on US policy towards China, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the 
Far East and Pacific released a hearing report on US policy towards Asia. While 
suggesting the United States should prevent Beijing from engaging in expansion in 
Asia, the report encouraged the US government to continue seeking peaceful contact 
with China. 76 
Gregor notes that "ever since 1969, the United States Congress had sought to 
72 Ibid., p. 57. 
73 Kraft, The U.S. Constitution and Foreign Policy, p. 29. 
74 Sutter, The China Quandary, p.17. 
75 Kraft, The U.S. Constitution and Foreign Policy, p. 30. 
76 Chang, United States-China Normalization, p. 131. 
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exercise greater over the foreign policy prerogatives of the executive office. 
To that end it had established an ad hoc Subcommittee on United States 
Agreements and commitments abroad".77 With growing assertiveness, Congress 
renewed its interest in China. And when Richard Nixon made his opening to China in 
the early 1970s, the Administration carefully calculated Congressional mood. 
The fact Richard Nixon opened the door to China "should not obscure the critically 
important role the Senate Foreign Relations Committee played in making the 
president's trip to China poetically possible in the first instance". 78 
On 10 March 1969, Senate Majority leader Mike Mansfield urged the United 
States to put an end to special travel restrictions towards China. Senator Edward 
Kennedy advocated the United States should establish consular relations with China 
and support Beijing's admission to the United Nations, although Kennedy 
emphasised these steps should be taken without jeopardising US relations with 
Taiwan. 79 
In September 1969, by a 77-3 roll-call vote, the Senate passed a resolution 
declaring that US recognition of a foreign government did not "of itself imply that the 
US approves of the form, ideology or policy of that foreign government".80 The 
resolution was regarded by its opponents as an attempt "to clear the way for the 
recognition of Communist China". 81 
Although there was a rising desire in Congress to revise the US containment 
and isolation policy towards Beijing, Congressional support for US commitment to 
77 A. James Gregor, The China Connection: U.S. Policy and the People's Republic of China (Stanford 
University: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 128. 
78 Kraft, The U.S. Constitution and Foreign Policy, p. 34. For more information, see the same book, 
pp.34-35. 
79 Chang, United States-China Normalization, p. 131. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
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was Joanne Chang out Congress responded 
favourably towards Sino-American rapprochement, not at the expense of Taiwan's 
security. For this reason, "President Nixon was particularly cautious the 
drafting of the Shanghai Communique to avoid any charge Sino-American 
rapprochement was achieved abandoning Taiwan".82 The fear of a strong 
domestic political backlash from conservative Republicans prevented the Nixon 
Administration from making further concessions to China on the Taiwan issue. This, 
scholars have observed, made it impossible for Nixon to establish full diplomatic 
relations with China during his visit to China in 1972.83 
Congress, like the American public, was surprised by President Nixon's 
announcement in July 1971 that he would travel to China in February 1972. 
Although Congress supported the Nixon Administration's China policy, members 
were unhappy Congress had not been openly and extensively consulted. Oksenberg 
notes that "the resulting resentment probably cost the executive branch some support 
its subsequent dealings with China".84 
Nixon planned to normalise US-China relations his second term. But he 
was soon tied to the Watergate scandal. "From April (1974) through Nixon's 
resignation on August 9, 1974", Ross noted, "the media and the Democrat-controlled 
Congress had the White House on the defensive, and flexibility in foreign policy was 
a major casualty". 85 
President Gerald Ford had a very short "honeymoon" with Congress. His 
82 Ibid., p. 133. 
83 Ibid.; Kraft, The U.S. Constitution and Foreign Policy, p. 35; Sutter, The China Quandary, p. 3. 
84 Michel Oksenberg, "Reflections on the Making of American China Policy" in U. Alexis Johnson et 
al. (eds), China Policy for the Next Decade: Report of the Atlantic Council's Committee on China 
Policy (Boston, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1984), pp. 74-75. 
85 Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969-1989 (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 56. 
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decision to grant free and absolute" generated a storm of 
controversy in Congress. While Henry Kissinger continued his efforts to normalise 
relations with China, his efforts were challenged by some members of Congress, 
including Senators Barry Goldwater, Strom Thurmond and Jesse Helms. They were 
particularly opposed to the Ford Administration's China policy. In October 1975, 
Goldwater insisted the President "switch the interests of the United States ... away 
from Communism and toward freedom in the Far East", and argued the President 
should cancel his visit to Beijing and visit Taiwan instead.86 They threatened to back 
Ronald Reagan for the Republican nomination. Thus, Ross concludes, Ford was in no 
position to make the difficult decision to break diplomatic relations with Taiwan and 
normalise relations with China. 87 
Ross believes the Carter Administration took a relatively benign view of the 
Soviet Union and was not in a hurry to normalise relations with China. Beginning in 
1978, however, Carter grew increasingly apprehensive about Soviet foreign policy 
and speeded up the process of normalisation. 88 
Most analysts share Ross' argument. Sutter, for example, notes "the 
administration of President Jimmy Carter, especially in its last two years, shifted 
away from the policy of 'evenhandedness' that had characterized the American 
approach to the Sino-Soviet powers in the past". 89 Hao, in his case study of 
normalisation of US-China relations and the Taiwan Relations Act, observes that 
President Carter hoped his policies would lead to "simultaneous improvement" in 
relations with both China and the Soviet Union and that in 1977 China policy had a 
86 Ibid., pp. 80-81. 
87 Ibid., p. 81. 
88 Ibid., p. 124. 
89 Sutter, The China Quandary, p. x, pp. 3-4. 
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agenda. 90 He lists a 
1978. The first and second were 
the "deterioration of American-Soviet Relations" the "potential of Sino-Soviet 
detente". Domestic considerations came third and mainly influenced the timing for 
the normalisation.91 
Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang offers a different explanation for the delay in 
normalising the relationship. In fact, she believes the case of Sino-American 
normalisation of relations provides a good example of a situation in which Congress 
is capable of influencing the outcome of foreign policy, although indirectly. She 
argues that "Were there no strong Congressional opposition to Beijing's terms, full 
diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing might have been established 
long before 1978 or even during President Nixon's 1972 trip to China".92 
Congressional opinion was generally favourable to normalisation of US-China 
diplomatic relations in the late 1970s. Many members, however, remained concerned 
over US relations with Taiwan and especially Taiwan's security after normalisation. 
They therefore were opposed to accepting Beijing's terms for normalisation. In July 
1978, the American Conservative Union (ACU) conducted a poll among members of 
the House of Representatives. Each Congressional office was asked to answer the 
following question: "Would you support normalisation of relations with the People's 
Republic of China if that meant that the United States would have to sever full 
diplomatic ties with the Republic of China and abrogate our Mutual Defense pact 
with that country?" Of the 435 House members and four delegates that ACU reached, 
90 Hao Yufan, Solving the Dilemma in China Policy: 1978-1979: A Case Study of Normalisation of 
US-China Relations and the Taiwan Relations Act (U.M.I Dissertation Information Service, 1991), p. 
104. 
91 Ibid., pp. 182-190. 
92 Chang, United States-China Normalization, p. 136. 
90 
1 expressed their opposition to normalisation on Beijing's terms. Another 
members were "leaning against" normalisation on such terms. One hundred 
eighty Congressmen either made no response or were undecided, and 8 members 
refused to answer the poll. Only 6 members stated that they were either in favour, or 
were "leaning favour". 93 
Although the Carter Administration had discussed normalisation with literally 
hundreds of senators and representatives from 1977 on,94 the process was known for 
its secrecy. Congressional leaders with responsibility for Asia had consistently 
warned the Carter Administration that failure to consult with Congress on US-China 
relations would likely lead to a "divisive debate" over China policy.95 On 20 July 
1978, just a few months prior to recognition, the Senate passed a non-binding 
resolution, the Dole-Stone resolution, by a 94 to 0 vote. The resolution stated that it 
was the sense of the Congress that there should be prior consultation between 
Congress and the executive branch on any proposed changes affecting the Mutual 
Defense Treaty of 1954 with Taiwan. The State Department announced that it 
recognised and accepted the need for such consultation.96 
In practice, however, the Administration conducted negotiations in secrecy.97 
It believed leaks would enable conservative politicians to mobilise sentiment against 
normalisation, thus either upsetting the new opening to China or undermining the 
93 As cited, ibid., p. 134 
94 Oksenberg, "Congress, Executive-Legislative Relations, and American China Policy", p. 215. 
95 Clement J. Zablocki, "U.S. Policy Toward China - A Congressional View" in the Institute of 
World Affairs, the University of Wisconsin, Domestic Developments in China and the Future of US.-
China Relations: Proceedings of the Wisconsin Conference on China, May 13-14, 1977, pp. 126-127. 
96 Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, pp. 141-142 .. 
97 Robert Sutter notes that the Carter administration defended its record of consultations with 
Congress, stressing that members of Congress had been told of the administration's intention to 
establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. But Congressional observers stressed that the central 
question in China policy at that time related not to diplomatic relations with the PRC but to concern 
about how normalisation would be handled by the administration, especially how would Taiwan be 
treated. The administration failed to provide adequate consultations on these important questions. See 
Sutter, The China Quandary, pp. 89-90. See also John Charles Daly et al., The Future of Chinese-
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popularity the breakthrough.98 Normalisation was announced on 15 
1978; only a select group of congressmen were informed the normalisation shortly 
before the announcement. Congressman Lester Wolff, then Chairman of 
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, later recalled: 
neither the administration nor the State Department consulted the 
Congress for any recommendations, but merely informed us of their 
decision, hours before the announcement was to be made. As 
Chairman of the Subcommittee for Asian and Pacific Affairs, having 
been given no inkling of the impending decision, I was infonned one 
hour before the president was to make his statement over the airwaves. 
I was told not of the contents of the message that was to be delivered 
but that the president was to make an important declaration, and to 
listen closely to the radio. Now, more importantly, the chairman of the 
full House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Zablochi, was also given 
this message. He was given double the time I had, two hours before 
the announcement, but far short of time to confer or make any 
recommendations. 99 
Congressmen were also angered by the fact that Chiang Ching-Guo, the 
President of Taiwan, was awakened 
President Carter planned, within the next seven hours, to end the thirty-year US 
relationship with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. And it was just days 
before a scheduled general election Taiwan. This contributed to a perception 
Congress that President Carter was hostile or indifferent to the fate of Taiwan. 100 
Scholars believe the Carter Administration's failure to seek prior consultation 
with Congress, and Congressional suspicion that the Administration's focus on the 
strategic importance of China undermined its commitment to Taiwan, created a 
American Relations (Washington D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
1979), p. 10. 
98 For a detailed analysis of secrecy that surrounded the Carter administration's China policy, see 
Sutter, The China Quandary, pp. 93-94, pp. 100-103. See also Oksenberg, "Congress, Executive-
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bipartisan consensus that Congressional involvement was legitimate and necessary in 
shaping US policy towards China. 101 As Congressman Gerald B. H. Solomon later 
noted, "the congressional reaction to President Carter's capitulation ... can be best 
characterized as one of muted anger, along with a firm resolve to neutralize the 
dangerous message that President Carter brought to the United States and to the free 
world on that day". 102 
The Years after the Normalisation 
After the normalisation in 1978, Congress "was determined to play its role in 
an assertive, vigorous fashion". 103 By then, Gregor notes, "the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee had already emerged as a formidable potential obstacle to 
101 Jones, "United States Arms Exports to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act", p.54. Kraft 
believes that "President Carter's decision to exclude Congress from the foreign policy making process 
proved to be a politically counterproductive one. It ushered in a period of frequently contentious 
executive-legislative relations; it prompted an almost endless stream of complaints about the lack of 
congressional consultation; and it made it harder for President Carter to persuade 'doubters' to trust the 
administration on military and diplomatic issues". (See Kraft, The U.S. Constitution and Foreign 
Policy, p.74). Sutter also notes that "The Carter administration's initiatives ... had the serious side 
effect of promoting repeated quarrels and controversy among American leaders, which undermined the 
administration's efforts to build support in the United States for its new relationship with China". (See 
Sutter, The China Quandary, pp. 4-5.) See also Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, p. 142; Tan, 
Qingshan, The Making of U.S. China Policy: From Normalisation to the Post-Cold War Era, (Boulder 
and London: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 33; Oksenberg, "Congress, Executive-Legislative Relations, 
and American China Policy", p. 216. and Hoyt Purvis, "Introduction: Legislative-Executive 
Interaction" in Hoyt H. Purvis and Steven J. Baker (eds.), Legislating Foreign Policy (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1984), pp. 7-8. 
102 Gerald Solomon, "Luncheon Address" in The Heritage Foundation, A Heritage Roundtable: US.-
China Relations: Challenge to American Policymakers (1984), p.49. Robert Sutter further articulates 
that the Carter administration's initiatives alienated four important groups in Congress, the 
administration, and elsewhere. They included: 1) Those who emphasised the need to preserve 
American honour and reliability in Asian and world affairs by maintaining commitments to long-
standing allies, represented by Senator John Glenn, Chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; 2) those who judged that American 
collaboration with China--especially closer U.S.-PRC military ties--would lead to serious adverse 
consequences for what they judged were far more important American interests vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union, represented by Secretary Vance; 3) Those who were traditionally suspicious of China's 
communist system and its intentions in East Asian and world affairs, represented by Senators Barry 
Goldwater, S. I. Hayakawa, and Jesse Helms; 4) Those who favoured an open approach in U.S. foreign 
policy designed to inform the American people and their representatives of the full implications of 
major departures in U.S. foreign policy, like the administration's initiatives to China, represented by 
congressman Lester Wolff. See Sutter, The China Quandary, p.5. See also Hao, Solving the Dilemma 
in China Policy, pp. 238-247. 
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Carter's plans". 104 Two different Congressional strategies evolved. One was to take 
the President to court. The other was to actively participate in the making of 
legislation proposed by the White House that would give legal standing to future US-
Taiwan relations. 
On 22 December 1978, Republican Senator Barry Goldwater filed a lawsuit 
against President Carter. In Goldwater v. Carter, the District Court of the District of 
Colombia ruled that the President's unilateral termination of the Mutual Defense 
Treaty with Taiwan of 1954 was "unconstitutional for lack of Senate or congressional 
participation" .105 Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Colombia reversed the decision on appeal. Ultimately, the Supreme Court declined to 
rule on the merits of the case, with a plurality holding that the plaintiff senators 
lacked standing to bring suit and a four-justice concurring opinion stating that the 
case was a nonjusticeable political question. 106 
The second and more significant product of Congressional concern over the 
Carter Administration's abandonment of Taiwan was the enactment of the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA). 107 The TRA was originally proposed by the Carter 
Administration. It was necessary to create the American Institute on Taiwan (AIT). 
As it turned out, the TRA provoked considerable resentment in Congress. It was 
regarded as hastily produced legislation which failed to address a number of broader 
foreign policy issues, including the security of Taiwan. 108 
Although aware of Congress' resentment, President Carter warned on 26 
104 Gregor, The China Connection, p. 128. 
105 As quoted in Colin P. Jones, "United States Arms Exports to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations 
Act: The Failed Role of Law in United States Foreign Relations", Connecticut Journal of International 
Law (9:51, 1993), p. 56. 
106 Ibid. For more information, see Kraft, pp. 81-113. 
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U.S. Constitution and Foreign Policy, pp. 115-141. 
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January 1979, the day the Administration submitted its legislation to Congress for 
approval, that he would veto any legislation that "would contradict or that would 
violate the agreements" with China, even if that veto came at the risk of a break in 
US-Taiwan ties. 109 The warning only aggregated the anger of Congress. 
Scholars generally agree Congress' activism influenced the outcome of the 
TRA. 110 After rewriting, revising and amending the Administration's initial proposal, 
the TRA clearly expressed Congressional concerns. 111 As summarised by Jones, 
The TRA not only reaffirmed the United States intention to maintain 
close and friendly relations with Taiwan, but codified the nation's 
policy of commitment to Taiwan's continued security. That policy 
includes supplying the island with the arms necessary to protect itself. 
The TRA further mandates that in furtherance of this policy, 'the 
United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and 
defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable 
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability'. Additionally, 
the TRA directs the President and Congress to make joint 
determinations of the nature and quantity of defense articles and 
services required by Taiwan. 112 
Fifteen years later, Representative Thomas J. Manton stated the TRA "gives 
the Congress a well-defined statutory role in conducting United States foreign policy 
toward Taiwan" and it "puts the Congress in the driver's seat with regards to peace, 
security, and stability in the Western Pacific region". 113 
Having examined Congress' role in four cases, including the TRA, Oksenberg 
summanses: 
While the executive branch is constitutionally charged with the 
management of foreign policy, on several occasions the Congress has 
decisively intruded into the management of China policy. When the 
Congress has chosen to immerse itself, its impact has proven profound 
109 Tan, The Making of U.S. China Policy, p. 34. Kraft, The U.S. Constitution and Foreign Policy, p. 
117. 
uo For a detailed description of the process, see Hao, Solving the Dilemma in China Policy, pp. 261-
328. 
111 Sutter lists four major aspects of the Congressional influence on the Act, namely security issues, 
economic and legal questions, security treaty and Congressional oversight. see Sutter, The China 
Quandary, pp. 77-80. 
112 Jones, "United States Arms Exports to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act", p. 57. 
113 Congressional Record, 20 April 1994, p. E724. 
and long-lasting. Sometimes, observers allege that congressional 
involvement tends to be sporadic and episodic. The four cases, 
however, reveal that Congress can seize and ride herd over vital issues 
for a sustained period of time. 114 
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Scholars generally agree TRA is an important case in examining the role of 
Congress in China policy. Tan, for example, believes 
The passage of the TRA represented an important change in the 
making of China policy. It signified congressional assertiveness in 
China policymaking. Congress, by revising the Taiwan legislation 
proposed by the executive, established its role as a China 
policymaker. 115 
Beijing raised objections with the US government over certain provisions of 
the proposed legislation. Observers noticed that "the belated and quiet Chinese 
protests seemed to reflect the PRC's ignorance of the American political system". 116 
None of Beijing's diplomatic personnel attended any of the Senate hearings. 117 
Senator Frank Church commented, "the Chinese Ambassador wants to talk to me. It 
comes as a surprise to him that he has several governments to contend with here in 
Washington, not just the President and the administration but the Congress too" .118 
Not surprisingly, the TRA soon caused trouble in US-China relations. Sutter 
noted "The passage of the TRA did not end controversy regarding US relations with 
Taiwan. Indeed, US policy toward Taiwan had been clouded by the passage of the 
Act". 119 While the US Congress regarded it as the law governing US-Taiwan 
relations, in the view of the PRC, it had no relationship whatsoever to the Joint 
114 Oksenberg, "Congress, Executive-Legislative Relations, and American China Policy", p. 218. 
115 Tan, The Making of U.S. China Policy, p. 25. 
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Communique on Normalisation negotiated by President Carter. 120 In fact, US arms 
sales to Taiwan was an unresolved issue left over from the normalisation of US-China 
relations. Both countries agreed to disagree on US policy towards this issue while 
normalising diplomatic relations. 121 During his administration, President Carter gave 
priority to his foreign policy objective of improving relations with China and put 
arms sales to Taiwan under close scrutiny. His Taiwan policy was therefore 
frequently attacked by Congress. Taiwan policy was also an issue in the 1980 
presidential election. Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan promised to carry out the 
TRA's provisions for arms sales to Taiwan. 122 In 1981and1982, this issue developed 
into the first crisis in US-China relations since normalisation. 123 
On 11 June 1981, President Reagan announced that "We have ... a law, 
called the Taiwan Relations Act, that provides for defensive equipment being sold to 
Taiwan as well as other things in the relationship. I intend to live up to the Taiwan 
Relations Act". 124 Beijing reacted strongly against President Reagan's speech and 
threatened to downgrade relations with the United States if the arms sales to Taiwan 
went through. 125 In the following months, the US-China relationship deteriorated 
sharply. By early 1982, Beijing accused the Reagan Administration of having driven 
the relationship to a "crisis point". 126 
120 See Tao-tai Hsia, "The P.R.C.'s Attitude Toward the Taiwan Relations Act" in Chen (ed.), China 
Policy and National Security, pp. 195-197. For an analysis about the TRA and US China policy, see 
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Then, on 30 July 1982, after several months of confusion in US China 
policy, 127 President Reagan told a group of Republican lawmakers the United States 
and China were in the process of drafting a joint communique "affirming the Taiwan 
Relations Act". 128 On 17 August, he announced the United States and China had 
signed a communique governing their relationship to Taiwan. According to the 
communique, the United States would limit and ultimately end arms sales to Taiwan. 
Although the Administration consulted with some influential members of 
Congress, the communique had been largely negotiated by the Administration 
unilaterally. 129 Tan has observed that while Congress played an important role in the 
decision to sell military spare parts to Taiwan, "there was no formal congressional 
action involved in the management of the arms sales crisis". 130 
In the years after the TRA, Congressional pressure has continued and has 
occasionally been effective. For example, in August 1979, only four months after the 
TRA, Vice-President Walter Mondale disclosed that the Administration planned to 
end some commercial agreements with Taiwan and replace them with unofficial 
arrangements. Congress regarded the disclosure as a reversal of the Administration's 
repeated assurances given at the time of US-China normalisation that all treaties and 
agreements between the United States and Taiwan, except the defence treaty, would 
remain in effect after formal ties had been established with China. It accused the 
Carter Administration of deliberately misleading Congress and responded to 
127 For more information, see ibid., pp. 130-135. 
128 Ibid., p. 135. 
129 Richard Bush pointed out that Congressional judgement over the level of consultation was mixed. 
While Senator Charles Percy, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee called the 
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Mondale's announcement quickly and forcefully. "Congressional pressure ultimately 
forced the administration to give ground", noted Sutter. 131 
Successive administrations, however, have tried to outmanoeuvre Congress. 
The Carter Administration on 4 January 1980 announced that a package of new 
weapons would be sold to Taiwan during the year. Congress was informed just a few 
days before the announcement and it was out of session when the announcement was 
made. The Administration did not consult with Congress and was criticised for 
having ignored Congress' desire to determine what US arms would be sold to 
Taiwan. 132 During the Reagan Administration, as mentioned earlier, the 17 August 
1982 communique was negotiated largely unilaterally by the Administration. 
Congressional members who had been active in the making of the TRA tend 
to think highly of the role the TRA has played in US policy towards Taiwan. 
Congressman Gerald B. H. Solomon claimed in 1984: "In light of the August 17th 
communique and the Taiwan Relations Act, we have prevented the erosion of our 
support for Taiwan and its capability to protect itself'. 133 Senator Richard G. Lugar, 
for six years chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, noted in early 
1989 that Taiwan's economic and political development "over the past decade would 
have been more difficult without the US security assurance in the TRA including the 
sale of arms, military and services". 134 
After examining Congress' role m some important issues m US-China 
relations from the normalisation to late 1980s, Tan concludes "Congress ... did more 
than oversee and approve the executive's China policies. It asserted itself, as it did in 
131 Robert Sutter, "The Taiwan Relations Act and the United States' China Policy", pp. 60-61. 
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the TRA, by initiating China policies, playing what is normally considered the 
executive role". 135 
On the side of the executive, Sutter summarises: 
Presidents Nixon and Gerald Ford were generally sensitive to the 
strong domestic disagreements over China and took care that their 
policies did not substantially exacerbate those tensions. President 
Carter adopted a different approach. He repeatedly pushed the U.S. 
relationship with the PRC forward despite sharp resistance from 
American leaders in the Congress, the administration, and elsewhere. 
Ronald Reagan also triggered a major public debate over U.S. policy 
concerning Taiwan during the presidential campaign of 1980. Peking 
responded with strong public pressure and new demands for further 
U.S. compromise over the Taiwan issue--a stance that led to a 
slowdown in U.S.-PRC relations. 136 
In 1983 the Reagan Administration started to look at China as a power of 
reduced strategic importance. China no longer occupied centre stage as a global 
power in American foreign policy. Its importance was second to Japan. The 
Administration acknowledged the existence of conflicts between the two countries 
and preferred not to compromise with China merely to try to eliminate inevitable 
sources of tension. 137 Sutter points out that the Reagan Administration's China policy 
"hit upon a balance that appeared basically acceptable to the administration and to 
various leaders in Congress". 138 Sutter believes that from 1983 or 1984 to mid-1989 
there was "general consensus over United States policy towards China" which 
"prevailed in Congress, and between Congress and the executive branch". 139 
During the George Bush Administration, however, this consensus no longer 
existed. President Bush had quite a different view about China. Ross notes that 
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"Unlike the Reagan administration, the Bush administration emphasized China's great 
strategic significance". 140 It believed that the Soviet threat was no longer the primary 
foundation of US policy towards China and that China was a regional power and not 
a global power. But the Administration "elevated regional issues to high priority". 141 
As it turned out, Bush's China policy during his four-year term caused serious friction 
between the Executive and Congress. 
Decision-Making Behaviour of Members of Congress in China Policy 
The literature on the factors influencing the making of US foreign policy has 
been growing steadily in the past two or three decades. The most examined factors 
include interest groups, public opinion and ideology. 142 Other factors receiving 
scholarly attention include the media and constituency.143 
In the case of US China policy, there are some studies on influential factors, 
although none focusing specifically on Congress. 144 Some detailed studies of 
Congress' role in making China policy also mention factors or motivations 
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142 Douglas C. Foyle, Counting the Public in: Presidents. Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1999); David A. Hubert, Public Opinion and the Reagan Doctrine: 
Issue Structure and the Domestic Setting of Foreign Policy (ANN Arbor, MI: University Microfilms 
International, 1996); Ole R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1996); William A. Marjenhoff, Public Opinion and Reagan Foreign 
Policy Making (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1994); Richard Sobel (ed.), Public Opinion in 
U.S. Foreign Policy: The Controversy over Contra Aid (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993); 
David Howard Goldberg, Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups: American and Canadian Jews 
Lobby for Israel (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990); Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign 
Policy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988); Thomas B. Lee (ed.), Ideology and 
Practice: The Evolution of U.S. Foreign Policy (Taipei: Tamkang University, 1985); Robert H. Trice, 
Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: U.S. Policy in the Middle East (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1976); Doris A. Graber, Public Opinion, The President, and Foreign Policy: Four Case 
Studies from the Formative Years (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1968). 
143 See for example, Bernard Cecil Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Berkeley, CA: Institute of 
Governmental Studies, University of California, 1993); Robert H. Puckett, America Faces the World: 
Isolationist Ideology in American Foreign Policy (New York: MSS Information Corp, 1972); James 
Reston, The Artillery of the Press: Its Influence on American Foreign Policy, 1st ed. (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1967). 
144 Outstanding examples are Rober G. Sutter, U.S. Policy toward China: An Introduction to the Role 
of Interest Groups (Lanham. MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Jie Chen, Ideology in U.S. Foreign 
Policy: Case Studies in U.S. China Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992); Leonard A. Kusnitz, Public 
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influencing the decisions of Congressional members. But most stop at mentioning 
these factors or motivations, without providing further analysis. 
Similar to the literature on Congress' role in making China policy, best 
literature on the decision-making behaviour of Congressional members in China 
policy mainly rests in studies about China policy during the late 1940s and the early 
1950s. There exist some detailed studies on certain members of Congress. One 
example is the study about Republican Congressman Walter H. Judd (1943-1962), 
who had served as a Congregationalist medical missionary in China for about 10 
years.145 
As an influential figure in China Lobby, Judd exercised an important role in 
China policy during his time in office. Even before he was elected to the House, he 
had been called as a witness before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He 
"freely used his personal experience in China to claim a peculiar understanding of the 
Oriental mind and the mysterious social and political institutions of the East".146 
While he was in Congress, he was one of Congress' most sought-after speakers. 
Time magazine informed its readers in March 1945 that "Of all Americans occupying 
elective office, the man who knows most about the Far East is almost certainly 
Congressman Walter Judd of Minnesota". 147 The New York Times in 1952 noted that 
Judd rated as an Asian expert not only with Republicans, but also with many 
Washington Democrats. 148 
Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China Policy, 1949-1979 (Wesport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1984). 
145 Tony Ladd, "Mission to Capitol Hill: A Study of the Impact of Missionary Idealism on the 
Congressional Career of Walter H. Judd" in Patricia Neils (ed.), United States Attitudes and Policies 
toward China: The Impact of American Missionaries (Armonk, New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 
1990), pp. 263-283. 
146 Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p. 88. Tucker's analysis of Walter Judd draws heavily on Floyd R. 
Goodno's Ph. D. thesis, Walter Judd: Spokesman for China in the House of Representatives 
(Oklahoma State University, 1970). 
147 Purifoy, Harry Truman's China Policy, p. 53. 
148 Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p. 256, note 48. 
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Judd's view on China policy was largely shaped by his conservative ideology 
and his experience in China. But that was not all. It was observed that "The sincere 
concern with which missionary Judd viewed the civil war in China did not prevent 
politician Judd from recognizing the partisan use to which Chinese developments 
could be put". 149 In April 1950, he boasted to his constituents that "much" of the 
material used in the Senator Joseph McCarthy's initial speeches had been supplied by 
him. "Communism charges", Judd asserted, "should be exploited by Republicans in 
this year's elections". 150 
In fact, the Republicans had tried to make China a major campaign issue in 
the 1948 presidential election. "Almost every major Republican supported 
Nationalist China unconditionally", it was observed. 151 But President Truman's 
support for aid to Chiang prevented China from becoming an effective campaign 
issue for the Republicans. 152 
Public opinion has long been regarded as an influential factor in US foreign 
policy making, though scholars disagree on its strength. Richard C. Bush argues that 
during the Bush Administration, "General public opinion on China was both difficult 
to gauge with any precision and had little consequence for policy". 153 He notes that 
the effect of public opinion regarding China on members of Congress was limited 
and that interest groups and constituents who took time to write to their 
representatives could be more effective. 154 
149 Ibid., p. 89. 
150 As quoted, Ibid. 
151 William P. Head, America's China Sojourn: America's Foreign Policy and Its Effects on Sino-
American Relations, 1942-1948 (Lanham, New York and London: University Press of America, 1983), 
p. 278. 
152 Ibid. Nancy B. Tucker noted that the reason why the Republicans had barely mentioned events in 
China during their campaign in 1948 was that they were convinced that Thomas Dewey would win the 
presidency. See Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p. 163. 
153 Bush, "Domestic Political Considerations That Shape U.S. Policy toward China, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwan", p. 150. 
154 Ibid. 
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Christensen, however, believes public opinion was an important factor which 
had influenced decision-making behaviour of members of Congress. In his detailed 
study of the making of US China policy in the late 1940s and 1950s, Christensen 
argues: 
Congressional oppos1t10n to a leaner, strongpoint grand strategy that 
included Europe but excluded China was also largely based in concerns 
about public opinion .... the debate on Capitol Hill shows that leaders 
there were acutely sensitive to public opinion. Domestic opinion about 
how to fight communism, not the inherent strategic importance of China 
or the belief that a limited program might be effective, led senators to 
approve the China aid measures. 155 
Public opinion is also somewhat linked to constituency politics. Christensen 
notes that "the key electoral strategy" for members of Congress immediately after 
World War II was "to appear more fiscally conservative than the administration on 
most foreign policy issues, including China, so as to pass the blame of high costs on 
to the administration". 156 But after the Truman Doctrine speech, Congressional 
members "wanted to appear in the lead both on cost cutting and on international 
anticommunism" to meet public demands "for both economy and 
anticommunism". 157 One answer they found was to force Truman to assume 
relatively inexpensive and symbolic anticommunist policies toward China whenever 
major legislation was raised for Europe. 158 
In her thorough study of US-China relations and the recognition controversy, 
Tucker identified other factors although without much detail. For example, she notes 
that the influential China bloc consisted of people with different motivations, 
including ideology, personal interest and constituency politics. Tucker summarises: 
A few members of Congress, such as Walter Judd (R, Minn.) and John 
Vorys (R, Ohio), had actually spent time there and felt a personal concern 
155 Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 69. 
156 Ibid., p. 72. 
157 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
158 Ibid., p. 73. 
about the civil war and the Kuomintang cause .... Others joined the 
China bloc ... because they represented an anticommunist front. Styles 
Bridges (R, NH), for one, followed a variety of such causes, seeking to 
defend his own country against subversion or contagion. Another group 
of Senators and Congressmen had their interest in China aroused by 
constituency pressures. Senator Pat McCarran (D, Nev.) labored to 
protect the silver producers of his state by urging appropriation of aid 
funds to China in silver and encouraging the Nationalist government's 
use of silver currency. 159 
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Not all scholars may agree with this classification. Purifoy, for example, 
believes that Senators Styles Bridges and William F. Know land, like Congressmen 
Walter Judd and John Vorys, were genuinely concerned about China. 16° Finkelstein, 
on the other hand, points out that Senator H. Alexander Smith, a leading member of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "was definitely not among those politicians 
who were using China problems for personal or partisan reasons". 161 Senator Smith, 
according to Finkelstein, felt that Walter Judd was too "emotional", Senator 
McCarren's motives were suspect and Senators Owen Brewster and Styles Bridges 
were determined to use China policy as strictly a partisan issue. He "genuinely 
attempted" to get the State Department leadership to work with Congress and to help 
Chiang and to work out a sound Asia policy. 162 
In addition to the China bloc, there was a group of "new isolationists" or 
"Asialationists". These people had been "old isolationists" in the Grand Old Party 
(GOP, the Republican Party). After World War II, they realised that they could no 
longer publicly admit to being isolationists without appearing ridiculous. On the one 
hand, they "believed devoutly" in the menace of Communism. On the other hand, 
they could not readily accept the grand strategy of "containment" as it "called for too 
159 Tucker, Pattern in the Dust, p. 162. 
160 Purifoy, Harry Truman's China Policy, p. 60. 
161 Finkelstein, Washington's Taiwan Dilemma, p. 216. 
162 Ibid., pp. 217-218. 
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much expenditure on far-flung adventures". 163 They would accept, however, less 
attention to Europe and more attention to Asia as it was "the traditional diplomatic 
preserve of Republicans" .164 
Indeed, the reason for the largest number in Congress to participate in the 
China controversy in those years was partisanship. "Senator Torn Connally (D. 
Tex.), an Administration Democrat, supported every action President Truman took", 
Tucker notes. "The Robert Tafts and William Knowlands, on the other hand, 
opposed the White House and the State Department with a relish that their scant 
interest in China could not explain", Tucker further points out. "They saw the 
Administration's ill-fated involvement in the Chinese civil war as a way to drive the 
'Democratic dynasty' out of power". 165 
Lobbying by interest groups was another factor. 166 Among the different 
lobbying efforts, that made by Chinese Nationalists was perhaps the most important. 
According to Tucker 
The Chinese Nationalists viewed members of Congress as their most 
important resource in the United States. Chinese officials and hired 
lobbyists cultivated Senators and Representatives, hoping to swing their 
military aid votes, to induce them to speak out publicly on behalf of the 
Kuomintang struggle, and to acquire their assistance in exerting pressure 
on the Adrninistration. 167 
As indicated in the Introduction of this thesis, the influence of interest groups 
on US foreign policy, including China policy, and on members of Congress has been 
relatively well studied. Another often-mentioned and relatively well-studied factor is 
ideology. 
163 Purifoy, Harry Truman's China Policy, p. 49. 
164 Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
165 Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p. 163 
166 For more information about the China lobby, see Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American 
Politics (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1960); Congressional Quarterly, China: US. Policy since 
1945 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980), p. 30. 
167 Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p. 162. 
106 
In his study, Christensen noted the Truman Administration could not sell its 
disengagement China policy to Congress because "China fit cleanly into the purview 
of the Truman Doctrine" .168 Representative Walter H. Judd charged "contradictions" 
in Truman's program and asked if the Administration had one policy in Greece and 
another in China. 169 
Indeed, from the early 1950s when Senator Joseph McCarthy started his hunt 
for Communists in the United States to the early 1970s, US China policy was 
dominated by anti-Communist ideology. Not only administration officials but also 
members of Congress could not afford to appear "soft" or "weak" on China. As 
noted by Sutter, 
It became an article of faith that the United States would check potential 
communist Chinese expansion ... would isolate the PRC diplomatically 
and economically, and would maintain support for the Nationalist 
Chinese government in Taiwan. To advocate change in this policy was 
thought to be suicidal in American politics, particularly in the face of the 
so-called China lobby. 170 
The prominent influence of ideology gave way to that of strategic 
consideration under the Nixon Administration. President Nixon wrote to Congress in 
February 1970, claiming that "the 'isms' [had] lost vitality".171 Kissinger also noted 
that "Our objective was to purge our foreign policy of all sentimentality" .172 
During the Carter Administration, Congress' strong displeasure with the 
Administration's conduct in normalising Washington's relations with Beijing and 
Congress' subsequent hard-line position on the TRA were mainly rooted in the 
Administration's failure to consult widely with Congress. Both chambers had made 
168 Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 61. 
169 Ibid., p. 63. 
170 Sutter, The China Quandary, p. 2. 
171 As cited in Yufan Hao, Dilemma and Decision: An Organizational Perspective on American China 
Policy Making (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1997), pp. 26-
27. 
172 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 191. 
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clear before late 1978 they expected to be informed of any possible changes in US 
policies towards Beijing and Taipei. 
Citing Congressional sources, Sutter offered several reasons why members of 
Congress were so concerned about being consulted before a shift in China policy.173 
One reason was that many members "saw the United States going too far in 
withdrawing from security commitments in the region ... and in trying to improve 
relations with former adversaries". 174 Another reason was the Carter 
Administration's poor record in consultations with Congress on other foreign policies 
issues. Yet another reason was constituency politics. China policy had a strong 
impact on local constituencies. While a majority of the American people favoured 
normalising relations with Beijing, a similar majority opposed breaking official US 
ties with Taipei.175 Therefore, "any U.S. decision to end official ties with Taiwan as 
a condition of normalization was likely to alienate a large portion of the American 
electorate" .176 
There are other factors which may have influenced the decision-making 
behaviour of members of Congress. One such factor is the media. By influencing 
public opinion, the media played an important role in shaping China policy in the late 
1940s and the early 1950s.177 However, its influence on members of Congress has not 
been well studied. In an interesting study about the interplay between the press and 
173 Hao made a similar explanation. But he did not mention constituency politics. See Hao, Solving 
the Dilemma in China Policy, pp. 124-127. 
174 Sutter, The China Quandary, p. 91. 
175 For a summary of various public opinion polls regarding Washington-Beijing and Washington-
Taipei relations, see Hao, Dilemma and Decision, pp, 58-59, 122-123. 
176 Sutter, The China Quandary, p. 92. 
177 See Christensen, Useful Adversaries; Finkelstein, Washington's Taiwan Dilemma; Tucker, 
Patterns In The Dust. 
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the US government in making China policy, Congress is hardly mentioned. The US 
government is almost exclusively represented by the executive branch. 178 
One more important, yet rarely studied factor, is Congressional ignorance. 
Tucker, in her study on China policy around 1950, points out that Congress' 
ignorance of Kuomintang politics and of the development of Chinese Communism 
pervaded the Congress. According to Tucker, the majority of senators and 
representatives shared with their constituents an almost complete indifference to 
China. State Department officials desiring cooperation from Congressmen in the 
lengthy process of decision making had to "be grimly determined to hunt them down 
and drag them there". 179 
Conclusion 
The limited study on Congress' role in the making of China policy 
demonstrates that Congress should by no means be neglected. In the period from the 
late 1940s to the late 1950s, Congress played a critical, or even decisive role, in 
making policies towards China, including continuing support for the KMT 
government before and after it fled to Taiwan and the US decision not to recognise 
the CCP. 
During the period from the Vietnam War to normalisation, Congress' role in 
China policy was less prominent, yet still visible. Both Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson were wary of anti-China sentiment in Congress and did not try to make 
major changes to China policy. President Nixon's visit to China was made at a time 
when Congress' attitude towards China had changed remarkably. Still, Congressional 
pressure had a substantial influence on the Administation's Taiwan policy and made 
178 Tsan-Kuo Chang, The Press and China Policy: The Illusion of Sino-American Relations, 1950-
1984 (Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1993), p. 244. 
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it impossible for Nixon to establish full diplomatic relations with the PRC during his 
visit to China in 1972. 
The Carter Administration largely sidestepped Congress in normalising US-
China relations. But Congress reacted strongly by rewriting, revising and amending 
the TRA. This specific case has become an often-cited case for studying Congress' 
role in foreign policy making. 
This literature review tends to emphasise cases in which Congress played an 
important role. This should not overshadow the fact that in many important cases 
Congress' role was very modest if not neglectable. Recent examples include Nixon's 
effort to open up China, Carter's effort to normalise US-China relations and Reagan's 
negotiation with China in managing the arms sales crisis. 
While some detailed studies of US-China relations give us a rather good big 
picture of Congressional influence on the outcome of US China policy, few of them 
provide a detailed analysis of the interactive relationship between the two branches. 
With regard to decision-making behaviour of members of Congress, scholars 
have identified influential factors like interest groups, ideology, constituency politics, 
partisanship, strategic consideration, personal concern, public opinion and Congress' 
ignorance. Yet, most of them have not been adequately studied. 
More in-depth studies are therefore of great importance in terms of theoretical 
contribution and prediction of Congressional behaviour in foreign policy. 
179 As quoted in Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p. 155. 
PART II 
Chapter 3 
MFN under the Bush Administration 
Only four months after George Bush entered the Oval Office in 1989, US-
China relations took a sharp downturn. The Tiananmen Square crackdown of 4 June 
1989 put the whole US-China relationship in danger. 
US public opinion reacted dramatically to the crackdown. In early 1989, 
according to a Gallup poll, 72% of Americans said they viewed China favourably. 
By August, only 31 % felt that way. Meanwhile, the percentage of Americans who 
viewed China unfavourably leapt from 13% to 58%.1 
This dramatic change of public opinion was reflected in the US Congress. As 
pointed out by Sutter and Dumbaugh, the crackdown "brought about an end to a 
pattern of general Congressional support for Administration initiatives on China that 
had characterized US policy since 1980".2 They note that "between 1989 and 1992, 
the US policy process on China was characterized by confrontation rather than 
consensus, with Congress and the Bush Administration clashing repeatedly over the 
direction and conduct of China policy".3 
Indeed, the Tiananmen Square crackdown set the background for the battle 
between the Bush Administration and Congress. Democrats and conservative 
Republicans in Congress took the opportunity presented by reconsideration of 
China's most-favoured-nation (MFN) status to express its dissatisfaction with the 
Bush Administration's China policy. Starting in 1990, Congress tried repeatedly 
without success to revoke or place conditions on China's MFN status. The legislative 
1 The Economist, "How America Sees China", 25 October 1997, p. 22. 
2 Robert Sutter and Kerry Dumbaugh, "U.S.-China Relations", Congressional Digest (Vol. 74, No. 8-
9, August-September 1995), p. 197. 
3 Ibid. 
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action in 1990 was incomplete and the 1991 and 1992 bills which passed both 
chambers were vetoed by Bush and the vetoes were sustained in the Senate. 
This chapter will examine each of these legislative bids in turn after a brief 
discussion of how Congressional attitudes developed in the immediate aftermath of 
the Tiananmen Square crackdown. This chapter is a chronological description. It 
will also note the motivations of key players. A more detailed analysis of their 
motivations is left for Part III of this thesis. 
Congressional Mood after the Tiananmen Square Crackdown 
Immediately after the crackdown, the Bush Administration imposed a series 
of sanctions against China. The Administration also said it would make a 
sympathetic review of requests by Chinese students and scholars in the United States 
who wished to delay their return home.4 At the same time, however, the 
Administration determined that it was important to maintain the economic 
relationships with China. s 
The Administration's actions initially won broad praise m Congress. 
However, while the Administration took a "measured response approach",6 Congress 
demanded a tougher China policy. As time passed by, the difference between the two 
branches with regard to China policy became greater and a clash seemed inevitable. 
4 Department of State Bulletin, "News Conferences of June 5 and 8 (Excerpts)", (98:2149, August 
1989), p. 46. 
5 Department of State Bulletin, "After the NA TO Summit: Challenges for the West in a Changing 
World: Secretary Baker's Address and Excerpts from the Question and Answer Session at the National 
Press Club on June 8, 1989", (98:2149, August 1989), p. 58. See also, Department of State Bulletin, 
"Secretary Baker's Interview on 'Evans and Novak,' Paris, July 15, 1989'', (89:2150, September 
1989), p. 11. 
6 Department of State Bulletin, "News Conference of June 29'', (89:2150, September 1989), p. 64. 
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On 20 June, the Bush Administration announced a second set of sanctions. 7 
The next day, in light of the executions in China, Senate Majority Leader George J. 
Mitchell called for the President to "make a complete review" of the US relationship 
with China, including economic relationship. But he specifically made clear that he 
did not suggest an immediate termination of trade. s 
The first two bills seeking to deny China MFN status were introduced to the 
Committee on Finance on 22 June 1989 by two Democratic senators: Senators Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan and Alan Cranston. Senator Moynihan is a former Harvard 
professor in international law and a staunch supporter of Tibet known for his 
"assertive belief in American principles".9 If Moynihan's bill passed, China's MFN 
status would be withdrawn 15 days after the date of enactment. Io On 23 June, another 
Democratic senator, Senator Dennis DeConcini, introduced to the Committee on 
Finance his bill to deny China MFN status. I I The Senate Finance Committee took up 
none of the three bills. 
It was the House that took the lead in expressing Congressional dissatisfaction 
with Bush's China policy. On 29 June, the House voted for economic sanctions 
against China to protest the suppression of dissent. It passed amendments containing 
the sanctions to the annual foreign aid authorisation bill by a 418-0 vote.I2 
The sanctions enclosed in the bill closely resembled actions Bush had already 
taken. Yet, the Administration refused to endorse the package. Recognising political 
7 Congress and the Nation, "Trade: 1989-90 Chronology", (Vol. VIII, 1989-1992), p. 251. 
8 Congressional Record, 21 June 1988, p. 12626. 
9 Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1992 (Washington, D.C.: 
National Journal, 1991), p. 830. 
IO For the text of the bill, see Congressional Record, 22 June 1989, p. 13126. 
I I Congressional Record, 23 June 1989, pp. 13436-37. 
I2 For the sanctions, see Martin Tolchin, "House, Breaking with Bush, Votes China Sanctions", New 
York Times, 30 June 1989, pp. Al, A7. 
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reality, however, the Administration made no attempt to stop the package other than 
to denounce it. Secretary of State James Baker stressed that the President, not 
Congress, bore the responsibility for formulating foreign policy. 13 
The foreign aid authorisations bill later died in the Senate. But the Senate on 
14 July agreed to a package of sanctions that generally paralleled the provisions 
passed by the House with the foreign aid bill. Noticeably, the Senate's package was 
co-sponsored by the leaders of both parties, namely Majority Leader George J. 
Mitchell and Minority Leader Bob Dole. The package was an amendment to the 
fiscal 1990 State Department authorisation bill and was adopted by an 81-10 vote. 
Along with other sanctions, the amendment called on the President to "immediately 
review ... the advisability of continuing to extend most-favored-nation (MFN) trade 
treatment to Chinese products".14 
By co-sponsoring the amendment, Bob Dole by no means intended to 
challenge the Bush Administration's China policy. Before voting, Dole said he was 
informed that the Administration could "live with the Senate action". He hoped that 
the amendment would give the President and the Administration "a stronger and more 
credible hand to play in their dealings with Beijing".15 
The Administration did not try to stop the packages of sanctions on China, but 
it demanded greater flexibility for the President to act on his own to repeal the 
sanctions. A deal was made between the President and Congress on 7 November 
1989. 16 The bill then passed the Congress on 16 November. But the measure 
13 Department of State Bulletin, "News Conference of June 29", p. 63. 
14 Congressional Record, 14 July 1989, p. 14734. 
15 Ibid., p. 14736. 
16 Ibid. See also US Congress, United States Policy Toward China, Hearing, before Committee of 
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, (2nd Sess., lOlst Congress, 8 February 1990), p. 48. 
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included an unrelated restriction on the President's foreign policy powers that 
prompted Bush to veto it on 21 November.17 
The difference between the Administration and Congress regarding US China 
policy was dramatised and brought to the attention of US public on 30 November 
when Bush vetoed Chinese Emergency Immigration Act (H.R. 2712), a bill that 
would give Chinese students in the United States four more years to apply for new 
visas, or for permanent residence, while also waiving the requirement that they first 
return to China. The measure, sponsored by Democratic Representative Nancy Pelosi, 
passed the House on a 403-0 vote and the Senate by a voice vote. The Chinese 
government had threatened to pull out of the Fulbright scholarship program and other 
educational exchanges if the bill became law. In announcing the veto, Bush said : "I 
want to see these exchanges continue because it is in the national interest of the 
United States to promote the exchange of technical skills and ideas between Chinese 
and Americans. It is my hope that by acting administratively, we will help foster the 
continuation of these programs" .18 Even as Bush vetoed the bill, he simultaneously 
ordered the Immigration and Naturalization Service to adopt a series of measures that 
would give all Chinese nationals who wanted to remain in the United States with 
exactly the protection offered in the legislation.19 Still, many legislators, especially 
the Democrats, were furious. They accused Bush of"kowtowing to Beijing".20 
17 Congress and the Nation, "Trade: 1989-90 Chronology'', p. 252. Bush vetoed the bill because he 
objected to the Moynihan provision, which prohibited the diversion of funds for purposes for which 
US assistance was prohibited. Congressional Record, 29 January 1990, p. 673. 
18 For the memorandum of disapproval from Bush, see Congressional Record, 23 January 1990, pp. 4-
5. Thomas L. Friedman, "White House Asks an Irate Congress for China Support", New York Times, 
24 January 1990, p. A8. 
19 For the comparison of the bill and the Administration's directive, see Congressional Record, 23 
January 1990, p. 47. 
20 Joan Biskupic, "Veto of Chinese-Students Bill Touches off Furor on Hill", Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report (47:48, 2 December 1989), p. 3316. 
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Despite the dissatisfaction in Congress, President Bush in early December 
made a decision which, while praised as "courageous" by his supporters,21 hardened 
the Congressional sentiment towards the Administration's handling of the US-China 
relationship. On 9 December, National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and the 
Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, made a surprise visit to Beijing, 
which further angered many members of Congress. During the visit, Scowcroft 
toasted Chinese leaders by saying that "In both our societies there are voices of those 
who seek to redirect or frustrate our cooperation. We must take bold measures to 
overcome these negative forces". 22 In the minds of many members of Congress, there 
was no doubt that Scowcroft was pointing to them as the "negative forces".23 
Members of Congress questioned Bush's judgment in sending senior aides to 
China. They said that step had the appearance of relaxing the sanctions against 
China. George J. Mitchell condemned the US overture as "embarrassing kowtowing 
to the Chinese Government",24 and Nancy Pelosi called it "a slap in the face to the 
forces of democracy".25 
More members were subsequently "astonished" by the revelation that 
Scowcroft and Eagleburger paid a secret visit to Beijing early in July although Bush 
21 US Congress, United States Political and Economic Policy Toward China, Hearing, before 
Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and International Economic Policy and Trade of 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives (1st Sess., lOlst Congress, 13 December 
1989), p. 34. 
22 Elaine Sciolino, "On China, Congress Is Almost Assertive'', New York Times, 28 January 1990, p. 
IV3. 
23 Congressional Record, 23 January 1990, p. 22. Sciolino, "On China, Congress Is Almost 
Assertive". When asked what the negative forces in the United States were in a Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee's hearing, Eagleburger answered: " They fit into two categories, .. Those who 
first of all have never believed that there should have been an opening to China and believe this is 
confirmation of that fact, and those who look upon the relationship between the PRC and the United 
States as wholly dependent ... upon their human rights performance". See US Congress, US. Policy 
Toward China, Hearing, before Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate (2nd Sess., lOlst Congress, 7 
February 1990), p. 33. 
24 Elaine Sctolino, "President Defends Aides China Visit", New York Times, 12 December 1989, p. 
A9. 
25 Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Gamble with Beijing", New York Times, 13 December 1989, p. A8. 
117 
said he had suspended high-level meetings with the Chinese government. They 
accused Bush of being duplicitous. 26 
Noticeably, a series of Bush's actions were taken during the recess of 
Congress. The Administration's first secret mission to China took place during the 4 
July 1989 recess. The second Scowcroft mission and the veto of the Chinese students 
bill occurred during the December adjournment. 
The Administration's unpopular moves hardened its Congressional critics' 
position and the struggle between the two branches accelerated. Distrusting the 
Administration in toughening its policy towards China, lawmakers believed Congress 
should take charge and act on its own. 
On 10 January 1990, Beijing lifted martial law. While Bush hailed this move 
as "a very sound step",27 Congress was not persuaded that China's action was 
significant or that Bush's policy towards Beijing was effective. Nancy Pelosi even 
dismissed the Beijing action as "an empty gesture".28 
Confidence in Bush's China policy was still slipping. In the first major test of 
Congressional support for Bush's China policy, the House overwhelmingly (390-25) 
overrode Bush's veto of the Chinese Emergency Immigration Act. The fight over the 
Act was more about symbols than substance: in legal terms there was not much 
distinction between the bill and the executive order. 
The Administration had focused its lobbying effort on the Senate. As late as 
23 January 1990, Secretary of State Baker was not sure whether the Administration 
26 Maureen Dowd, "2 U.S. Officials Went to Beijing Secretly in July", New York Times, 19 December 
1989, pp. Al, A9. US Congress, United States Policy Toward China, Hearing, before Committee of 
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, p. 17. 
27 Robert Pear, "Bush Hails a Thaw in China; Congress Is Skeptical", New York Times, 12 January 
1990, p. Al. 
28 Robert Pear, "U.S. Eases China Curbs as Martial Law Is Over", New York Times, 11 January 1990, 
p. Al; Pear, "Bush Hails a Thaw in China; Congress Is Skeptical". 
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would be able to stop the Senate from confirming an override of the veto. Senator 
Alan K. Simpson, the Senate minority whip, predicted that a veto override "will pass 
like a dose of salts".29 But Bob Dole told Baker he would tally the votes he could 
muster. He would try to enlist everyone from past Presidents to China experts in an 
attempt to block an override. 3o 
On 25 January, the day Senate voted on the veto, the Administration lobbied 
intensely, with Bush meeting Republican senators, Baker visiting the Senate, and 
former President Richard M. Nixon making phone calls to senators. Alan K. Simpson 
later said that he had never seen the President "as focused, as forceful and as 
effective" as he was at the morning meeting.31 
In the end, the Senate did not override the veto, but the attempt to do so failed 
by just 4 votes (62-37). Those who voted to sustain Bush's veto were all Republicans. 
But even they had doubts about Bush's China policy. In fact, in Congress, "no one 
was happy" Bush had vetoed the bill in the first place. 32 Senators who voted with the 
President did so because they felt "there was a heavy element of partisan politics 
involved".33 There were also other reasons: first, Bush promised senators his 
administrative actions would insure no Chinese students would be sent home; 
secondly, Bush convinced senators that if the vote was lost it would mean a serious 
political blow to the Presidency at the start of a new political season; thirdly, senators 
believed that the President, not Congress, should make foreign policy.34 A White 
29 Thomas Friedman, "Bush Is Set Back by House Override of Veto on China", New York Times, 25 
January 1990, pp. Al, A6. 
30 Ibid. 
31 R. W. Apple Jr., "Senate, by 4 Votes, Fails to Override Bush's China Veto: Getting Mad, Getting 
Even'', New York Times, 26 January 1990, pp. Al, A9. 
32 Sciolino, "On China, Congress Is Almost Assertive". 
33 US Congress, U.S. Policy Toward China, Hearing, before Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 
p. 43. 
34 Apple, "Senate, by 4 Votes, Fails to Override bush's China Veto: Getting Mad, Getting Even". 
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House official also revealed "there were attempts to convince Republicans - no 
matter what they thought of this particular issue - that it was more important to 
stand with the President, that this issue would set the tone for this whole session of 
Congress and show whether the Democrats can roll us when they want to".35 
After the unsuccessful override attempt, Congress fell back on the State 
Department authorisation bill which Bush had also vetoed. Congress had been 
working on a revised version which did not have the provision Bush found offensive. 
On 30 January, the Senate unanimously approved (98-0) the new bill and it was 
signed into law by Bush on 16 February. The bill denounced the Chinese 
government's "unprovoked, brutal and indiscriminate" attack on the thousands of 
protesters in Beijing on 3-4 June. Adding teeth to the rhetoric, the bill put into law a 
number of the sanctions that Bush had imposed. The sanctions would mainly affect 
US private investments in China, military industry and nuclear industry. The 
President could lift any or all sanctions through the national interest clause, or by 
reporting to Congress that China had made "progress on a program of political 
reform", including such items as halting the executions of dissidents and releasing 
political prisoners.36 
Again, the Congressional action was much a symbolic gesture. First, it simply 
enforced the sanctions the Administration had imposed on China. Secondly, by the 
35 Sciolino, "On China, Congress Is Almost Assertive". 
36 Congress and the Nation, "Trade: 1989-90 Chronology", p. 252. The major sanctions included: 1) 
Suspended risk insurance and other financing for private investments in China by the OPIC. Aid to 
China under the US Trade and Development program also was to be suspended; 2) Prohibited all 
exports to China of weapons and military equipment. This did not apply to items intended for civilian 
use. A similar provision prohibited exports to China of instruments and equipment used for crime 
control or detection; 3) Prohibited exports to China of satellites made in the United States. The main 
effect of this sanction was to continue a ban on the Chinese launching of a Hughes Aircraft Co. 
Satellite; 4) Prohibited exports to China of supplies, equipment and technology used for nuclear power, 
or of any items that could be used to produce nuclear weapons. This provision had the effect of 
suspending the 23 July 1985 nuclear-cooperation agreement between the United States and China; 5) 
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time the State Department authorisation bill was enacted, the White House had 
already softened the impact of several sanctions. In December 1989, the 
Administration allowed the Boeing Corporation to ship to China several airliners that 
initially had been subject to sanctions on arms sales but, according to the 
Administration, had been found to be commercial in nature. And Bush lifted one of 
his most visible economic sanctions against China and allowed export to China of 
three Hughes communications satellites. 37 
Bush also lifted a sanction imposed by Congress and allowed the Export-
Import Bank to issue loans and other guarantees for US exports to China. Congress 
on 22 November 1989 cleared bill, which Bush signed on 19 December 1989, barring 
Ex-Im activities in China. But that bill gave the President discretion to allow the 
financing if he found that China was making political reforms or if doing so was in 
the national interest of the United States. Bush chose the latter course and sent such a 
report to Congress invoking the national interest provision. 38 
It was apparent that the White House's initial reaction towards the Tiananmen 
crackdown was milder than that of Congress. Given the public opinion and the 
sentiment of Congress, Bush could have adopted a much tougher attitude towards 
China. But Bush took a series of actions which he knew would be "in the face of 
popular opposition and at substantial political risk".39 In the first several months after 
the Tiananmen crackdown, neither chamber of Congress was ready to seriously 
challenge the Administration on China policy. They passed bills mainly to express 
Required the President to work with US allies to suspend contemplated liberalisation of controls on 
exports of weapons and high-technology goods to China. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Lawrence S. Eagleburger, "Prepared Statement of the Honorable Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy 
Secretary of State" in US Congress, United States Policy Toward China, Hearing, before Committee 
of Foreign Affairs, US House ofRepresentatives, p. 40. 
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the sense of Congress. As time passed by, however, the difference between the two 
branches in terms of China policy became greater. The visits to China by Scowcroft 
and Eagleburger and Bush's veto of the Chinese Emergency Immigration Act 
indicated that the Bush Administration was on a course colliding with Congress. 
1990: Congressional Attempts and the Administration's Uncompromising 
Stance 
As shown in the previous section, Congress in 1989 did not make any serious 
challenge against the Administration on China's MFN status. Several bills revoking 
or conditioning the status were introduced to the Senate Finance Committee but were 
not taken up by the committee. Congress' major efforts were to impose broad 
sanctions on China. But much to the disappointment and dissatisfaction of many 
Congressional members, the Bush Administration was not determined to carry out 
these sanctions. More importantly, the Administration did not want to isolate China 
and tried actively to maintain high-level contact with the Chinese government, which 
enraged many members of Congress. In 1990, Congress started serious challenges to 
the Administration's China policy and the annual renewal of China's MFN status 
became the most prominent target. 
As the date of the expiration of China's MFN status (2 June) drew near, 
China's MFN status became a central issue in US China policy. On 16 May, Bush 
said "it isn't an easy call because I don't want to send a signal that we are happy with 
the human rights record".40 Two days later, in a floor speech, George J. Mitchell said 
that renewal of MFN status would "sacrifice our principles to temporary dictators" 
40 "Budget Summit No. 1 Concern in Session with Reporters", Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report (48:20, 19 May 1990), p. 1591. 
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and that Bush's conciliatory efforts to date had been "a dismal failure". He urged 
Bush not to "compound the mistake".41 
Unlike the House of Representatives where v01ces of support for the 
Administration's China policy were very weak, the Senate had much fiercer debates 
on US China policy. Responding to Mitchell's speech, Senator John H. Chafee, one 
of "the most politically moderate of Senate Republicans", 42 complained that 
It seems to me unfortunate in this Senate that we spend so much time 
as we do, hectoring the administration on how to run their side of the 
ledger .... I appreciate the concern of the majority leader for what is 
taking place in China, or this part of the world, or that part of the 
world, but I think, ... we have a pretty full platter ourselves. I wish 
we could get on with some of these matters.43 
Chafee later noted that Hasbro, the world's largest toy company in his home 
state Rhode Island, had hundreds of American jobs dependent on a portion of its 
products being made in China. "If we deny Hasbro that source", Chafee said, "we 
will give Hasbro's foreign competitors, who are all obtaining a portion of their 
products in China, an incredible advantage".44 
On 23 May, a joint resolution to deny the renewal of MFN for China was 
introduced in the Senate. The next day, Bush announced his decision to renew 
China's MFN status. The Administration had not consulted widely with Congress on 
the issue. Representative Stephen J. Solarz, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, complained that with the decision only 
days, or, perhaps, even hours away, none of the Members of Congress who had been 
41 Ronald D. Elving, "U.S.-Soviet Pact May Falter over Baltics, Emigration", Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report (48:20, 19 May 1990), p. 1540. See also Congressional Record, 18 May 1990, pp. 
1168-70. 
42 Bob Benenson, "GOP Takes the Reins of Power: Senate Committee on Environment and Public 
Works'', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (52:44, 12 November 1994), p. 3281. 
43 Congressional Record, 18 May 1990, p. 11170. 
44 Congressional Record, 26 February 1992, p. S2262. See also Anne Veigle, "China Syndrome", 
Washington Times, 2 July 1991, pp. Cl, ClO. 
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most actively involved in China policy had yet heard anything either from the 
President or his chief advisers on this issue.45 
According to a report in the New York Times, though, the Administration did 
work hard to support Bush's decision. It prepared statistics on how the cancellation 
ofMFN for China would affect specific profits in individual lawmakers' districts.46 It 
also prepared a document outlining the reasons for the President's decision. The 
reasons included 1) China met the Emigration Requirements of Jackson-Yanik; 2) US 
business would be hurt; 3) US consumers would be hurt; 4) Hong Kong would be 
hurt; 5) Reformers would be harmed and hardliners would be strengthened; 6) 
sanctions remained in place and 7) engagement paid off in the long run.47 
The announcement, however, drew immediate fire on Capitol Hill, especially 
in the House of Representatives, and the promise of vigorous efforts to reverse the 
decision. Shortly after Bush's announcement, Democratic Representative Tom Lantos 
and Republican Congressman John E. Porter, the co-chairmen of the Congressional 
Human Rights Caucus founded by Lantos, introduced a resolution disapproving of 
Bush's extension ofMFN status to China.48 
Lantos' constituency had a large percentage of Asian Americans, 17. 7 per 
cent in 1990.49 Lantos' main interest in the House had been in foreign policy, 
focusing on human rights. As "an outspoken backer of Tibetan human rights", he 
invited the Dalai Lama to testify before Congress in 1987.50 According to Lantos, he 
45 Congressional Record, 21May1990, p. 11301. 
46 Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Called Ready to Renew China Trade Status for a Year", New York Times, 
23 May 1990, pp. Al, AS. This report can not be confirmed. 
47 For detailed information, see Congressional Record, 24 May 1990, pp. 12327-29. 
48 Ibid., p. 12541. 
49 Barone and Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, p. 112. 
5o Ibid., p. 111. 
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was the only person in Congress accused by the Chinese government of being 
"ignorant and arrogant".51 
Representative Donald J. Pease, a leading Ways and Means Democrat, also 
introduced a bill. The Pease bill would require the President, by 3 June 1991, to 
certify that China had met the following criteria before MFN status could be 
extended: made substantial progress in improving human rights; lifted martial law 
and terminated its assistance to the Khmer Rouge and began cooperating with 
multilateral efforts to negotiate a settlement to the conflict in Cambodia. The bill also 
included a provision under which the withdrawal of MFN would prompt a US 
proposal that China be stripped of its observer status in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).52 The bill, according to Pease, presented "an alternative to 
the two positions most discussed", namely immediate revocation and renewal, so long 
as China had made little more than cosmetic progress in human rights and other 
areas.53 Pease later said his bill was a "solid middle-ground approach". "Our aim as a 
nation should not be to cut off MFN but to use the leverage of annual renewal to 
make progress", said Pease. "lfwe hold up absolute standards, why should they even 
try to meet them ?"54 
Similarly, Representative Stephen J. Solarz, who had "largely concentrated 
and greatly distinguished himself' on foreign policy,55 also offered the 
Administration a middle road: less far-reaching legislation to tie next year's decision 
on MFN status to the release of political prisoners and other human rights gains. 
51 Informal talk by Tom Lantos at the Australian National University on 17 February 1998. 
52 Congressional Record, 24 May 1990, p. 12566. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ronald D. Elving, "Bill Links China's MFN Status to Human Rights Progress", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (48:28, 14 July 1990), p. 2200. 
55 Barone and Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, p. 863. 
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Solarz warned that if the Administration did not support this approach, it could "run 
the risk of immediate termination" of MFN. "I assure you, Congress will move 
forward", he said. 56 
The Administration, however, showed no interest in tying China's trade status 
to human rights conditions. "Let me emphasize that granting MFN is in no sense an 
act of approval of a given country's policies", Richard H. Solomon, Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said at the 24 May hearing. "It 
does not mean that the country in question is our most favorite nation".57 
In the following weeks, more bills regarding China's MFN status were 
introduced in the House. But division also existed in Congress, especially in the 
Senate, and heated debates arose. While the opponents of renewing China's MFN 
status argued the White House had been too soft to China and wanted to use the MFN 
status as a leverage to pressure Beijing to improve its human rights record, the 
supporters of renewal contended the removal of China's MFN status would set back, 
rather than promote, the cause of economic and political reform. Bob Dole, for 
example, argued that "Economic competition is replacing military and political 
challenges".58 Claiborne Pell, Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
noted that renewing MFN status was "one of the most difficult" the United States 
faced in a year of debate on China policy. He expressed support for President Bush. 59 
In the House, the debate was largely between those who would immediately 
revoke MFN status for China and those who would condition future extensions on 
56 Alyson Pytte, "Bush Renews MFN for China Stirs Angry Hill Reaction'', Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report (48:21, 26 May 1990), p. 1639. 
57 1990 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, "Efforts at Hard Line on China Thwarted", p. 765. 
58 John R. Cranford, "Trade and Foreign Policy: The Ties That Bind", Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report (48:23, 9 June 1990), p. 1773. See also, Ronald D. Elving, "Accord Elusive on Renewal 
ofMFN Status for China", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (48:25, 23 June 1990), pp. 1944-
1945. 
59 Congressional Record, 24 May 1990, p. 12325. 
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certified human rights progress. A few members undoubtedly supported approval of 
MFN status without conditions, but they were keeping their heads down. 
The debate appeared to have been coloured by constituency politics. For 
example, House Speaker Thomas S. Foley, and majority leader Richard A. Gephardt, 
had been restrained in criticising Bush. Both could find at least some constituency 
backing for economic ties with China. While Foley was from a farm district 
producing mainly wheat and barley,60 Gephardt's suburban St. Louis district had a 
strong connection with the nearby based McDonnell Douglas Corporation which had 
a big economic interest in China.61 
Four weeks after Bush's announcement, neither of the Congressional 
committees charged with reviewing China's MFN trade status seemed close to a 
decision. In the hearings held in the week of 18 June by the Senate Finance and 
House Ways and Means committees, there were repeated warnings about unintended 
consequences. "Cutting ties with China might make us feel good in the short run, but 
would it be good in the long run?" asked Bob Dole. While acknowledging his own 
state's interest in grain sales to China, Dole said he was convinced that sanctions 
would cost jobs in China's southern and coastal provinces where free-market and 
partly private ventures had flourished. 62 
The two committee chairmen had not yet made their positions known. But 
House Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, whose closeness to President 
Bush gave some liberal members "heartburn",63 had said he disliked the notion of 
placing conditions on renewal of most-favoured-nation status. Senate Finance 
60 Barone and Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 199 2, p. 1309 
6l The company then had a company in Shanghai, China. Cranford, "Trade and Foreign Policy'', p. 
1775. 
62 Elving, "Accord Elusive on Renewal ofMFN Status for China'', p. 1944. 
63 "Business Week/Harris Poll'', Business Week (16 April 1990), p. 52. 
127 
Chairman Lloyd Bentsen, who was thought to be "probably the key player" on trade 
in Congress and was believed "pro-business" with "basic thrust . . . toward free 
trade'', 64 also said he thought sanctions would hurt China only if enough countries 
joined in to make them stick. "Embargoes are effective only so far as you hurt [the 
sanctioned country] more than you hurt yourself', he said. 65 The Administration kept 
warning that all US allies planned to continue nondiscriminatory trade treatment for 
China and that the US would be "the only Western country" to withdraw MFN for 
China if the President did not renew it. 66 
On 12 July, the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade approved of 
the Pease bill (H.R. 4939) by voice vote. The bill would allow China another year of 
normal US tariffs under most-favoured-nation status. But before renewing that status 
in June 1991, the bill required the President to certify that China had made 
"significant progress" towards meeting a list of human rights objectives. Without a 
Presidential certification of progress on these fronts, Congress would disapprove of 
any further extension ofMFN status. 67 
Before adopting the Pease bill, the Subcommittee rejected, on a 3-10 vote, a 
tougher substitute which would have required China to meet - not merely make 
progress towards - specified human rights standards. The measure was far more 
likely to cause actual withdrawal of China's MFN status one year later. The 
64 Barone and Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, p. 1177. Business Week, "The Early 
Line on Clinton Administration", 16 November 1992, p. 30. 
65 Elving, "Accord Elusive on Renewal ofMFN Status for China". p. 1944. 
66 Congressional Record, 24 May 1990, p. 12328. 
67 These objectives would include releasing political prisoners, accounting for those arrested since the 
June 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, ending martial law in all of China (including Tibet), easing 
restrictions on the news media and ending the intimidation of Chinese citizens abroad. See Elving, 
"Bill Links China's MFN Status to Human Rights Progress", p. 2200. 
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subcommittee session featured sharp exchanges, with one member calling another 
member's remark "idiotic".68 
The Pease bill passed by the Subcommittee was a revised one. It dropped the 
requirement that China stop supporting the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the 
provision regarding China's observer status in GATT. 
Despite these changes, the Administration continued to express opposition to 
the bill. In a letter to Subcommittee Chairman Sam M. Gibbons, Eagleburger said 
making MFN contingent on reforms in human rights could backfire and cause 
conditions in China to worsen.69 Kent Wiedermann, State Department Director of 
Chinese and Mongolian Affairs, told the Subcommittee on the same day that MFN 
was crucial to continued trade - "the most fundamental fashion in which we 
maintain contact with the Chinese people".7° 
Despite its public statement, the Administration, realising the House would 
certainly act, collaborated with Pease and the Subcommittee on the bill to ensure that 
the bill would not be too tough to comply with.71 
The House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Rostenkowski strongly 
supported the bill and his committee accepted the bill on 18 July. The committee 
turned back three amendments sponsored by Richard T. Schulze, a Republican whose 
district's mushroom industry had been hit by the imports of cheap Chinese 
mushrooms.72 These amendments would have either cancelled China's eligibility for 
MFN status immediately or stiffened the procedures for granting MFN to China the 
68 Ibid., pp. 2200-2201. 
69 Ibid., p. 2201. 
70 Ibid. 
71 David S. Cloud, "Sentiment Grows in Congress to Reject MFN for China", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (49:17, 27 April 1991), p. 1045. See also, Congressional Record, 19 October 
1990, p. Hl0529. 
72 Barone and Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, p. 1060. 
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next year. Schulze and a handful of others on the committee complained that the 
Pease bill was tantamount to telling the Chinese government: "You've got one more 
year, but please do a little bit better".73 
Disagreeing with Schulze, Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan 
Rostenkowski said withdrawal ofMFN would be "counterproductive".74 
Schulze and his allies tried to seek the committee's endorsement - and 
Rostenkowski' s endorsement in particular - for a House floor vote on terminating 
MFN for China. But their efforts failed. Instead, the committee voted to ask the 
Rules Committee to permit no amendments to the Pease bill during floor debate. 15 
In early August, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait precipitated the Persian Gulf 
cns1s. In the early stage of the crisis, China supported the United States by favouring 
all eight United Nations Security Council resolutions on the situation and acting to 
enforce the United Nations-approved trade embargo.76 This might have helped 
China's case on Capitol Hill as noted by some observers.77 But it certainly did not 
help a lot. 
On 20 August, the enactment of a seemingly unrelated bill to reauthorise the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative created a new procedure for expedited consideration of 
bills rejecting Jackson-Yanik waivers. Until then, Congress was not expected to act 
under the specific terms of the 1974 law to reject a Jackson-Yanik waiver.78 
The August enactment of changes to the Jackson-Yanik waiver process 
73 1990 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, "Efforts at Hard Line on China Thwarted", p. 766. 
74 John R. Cranford, "Panel Oks China MFN Status, Seeks Future Rights Gains", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (48:29, 21 July 1990), p. 2288. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Assailing Beijing, House Votes a Rise in China's Tariffs'', New York Times, 
19 October 1990, pp. Al, A8. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Congress and the Nation, "Trade: 1989-90 Chronology", p. 173. 
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opened a second avenue for legislative assault on China's trade relationship with the 
United States. Representative Gerald B. H. Solomon, a "staunch conservative" with 
"hawkish views on trade'',79 introduced a resolution on 5 September to disapprove of 
Bush's Jackson-Yanik waiver for China and thus cancel China's current MFN 
eligibility outright.80 On 25 September, Ways and Means by voice vote approved the 
bill for floor action. 
As it turned out, the House had a long and fierce floor debate on China's MFN 
status. The debate took place on 18 October and lasted for five hours. s1 The House 
first considered Solomon's disapproval resolution. While its supporters cited human 
rights violations, its opponents argued that revoking China's MFN status would 
isolate China and hurt the reformers in China. These opponents also cited US 
economic interests and, quite frankly, their personal interests. Republican leader 
Robert H. Michel, for example, publicly stated his personal stake in maintaining 
China's MFN status. He almost lost his election in the early 1980s for not being able 
to advance the interests of Caterpillar Tractor Company, the single most important 
manufacturer in his district. s2 
The House passed Solomon's bill by a vote of 24 7-17 4, but this level of 
support would be insufficient to override a Presidential veto. The House then debated 
the Pease bill. As mentioned earlier, despite its public statement against the bill, the 
Administration worked with Pease and the Subcommittee on Trade of the Ways and 
79 David S. Cloud, "GOP Takes the Reins of Power: House Rules Committee'', Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (52:44, 12 November 1994), p. 3266. See also Barone and Ujifusa, The 
Almanac of American Politics 1992, p. 888. 
SO John R. Cranford, "Committee Links China Status to Progress on Rights", Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report (48:39, 29 September 1990), p. 3102. John R. Cranford, "House Passes Bills to Punish 
China for Tiananrnen Action", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (48:42, 20 October 1990), p. 
3490. The bill was co-sponsored by Senators Richard T. Schulze, Charlie Rose (D-North Carolina) 
and Edward Markey (D-MA). See Congressional Record, 16 October 1990, p. H9924. 
8! For the debate, see Congressional Record, 18 October 1990, pp. Hl0506-553. 
82 Congressional Record, 18 October 1990, p. H1051 l. 
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Means Committee in drafting the bill. As it came to the floor, Pease's bill required the 
President to find that China was making "significant progress" towards meeting seven 
specific human rights goals before he could renew MFN status for China. 83 The 
Administration, as observed by Pease, strongly opposed the bill but was not 
threatening to veto it. 84 However, Nancy Pelosi, Frank R. Wolf, John E. Porter and 
John R. Miller tried to add amendments to make it more difficult for the President to 
rule that China was improving its human rights record. 85 
Pelosi, whose constituency was 30 per cent Asian-American,86 was elected to 
the House only in 1987. She attracted national attention in her first full term by 
sponsoring the Chinese Emergency Immigration Act to give Chinese students 
protective immigration status and by opposing President Bush on that issue. By the 
time the issue was settled, Pelosi had been appointed chairperson of a new informal 
Congressional committee on China policy, the Congressional Working Group on 
China.87 Pelosi's amendment would stiffen the definition of significant progress by 
requiring that the Chinese government release political prisoners detained after the 
Tiananmen Square crackdown. 
Frank R. Wolf, "a serious man whose personal attitudes are those of a 
churchgoing family man",88 offered an amendment to Pelosi's amendment. His 
amendment would attach a religious-liberty condition to extending MFN status for 
83 For bill, see ibid., pp. H10544-45. H10549, p. H10554. 
84 Ibid., p. H10533. 
85 For the amendments, see ibid., pp. H10545, H10549, H10554-55. 
86 Marilyn Greene, "Democrat Wants Reform Tied to China Trade Deal", USA Today, 12 June 1991, 
p.2A. 
87 David Zweig, "Sino-American Relations and Human Rights: June 4 and the Changing Nature of a 
Bilateral Relationship'', in William T. Tow (ed.), Building Sino-American Relations: An Analysis for 
the 1990s (New York: Parago House, 1991), p. 77. See also Congressional Record, 31March1992, 
p. H2087. 
88 Barone and Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, p. 1289. 
132 
China. It required China to end religious persecution and release all detained leaders 
and members of religious groups. 
John R. Miller, grandson of Latvian immigrants and "adamantly anti-
Communist" on foreign policy,89 offered an amendment establishing a set of human-
rights principles for United States businesses operating in China. 
An amendment offered by John E. Porter, co-chairman of the Congress 
Human Rights Caucus, required China to live up to its promises of democracy and 
free enterprise when Hong Kong reverted to Chinese control. 
The amendments were not acceptable to the Administration. In a letter to 
House minority leader Robert H. Michel, Secretary of State James Baker explicitly 
stated that 
The amendments to HR 4939 [the Pease bill] proposed by 
Representatives Pelosi, Wolf, Porter and Miller would only worsen the 
impact of the bill. The Administration opposes all four of them. If HR 
4939 was made more restrictive by the addition of any of these 
amendments, the bill would be vetoed. 90 
Powerful House members like Dan Rostenkowski urged other members to 
oppose all amendments. Pease opposed any amendments because he was worried the 
amendments would go beyond what China could respond to. "We must act prudently 
and go as far as we can now to hold the Government of China directly responsible 
and the White House secondarily accountable for the protection of human rights 
inside China", Pease said.91 But for Rostenkowski, his major concern was to save the 
bill being vetoed by the President. 
While many House members did not believe it wise to cut off US trade with 
89 Ibid., p. 1299. 
90 Congressional Record, 18 October 1990, p. H1051 l. 
91 Ibid., p. H10533. 
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China, they did want to express the sense of Congress - dissatisfaction with China's 
human rights record. In the end, by a 34 7-7 4 vote and a 409-7 vote respectively, the 
House passed the Pelosi-Wolf amendments and the Porter-Miller amendments. It then 
passed the Pease bill by a 384-30 vote. 
In the Senate, although George J. Mitchell favoured removing China's MFN 
status outright or at least restricting its future renewal, he could not muster support for 
the idea among his fellow senators. On 11 July, he introduced a bill with a provision 
similar to Nancy Pelosi's amendment to the Pease bill, namely ending the tariff 
breaks in three months if the President could not certify that prisoner release and 
other human rights condition had been met.92 This draft legislation, however, was not 
subjected to the expedited procedures that governed action on Representative 
Solomon's bill disapproving of Bush's waiver for China's MFN status. It had not 
been taken up by the Senate Finance Committee, which had jurisdiction. Its 
chairman, Lloyd Bentsen, was immersed in the tax and budget imbroglio.93 
The only legislative activity on the Senate side was a full committee hearing 
on China's MFN status on 20 June held by the Finance Committee. Afterwards, 
Lloyd Bentsen would say only that he was still reviewing Congress' options on 
China. But as mentioned earlier, in his opening remarks at the hearing, he said he 
thought sanctions would hurt China only if enough countries joined in to make them 
stick. That set Bentsen apart from the strict non-renewal posture struck by Mitchell, 
who had been the most outspoken member of the Democratic leadership in either 
body. 
Most committee members doubted the effect of cutting off MFN for China. 
92 For the bill, see ibid., 11 July 1990, p. S9567. 
93 Farnsworth, "Assailing Beijing, House Votes a Rise in China's Tariffs". 
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As expressed by one member, cutting off MFN would "in classic fashion, be hurting 
precisely those we were trying most to help".94 Daniel Patrick Moynihan was alone in 
supporting a denial ofMFN status for China.95 
China made moves in 1990 aimed at influencing both US Congress and US 
public opinion. In early May, it released an additional 211 prisoners. Then it made a 
$4-billion agreement with Boeing to purchase up to 72 airplanes. At the end of June, 
it allowed Fang Lizhi, a prominent Chinese dissident who had taken refuge in the US 
Embassy in Beijing, to leave China and travel to England on basically the same terms 
it had rejected earlier in the year. 
Partly because of China's efforts, and more importantly because of the 
damage to US economic interests and US influence in China inherent in revoking 
China's MFN status, domestic consensus on the issue broke down in 1990. Major 
newspapers like the New York Times, Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times all 
supported maintaining MFN for China. The consensus among Chinese students in 
the United States also collapsed, with many groups supporting MFN for China.96 
As for the two house bills, they were short-lived. They died one day after 
their passage as lawmakers wanted to return home to campaign for the 1990 mid-term 
election, and the 1990 session ended before the Senate considered the bills. 
1991: Stronger Congressional Efforts and the Administration's Compromises 
Congressional challenges to the Bush Administration's China policy gained 
momentum in 1991. The House passed a bill conditioning China's MFN status by a 
94 1990 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, "Efforts at Hard Line on China Thwarted", p. 768. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Robert S. Ross, "National Security, Human Rights, and Domestic Politics: The Bush Administration 
and China" in Kenneth A. Oye et al. (eds.), Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy in the 
Post-Cold War Era (Harper Collins Publishers, 1992), p. 306. 
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vote above the two-thirds majority necessary to override a Presidential veto. The 
Administration, focusing its lobbying efforts on the Senate, worked hard to win the 
votes of the senators from its own party and those from farm states with big economic 
interests in maintaining China's MFN status. In the end, although the Administration 
could not prevent the bill from passing the Senate, it won enough votes to sustain a 
potential Presidential veto. 
In the first several months of 1991, Congressional sentiment for revoking 
China's MFN status intensified.97 On 31 January 1991, the Department of State 
submitted to the Congress its annual Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 
stating that in China "observance of human rights fell far short of internationally 
recognized norms".98 In addition to the human rights issue and the previous disputes 
between Congress and the Administration, many in Congress seized on reports that 
China used prison labor to produce goods exported to the United States, that it was 
evading US textile quotas by diverting shipments through Hong Kong, and that it was 
selling weapons and nuclear technology to Middle East countries despite promises to 
limit proliferation.99 
The US trade deficit with China had also emerged as a big issue. The trade 
deficit with China swelled from $6.2 billion in 1989 to $10.4 billion in 1990 (see 
Table 3. 1). It was growing rapidly and seemed likely to replace Taiwan in 1991 as 
the second largest US trade deficit after Japan. While the United States said China 
97 Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 
"Two Years after Tiananmen: An Evaluation of China's Policy" in US Congress, Sino-American 
Relations: Current Policy Issues, Hearings, before Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate (1st Sess., 102nd Congress, 13, 25 and 27 June 1991), p. 
1. 
98 Congressional Record, 12 March 1991, p. S3107-08 
99 Cloud, "Sentiment Grows in Congress to Reject MFN for China", p. 1044. For more information, 
see Harding, A Fragile Relationship, pp. 276-277. Congressional Record, 21 March 1991, pp. S4072-
73, 17 April 1991, pp. S4518-21. 
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was restricting US imports, China blamed economic conditions, Western sanctions 
and US statistics. Ioo 
Table 3.1 
US Trade With China 
(In millions of dollars) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Surplus 2,697 1,708 628 
Deficit 71 61 6 1,665 2,796 3,490 6,235 10,417 
Source: Department of Commerce, as quoted by David S. Cloud in "Sentiment Grows in 
Congress to Reject MFN for China" in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (49:17, 27 
April 1991), p. 1044. 
The Administration acknowledged that trade problems with China were 
severe, but it did not want them to become the reason to revoke or condition China's 
MFN status. Partly to show Congress it could get tough with China on trade matters, 
even though MFN remained in place, the Administration had been taking steps to 
address the problems. For example, US trade negotiators were pressing China to 
open talks for the first time on improving access to the Chinese market. The 
Administration also took action against the alleged wide-spread piracy in China of 
intellectual property, such as tapes, software and pharmaceuticals. On 26 April, 
China was among three nations targeted under the "special 301" section of the 1988 
Trade Act, which requires retaliation against countries that do not adequately protect 
US intellectual property. IOI 
IOO Cloud, "Sentiment Grows in Congress to Reject MFN for China", p. 1044. 
IOI Ibid. 
137 
But these steps were far from enough for critics of China. China was still not 
popular in the United States. So was free trade since the United States was in the 
middle of a recession. More importantly, while critics argued China had not behaved 
any better since the previous year's MFN extension and, therefore, did not deserve 
further special treatment, many business groups that had lobbied for an extension 
were uninvolved in the first several months of 1991. Some observers believed that 
part of the reason might be loss of appeal of China's market, which some US officials 
said was increasingly closed. The major evidence was that China was the only major 
US market in which US exports in 1990 showed a decline.102 
Based on these considerations, many experts believed that Congress might 
have the votes in 1991 to override a Bush veto of anti-China legislation. 
On 9 May, Senator Jesse Helms introduced a bill making available MFN 
status to China only if certain conditions were met. The conditions included "five 
noes and two yeses". The noes were: no nuclear weapons exports; no ballistic missile 
exports; no arms for the Khmer Rouge; no political prisoners and no slave-labor 
exports. The two yeses were to negotiate with Tibet and to adopt some international 
human rights standards.103 
Jesse Helms had been a long-time critic of China whose dislike for renewing 
MFN status for China exceeded that of many Democrats. His home state North 
Carolina had been particularly affected by a surge in textile imports from China.104 
102 Ibid., p. 1045. US exports to China in 1990 dropped 17 per cent. 
103 Congressional Record, 9 May 1991, pp. S5629-30. 
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On 15 May, after meeting with the Senate Republican Policy Committee, 
Bush said he wanted to see MFN for China continued. The White House indicated the 
renewal might be conditional. "There are other possibilities, such as adding 
conditions or at least expressing our views about human rights progress in China and 
other matters", said White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater.105 And Bush later told 
reporters, "Marlin put it right". 106 The Administration's indication possibly reflected 
the reality that Congressional forces were strong enough to block unconditional 
renewal of MFN and to override a potential veto. Bob Dole, who said he would 
continue to support the President, admitted the President's supporters would "have an 
uphill fight" .107 
On 16 May, George J. Mitchell and 26 co-sponsors introduced a bill 
effectively revoking MFN. To keep its MFN trade status, China would have to 
release all political prisoners, end religious persecution and restrictions on emigration, 
reduce its trade surplus with the United States, and participate in international efforts 
to limit arms proliferation, all within six months after the bill's passage.108 One week 
later, on 23 May, Mitchell co-sponsored a resolution requiring China's MFN status be 
denied 15 days after the enactment of the Act.109 
Several relevant bills were also introduced m the House. Gerald B. H. 
Solomon co-sponsored a resolution to revoke China's MFN status. Nancy Pelosi 
introduced the US-China Act of 1991 (H.R. 2212) barring the President from granting 
105 Adam Clymer, "Terms Sought on China Trade", New York Times, 17 May 1991, p. A6. 
106 Ibid. 
l07 Congressional Record, 17 May 1991, p. S6106. See also David S. Cloud, "Bush Begins Lobbying 
Effort to Continue China Status", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (49:20, 18 May 1991), p. 
1260. 
108 Congressional Record, 16 May 1991, pp. S5990-93. See also Cloud, "Bush Begins Lobbying 
Effort to Continue China Status", p. 1260. 
109 Congressional Record, 23 May 1991, pp. S 6700-01. 
139 
MFN status to China in 1992 unless Beijing accounted for and released political 
prisoners arrested during the Tiananmen Square crackdown. Pelosi's bill also 
required China to make "significant progress" in other human rights areas, including 
ending torture and religious persecution in Tibet and permitting press freedom. Don J. 
Pease, who collaborated with the Administration in 1990 on a weaker alternative, had 
toughened his bill in 1991. For example, he had adopted Pelosi's main condition: 
Before MFN could be granted in 1992, Tiananmen Square protesters would have to 
be released from jail.110 Stephen J. Solarz was also considering a measure requiring 
the President to certify that China had met what Solarz called a reasonable set of 
human rights standards before MFN could be renewed in 1992. Solarz said he would 
require only that the Chinese permit Voice of America broadcasts and stop harassing 
Chinese students in the United States, while showing some progress in other areas. 111 
In a speech at Yale University on Memorial Day, Bush formally announced he 
was recommending renewal of China's MFN status. 112 He charged that his opponents 
in Congress were adopting a policy of "self-righteousness draped in a false morality". 
He argued that "China can - easily can affect the stability of the Asian-Pacific 
region, and therefore affect the entire world's peace and prosperity .... And so when 
we find opportunities to cooperate with China, we will explore them. When problems 
arise with China's behavior, we will take appropriate action". 113 
But experts like Harry Harding, a China specialist who supported Bush's 
110 David S. Cloud, "White House Looks to Senate to Maintain China Status", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (49:22, 1 June 1991), pp. 1433-1434. 
111 Pamela Fessler, "China Trade Creates Moral Debate Shaded by Political Undertones'', 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (49:23, 8 June 1991), p. 1513. 
112 For the text of Bush's report to Congress concerning extension of waiver authority for China, see 
US. Department of State Dispatch, "President's Report on MFN Status for China'', (2:24, 17 June 
1991), pp. 430-32. 
113 New York Times, "Excerpts from Bush's Remarks on China", 28 May 1991, p. A8. 
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decision to renew MFN, suggested Bush should work with Congressional leaders on a 
compromise. Harding argued the Administration had paid dearly for fighting 
Congressional efforts over the previous two years to protest China's abuse of human 
rights. Congress had grown increasingly suspicious of Bush's position and 
increasingly unwilling to compromise. "Wouldn't it have been better for the 
Administration to have accepted Pease when it was on the table last year", Harding 
asked, "rather than waiting until this year, when even Pease isn't putting Pease on the 
table?"114 
The Administration, however, was not going to make a deal with the House. 
White House officials believed any measure that emerged from the House would be 
unacceptable to Bush. "It is just too hard to educate that many members", a White 
House official said.115 
Once again, the Administration counted on the Senate to save it from stringent 
conditions the Chinese government would almost certainly reject. But that required 
overcoming Mitchell, whose bill was much stricter than Pelosi's. As noted by some 
observers, "Pelosi's bill is nothing more than a one-year plant-closing notice. And 
the Mitchell bill is nothing more than a six-month plant closing notice". 116 
The White House appeared to have two options: negotiate with lawmakers on 
conditions giving Bush broad discretion to continue China's MFN status, or veto 
legislation revoking MFN and round up the votes to sustain the veto. In either case, 
the Administration's prospects were better in the Senate. 
Neither Mitchell nor Bush had full confidence of winning the struggle. On 
27 May, Mitchell told reporters there "clearly is a majority in Congress" opposed to 
114 Fessler, "China Trade Creates Moral Debate Shaded by Political Undertones", p. 1513. 
115 Cloud, "White House Looks to Senate to Maintain China Status'', p. 1434. 
116 Ibid. 
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Bush's decision to renew China's MFN status. Could the Democrats muster the two-
thirds vote needed to override a veto? "Whether it's a two-thirds majority, I don't 
know", Mitchell said. 117 On the same day, in his speech at Yale University, Bush 
seemed to lay the groundwork for a compromise. While vowing to oppose "sweeping 
conditions", he did not explicitly rule out linking renewal of MFN to some new 
conditions.118 
Bush's ambiguity led many experts and lawmakers to believe that 
conditioning renewal of China's MFN status in 1991 was highly possible. "The 
President is in a very different position from a year ago'', said Representative James 
A. Leach. "The question today is between reasonable conditions and unreasonable 
ones, not between no conditions and some".119 
One week later, however, Bush seemed again ready to reject any conditions. 
In a 4 June meeting with a group of senators thought likely to support his position, 
Bush said he wanted MFN renewed with no conditions. Senator Alan K. Simpson 
said he mentioned the possibility of attaching some conditions to MFN renewal at the 
meeting, but "that really was not very well-received". The problem with conditions 
from Bush's perspective, said Simpson, was that "if you do two, you get 22". 120 
But there were other signs Bush might be positioning himself more for a 
bargain than a fight. Senator Richard G. Lugar, former chairman of Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, also at the meeting, said Bush was not saying "no, never" to 
attaching something to MFN renewal. "His position is, let's discuss why [extending] 
MFN is in our own interests and how we can use other means to influence China 
117 Tuid. 
118 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, "Bush Says China MFN Status Will Be Catalyst for 
Change" (Presidential Address), (49:22, 1June1991), pp. 1459-1460. 
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before we get into discussing all the things we might consider". 121 Lugar had 
suggested a preamble or "sense of Congress" language could be added to MFN 
renewal to express US outrage at human rights abuses by the Chinese government. 
He thought Bush would veto anything stronger.122 
Many others, however, were adamant that something much stronger was 
required. Representative John R. Miller even warned that the more adamant Bush 
was about not setting conditions on MFN, the more adamant legislators would 
become about cutting it off. "The outcome will depend, in part, on the President", 
Miller said. "If he takes the position that he will only accept unconditioned renewal 
and is not interested in discussing any incentives or disincentives or conditions, then I 
think you're going to see sentiment grow for complete revocation". 123 
In the Senate, the fight had quickly taken on partisan overtones. "Republicans 
would be inclined to give the President a maximum amount of flexibility in this area 
and also express the sense of outrage that we feel", said Senator Richard G. Lugar. 124 
But the White House also faced a restive right wing led by Jesse Helms. 
In the week of 10 June, after negotiations, Nancy Pelosi, Stephen J. Solarz and 
Don J. Pease agreed to unite and push legislation that would withdraw China's MFN 
status a year later unless Beijing disclosed the fate of protesters unaccounted for since 
the 1989 crackdown and released some of those arrested. Further, the bill would 
require "overall progress" toward such goals as ending human rights violation, 
121 Ibid., p. 1513. 
122 Ibid. 
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124 Cloud, "White House Looks to Senate to Maintain China Status", p. 1433. 
143 
religious persecution, restrictions on press freedom, and harassment of Chinese 
students in the United States, before China could receive MFN status in 1992.125 
The compromise required Pelosi to accept a slight weakening of her bill. 
Solarz and, to a lesser extent, Pease, were uncomfortable with stringent conditions 
requiring Bush to certify that China had made specific improvements before he could 
renew its trading status. But they accepted her requirement concerning the 
Tiananmen Square protesters.126 
By joining together, Pelosi, Solarz and Pease hoped to bolster their chances of 
winning a veto-proof margin when the House voted on their legislation. "It allows us 
to present a united front", said Pelosi.127 
In the Senate, Bush's prospects for preserving China's MFN status were 
better. Among the most vocal supporters were not only loyal Republicans but also 
those from both parties whose home states had big economic interests in China. 
Among them, the most prominent were senators from farm states. The total value of 
US agricultural products sales to China increased from $58.4 million in 1986 to 
$814.0 million in 1990. This did not include significant sales transshipped through 
Hong Kong. The value of US wheat sales to China increased from zero in 1986 to 
$497.3 million in 1990.128 This made wheat one of the top US exports to China and 
China became one of the largest importers of US wheat, buying as much as 20 per 
cent of total US wheat exports in some years.129 According to the Congressional 
125 David S. Cloud, "House Critics of Bush Policy Unite on China Trade Bill", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (49:24, 15 June 1991), p. 1568. 
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Research Service, if China's MFN status was revoked, wheat would probably be the 
hardest hit American product. 130 Other studies showed American wheat farmers 
would get 27 cents a bushel less for their wheat if wheat exports to China were cut 
off. 131 Farm states which did not have direct trade with China might also be hit if 
China's MFN status was revoked. Republican Senator Charles Grassley, for 
example, pointed out that wheat sales to China was important to his state Iowa 
although Iowa did not raise much wheat; when wheat prices fell, livestock producers 
substituted wheat for com in their animal feed rations. Com was Iowa's major 
agricultural product.132 
Republican Senator Larry Pressler from farm state South Dakota strongly 
supported the Bush Administration's efforts to renew China's MFN status. Pressler 
had a reputation for independence and unpredictability due to his "assiduous defense 
of home-state interests". 133 Along with many manufacturing and merchandising 
concerns, Pressler was concerned about his state's potential loss in wheat sales to 
China. 134 
Senator Max Baucus, a Democrat from farm state Montana, was an even more 
vocal supporter for China's MFN status. Montana exported 70 per cent of its wheat 
to Pacific Rim countries, and many farmers said that denial of MFN status to China 
would cause a collapse in wheat prices.135 
Baucus stressed that MFN was "the wrong tool" to address US concerns over 
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a series of issues regarding China, including its human rights violations, unfair trade 
practices and nuclear proliferation. He also believed revoking China's MFN would 
hurt the Americans. The example he cited was US policy towards the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan. Similarly, Baucus noted, denying China MFN status would seriously 
harm American farmers as China was "a particularly important market for United 
States wheat". 136 
Realising the strong sentiment against Bush's China policy, Baucus pressed 
the Administration to take punitive actions of its own against China in order to 
mitigate the feeling among lawmakers that they must act. "If Congress is to extend 
China's MFN, we must see tangible evidence that the Administration is taking 
action", wrote Baucus in a letter to Bush and circulated among other senators for 
signatures.137 
Baucus called for the Administration to block loans to China by multilateral 
institutions, retaliate against China for its barriers to US imports and use of prison 
labor, negotiate to prevent export of China's ballistic missiles, and drop US 
opposition to Taiwan becoming a signatory to the GATT.138 
A crucial element in the fight over China's MFN status would be the position 
taken by the chairmen of the two committees with jurisdiction over trade - Dan 
Rostenkowski of House Ways and Means, and Lloyd Bentsen of Senate Finance. It 
was Rostenkowski who urged Pelosi, Solarz and Pease to reach a compromise and his 
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blessing could speed the bill through the House. Bentsen had recently met with 
Mitchell, and according to aides, promised he would not hold up Mitchell's bill in 
committee. But neither Rostenkowski nor Bentsen had taken a position on renewing 
China's MFN status.139 
On 19 and 20 June, the Senate Finance Committee held hearings to consider 
the President's decision on renewal of China's MFN status. Unlike the previous year, 
the response to Bush's request was cool and sceptical in the 19 June hearing. 
Chairman Bentsen warned that Congress was unlikely to continue China's MFN 
status without attaching conditions requiring improvements and other reforms. And 
Bentsen took issue with the Administration's contention that a cutoff of MFN was 
unlikely to force economic liberalisation in China. However, Bentsen still refrained 
from taking a formal position on the issue yet.140 
On 26 June, the House Ways and Means Committee approved both the US-
China Act of 1991 and Solomon's disapproval resolution by voice vote. The next day 
the Senate Finance Committee voted on Senate version of US-China Act of 1991 (S 
1367), which had been unveiled by Mitchell on 25 June. It was a modified version 
of a bill (S 1048) Mitchell had introduced on 16 May. The committee reported to the 
full committee the US-China Act of 1991 without recommendation by a vote of 11-9. 
It also reported a resolution to revoke China's MFN status unfavourably by voice 
vote. Committee Chairman Bentsen voted against the disapproval resolution but for 
the US-China Act. Like other opponents to China's MFN status, Bentsen cited 
China's human rights violations and unfair trade practices as his major reasons. 141 
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Observers noticed that partisan fissures were widening: Democrats moved 
ahead with MFN legislation that ignored Bush's wishes while Republicans began to 
defect. The split was apparent when the Senate Finance Committee took up US-
China Act of 1991. Although several committee Republicans had previously 
expressed doubts about Bush's position, not one voted for the bill. There was still 
outrage among Republicans about Beijing's recalcitrance, but as the issue became 
more partisan, they began to dismiss Mitchell's approach as an effort to embarrass 
Bush. "Republicans were still looking for a way to dramatise their concern without 
tying Bush's hands", it was observed.142 
Mitchell, who sat on the Finance Committee, did not even get the support of 
all the Democrats. Panel member Max Baucus reiterated his hope that Congress 
would forgo placing conditions on MFN ifthe Administration would agree on its own 
to impose sanctions against China. He joined in an 11-9 party-line vote to send 
Mitchell's bill to the floor, but he and other Democrats balked at giving it a 
favourable recommendation. In spite of this, Baucus believed that "some version of 
this legislation is almost certain to pass Congress - perhaps with enough votes to 
override a veto".143 But a Republican Congressional aide said a bill without the 
endorsement of the committee of jurisdiction was "damaged goods".144 
In fact, Mitchell's move to modify his earlier version of the bill, S 1084, was 
an implicit acknowledgment he could not attract majority support for the bill which 
required, among other conditions, release of all political prisoners in China and an 
end to religious persecution. His compromise, S 1367, won him support from several 
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Democrats, including Lloyd Bentsen. But Mitchell kept only one Republican co-
sponsor and lost another Republican. Mitchell's first bill had 29 co-sponsors. His 
second bill attracted only 24 by the time it was taken up by the Finance Committee. 
Mitchell was not confident that he would have the two-thirds majority to override a 
potential veto. "We'll pass it with a majority. Whether we'll have 67 votes, I don't 
know", he said after the Finance Committee action.145 
As noted above, initially it seemed likely the House would pass a more 
moderate bill than the Senate. Some hoped a compromise would result which Bush 
would then support. That scenario became unlikely after 26 June 1991 when the 
House Ways and Means Committee acted on the US-China Act of 1991. The House 
bill was tougher than Mitchell's version in some respects and was, in all likelihood, 
unacceptable to the White House. 
Virtually the same partisan split evident in the Finance Committee emerged in 
Ways and Means. Many Republicans argued vehemently that the panel should not 
force Bush to revoke MFN by producing a bill with conditions China was unlikely to 
meet. Committee Chairman Rostenkowski and Trade Subcommittee Chairman Sam 
M. Gibbons sided with the Republicans. "We'll end up with a bill that will be 
popular in the US Congress but will harden the Chinese government's resolve", 
Rostenkowski wamed.146 Similarly, Gibbons argued that "None of us know how 
far you can push China. There is a good chance that if we push them too hard, they 
will just retreat within themselves".147 
But the pleas for restraint were ignored as committee Democrats passed 
several amendments toughening the bill sponsored by Nancy Pelosi. By the end of the 
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Ways and Means proceedings, several members said Pelosi' s bill had been 
transformed from a measure that might get results to one so laden with tough 
conditions China would never comply. "I guess Pelosi is just becoming a garbage 
truck. Everybody throws in everything they can think of', said Gibbons.148 
The mandatory conditions added in committee included requirements that 
China end any population-control or sterilisation; assure the United States it was 
neither selling ballistic missiles to the Middle East nor assisting other countries in 
acquiring nuclear technology; and prevent the export of products to the United States 
made with prison labor. 149 Rostenkowski noted that the bill, as approved by the 
committee, might set such high standards that China might decide that it either could 
not, or would not, meet the bill's conditions.1so He believed that these conditions 
would "further enlarge the appetite of the President to veto and make it more difficult 
to override". 151 
The key test of the Administration's influence came on an amendment 
sponsored by ranking Republican Congressman Bill Archer of Texas, who 
represented the constituency which Bush once represented. It was observed that his 
district was well on its way "to being the most Republican constituency in America .. 
. This is a place where people believe in free economic markets". 1s2 Archer 
proposed giving Bush wide discretion to decide whether to continue MFN in 1992. 
"We want to give some direction [to the] President, but say: Ultimately, the decision 
148 Cloud, "GOP Loyalty to Bush May Be Key in Fight over China Status", p. 1741. 
149 David S. Cloud, "House Attaches Conditions to MFN Status for China", Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report (49:28, 13 July 1991), p. 1880. For the text of H R 2212 and the committee 
amendments, see Congressional Record, 10 July 1991, p. H5343-44. 
150 Congressional Record, 10 July 1991, p. H5316. 
151 Cloud, "GOP Loyalty to Bush May Be Key in Fight over China Status'', p. 1738. 
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is yours", said a Republican.153 White House demonstrated that it had strong 
support in its own party. All two of the 13 committee Republicans voted for 
Archer's amendment, as did Rostenkowski and Gibbons. But it was not enough. The 
amendment failed by a vote of 15-17.154 
On 10 July, the US-China Act of 1991 passed the House by 313-112. The vote 
was well above the two-thirds majority needed to override a veto. At the beginning of 
consideration of the bill and the committee amendments, Rostenkowski, who strongly 
argued against strict conditions when his committee considered the bill, stated that 
despite his reservation about the bill and the committee amendments, he would "not 
stand in the way of their adoption by the House" and that he was "prepared to support 
the bill as amended" with the hope that the House would improve the bill in 
conference with the Senate. 155 His statement might have set the tone for the debate. 
Before voting on the US-China Act of 1991, the House rejected (118-313) 
Archer's motion to recommit the bill. The motion to recommit took the form of a 
substitute for the bill and was intended to weaken the bill. 156 In addition, the House 
passed, by a vote of 223-204, Solomon's disapproval resolution. That measure, if 
enacted, would have had the effect of immediately withdrawing China's MFN status. 
The bill was viewed as a symbolic action unlikely to become law.157 
The Senate was scheduled to take up the Mitchell bill , or the Senate version 
of US-China Act of 1991, in the week of 22 July. Pressure was intensifying as the 
vote neared and lawmakers were forced to choose sides. Several days before the 
153 Cloud, "GOP Loyalty to Bush May Be Key in Fight over China Status", p. 1738. 
154 Ibid. See also Congress and the Nation, "Trade: 1991-92 Chronology" (Vol. VIII, 1989-1992), p. 
191. 
155 Congressional Record, 10 July 1991, pp. H5316, H5344. 
156 For the text of the substitute, see ibid., pp. H5366-68. 
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Several undecided Democrats were 
leaning in Mitchell's direction, while most Republicans were leaning against him.158 
Both Bush and Mitchell were trying to win the votes, one by one. 
Comparatively, Mitchell had the tougher job. Firstly, he needed 67 votes while Bush 
needed only 34. Secondly, he was in a dilemma. His combative stance against Bush 
had alienated many Republicans who might be inclined to support punishing China if 
it were not being orchestrated by the Democratic leader. To win them over, Mitchell 
signalled a shift in his strategy. On 18 July, he "postponed indefinitely" a separate 
measure introduced by Alan Cranston that would revoke China's MFN status 
immediately. But the shift was little noticed. 
Mitchell could not afford to weaken his own bill too much, or he risked losing 
support from the liberal Democrats and conservatives already in his camp. As noted 
by Max Baucus, "That's the dilemma- the more conditions, the more it bogs down. 
That's where they are".159 
Bush, on the other hand, could be more flexible. In mid-June, Secretary of 
State James Baker sent a letter to each senator highlighting the sanctions already 
applied against China by the Administration. Baker did not forget to point out that 
the United States stood alone as the only country whose original sanctions remained 
in place and now pursued additional measures. 160 
After the votes of 10 July, the Administration felt more pressure. Baucus, 
while disapproving of the House votes, said he was "looking very closely at the 
l58 Cloud, "Mitchell Struggling for Votes to Restrict MFN for China", p. 1972. 
159 Ibid., pp. 1971-1972. 
160 Congressional Record, 24 June 1991, p. S8483. 
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administration's response" to the initiatives set out in his 19 June letter to the White 
House.161 Baucus clearly stated: 
If the administration in its response to me and to the Senate does not 
indicate that it is taking sufficiently aggressive actions to address 
human rights, transfer of technology sales, slave labor, products made 
by slave labor, and trade policy objectives, then I will be one of the 
first to state that I think the administration response is ineffective and 
insufficient, and I would reluctantly vote to condition MFN extension 
accordingly.162 
Then, in his 19 July letter to Max Baucus, Bush announced a series of steps the 
Administration would take to bring pressure to bear on China - and thus lessen the 
pressure Congress felt to act. In the letter, the Administration pledged to retaliate 
against Chinese imports under Section 301 of US trade law unless there was progress 
in the following month in talks with Beijing on opening the restricted Chinese market. 
It threatened action against China unless it stoped funneling textile shipments through 
third countries to avoid US quotas. In addition, the White House promised to oppose 
loans to China from the World Bank and other multi-lateral lending agencies, except 
for loans serving basic human needs. The Customs Service would toughen 
enforcement of US laws prohibiting import of goods from China made with prison 
labor, and the Administration said it would coordinate with other countries to ensure 
China's adherence to nuclear non-proliferation and other arms control treaties.1 63 
The matter of most debate within the Administration had been whether to drop 
US opposition to Taiwan becoming a signatory to the GATT. The United States had 
been unwilling to see Taiwan entering GATT in advance of China, since "there is no 
161 Ibid. 17 July 1991, p. S10216. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid., 22 July 1991, pp. S10519-20; 25 February 1992, pp. S2134-35. Congressional Digest, "The 
President's Letter", (70:10, October 1991), pp. 228-229. 
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question that China would go ballistic".164 But support in Congress for Taiwan's 
GATT membership was strong. And the shift in US policy could win still more votes 
for the Administration. Bush pledged to "work actively" to see that Taiwan was able 
to join the GATT as a customs territory, although he gave no timetable and said that 
the policy switch "should in no way be interpreted as a departure" from the US view 
that Taiwan was part of China.165 
Baucus and other senators viewed Bush's letter very positively. In his 
response to the Administration plan, Baucus said that "this leaves the Senate with a 
clear choice: We can make a hollow show of outrage by withdrawing MFN or we can 
support a positive, constructive policy that encourages reform in China". 166 Bob 
Dole, who also signed Baucus' 19 June letter, told Bush he thought the letter was 
satisfactory. Dole assured the Senate "this was not just a letter to pacify a number of 
Senators who had grave concems".167 
As expected, farm groups lobbied intensively against Mitchell's bill, the 
Senate version of US-China Act of 1991. China was not only a big market for US 
wheat but also a big buyer of US-produced fertilisers. A Democratic senator noted 
"the White House was able to bring in all grain groups to make this their top 
issue" .168 
The Chinese government also intensified its Senate lobbying effort. On 28 
June, China signed a contract with Hill and Knowlton, a US public relations giant. 
China paid Hill and Knowlton $150,000 for the first month of a six-month contract to 
164 Cloud, "House Critics of Bush Policy Unite on China Trade Bill'', p. 1568 
165 Cloud, "Mitchell Struggling for Votes to Restrict MFN for China'', p. 1972. See also David S. 
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boost its image among US lawmakers and persuade them to approve extension of 
MFN. "Our goal'', said a contract proposal Hill and Knowlton presented to the 
Chinese, "must be to find 34 senators who will vote to sustain a veto". Hill and 
Knowlton maintained close ties with the White House: from 1985-1988, its President, 
Craig Fuller, was chief of staff to then-Vice President Bush.169 
With a tougher China policy and intensive lobby, the Bush Administration 
won an important victory when the Senate voted on the US-China Act of 1991 on 23 
July. Before voting, Bob Dole asserted the bill would be vetoed by the President and 
the veto would be sustained. "We have many more than the required 34 votes to 
sustain a veto", Dole claimed.170 
The Senate passed the US-China Act of 1991, after first substituting the text 
of the Mitchell bill (S 1367). The Senate version was similar to the House measure, 
but following a series of floor amendments it was more detailed in its requirements. 
The White House could draw some comfort from the size of the no-vote: it won 44 
votes, 10 more than needed to sustain a potential Presidential veto. The 
Administration prevailed by retaining the support of 37 Republicans and persuading 7 
Democrats from farm states to cross party lines. Both Democrats from Louisiana, a 
leading exporter of fertilisers to China, voted against Mitchell's bill.171 Almost all of 
the Republicans who had remained publicly uncommitted going into the debate sided 
with the Administration in the end. 172 Only 6 Republicans voted against the 
169 Gary Lee, "With Vote Approaching, China Hire Hill and Knowlton to Lobby for MFN", 
Washington Post, 10 July 1991, p. A19. 
170 Congressional Record, 23 July 1991, p. S10632. 
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Administration, led by Senator Jesse Helms who, added to his strong dislike of China, 
had been under strong pressure to protect the textile industry of his home state.173 
Following the Senate action - and the virtual certainty the bill would not 
become law over Bush's veto - the measure languished. Mitchell vowed to have a 
conference report on the bill and send it to the President even if he could not come up 
with more votes. But he had been virtually silent on the issue.174 On the other hand, 
Baucus was pushing the Administration to implement the steps outlined in its 19 July 
letter. On 24 September, Baucus sent President Bush a letter complaining the 
Administration had been "slow to implement a number of the steps", especially Super 
301 investigation of China's trade barriers.175 Under this pressure, the Administration 
initiated an investigation in mid-October. Baucus then asked his colleagues to give 
Bush's China policy "a chance to work and put legislation to condition or deny MFN 
to China on hold".176 
The House and Senate appointed conferees in late October to produce a 
compromise version. And without holding a public meeting, conferees reached 
agreement in late November. Under the compromise, the President would have been 
barred from recommending a waiver of Jackson-Yanik in 1992 unless China 
accounted for and released citizens detained as a result of the Tiananmen Square 
protests. In addition, China would not receive MFN ifit transferred M-9 or M-11 
173 In 1991, 14 per cent of US total imports were Chinese textiles and apparel [ See Congressional 
Record, 25 February 1992, p. S2179]. US textile industry had been lobbying hard for revoking China's 
MFN status [See Veigle, "China Syndrome"]. Jesse Helms imposed much pressure upon the 
Administration regarding China using slave labor to manufacture textile products. He sought for the 
promise from Carol Hallett, the US Commissioner of Customs, "to get to the bottom of this". 
Congressional Record, 6 May 1992, p. S6096. 
174 David S. Cloud, "China MFN Bill Going Nowhere as Adjournment Approaches", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (49:46, 16 November 1991), p. 3366. 
175 Congressional Record, 24 September 1991, pp. S13517-18. 
176 lbid., 15 October 1991, p. S14622. Bush sent Baucus his reply letter on 5 November along with an 
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missiles or missile launchers to Syria or Iran or assisted those countries in building 
nuclear weapons. Beyond that, most of the other preconditions specified in the House 
and Senate bills were watered down simply to require that China make "significant 
progress" in achieving human rights, trade and non-proliferation objectives.177 
It was not until 26 November, just one day before departing, that the House 
approved the conference report on the US-China Act of 1991. Although the vote was 
overwhelming, 409-21, the bill was significantly less harsh than either of the two 
original bills the House and the Senate passed respectively in July.178 The Senate 
failed to act on the conference report before adjourning. Senators said they decided 
not to bring up the bill in order to keep the issue alive next year.179 
The Senate never acted on Solomon's disapproval resolution. 
1992: The Repeat of the Fight 
The fight over China's MFN status was repeated in 1992. Twice did Congress 
try to override Bush's veto and twice it failed in the Senate. Indeed, the issue had 
been so well debated that the fight, fierce as it was, had become boring and the 
outcome was almost predictable. 
Support for the President had been slowly eroding m Congress after 
continuing trade disputes, further disclosures about Chinese exports of missile 
technology to the Middle East and news reports that China had sold advanced 
ballistic missile technology and launchers to Pakistan in the recent past and to other 
177 Congress and the Nation, "Trade: 1991-92 Chronology", p. 191. 
178 Elizabeth A. Palmer, "House Approved Conditions on China MFN Status", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (49:48, 30 November 1991), p. 3517. 
179 David S. Cloud, "China Trade Status", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (49:50, 14 
December 1991), p. 3671. 
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countries previously. 180 On 31 January, against the opposition of Mitchell, Pelosi and 
several other members of Congress,181 Bush and James Baker held a frosty meeting 
with Chinese premier Li Peng.1s2 
In early February, Baucus predicted Congress would pass legislation 
restricting MFN, but "the President will veto it. And the veto will be sustained".183 
At the same time, the Administration began strenuous lobbying. The effort concluded 
on 25 February with Republican senators meeting over lunch with James Baker and 
Brent Scowcroft. 184 
On 25 February, the Senate took up the conference report on the US-China 
Act of 1991 which passed the House on 26 November 1991. Despite the 
Administration's lobbying efforts, support for the Administration was weakening. 
Senator Bob Packwood led the bill's opponents. Along with other reasons, Packwood 
supported MFN for China as China was "one of Oregon's largest export markets". 
IBO While US trade deficit with China increased to $12.7 billion in 1991, US major newspapers 
continuously reported Chinese exports of missile technology to the Middle East and Pakistan. On 31 
January 1992, the New York Times reported a Chinese delivery to Syria of 30 tons of chemicals needed 
to build a solid-fuel missile and the transfer to Pakistan of guidance units to control the flight of the M-
11 missile. On 22 February, the Washington Post reported that the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee was informed in a closed briefing of Chinese contracts to sell more than $1 billion in 
missile and nuclear-related technology to Iran, Syria, Pakistan, and other countries in the Middle East. 
On 3 April, the Los Angeles Times reported that Chinese officials were negotiating with Iran for 
possible delivery of guidance systems that could have been used for ballistic missiles. On 22 April, the 
Washington Times reported a Chinese deal with Iran for a fleet of Chinese patrol boats equipped with 
Styx antiship missiles. On 28 April, the Washington Post reported that China unloaded small arms at 
an Libyan port after the 5 April embargo against Libya was imposed by the U.N. Security Council. On 
21 May, China conducted an underground nuclear test of 1,000 kilotons for a new intercontinental 
ballistic missile that was being developed. The blast was the largest in Chinese history, far exceeded 
the generally accepted 150-kiloton limit agreed on in 1974 by the United States and the former Soviet 
Union. Congressional Record, 21July1992, p. E2183. 
181 For their letter to Bush, see Congressional Record, 30 January 1992, p. H146. 
182 Bush told Li that "the record of the Chinese Government on human rights is insufficient. We 
would like to see significant improvement". Li reportedly refused to promise any changes in China's 
human rights policies. See Alexander M. Sullivan, "Bush, Li Peng Hold Businesslike Talks", USIS, 3 
February 1992, File ID: EP-103, Tracking no. 213170; Keith Bradsher, "Bush Vetoes Conditions on 
Trade Status of China", New York Times, 3 March 1992, p. A7. 
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"Trade with China means more exports, more jobs, and more income for 
Oregonians'', said Packwood.185 Senator Bob Dole had argued for weeks without 
success for a voice vote, which would have allowed Republican senators to support 
the President without being identified individually as having done so.186 
In the end, the Administration lost the vote by 39-59. Ten conservative 
Republican senators voted for the bill.187 Several senators who opposed the bill in 
1991 but voted for the conference agreement cited weapons proliferation as a primary 
concern, 188 despite the fact that China had just agreed to adhere to the guidelines and 
parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which bans the 
transfer of certain equipment and related technology.189 Among them was John H. 
Glenn, Jr. 190 It was observed that "no other member of Congress has been so 
knowledgeable or vigilant about transfers of nuclear technology and materials to 
Third World" as Glenn.191 
As expected, the legislation was vetoed by Bush on 2 March.192 On 11 
March, the House voted 357-61 to override Bush's veto. Although the vote was 
overwhelmingly against Bush's veto, the 357 votes for the enactment of the bill was a 
52-vote drop from the 409 votes for the conference report on the bill. And while 
originally there were only 21 votes against the conference report, 61 Congressmen 
ended up supporting Bush's veto and voted against the enactment of the bill. Among 
them, 51 were Republicans. Noticeably, 110 members of the Republican Party voted 
185 Congressional Record, 25 February 1992, p. S2151. 
186 Bradsher, "Senate Backs Curbs on Beijing's Access to Markets in U.S.". 
187 Ibid. 
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to override the President's veto. An important reason might be that many of them 
believed the conditions in the bill were much less harsh than those in the original bill. 
For example, William Broomfield, ranking Republican of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, "regretfully" voted for enactment of the bill over the President's veto. He 
believed that the United States must place "realistic conditions" on the continuation 
of normal economic relations.193 
As in previous years, a more crucial test for the override motion would take 
place in the Senate. Since the Senate sent the bill to the President by a vote of 59-39, 
eight votes short of the 67 needed for a two-thirds majority, the likelihood of an 
override in that body was far from certain. Bob Dole had noted that "there has been 
probably a change of some votes but I think in the final analysis, President Bush's 
policy will be sustained when the veto of the conference report comes back" .194 The 
supporters of the bill planned to lobby hard. They were encouraged to learn that the 
two Democratic senators who were absent from the last vote both planned to vote for 
the override measure. That would narrow the margin in the Senate to six votes.195 
Supporters of the Administration's China policy emphasised the progress and 
achievements of the policy. These included China's agreement in January to pass and 
implement tough new laws to end piracy of United States intellectual property. The 
new agreement had been endorsed by all major US intellectual property producers. 
Second, in February China agreed to abide by the provisions of the MTCR. Third, in 
March China acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Finally, China 
193 US/S, "Leading Republican Votes Against Bush on China MFN Veto", 12 March 1992, File ID: 
EP-410, Tracking no. 219301. 
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had released some political prisoners, accounted for others, and allowed relatives of 
dissidents in exile to join their families abroad.196 
Critics of the Administration's China policy, however, were not impressed. 
They continued to condemn China's human rights violations and to blame China for 
the increasing trade deficit. As for China's signing the NPT and its pledges to abide 
by the MTCR, they argued they had "good reason for skepticism" and that the US-
China Act of 1991 would "hold Chinese leaders to the letter and spirit of their 
word". 197 
The China MFN issue had been so well debated that on 18 March, when the 
Senate considered Bush's veto, neither party could find enough speakers to carry the 
debate to 4 o'clock, which was the time set for vote.198 Bob Dole, who was confident 
that Bush's veto would sustain, claimed minutes before the voting that the Senate 
would increase Bush's record of successful vetoes from 24 and 0 to 25 and 0.199 At 
the same time, a supporter of the US-China Act of 1991 confessed that "we may pick 
up a few more votes today. We may come closer to our goal. But in the end, we all 
know the likely outcome. . .. this override vote will fail".200 Indeed, with a vote of 
60-38, the Senate failed to override the veto. Farm-state senators from both parties 
opposed restrictions on imports from China for fear China would retaliate against 
imports of food from the United States.201 With these exceptions, the vote followed 
party lines with most Republicans voting to sustain the President's veto. 
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In the following two months, some business leaders observed the erosion of 
their support in Congress.202 After spending four days in mid-May in Washington 
meeting with members of Congress and Administration officials, Gareth C. C. Chang, 
Chairman of the American Chambers of Commerce in Hong Kong, expected the 
upcoming debate in the US Congress over China's MFN status would be the 
"toughest" ever. His impression was that the Bush Administration shared his 
expectation. 203 
The battle over China's MFN status revived on 2 June when Bush notified 
Congress that he was granting China another Jackson-Yanik waiver for the year 
beginning on 3 July 1992.204 Again, the announcement immediately drew protests 
from Capitol Hill, mainly from Democrats, who argued that the President's policy of 
"constructive engagement" with China had produced no tangible results.205 
Democrats were hoping that election-year political pressures would help break down 
support in the Senate for continuing normal trade relations with China. 
This time, Don J. Pease and Nancy Pelosi co-sponsored the United States-
China Act of 1992 (H.R. 5318). The bill was similar to the US-China Act of 1991 in 
its requirement that the President certify to Congress that the Chinese government 
202 Issues that could contribute to the erosion of Congressional support included difficulties two 
prominent US senators had in obtaining visas to visit China, harassment of foreign journalists in China, 
ongoing human rights problems and missile proliferation, and the upcoming US election in November 
[See Robert F. Holden, "Hong Kong, PRC AmChams See Next MFN Debate as Toughest Ever", 21 
May 1992, File ID: EP-403]. On 30 April Chinese police detained and interrogated James Miles, a 
British Broadcasting Corporation correspondent, for attempting to report on a protest in Tiananmen 
Square. On 17 May, Beijing security officers interrogated Washington Post Beijing correspondent 
Lena Sun and confiscated materials from Sun's office. On 20 May, Representative Gus Yatron, 
Chairman of Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, and 
Representative Solarz introduced a resolution (H. Res. 461) condemning China's harassment of foreign 
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was making significant progress in addressing human rights, trade and weapons 
proliferation concerns. But it differed in one significant respect. While the US-China 
Act of 1991 was directed at all imports of Chinese-made goods, the US-China Act of 
1992 was more narrowly drawn. It would impose higher, non-MFN tariffs only on 
goods produced by state-owned factories. Goods produced by companies that were 
joint Chinese-foreign ventures, or by Chinese factories that were collectively or 
privately owned, would automatically receive MFN treatment for the year that began 
in July 1993.206 Pease said the change was intended to appeal to members who had 
complained in the past that denying MFN status to China would harm US business 
interests and hurt reform-minded forces in China.201 It also aimed at overcoming the 
Administration's concerns about damaging China's nascent free-market sector, which 
it argued was the best long-term hope for political change in China.208 
Meanwhile, Representative Gerald B. Solomon sponsored a measure 
disapproving of the extension ofMFN for China. 
In the Senate, George Mitchell introduced a bill (S 2808) setting "minimum 
standards" which China must meet to continue to receive MFN status. These 
standards were related to political prisoners, forced labour, religious freedom, trade 
practice and arms sales.209 Mitchell believed that "the time to change the President's 
failed policy is long overdue. This year we will change it".210 
206 For the text ofH.R. 5318, see Congressional Record, 21July1992, pp. H6296-97. 
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On 23 June the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means 
Committee voted to report Solomon's disapproving bill unfavourably to the full 
committee. The bill sponsored by Pelosi and Pease was approved by the 
Subcommittee on 29 June. The Administration lobbied hard against the bill. During 
a 29 June hearing, Undersecretary of State Arnold Kanter tried to convince 
Congressmen that "broad trade sanctions, including targeted MFN withdrawal, will 
not advance the struggle for political liberty and reform in China".211 Deputy US 
Trade Representative Michael Moskow criticised the bill's attempt to make 
conditionality more palatable by targeting only state-owned enterprises for sanctions 
if conditions were not met. Moskow asserted the legislation was "unworkable" as the 
US Customs could not enforce such provisions effectively and the Treasury would 
find it impossible to create an accurate register of non-state enterprises.212 
Despite stiff Administration opposition, a bipartisan majority of the House 
passed the more narrowly drawn United States-China Act of 1992 on 21 July by a 
vote of 339-62. Before passing the bill, the House passed Solomon's disapproving 
bill by a vote of 258-135. While Pelosi supported the disapproving bill, Pease and the 
powerful Rostenkowski argued against the bill. "A vote to cut off China's MFN 
status is a vote to cut off all potential influence of the United states over Chinese 
behavior", Rostenkowski argued.213 
In the Senate, in what amounted to a replay of the move he made during the 
previous year's debate over China's MFN status, Max Baucus sent a letter to President 
Bush asking him to "ratchet up" his administration's pressure on China to improve its 
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trade, weapons proliferation and human rights practices.214 Baucus released the letter, 
which was signed by nine senators, at the 30 July Senate Finance Committee hearing 
on China's MFN status. While he still believed MFN was "the wrong tool" for 
addressing American concerns with China, he said the situation in China was 
"unacceptable". He urged the Administration to "actively pursue a 'smart weapons' 
approach to China", referring to carefully targeted measures. Otherwise, Baucus 
warned, he would "vote for conditions as the only alternative".215 
In another replay of what happened in 1991, the Senate Finance Committee 
voted 11-9 along party lines on 4 August to report an amended version of the United 
States-Act of 1992 to the floor. And again, the bill was reported without 
recommendation. It was observed that the bill presumably would not even have made 
it out of the committee had Chairman Lloyd Bentsen not moved to report it without 
recommendation, a rare procedure. Like the previous year, Max Baucus joined the 
party-line vote although he opposed limiting trade with China. Had he voted no, the 
bill would have died on a tie vote.216 The Senate language was nearly identical to the 
House version. 
Possibly to reduce the pressure imposed on Bush, on 7 August China signed 
an agreement promising to investigate accusations of the use of prison labor in 
production of goods for export and to let American diplomats inspect Chinese 
institutions in disputed cases.217 
214 For the letter, see ibid., 1 October 1992, p. 815916. 
215 USIS, "Baucus Asks Administration for New China Policy -- Again", 30 July 1992, File ID: EP-
408, Tracking no. 237096. 
216 John R. Cranford, "Finance Committee Reports Bill on China MFN Restrictions", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (50:32, 8 August 1992), p. 2336. 
217 For the text of the Memorandum Of Understanding, see US. Department of State Dispatch, 
"Prohibiting the Import and Export of Chinese Prison Labor Products", (3 :33, 17 August 1992), p. 660. 
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On 14 September, the Senate passed the United States-China Act of 1992 by 
v01ce vote. The lack of a roll-call vote was certainly not an indication of 
overwhelming support. In fact, even if there had been a roll-call vote, the result 
would have been predictable: enough votes to pass the bill, but not enough votes to 
override a potential presidential veto. As pointed by Bob Dole in the 14 September 
debate, the China MFN debate had become "so repetitive, and the outcome of our 
deliberations so predictable" that the debate had become very boring.218 
Before the Senate voted on the bill, Bush sent a letter to Bob Dole. In the 
letter, Bush listed the progress the Administration had achieved in dealing with 
China's human rights, trade and non-proliferation issues.219 George Mitchell, 
however, claimed that "the Administration's policy is a failure". 220 
In supporting the Administration's policy, Senator Alan Simpson argued that 
"threatening China's trade status will not cause China to respond to us on any of those 
issues [human rights, nuclear arms proliferation, and trade] -- at least to any 
acceptable degree". Simpson further accused the Democrats of being politically 
motivated: 
the constant threat of the revocation of MFN to China has taken a 
political life of its own. It rises here only because it is closer, and the 
closer it gets to the election the closer we want to get MFN. This is 
one of those blusters that has a detonating cap on it, and those in 
opposition want to put the plunger down as soon as they can so it will 
blow up before November 3. We know how that works. I think this 
effort is becoming increasingly self-defeating. People come to us and 
218 Congressional Record, 14 September 1992, p. S13336. 
219 For the letter, see ibid., p. Sl3337. 
220 USJS, "Senate Debate over China MFN Takes on More Political Tone", 16 September 1992, File 
ID: EPF303, Trucking no. 243164. 
say: We will bargain our position. We were on the other side before. 
Political, it is. Effective, it cannot be and will not be.221 
The Senate never acted on Solomon's disapproving bill and it died. 
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With adjournment approaching, Congressional Democrats worked overtime to 
send the United States-China Act of 1992 to Bush's desk in time to force a formal, 
visible veto, rather than letting the President allow it to die without his signature after 
Congress adjourned in October.222 On 22 September, the House by voice vote 
accepted the Senate version of the United States-China Act of 1992, thus clearing the 
bill for the President. 
As expected, Bush vetoed the measure on 28 September, saying in his veto 
message that he completely shared the objectives of the legislation. But he repeated 
the argument that punishing China by restricting its American trade would only hurt 
ordinary Chinese citizens and American companies that sold goods there. "It is easy 
to be discouraged by the pace of progress in this area", Bush said, "but it would be a 
serious mistake to let our frustration lead us to gamble with policies that would 
undermine our goals". 223 
The House voted 345-74 on 30 September to override the veto. But the next 
day, as it had six months earlier, the Senate upheld Bush's veto by a vote of 59-40. 
Fifty-one Democrats and eight Republicans voted to override the veto while five 
Democrats and thirty-five Republicans voted to sustain it. Senator J. James Exon, 
Chairman of Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence of Armed 
Forces Committee, changed his position by supporting Bush's veto. He cited his 
221 Congressional Record, 14 September 1992, p. S13335. 
222 Michael Wines, "Bush, This Time in Election Year, Vetoes Trade Curbs Against China", New 
York Times, 29 September 1992, P. Al. 
223 For the veto message, see U.S. Department of State Dispatch, "Additional Conditions for Renewal 
of China MFN Status Disapproved" (3:40, 5 October 1992), p. 759. 
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concerns about the President's jet fighter sale to Taiwan as the reason. "Given that the 
weapons sales will not be overturned by the Congress, the symbolic isolation of 
China through overturning the President's veto of MFN conditions could be 
dangerous at this unique point in history. In spite of the President's actions, I am 
compelled to put the interests of the US ahead of any political interest", stated 
Exon.224 
Conclusion 
The above analysis demonstrates that the Bush Administration's repeated 
victory over Congress was largely based on partisanship, especially that in the Senate. 
A vast majority of Republican senators consistently sided with the Administration. 
Even in the House, the element of partisanship can hardly be dismissed. Although a 
majority of Republican members supported bills conditioning China's MFN status, 
many of them voted against revocation bills. They also tried to oppose harsh 
conditions and asked for more flexibility for the President. 
The analysis also revealed the strong influence of constituency politics. 
Several Democratic senators from farm states with big economic interests in trade 
with China consistently sided with Republicans. Democrat senator Max Baucus 
passionately defended the Administration's policy and was a prominent leader in 
supporting MFN for China. 
The relevant committees in both chambers played different roles. The House 
Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as well as 
their subcommittees, which have broad function over the making of US China policy, 
were active in inputting their voices. They held a number of hearings relating to US 
224 Congressional Record, 1 October 1992, p. S15926. 
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China relations, some of them focusing on China's MFN issue. Committee members 
actively participated in the debates. However, the influence of these committees was 
limited due to the fact that they do not have jurisdiction over most of the bills relating 
to the issue. 
In this sense, the decisions made by the House Ways and Means Committee 
and the Senate Finance Committee along with their relevant subcommittees were 
more influential. Although these two committees did not support the Bush 
Administration's non-conditional renewal of China's MFN status, both were against 
cutting off trade with China and neither took a strong lead in conditioning MFN. 
While the House Ways and Means Committee passed the bills conditioning China's 
MFN status by voice vote, the Senate Finance Committee twice passed the bills 11-9 
along party lines. 
To sum up, partisanship, constituency politics and weak committee leadership 
in opposition efforts all contributed to the victory of the Bush Administration in 
protecting China's MFN status from a Congressional move to suspend it. 
Chapter 4 
MFN under the First Clinton Administration 
US policy towards China's MFN status underwent dramatic changes during 
the first two years of the first Clinton Administration. Bill Clinton, whose campaign 
rhetoric was highly critical of George Bush's China policy, decided to condition 
China's MFN status by issuing an Executive Order in 1993. But the policy failed and 
the Clinton Administration had to reverse its policy and delink China's MFN status 
and human rights in 1994. 
Congress, still controlled by Democrats in those first two years, supported the 
Clinton Administration's dramatic changes. No challenge was made against the 
Administration's 1993 decision. The 1994 decision was opposed by some members. 
But the opposition force was too weak to organise a serious challenge. Bills opposing 
the Administration's decision of delinking China's MFN status and human rights 
were killed in Congress. 
This chapter examines the cooperation and struggle between the first Clinton 
Administration and Congress in making US policy towards China's MFN status. The 
chapter focuses on the first two years of the Administration, namely 1993 and 1994, 
and is divided into three sections. The first section analyses the cooperation between 
Congress and the Executive in reaching agreement conditioning China's MFN status, 
with the Administration issuing an Executive Order. The second section discusses the 
change in the Administration's view about the issue and the final decision of 
delinking China's MFN status and human rights. The change of Congress' view on 
China's MFN status and its influence on the Administration are examined in the final 
section. 
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Conditioning China's MFN Status: Cooperation and Compromise 
China's MFN status remained a central issue in US-China relations in 1993, 
the first year of the first Clinton Administration. With the change of administration, 
the relations between the Executive and Legislature changed. Both branches were 
now controlled by Democrats and Congressional Democratic leaders were "almost 
desperate" to ensure that relations between White House and Congress "would be 
modeled on anything but the Carter example". 1 Noticeably, the day after Clinton's 
election, all 19 returning House committee chairmen "whipped off' a letter to him 
pledging support. 2 
On the issue of China's MFN status, Clinton had expressed his support for 
Congressional efforts to condition the status. The relationship between the two 
branches regarding the issue was much less tense than that under the Bush 
Administration. Indeed, cooperation replaced conflict in the relationship. In its early 
days, the Clinton Administration prepared to condition China's MFN status, although 
it did not publicly commit itself to any specific course. While Congress was actively 
passing legislation revoking or conditioning China's MFN status, the Administration 
was reluctant to take the lead. In the end, the Clinton Administration conditioned 
China's MFN status by issuing an Executive Order and Congress readily accepted the 
Administration's move. 
1 During the Carter Administration, there was a serious divisiveness between the two branches 
although both were controlled by Democrats. The divisiveness "helped sow the seeds for 12 years of 
Republican rule". Pamela Fessler, "Democrats Dress for Dance With New Administration", 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (50:45, 14 November 1992), p. 3617. 
2 Ibid. 
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In his campaign for the White House, Clinton attacked the Bush 
Administration for "coddling the dictators of Beijing".3 Along with this denunciation 
came Clinton's oft-proclaimed endorsement of Congressional efforts to make the 
annual extension of China's MFN status conditional on improvements in Beijing's 
human rights, trade and arms-export policies. 
Early in December 1991, at a debate in New Hampshire, Clinton said China's 
access to the United States market should be closed entirely unless democratic 
changes were made by the end of 1992.4 
On 3 June 1992, the last time Bush granted China an unconditional renewal of 
its MFN status, Clinton called the White House action "another sad chapter in this 
Administration's history of putting America on the wrong side of human rights and 
democracy".5 He criticised Bush for insufficient vigour in pursuing American values 
around the world and was indignant the Administration "would do business as usual 
with those who murdered freedom in Tiananmen Square".6 
In the summer, Clinton wrote in his campaign manifesto: 
We believe that the Bush Administration erred by extending most-
favored-nation trade status to the People's Republic of China before it 
achieved documented progress on human rights. We should not 
reward China with improved trade status when it has continued to 
trade goods made by prison labour and has failed to make sufficient 
progress on human rights since the Tiananmen Square massacre.7 
3 Clinton used the phrase "coddling " in his three campaign speeches. Don Oberdorfer, "Clinton 
Softens Rhetoric on U.S. Policy on China'', Washington Post, 20 November 1992, p. A38. 
4 Keith Bradsher, "Clinton Aides Propose Renewal of China's Favored Trade Status", New York 
Times, 25 May 1993, pp. Al, A2. 
5 Jim Mann, "Clinton Seeking Way to End China Trade Wrangle'', Los Angeles Times, 9 May 1993, 
pp. Al, Al2. 
6 George Szamuely, "Clinton's Clumsy Encounter with the World", Orbis, (38:3, Summer 1994), 
p.374. 
7 Bradsher, "Clinton Aides Propose Renewal of China's Favored Trade Status". 
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On 1 October, in a speech in Milwaukee, one of his major foreign-policy 
addresses of the campaign, Clinton said: 
There is no more striking example of Mr. Bush's indifference toward 
democracy than his policy toward China. Today, we must ask 
ourselves, 'What has the President's China policy really achieved?' 
The Chinese leadership still sells missiles and nuclear technology to 
Middle Eastern dictators who threaten us and our friends. They still 
arrest and hold in prison leaders of the pro-democracy movement. 
They restrict American access to their markets, while our trade deficit 
with China will reach $15 billion this year .... I do believe that our 
nation has a higher purpose than to coddle dictators and to stand aside 
from the global movement toward democracy. s 
At the very beginning of 1993, Nancy Pelosi called on Clinton to "stand firm 
on the issue" and to "work with Congress".9 It was observed, however, that in his 
early post-election statements on China's MFN status Clinton stuck largely to 
repeating broad campaign themes while at the same time he softened his rhetoric and 
did not commit himself to any specific course of action, such as revoking or attaching 
conditions to MFN.10 Possibly he was buying himself time. As suggested by the 
Asian Foundation, "It would be unwise to take immediate action on any one aspect of 
the bilateral [U.S.-China] relationship pending a full review of our overall 
relationship with the PRC".11 
Yet, Clinton maintained his position that China's MFN status should be 
closely linked to human rights. In a 19 November 1992 speech, Clinton said 
Americans "have to insist on progress in human rights and human decency" .12 On 26 
8 Thomas L. Friedman, "Clinton Says Bush Made China Gains", New York Times, 20 November 1992, 
pp. Al, A20. 
9 Nancy Pelosi, "Policy Should Reflect U.S. Values", Boston Globe, 1 January 1993, p. 19. 
10 Jim Mann, "China Issue: Early Test for Clinton", Los Angeles Times, 25 January 1993, pp. Dl, D8. 
11 USIS, "Senator Inouye: America's Role in Asia--Interests and Policies", 22 March 1993, File 
ID:EPF107, Tracking no. 273557. 
12 Friedman, "Clinton Says Bush Made China Gains". 
173 
February 1993, Clinton made a speech at American University. In regard to trade 
with China, Clinton said: "We have a right to expect progress in human rights and 
democracy as we support that progress". 13 
Clinton's 26 February statement was explained in terms of the need to attach 
some sort of conditions to China's MFN status. While Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher thought "President Clinton will be embracing a renewal of most favored 
nation's treatment only if we see real progress towards democracy in China",14 White 
House Communications Director George Stephanopoulos explicitly stated "the 
President believes that we should extend it [China's MFN status] subject to 
conditions on progress in human rights and opening up towards democracy and 
releasing political prisoners".15 
Unlike the Bush Administration's China policy, the new Clinton 
Administration had a China policy which was overshadowed by democracy and 
human rights issues. Christopher declared that "our policy will seek to facilitate a 
peaceful evolution of China from communism to democracy" .16 
Clinton's appointment of former US ambassador to China, Winston Lord, as 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs was viewed as yet 
another sign of the new Administration's intentions. 17 Lord had been strongly 
supportive of Congressional efforts to link an extension of China's MFN status to 
improvements in its human rights policies. In 1991, Lord wrote in the New York 
13 USJS, "Christopher, Stephanopoulos: Clinton Favors China MFN Conditions'', 8 March 1993, File 
ID:EPF105, Tracking no. 270980. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Mann, "China Issue". 
17 Ibid. 
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Times: "Simply extending most favored nation treatment would be a grave mistake. 
If other steps outlined are not undertaken, this trade status should be revoked". 
Among other recommendations, Lord urged Bush to expand Voice of America 
broadcasting to overcome jamming, conduct a symbolic meeting between Chinese 
students and the President, reaffirm the freeze on technology loans, and postpone 
World Bank loans.18 
In early February 1993, Lord, who had already been named Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, reportedly told key senators 
privately he would advocate imposing conditions on China's MFN status when it 
came up for renewal later that year. He further hinted that he preferred the conditions 
to be imposed by the White House rather than through legislation by Congress, 
thereby giving the President more flexibility in dealing with the issue.19 
In the first Congressional appearance of his term as Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher began to edge away from the Bush Administration's policy on the issue 
of China's MFN status. Testifying before the House Appropriations Subcommittee 
on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary on 10 March, Christopher said he 
hoped the Administration could renew MFN for China that year "but conditioned on 
their making very substantial progress" in several areas. These areas included human 
rights and "abusive trade practices" that were reflected in China's $19 billion trade 
surplus with the United States.20 Christopher promised to work closely with the 
18 USJS, "Christopher: U.S. Will Try to Use MFN to Curb China Abuses", 30 March 1993, File 
ID:EPF204, Tracking no. 274943. 
19 Michael Chugani, "USA: US Adviser Back MFN Conditions", South China Morning Post, Reuters 
Business Briefing, 6 February 1993. 
20 USIS, "Christopher Hopes to Renew China's MFN status with Conditions", 11 March 1993, File ID: 
EPF406, Tracking no. 271733. Some sources give different numbers about China's trade surplus with 
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leading Congressional advocates of imposing sanctions on China to seek a "balanced" 
approach to the issue.21 
In the first several months, the Clinton Administration's China policy was 
neither active nor creative. It was believed the Administration had "grappled with 
Bosnia, Russia and his domestic economic fix-it plan".22 This could be one of the 
reasons. But a more important reason was that, according to several senior policy-
makers at the time, Clinton treated China largely as a domestic issue in his first year 
in office.23 In addition, in striking contrast with George Bush, who was believed "a 
foreign-policy natural'',24 Clinton lacked both experience and interest in foreign 
policy. Clinton had been chairman of the Democratic Leadership Council, yet took 
no part in the foreign policy debates of the 1980s within his own party. Opinion polls 
throughout 1992 showed that voters preferred to have George Bush in charge of the 
nation's foreign policy rather than Bill Clinton by a substantial margin. 25 
the United States. $25,729 million in USIS, "U.S.-China Trade Deficit and Greater China", 3 March 
1993, File ID: WER302, Tracking no. 270125. 
21 Carroll J. Doherty, "Christopher Weighs in on China, Empty Embassy in Moscow", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (51 :11, 13 March 1993), p. 622. 
22 Marcia Stepanek, "Clinton Takes Back Seat to Congress on China", San Francisco Chronicle, 2 
May 1993, p. Bl2. 
23 Barton Gellman, "U.S., China Nearly Came to Blows in '96'', Washington Post, 21 June 1998, p. 
AOL 
24 Lee Walczak, "George Bush Just Didn't Get It", Business Week (16 November 1992), p. 33. 
25 When asked who would handle better foreign affairs between George Bush and Bill Clinton, the 
voters consistently showed confidence in George Bush. 
Bush Clinton No preference 
March 20-22 70 22 8 
July 17-18 64 25 11 
August 10-12 62 30 8 
August 21-22 73 19 8 
August 31-September 2 67 24 9 
September 11-15 73 20 7 
See William R. Thompson, "Foreign Policy, the End of the Cold War, and the 1992 Election", in 
Bryan D. Jones, ed., The New American Politics: Reflections on Political Change and The Clinton 
Administration (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p.169. See also Szamuely, "Clinton's Clumsy 
Encounter with the World", p. 373. 
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Clinton's lack of experience in foreign policy making, and perhaps especially 
in dealing with China, was demonstrated by his move in March 1993. In that month, 
Clinton sent a letter to Beijing listing fourteen issues of concern to him, ranging from 
human rights to non-proliferation to economic disputes. He suggested that Beijing 
take steps to satisfy these concerns which, in tum, would benefit Beijing in terms of 
MFN status. Angered by the "coercive ultimatum'', Beijing fired back a list of seven 
demands of their own for changes in US policy.26 
After this brief exchange, the Administration did not take any initiatives to 
face the challenge of US-China relations, except making some broad statements. This 
not only failed to satisfy those who wanted to engage China but also angered China 
critics. In late May, Senator Jesse Helms complained that "almost 4 months after Mr. 
Clinton's inauguration, his Administration is demonstrably absent without leave when 
it comes to Communist China's arrogant and cruel behavior".27 
While the Administration was impotent in taking the lead, Congress was ready 
to take charge of China policy. In mid-January, before Clinton entered the White 
House, George Mitchell outlined his policy towards China's MFN status during a 
television interview: "I think we should continue MFN trading status for another year 
but place conditions on it that say 'Unless you take these steps to improve your 
policies, then MFN status will not continue'".28 On 22 April 1993, Mitchell 
introduced a bill (S 806) to impose conditions on the renewal of MFN status on China 
in June 1994. The bill was co-authored by Nancy Pelosi, who introduced the bill in 
26 Don Oberdorfer, "A Look at the China Challenge", Washington Post, 7 November 1993, p. C3. 
27 Congressional Record, 24 May 1993, p. 86336. 
28 South China Morning Post, "USA: Clinton's Great Chinese Puzzle'', Reuter Business Briefing, 17 
January 1993. 
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the House two days later. Pelosi had become so prominent that she co-chaired the 
Democratic Party's Platform Committee in 1992.29 
Also called the "United States-China Act of 1993", the Mitchell-Pelosi bill 
was essentially the same legislation introduced by Pease and Pelosi in 1992 - HR 
5318 or "United States-China Act of 1992". The only substantive changes involved 
provisions concerning Tibet. Where the 1992 legislation made a symbolic gesture by 
referring to China and Tibet as separate entities, the new bill called for China to make 
"significant progress" in ceasing religious persecution in China and Tibet, and ceasing 
financial and other incentives to encourage non-Tibetans to relocate to Tibet. The 
major conditions which China would have to meet for MFN status to be renewed after 
July 1994 included allowing umestricted emigration of political and religious 
prisoners, providing an acceptable accounting and release of political prisoners, 
ending dangerous arms sales in the Middle East and halting unfair trade practices. 30 
The White House, without even reviewing the bill, said the Mitchell-Pelosi 
bill's "general approach of conditioning MFN trade status to progress toward human 
rights and democracy is something the president is consistently supporting". 31 
The Clinton Administration's response to the Mitchell-Pelosi bill 
demonstrated its readiness to condition China's MFN status. The response also 
reflected the leadership of Congress on this issue. Indeed, Congress had so much 
control that Nancy Pelosi became even more assertive. She said rhetoric would not 
be enough for Capitol Hill and that she and other Democrats would be willing to work 
29 Edward Epstein, "China Faces New Hurdle", San Francisco Chronicle, 25 August 1993, p. AlO. 
30 Congressional Record, 22 April 1993, pp. S4825-S4829. See also USIS, "Senate Majority Leader 
Says China MFN Bill Not Unfair", 22 April 1993, File ID: EPF406, Tracking no. 279567. 
3 l USIS, "The White House Continues to Review the China Trade Issue--White House Report, 
Thursday, April 22", 22 April 1993, File ID: POL402, Tracking no. 279335. 
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with Clinton to develop China policy - "but we will only go so far'', said Pelosi. 
"We are not open to unconditional renewal ofMFN".32 
Noticeably, along with the new administration, there were new key players on 
Capitol Hill on the issue of China's MFN status. One of them was Republican 
Representative Christopher H. Smith. Smith was a "27-year old anti-abortion 
activist" when he was elected to Congress in 1980.33 As a pro-life Catholic, Smith 
had "stoutly" opposed channelling any aid to China's one-child-per-family policy 
which fostered coerced abortion and sterilisation.34 Although he had consistently 
voted against unconditional MFN for China under the Bush Administration, Smith 
maintained a low profile. In 1993, however, this Republican Congressman, who later 
became chairman of House International Relations' Subcommittee on International 
Operations and Human Rights, was vocal in criticising the Democrat Administration 
and became a leading figure in the debate. On 4 May, Smith introduced a bill to 
condition China's MFN status. The bill required an end to the practice of abortion 
and involuntary sterilisation. 35 
Some leading Democrats were concerned about the Congressional move. 
They urged President Clinton to act quickly and take the lead. Early on 7 January, 
Senator Max Baucus advised then President-elect Bill Clinton to review China's 
progress on some key areas before renewing China's MFN status in June. Baucus 
said: 
An early statement by President Clinton or Secretary Christopher 
should emphasize that the administration will carefully review China's 
32 Stepanek, "Clinton Takes Back Seat to Congress on China". 
33 Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1992 (Washington D.C.: 
National Journal, 1991), p. 785. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Congressional Record, 4 May 1993, p. H2201. 
progress on human rights, arms control and trade policy when making 
its June MFN recommendation to Congress under Jackson-V anik. The 
statement should make it clear that further statutory conditions are not 
necessary to keep pressure on China. 36 
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On 15 March, Representative Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, wrote a letter to Clinton. Hamilton had consistently 
voted for conditioning China's MFN status under the Bush Administration. He was 
one of the influential senior Democrats and once considered a candidate for Secretary 
of State in the first Clinton Administration.37 In his letter to Clinton, he did not say 
he had changed his mind. But he explicitly stated he was opposed to "placing 
statutory conditions on, or denying, MFN status for China".38 Such a step, he 
believed, would harm US interests and deprive the Executive Branch of "flexibility to 
adjust to changing circumstances".39 Hamilton wrote: 
I urge you [Clinton] to assert your personal leadership with respect to 
US policy towards China. Your early attention to China would 
enhance both your policy flexibility and your ability to protect and 
promote US objectives in a country of strategic importance to the 
United States. . . . Whatever your policy choice, strong presidential 
direction will prevent the foreclosure of policy options. A perception 
of policy drift would create momentum in the Congress towards 
legislation that may be difficult or impossible to reverse.40 
In early May, Max Baucus renewed his effort of MFN for China. On 5 May, 
Baucus and six other Democratic senators wrote to Clinton suggesting a policy he 
36 Robert F. Holden, "Baucus Asks Clinton to Review China Rights, Trade Progress", USIS, 7 January 
1993, File ID: EPF402, Tracking no. 261600. Italics added. 
37 Phil Kuntz, "Organization of the New Senate Will Look Like the Old One", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (50:44, 7 November 1992), p. 3587. 
38 USJS, "House Foreign Affairs Chairman Opposes China MFN Conditions", 24 March 1993, File 
ID: EPF305, Tracking no. 273969. Italics added. 
39 Ibid. 
4o Ibid. 
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might adopt towards China. They urged Clinton to "keep lines of trade and 
communication open by renewing China's MFN status this year". However, they 
expected Clinton to condition the MFN although they asked him "to avoid statutory 
or other rigid new conditions on the renewal of China's MFN status for next year". 
Instead, Clinton should set "broad, achievable conditions rather than rigid, detailed 
conditions that impose humiliating tests".41 
At the same time, Clinton, "a man who listens to business"42 and a man who 
demonstrated "natural interest in international economics" since his student days,43 
came under intense pressure from business and farm groups not to impose any 
conditions on China's MFN status. In fact, given Clinton's stance during the 
campaign, American companies had been working the China trade issue more 
aggressively than ever before. They feared Beijing might retaliate by curbing 
purchases of American goods. "The pressure from the Chinese is not overt, but it's 
generally understood that all these big business deals will die overnight if their 
favorable status is revoked. Everything that we are selling, they can buy from 
someone else", said Richard A. Brecher, Director of Business Advisory Services for 
the United States-China Business Council, a private association representing about 
200 American businesses in China.44 
For many American companies, the prospect of trade with China was 
breathtaking. AT&T said it hoped to make billions of dollars through a joint 
41 Congressional Record, 20 May 1993, p. S6204. Italics added. 
42 Ralph Dannheisser, "Business Group Favors Many Likely Clinton Approaches", USIS, 17 
November 1992, File ID: EC0203, Tracking no. 253870. 
43 Robert F. Holden, "Clinton No Stranger to International Trade, Investment", USIS, 18 Nov. 1992, 
File ID: EC0302, Tracking no. 254096. 
44 Calvin Sims, "China Steps up Spending to Keep U.S. Trade Status'', New York Times, 7 May 1993, 
pp. Dl, D2. 
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agreement with the Chinese government to provide the country with modem 
telecommunications. Company executives estimated they could supply about half the 
15 million telephone lines that China planned to install each year for the following 
several years. "We are talking about a business in China that is as big if not bigger 
than that in the United States'', said Randall L. Tobias, vice chairman of AT&T.45 
US business groups repeatedly warned that the United States would suffer 
tremendously if China's MFN status was revoked or conditioned. On 20 May, in his 
testimony before a panel of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Donald Anderson, 
President of the US-China Business Council , said withdrawing or conditioning most-
favoured-nation status "would be a recipe for disaster for U.S. workers, consumers 
and employers".46 
In 1992, orders from China were up 19 percent from 1991. 47 Trade experts 
estimated that exports to China created about 150,000 jobs in the United States in 
1992. According to the US-China Business Council, American firms signed 3,265 
contracts worth $3 .1 billion of investment in China in 1992, more than five times as 
much as the previous year. What's more, China's economy was growing at annual 
rates of 12% or 13% while the European and Japanese economies had stalled, 
Russia's would-be economic transformation had not taken off, and there were very 
few other places in the world that American firms could look to for economic 
growth.48 
45 Sims, "China Steps up Spending to Keep U.S. Trade Status". 
46 Mitchell Locin, "Trade Chief Hints China's Status with US May Not Change in '93", Chicago 
Tribune, 21 May 1993, p. 16. 
47 Sims, "China Steps up Spending to Keep U.S. Trade Status". 
48 Jim Mann, "China: Executives Press Clinton on Relations with Beijing", Los Angeles Times, 19 
November 1993, pp. Al, A12. 
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These figures and facts certainly did not escape Mickey Kantor, US Trade 
Representative. On 20 May, Kantor stated frankly: "You're dealing with the world's 
third-largest economy. Sometimes life is not simple. Sometimes you have 
contradictory goals. You can't help it".49 
While the Administration was finalising its decision, more bills relating to 
China's MFN status were introduced in Congress. On 25 May, a bill to separate trade 
from human rights issues was introduced in the House. The bill authorised the 
President to enter into agreement with China to establish a United States-China 
Bilateral Human Rights Commission.so On 26 May, S 1034, the Fair Trade With 
China Act was introduced in the Senate. The legislation provided that beginning 3 
July 1994 the President might not renew the MFN trade status to China without first 
determining China was no longer manipulating its currency to gain unfair competitive 
advantages in trade with US. The legislation targeted the US trade deficit with China 
then approaching $20 billion.sl 
The White House had repeatedly expressed its willingness to "work closely 
with Congress" and there had been some consultation. 52 But the consultation was 
largely limited to Democrats and Republicans, especially leading Republicans on the 
issue, were not happy. As late as 25 May, Representative Christopher H. Smith 
complained that "the Administration's consultation with Congress [on China's MFN 
status] had been negligible".53 
49 Locin, "Trade Chief Hints China's Status with U.S. May Not Change in '93". 
50 Congressional Record, 25 May 1993, p. E1349. 
51 Congressional Record, 26 May 1993, p. S6600. 
52 Robert F. Holden, "Insufficient Progress by China Could Force Clinton to Condition MFN", USIS, 
6 May 1993, File ID: EPF405, Tracking no. 282651. 
53 Congressional Record, 25 May 1993, p. H2728. 
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It had become clear by then that the Clinton Administration would condition 
China's MFN status by issuing an Executive Order. Such an approach would be more 
palatable to China as it would be much easier and less cumbersome for China to 
persuade the White House that China had met the required conditions than it would 
be to satisfy majorities in the House and Senate. 
Christopher H. Smith was not happy with the idea of issuing an Executive 
Order. "If the President goes the route of a loophole-ridden Executive Order", Smith 
argued, "he will short circuit the opportunity for Congress to make it clear to the 
Beijing regime that substantive improvements in human rights are absolutely 
necessary if China's preferential trade treatment is to be continued".54 Some 
lawmakers were not willing to give MFN to China at all. Representative Gerald B. 
Solomon argued that the only way to get China's cooperation on human rights, and in 
areas of trade,. military and foreign policy is to "cut off MFN, and cut it off now".55 
Clinton was accused of having a "trust deficit".56 
Both Mitchell and Pelosi, however, did not mind whether conditions were 
imposed by legislation or by Executive Order. A Mitchell aide acknowledged that, in 
a sense, Congress was playing "bad cop" while the Administration played "good cop" 
in dealing with China. 57 Pelosi also noted that "What we want more than anything is 
a unified message from the President and the Congress".58 In fact, Congressional 
leaders wanted Clinton to take the lead on China policy; the relevant bills were 
54 Ibid. 
5S Jane A. Morse, "Lord: MFN Conditions Support U.S. Interests", USJS, 8 June 1993, File ID: 
EPF208, Tracking no. 287977. 
56 Congressional Record, 27 May 1993, p. S6638 
57 Mann, "Clinton Seeking Way to End China Trade Wrangle". 
58 Bradsher, "Clinton Aides Propose Renewal of China's Favored Trade Status". 
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intended more as a negotiating tool. 59 They believed "it would be advisable to give 
the broadest reasonable discretion and flexibility to the President of the United States 
in this matter". 60 
Thus, on 28 May Clinton signed Presidential Executive Order 12850 
demanding that China improve its human rights policies during the next 12 months. 
The Order extended China's MFN trade privileges for another year. But the Order 
required the Secretary of State to recommend next year whether the President should 
extend China's trade benefits for the 12 months after 3 July 1994. The Secretary 
should not recommend extension unless he determined that 1) extension would 
substantially promote the freedom of emigration and 2) China was complying with 
the 1992 bilateral agreement between the United States and China concerning prison 
labour. If China wanted further annual renewals, it should make "overall, significant 
progress" on human rights questions. The Order also said the Secretary should not 
recommend any favourable trade renewal unless China had made progress in the 
following five human rights areas: 1) Taking steps to begin adhering to the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights; 2) Releasing and providing an acceptable accounting 
of political prisoners; 3) Ensuring humane treatment of all prisoners, "such as by 
allowing access to prisons by international human rights organisations;" 4) Protecting 
"Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage;" 5) Permitting international radio 
and TV broadcasts into China. 61 
59 Lena H. Sun, "China Presents Dilemma for Clinton's Policy Makers", Washington Post, 9 May 
1993, pp. A25, A28. 
60 Congressional Record, 6 May 1993, p. S5552. 
61 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, "Executive Order 12850 - Conditions for 
Renewal of Most-Favored-Nation Status for the People's Republic of China in 1994, May 28, 1993" 
(Vol. 29, 31 May 1993), p. 983. 
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The Order was widely hailed as a masterful solution. Chinese dissidents, 
liberal Democrats, conservative Republicans, Asia Watch, members of the US-China 
Business Council and even a representative of Tibet's leadership gathered at the 
White House for the signing of the Order. 
"Starting today, the United States will speak with one voice on China policy", 
Clinton said in a written statement. "We no longer have an executive branch policy 
and a Congressional policy. We have an American policy".62 On Capitol Hill it was 
hailed that "with an executive order he [Clinton] bridged a 4-year divide between the 
White House and Congress".63 
Nancy Pelosi was pleased because Clinton had issued the Order without 
waiver. "That is to say, next year, unless the People's Republic of China meets these 
conditions, the President will not request a waiver for MFN for China".64 Pelosi, 
however, did not give her full trust to the Administration. "But in praising the 
President's Executive Order, that does not by any means mean that Congress 
relinquishes its right to refuse a request by the President for a waiver should we arrive 
at a different conclusion from the President in terms of China's MFN".65 
There was doubt about the wisdom of the Executive Order. Sam M. Gibbons, 
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade, warned that "the 
big battle on this is going to be next year ... because it's going to be on whether or 
62 Jim Mann, "Clinton Ties China's Trade in Future to Human Rights'', Los Angeles Times, 29 May 
1993, pp. Al, AlO. 
63 Congressional Record, 21 July 1993, p. H4877. 
64 Congressional Record, 10 June 1993, p. H3438 
65 Ibid. 
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not the president's conditions have been met, and he's laid out some pretty tough 
positions".66 
Delinking MFN and Human Rights: A Frustrated Administration 
After issuing the Executive Order, the Clinton Administration soon realised its 
China policy was not working. It then adjusted its policy and adopted a 
"comprehensive engagement" approach. As for the MFN issue, the Administration 
kept pushing China to meet the conditions set in the Executive Order, not because it 
believed MFN provided leverage but because it felt boxed in by the Order. One year 
later, the Administration not only renewed China's MFN status, but also delinked 
MFN and human rights. 
Not long after the signing of the Order, the US-China relationship rapidly 
deteriorated with the occurrence of a series of controversies, including US 
Congressional resolutions opposing the selection of Beijing as the host of the 2000 
Olympic Games and Beijing's treatment of a leading dissident, Han Dongfang, who 
was stripped of his passport and denied permission to re-enter China after spending 
some time in the United States. There were also long-existing trade disputes, such as 
disputes over textiles and lack of progress in market access. 
Most explosive, however, were the Yin He issue and the M-11 missile issue. 
Both issues pertained to China's credibility of its adherence to international norms. 67 
66 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, "Bill to Block China MFN Reported by Committee" 
(51:25, 19 June 1993), p. 1550. 
67 The Yin He issue started in July, when US intelligence began tracking the Chinese freighter, 
believed to be carrying a shipment of materials for chemical weapons to Iran. Such a shipment would 
violate the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of which China is a signatory. At the insistence of 
the United States, China permitted an inspection of the ship's cargo. No such materials were found. 
The Chinese government demanded a formal apology and compensation from the United States for the 
additional expense of the ship, including weeks of delay at sea. The United States refused. 
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While the Chinese government denounced the United States as a "self-styled world 
cop" on the Yin He incident, 68 M-11 missile issue did even more damage to US-China 
relations. China in 1992 promised the Bush Administration it would honour the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), though China did not sign the 
agreement. In return, the Bush Administration ended sanctions against China's 
transfer of high technology.69 In early 1993, US intelligence agencies had reportedly 
acquired what they believed to be compelling new evidence of M-11 technology 
transfers to Pakistan, which previously had been less than conclusive. By mid-July, 
intelligence reports had led some senior American arms experts to conclude Pakistan 
had received all the components to assemble missiles. On 25 August 1993, the 
Clinton Administration announced that it would ban American exports of almost $1 
billion in high-technology goods to China over the next two years to punish Beijing. 
The sanctions prevented American companies from receiving export licenses to sell 
China advanced electronics equipment as well as technology for space systems and 
military aircraft. At the time, the United States sold China $400 million to $500 
million of such technology each year.70 
Amid the Yin He and M-11 episodes, Washington also detected that Beijing 
was preparing its thirty-ninth nuclear test, which China conducted on 5 October 
despite US protests. 
68 Jim Mann, "U.S. Prepares Steps to Improve Ties With China", Los Angeles Times, 30 September 
1993, p. A9. See also Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Warns Beijing as Problems Grow", New York Times, 1 
October 1993, p. AlO. 
69 Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. May Threaten China With Sanctions for Reported Arms Sales", New York 
Times, 20 July 1993, p. A3. 
70 Steven Greenhouse, "$1 Billion in Sales of High-Tech Items to China Blocked", New York Times, 
26 August 1993, pp. Al, A15. 
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While insisting that the United States was still looking to maintain a 
"constructive" relationship with China, the Clinton Administration acknowledged that 
"there's no question we have some problems [with China] coming together at the 
same time".71 Christopher described the relationship as being in "rough waters".72 
On 31 August, Winston Lord acknowledged that "with respect to how we've done or 
how the Chinese have done ... on the whole, I'd have to say that we've had some 
setbacks". 73 
In fact, some Administration officials had detected a deteriorating trend in the 
relationship for some time. In mid-July, Lord warned in a classified letter to 
Christopher the relations with China were "spiraling downward" and urged an 
entirely new strategy of intensive engagement with Beijing in which incentives would 
substitute for threats.74 But Lord's letter did not attract much attention. 
What happened in the following two "nightmare months"75 created a new 
urgency to halt the downward slide. A classified US National Intelligence Estimate 
on China forecasted that China's military leadership would regard US forces as "the 
enemy" unless Washington avoided fostering that impression. 76 In addition, it was 
believed that as China was facing a succession struggle after the death of Deng 
Xiaoping China policy deserved more attention and delicacy.77 
71Jim Mann, "U.S.-China Ties Tum Sour Amid Tensions on Key Issues'', Los Angeles Times, 26 
August 1993, pp. Al, A9. 
72 Steven A. Holmes, "U.S. Sets June Deadline for China to End Abuses", New York Times, 21 
October 1993, p. A13. 
73 USIS, "Lord on U.S. Policy toward East Asia and the Pacific". 
74 Daniel William and Clay Chandler, "U.S. Aide Sees Relations with Asia in Peril", Washington Post, 
5 May 1994, p. A38. See also Thomas L. Friedman "Clinton and China: How Promise Self-
Destructed", New York Times, 29 May 1994, pp. 11, 18. 
75 A phrase used by a Washington policymaker. See Daniel Williams and R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. to 
Renew Contact with Chinese Military", Washington Post, 1 November 1993, pp. Al, A6. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
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With the effort of Lord and the most senior China hand in the Administration, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Security Affairs, Charles Freeman, drafts 
of a China policy review were presented to Clinton at the end of August.78 In mid-
September, Clinton signed an "action memorandum" which codified a new strategy 
- the strategy of "comprehensive engagement".79 The new strategy was a shift from 
being "aloof' to "engaged" with the highest echelon of the Chinese leadership. Thus, 
a procession of high-level officials would be sent to Beijing. Moreover, a presidential 
meeting was now on the agenda. 80 
The Clinton Administration was quick to implement its new strategy towards 
China. On 21 September, National Security Affairs Adviser Anthony Lake made a 
speech at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in 
Washington. In that speech, he emphasised that the US-China relationship was "one 
of the most important in the world" and would "strongly shape both our security and 
economic interests in Asia".81 Four days later, Lake and Lord met with Chinese 
ambassador Li Daoyu to briefhim on the results of the policy review. They proposed 
a series of top-level meetings and passed an invitation for Chinese president Jiang 
Zemin to meet with Clinton in Seattle. They also handed Li a confidential diplomatic 
paper. The paper carried a message reassuring Beijing that US policy continued to be 
based on the "three communiques" and supported a unified China. 82 Clinton also sent 
78 Robert A. Manning "Clinton and China: Beyond Human Rights'', Orbis (Vol. 38, no.2, Spring 
1994), p. 197. 
79 Williams and Smith, "U.S. to Renew Contact with Chinese Military". Some Clinton Administration 
officials called the strategy "enhanced engagement". See Elaine Sciolino, "Clinton Takes Political 
Risk in Talking to Chinese", New York Times, 17November1993, pp. Al, A6. 
80 Williams and Smith, "U.S. to Renew Contact with Chinese Military". 
81 USIS, "Lake Says U.S. Interests Compel Engagement Abroad'', 21 September 1993, File 
ID:TXT203, Tracking no. 304280. 
82 Williams and Smith, "U.S. to Renew Contact with Chinese Military". 
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Chinese president Jiang Zemin a letter announcing the United States would help 
promote a "strong, stable and prosperous China".83 Then, on 30 September, 
Christopher met with Qian to arrange a series of visits, including several with Cabinet 
officials, and to restore military-to-military contacts. 84 
To symbolise that human rights still played a central role in the 
Administration's China policy, and thus to defuse any possible negative reaction 
towards the new strategy, Clinton first sent to Beijing Assistant Secretary of State for 
Human Rights John Shattuck. Shattuck was followed by Agriculture Secretary Mike 
Espy, who said in Beijing that Clinton wanted to improve the relationship with 
China.85 In early November, Charles Freeman went to Beijing and met with the 
Chinese defence minister and senior military officials. Freeman's visit was seen as 
the most important because it marked the end of a four-year American policy to 
isolate China's military.86 
The highlight of the events was the meeting between Clinton and Jiang Zemin 
in Seattle on 19 November 1993. The meeting was the highest-level contact since the 
Tiananmen Square incident. Before the meeting, in a goodwill gesture towards 
China, the Clinton Administration agreed to sell China the sophisticated $8 million 
supercomputer.87 In informing Qian on 17 November, Christopher did not ask for any 
83 Sciolino, "Clinton Takes Political Risk in Talking to Chinese"; Oberdorfer, "A Look at the China 
Challenge". 
84 Manning, "Clinton and China: Beyond Human Rights", p.198. 
85 USJS, "Espy: Clinton Wants to Improve the Relationship with China'', 21 October 1993, File 
ID:EPF405, Tracking no. 308598. 
86 USIS, "High-level U.S. Military Talks Begin with China'', 1 November 1993, File ID:EPF106, 
Tracking no. 310386. 
87 The Bush Administration postponed the sale in December 1992 after intelligence reports showed 
that China had exported the M-11 technology. But in the final days of his Administration, Bush 
overruled the Defense Department and ordered the approval of a license pending necessary processing. 
That put the decision on the desk of Clinton, who had accused Bush in the Presidential campaign of 
not doing enough to halt the spread of nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic missile technology. 
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concessions from Beijing. Christopher also told Qian the United States would be 
prepared to interpret an American law governing the export of high technology to 
China to allow the export of two of seven sophisticated American-made satellites 
banned by sanctions imposed on China in August. 88 
In spite of the efforts, the high-profile meeting yielded little. Neither side 
gave much ground. Although Clinton was reluctant to let human rights issue 
dominate the relationship, he still closely linked China's MFN status to its human 
rights record. Jiang rejected any interference in China's internal affairs, especially the 
attachment of conditions to MFN extension. 89 
The Clinton-Jiang meeting might have made the Clinton Administration 
realise the Executive Order would not work. It was later reported that within weeks 
of the meeting, a consensus began to emerge in the Clinton Administration that the 
United States had to find a formula to allow the extension of China's trade benefits.90 
But by the end of 1993, the Administration found that China had not improved 
its human rights record enough to win renewal of trade benefits. According to the 
State Department's annual human rights report, released on 1 February, the Chinese 
government's overall human rights record in 1993 "fell far short of internationally 
See Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Will Allow Computer Sale to Court China", New York Times, 19 November 
1993, pp. Al, A12. 
88 Sciolino, "Clinton Takes Political Risk in Talking to Chinese". The White House's pressing for a 
broad legal interpretation of the law requiring sanctions was an effort to persuade the Chinese to begin 
talks on the sanctions, and a major concession to United States business. White House lawyers argued 
that satellites that did not include components on the State Department's munitions list were not 
covered by the sanctions law and should be allowed for export. "The National Security Council 
genuinely believes that the legal arguments are not clear cut and that their is some discretion on how to 
apply the law", an Administration expert said. See Elaine Sciolino, "US and China Try to End Bar to 
High-Tech Trade", New York Times, 12 November 1993, p. AlO. 
89 R. W. Apple Jr., "'Dialogue' Is Begun as Clinton Meets with China's Chief', New York Times, 20 
November 1993, pp. Al, A6. 
90 Friedman, "Clinton and China: How Promise Self-Destructed". 
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accepted norms as it continued to repress domestic critics and failed to control abuses 
by its own security forces". 91 The report offered little justification for ruling that 
China had gone far enough. Pressed by questioners, John Shattuck had to say there 
had been "by no means enough to satisfy the conditions of overall significant progress 
within the executive order of the president".92 
In early 1994, analysts found it hard to justify Clinton renewing China's MFN 
status for another year. Former member of Congress Stephen J. Solarz , who served 
in the House of Representatives for two decades and chaired House Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, observed in January 1994: 
Unless some political prisoners are released, unless there is some 
relaxation of the repression in Tibet, unless something is done in the 
area of the jamming of foreign radio broadcasts, such as the Voice of 
America, I think that it may well not be possible for the President, 
given the commitments he has made to Congressional leaders in both 
the House and the Senate on this issue as well as the terms of the 
Executive Order itself, to extend MFN status for another year. 93 
Clinton's economic team, however, began to discuss the possibility of 
renewing China's MFN status without the annual review of its human rights record. 
Just days before the release of the annual report on human rights, Robert E. Rubin, 
head of the newly created National Economic Council and Clinton's chief economic 
adviser, who "believes market solutions",94 said the Administration would like to 
91 Carl Goldstein, "Jerk Movements: U.S.-China Ties See-saw on Human Rights", Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 17 February 1994, p. 20. 
92 lbid. 
93 Stephen J. Solarz, Clinton's Asian Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), p. 
7. 
94 Howard Gleckman, "Clinton's Economic Brain Trust", Business Week (10 August 1992), p. 41. 
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sever the MFN-human rights linkage if China kept its commitments on the treatment 
of political prisoners, elimination of prison labour and other human rights issues.95 
The key issue was how to define the progress or commitments that China 
made. Reportedly, there were indications the Clinton Administration might be 
backtracking on its commitment to human rights in China. What the Administration 
was seeking was no longer significant progress in human rights but a grand gesture 
which would allow the Administration to weather the potential criticism. Reports 
claimed it was mainly for this reason that John Shattuck was sent to Beijing in late 
February, shortly before Christopher was to pay his first visit to Beijing as Secretary 
of State. 96 
Shattuck, however, almost derailed the Administration's new approach. 
Shattuck, without informing Christopher or Lord, held a 90-minute encounter with 
China's most prominent dissident Wei Jingsheng. Wei quickly publicised the 
meeting, and China furiously denounced the United States, calling Wei a "criminal on 
parole" and charging Shattuck with breaking Chinese laws. 97 
Over the next few days, China rounded up dissidents. It was partly because of 
the approaching of National People's Congress. But more importantly, it was to 
prevent any contact between the dissidents and US officials.98 So, after months of 
trying to "engage" China, the United States and China were on the collision course. 
95 Peter Behr, "Offering China a Carrot on Trade", Washington Post, 29 January 1994, pp. Cl, C7. 
96 Congressional Record, 3 March 1994, p. E349. 
97 Friedman, "Clinton and China: How Promise Self-Destructed". 
98 When Christopher appealed to Qian to release any activists detained just before Christopher's visit, 
Qian quipped: "We would not have detained any if we had known you were not going to meet with 
any". Daniel Williams, "U.S. 'Disappointed' as Christopher Leaves China", Washington Post, 15 
March 1994, p. A15. 
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"I fear", said a State Department official, "that we are heading for a major-league 
train wreck". 99 
The rounding-up of dissidents made Christopher's immediate visit 
contentious. Christopher decided to go ahead with his visit, arguing that China had 
been hearing mixed signals and needed to hear US position stated directly and 
clearly. 100 
Throughout his three-day trip, however, Christopher found himself on the 
defensive. Both Qian Qichen and China's Premier, Li Peng, told Christopher China 
would never accept conditions for renewal of MFN status nor accept contact between 
US officials and Chinese dissidents. 101 Christopher cabled Clinton on 12 March that 
the Chinese were "rough, somber, sometimes bordering on the insolent".102 At the 
same time, American businessmen in China complained that a strategy of using trade 
to force changes in China's human rights policies only inhibited their ability to 
compete in the Chinese market.103 
Watching his China policy heading towards a dead end, Clinton was 
:frustrated. He made no effort to support his Secretary of State in public and told 
reporters he was "disappointed" with the trip.104 
99 The Economist, "Colliding with China", 12 March 1994, p. 31. 
100 Ed Scherr and Bruce Carey, "China Must Strive for World Human Rights Standards", USIS, File 
ID: POL406, Tracking no. 332846. USIS, "Secretary of State Christopher Outlines U.S. Policy in 
Asia", 17 March 1994, File ID: EPF404, Tracking no. 332820. See also USIS, "My Trip to Beijing 
Was Necessary", 22 March 1994, File ID: AEF207, Tracking no. 333885. 
101 When Christopher suggested that China should arrange meetings between U.S. officials and 
Chinese dissidents as a display of goodwill on human rights, Qian simply responded: Such visits 
would rupture relations. Qian even told a news conference that the two countries would have different 
concepts about human rights "for a long time to come". Williams, "U.S. 'Disappointed' as Christopher 
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103 Uli Schmetzer, "China Standing Firm on Rights Questions", Chicago Tribune, 13 March 1994, pp. 
Il, Il2. 
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The widely-reported Christopher episode exposed the Clinton 
Administration's frustration over its China policy. Administration officials 
demonstrated their frustration by sending mixed messages to Beijing.105 A good 
example occurred in late February when both Under-Secretary of Commerce for 
International Trade, Jeffrey E. Garten, and John Shattuck, Clinton's emissary on 
human rights, were visiting Beijing. While Garten admitted he was lobbying on 
behalf of American companies for contracts in China amounting to at least $6 billion, 
Shattuck warned that unless Beijing gave organisations such as the International Red 
Cross access to its jails, facilitated emigration, and treated Tibetans better, these 
commercial projects might be doomed. Also, while Shattuck lunched with Wei 
Jingsheng and was told to be tougher on trade, Garten painted a glowing picture of 
China's business potential. He foresaw more US involvement in telecommunications, 
power plants and transport. He also said that a bilateral committee on trade and tariffs 
would meet regularly to vigorously promote US investments, market access and 
finance as well as to discuss intellectual property rights. "I am not attempting to send 
any message to the US ... and I don't know what will happen in June [on MFN], but 
it is inconceivable to me there will not be a lot of business, whatever happens", 
Garten said.106 
Observing the inconsistency of the Clinton Administration's China policy, 
Representative Christopher H. Smith later noted that "for the past year his [Clinton] 
Administration has been like the Tower of Babel, speaking with many tongues, 
105 The Economist, "China Boxes", 30 April 1994, p. 36. 
106 Uli Schmetzer, "U.S. Sends China Mixed Message on Trade, Rights'', Chicago Tribune, 3 Mar 
1994, pp. IIIl, III3. 
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sending mixed messages, floating trial balloons and suggesting that a whitewash or 
reversal was being cooked up".107 
Naturally, the Clinton Administration would not acknowledge the failure of its 
policy towards China. Testifying before a House Appropriations subcommittee on 17 
March, Christopher insisted China had made "solid improvement" in two key areas of 
human rights: prison labour and immigration. But he did add that additional 
improvements were required for China to avoid losing US trade benefits that spring. 
"It will have to take place before the date of renewal, or I won't recommend it'', 
Christopher said.108 
China, however, showed no sign of compromise. Instead, the Clinton 
Administration started to publicly back away from its human rights policy. Not long 
after Christopher's visit to China, Qian said China was prepared to return to Cold War 
status of no trade relations with United States if disputes over China's human rights 
record could not be resolved.109 Almost at the same time, Clinton stated that "Our 
policy is that human rights are important, but so are the other issues". 110 
Actually, by then Clinton's economic team had already agreed that the annual 
rite of threatening China with a withdrawal ofMFN status unless certain human rights 
conditions were met was outmoded and should be replaced. Clinton himself told 
aides and lawmakers the last thing he wanted to do was to withdraw China's MFN 
107 Congressional Record, 26 May 1994, p. El 120. 
108 David S. Cloud, "Congress, White House Agree China Has Yet to Earn MFN", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (52:11, 19 March 1994), p. 658. 
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Times, 21March1994, p. Al. 
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Policy, Trade and Environment; International Security, International Organisations and Human Rights; 
and Asia and the Pacific, House of Representatives (2nd Sess., 103rd Congress, 24 March 1994), p. 
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status: Do so would cost thousands of American jobs and billions of dollars in 
contracts.111 
It is important to note that the United States had tried in vain to win the 
support from its allies for its human rights policy towards China. Winston Lord 
explained to Congress that "We have tried extremely hard .... Clearly, our allies put 
a higher stake on commercial objectives relative to human rights than we do". 112 
Not surprisingly, economic interest groups again lobbied hard for China's 
MFN status. As Clinton prepared to attend the funeral of former President Richard 
Nixon in California in late April, the Business Coalition for United States-China 
Trade gave him a petition signed by nearly 450 California-based companies. 
"Despite strong recovery elsewhere in the nation, California is still mired in recession 
... The loss of [China's] most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status would be an 
additional devastating blow to the California economy", the petition said. 11 3 The 
Coalition focused on California because it believed Clinton "absolutely" needed the 
state for re-election.114 
The Coalition's lobbying effort was followed by a much larger lobbying 
effort. In one of their largest lobbying efforts ever, nearly 800 major US companies 
and trade associations wrote Clinton in early May, asserting that a rupture in trade 
relations with China would sacrifice billions of dollars in business, eliminate tens of 
111Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. May Ease Rights Goals with Beijing'', New York Times, 24 March 
1994, p. Al. 
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thousands of US jobs and set back the cause of human rights. "We rely on your 
leadership, and China's cooperation, to avert a disastrous economic confrontation", 
the letter said. 115 
By late April, public speculation focused on whether the Administration 
would extend MFN with or without some form of targeted sanctions attached. 
Business groups felt they had received some degree of assurance from the executive 
branch that MFN would be extended.116 
However, the Clinton Administration felt boxed in by its own Executive 
Order. As acknowledged by a White House spokeswoman, unfortunately, "there's 
no way to take back the Order the president signed last year".117 The White House 
quietly signalled Beijing that it would consider ending the annual threat of trade 
sanctions if China met Washington's minimum human rights demands. According to 
one senior official, the Clinton Administration told the Chinese government: "Get us 
over the executive order, and we will consider all kinds of altematives".118 Clinton 
himself said that while he would do all he could to avoid having to withdraw MFN 
status from Beijing, he felt politically, morally and legally bound to fulfil the basic 
terms of the Executive Order.119 
The White House now emphasised they were not expecting a lot from Beijing. 
White House point-man on human rights and democracy, Morton Halperin, stressed 
115 Peter Behr, "Major U.S. Companies Lobbying Clinton to Renew China's Trade Privileges", 
Washington Post, 6 May 1994, p. A19. 
116 US Congress, U.S. Policy Toward China, Hearing, before Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate (2nd Sess., 103rd Congress, 4 May 1994), pp. 
10-11. 
117 David S. Cloud, "As Deadline Nears, Pressure Builds for Clinton to Punish China", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (52:20, 21May1994), p.1283. 
l l8 Friedman, "U.S. May Ease Rights Goals with Beijing". 
119 Ibid. 
199 
that MFN was not such a special privilege and that quite a few trade partners enjoyed 
"better-than-MFN" treatment. He noted that "China will not be a perfect country 
even if it met all conditions in the executive order".120 
Thus, a dramatic change emerged. Senior Clinton officials, such as Winston 
Lord, had earlier warned Beijing that a few cosmetic concessions on human rights 
could not win renewal of its MFN status.121 But as the deadline approached, and as it 
became clear China was not going to move very much, the Clinton Administration 
was ready to accept a few, last-minute, face-saving concessions. 
The implementation of the latest policy change started quietly in late April 
1994. During Richard M. Nixon's funeral in late April, Anthony Lake and other 
officials met with Ambassador Li Daoyu and proposed that a secret emissary be sent 
to Beijing. The emissary was later sent with a proposal for the Chinese leadership: If 
Beijing made enough minor gestures to cover the basics of the Executive Order, the 
Administration was prepared to drop the link between trade and human rights 
permanently.122 
In response, China invited an American technical team to discuss the jamming 
of Voice of America broadcasts and promised to release an important democracy 
protester and give visas to the families of certain dissidents. China had already 
agreed to abide by an understanding with Washington on banning exports of goods 
made with prison labour. Therefore, with the concession on the visas the Clinton 
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Administration could claim that the two "mandatory" conditions of the Executive 
Order had been met. 
In light of these developments, Christopher on 19 May gave Clinton a report 
on China's human rights record that effectively provided legal argument for renewing 
favourable trade status. In the report, Christopher also stated bluntly there had been 
no "overall, significant progress' on the five other conditions in the Executive Order. 
In fact, he wrote, China's human rights record remained far below basic international 
standards.123 
At the same time, as a last effort to get more concessions from Beijing, the 
Clinton Administration summoned former President Jimmy Carter for help. On 19 
May, Carter met with Ambassador Li and asked China to set a date for talks with 
Tibet's leadership and to release more political prisoners. But China did neither. 
Clinton then asked Carter to head an independent human rights panel recommended 
by Christopher that would press China to make more progress. Carter not only 
declined, but also advised Clinton to discard the idea, saying it would achieve little 
and would not be taken seriously by human rights organisations. Clinton accepted the 
advice. 124 
Clinton considered various ideas of "partial revocation" targeted at imports 
from state enterprises or companies affiliated to the People's Liberation Army (PLA). 
He finally rejected all for both technical and strategic reasons. Technically, it was 
argued that China had no sharp distinction between "public" and "private" sectors and 
that many of China's private enterprises were also engaging in human rights abuses. 
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Strategically, it was argued the Chinese military (PLA) should be wooed, not 
alienated. 125 More importantly, as stated by Lord, the Clinton Administration wanted 
to "move the MFN debate from the center" of US China policy.126 
The only decision approaching a sanction was a ban on imports of Chinese 
assault weapons and ammunition. In fact, Clinton wavered in the final days over 
whether it would be better to make a clean break with the past and impose no 
sanctions at all, an argument made by Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen and the 
economic team. But Christopher and Mickey Kantor insisted on this ban.121 Such 
imports, however, amounted to only $200 million a year, a tiny figure compared with 
the $31 billion in goods China sold to the United States in 1992. Above all, Clinton 
ended the agonising annual ritual linking human rights and trade. 
In announcing his decision, Clinton said: "To those who argue that in view of 
China's human rights abuses we should revoke MFN status, let me ask you the same 
question that I have asked myself: Will we do more to advance the cause of human 
rights if China is isolated, or if our nations are engaged in a growing web of political 
and economic co-operation and contacts?"128 Clinton's words might have reminded 
people of the argument Bush had made three years ago. On 27 May 1991, before 
extending China's MFN trading status, Bush said: "Critics who attack MFN 
[extension] today act as if the point is to punish China - as if hurting China's 
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economy will somehow help the cause of human rights. The real point is to pursue a 
policy that has the best chance of changing Chinese behavior" .129 
Thus, Clinton's decision on China's MFN trade status completed a "full 
circle" .130 
Delinking MFN and Human Rights: A Divided Congress 
After Clinton signed the Executive Order, those who believed MFN was a 
wrong tool to punish China gathered strength and the situation began to change in 
their favour. 
Not surprisingly, some members of Congress did not think the Executive 
Order was enough and felt the United States should go further. Gerald B. H. 
Solomon, for example, introduced a bill which would revoke China's MFN status, 
effective 60 days after enactment. But in mid-June the Committee on Ways and 
Means voted 35 to 2 to adversely report the bill. The committee reported the bill 
because, under the Jackson-V anik amendment, Solomon could demand a floor vote 
whether or not the committee reported the measure. 131 The bill later failed to pass the 
House with a vote of 105-318. Nancy Pelosi might have spoken the minds of many 
Congressional members when she was arguing against the bill. Pelosi believed "the 
Executive Order lays out the benchmarks, and China has one year to meet them". 132 
She warned that "If they do not meet them, the course of action is clear" .133 
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The Clinton Administration could hardly feel relieved with the vote. Given 
that the Clinton Administration had already conditioned China's MFN status, it was 
impressive that the Solomon bill still received 105 votes. The vote placed a pressure 
on the Administration to carry out the Executive Order. 
The Executive Order had little immediate impact on China. In August 1993, 
Nancy Pelosi visited China with other members of the House Intelligence Committee. 
After coming back, Pelosi said: "I didn't see any progress in human rights at all". 
She believed that, as things then stood, "the Congress would vote against MFN for 
China", if Clinton were to back another extension in 1994.134 
Congressional pressure had a strong influence on Clinton's meeting with Jiang 
Zemin in November 1993. As mentioned above, despite his strategy of 
"comprehensive engagement" Clinton closely linked China's MFN status to human 
rights. This was perhaps mainly to satisfy Congress. In an effort to show that the 
Administration's human rights initiatives enjoy strong Congressional support, Nancy 
Pelosi released a letter signed by 270 members of Congress, which said there had 
been "no sign of improvement in human rights in China and Tibet" since Clinton 
signed the Order.135 
Nancy Pelosi's influence on the meeting was especially prominent. As stated 
by the title of a newspaper article, "though absent from meeting, Pelosi had a place at 
the table".136 And indeed, Pelosi was "very pleased at how the president presented the 
case to Jiang" .137 
134 Epstein, "China Faces New Hurdle". 
135 Mann, "China: Executives Press Clinton on Relations with Beijing". 
136 Edward Epstein, "Though Absent From Meeting, Pelosi Had a Place at the Table", San Francisco 
Chronicle, 22 November 1993, p. A3. 
137 Ibid. 
204 
While Nancy Pelosi and other leading figures of the force against 
unconditional renewal of China's MFN status kept pressuring the Administration, the 
leaders of the forces for the unconditional renewal remained firm and vocal. After 
Clinton signed his Order, Senator Bob Dole said in a statement: "Every year 
American farmers and manufacturers have to hold their breath to see if their ability to 
do business with China will be cut off. Now they are guaranteed another year of 
uncertainty". He said he would have extended China's benefits without those 
conditions.138 
Bob Dole was influential simply because of his role as Senate Minority 
Leader. In terms of firmness, consistency and, more importantly, persuasiveness, 
Senator Max Baucus remained the most influential figure for unconditional renewal 
of China's MFN status. In August 1993, the same month in which Nancy Pelosi 
visited China, Max Baucus also travelled to China. The conclusion he drew from his 
visit was just opposite to that of Nancy Pelosi. In his report to members of Congress, 
administration officials and others concerned with American policy towards China, 
Baucus said: 
The US-China relationship involves many issues .... After this trip, I 
believe more strongly than ever that threatening trade by linking all -
or indeed any - of these issues permanently to MFN status is the 
wrong approach. We will serve ourselves, and the Chinese people, far 
better if we remain engaged with China, solve our problems one by 
one, and work together in areas where we can do so.139 
Both sides of the argument watched the issue closely and made their views 
heard. But before 1994, both sides were mainly watching the evolution of events 
138 Congressional Record, 28 May 1993, p. S6813 
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while trying to influence the evolution. Starting from 1994, with the deadline for 
considering China's MFN status drawing near, forces against unconditional renewal 
lost their momentum to those supporting unconditional renewal. 
In an effort to ensure China would get MFN status in 1994, Baucus advised 
Beijing to make some progress towards the Executive Order. In an address to the US-
China Business Council on 27 January 1994, Baucus argued the Clinton 
Administration was "not asking for the moon". "To meet the conditions, China need 
not go beyond its existing law and policy, much less its obligations under the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights", he said. 140 Baucus noted that Beijing had 
made some movement on human rights since Clinton's Executive Order laid out the 
conditions for renewal. However, he warned that "The Administration believes this is 
not enough".141 
Congress was certainly unhappy with the progress China made in improving 
its human rights record in 1993. The problem facing Congressional members was 
what to do if China did not meet the conditions set in the Executive Order by early 
June 1994. All sides felt 1993 might be the last year in which Washington could 
attach conditions to China's MFN status. Representative Tom Lantos said the United 
States had better leverage with China then it ever would have again. "We ought to 
use it", he added. 142 He later argued: 
If we do not follow through on the policy we ourselves set [in the 
Executive Order], we will lose credibility not only in Beijing, but in 
140 Robert F. Holden, "Sen. Baucus: We Need Action from China on (MFN) Executive Order", USIS, 
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141 Ibid. 
142 Goldstein, "Jerky Movements: UC-China Ties See-saw on Human Rights", p. 20. 
Pyongyang, Baghdad, Havana and throughout the world who look to 
the United States for leadership on human rights.143 
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Those who had been arguing for unconditional renewal warned of the 
potential damage the leverage might inflict on both countries. Max Baucus wrote in 
the Washington Post, that "Revoking MFN is the trade equivalent of dropping a 
nuclear bomb". 144 He reaffirmed his long-held argument that withdrawing China's 
MFN status would not only hurt China, but also the United States. Noting that 
China's market for civil aviation, computers, telecommunications, environmental 
technology and more might be the world's largest, Baucus warned that "Revoking 
MFN makes it vanish forever [for Americans] because even if China retains MFN 
status again in 1996, Chinese firms could never again consider Americans reliable 
partners". 145 
More importantly, many of those wanted to link human rights and China's 
MFN status also hoped the Clinton Administration would not have to withdraw 
China's MFN status. Some who favoured keeping up human rights pressure on China 
feared the annual MFN grind might start to work against their cause. It was observed 
that Congress was "tired of the MFN debate".146 
Tired as Congress might be, there were still watchful eyes in Congress. For 
example, noticing reports the Clintqn Administration might be backtracking on its 
commitment to human rights in China during John Shattuck's second visit to China in 
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late February 1994, Representative Christopher H. Smith was worried. He argued 
that action rather than promises was important.147 
For the Administration, Congress remained a player it had to deal with 
carefully. After his controversial Beijing trip, Warren Christopher personally called 
Mitchell and Pelosi from Asia to deny reports the Administration was looking for 
ways to delink China's MFN status and human rights.148 
Christopher's visit to China marked a turning point for many Congress 
members. Prior to the visit, 275 House members signed a letter to Christopher, 
expressing their support for Clinton's policy of linking China's MFN status and 
human rights.149 After the visit, Capitol Hill began to share the sentiment of 
Clinton's economic team, that linking China's MFN status with human rights was 
outmoded and should be replaced. As noted by Lee H. Hamilton, "the Congressional 
mainstream would still want to maintain some linkage between trade and human 
rights, but the drift is toward delinkage. It is impossible to improve the relationship if 
you have to go through this fight every year".150 
Indeed, Congress shared the Administration's dilemma and frustration. After 
Christopher's visit to China, Representative Robert T. Matsui noted "Members are 
angry at the treatment of the Secretary of State, but there's a fear about cutting off 
trade". 151 Matsui called for strong presidential leadership. 
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Not only did more and more members of Congress doubt the effectiveness of 
linkage, but more and more started to weigh the impact of revoking China's MFN 
status on the interests of their constituencies. In the past, the Democratic Congress 
could score points for high-mindedness by demanding MFN withdrawal, confident 
that Republican president George Bush would veto the idea. With Clinton in the 
White House, this was no longer possible. 
On 19 April 1994, Democratic Representative James L. Bacchus invited 
colleagues in the Florida Congressional delegation to a dinner with business 
executives to consider the impact of withdrawing China's MFN status on Florida's 
economy. Florida sold over $200 million in exports to China in 1993. Much of that 
trade might evaporate if the United States withdrew China's MFN trade status. In 
1992, the last time the House considered the issue, Bacchus voted in favour of cutting 
off trade unless China improved its human rights record. Two years later, with the 
possibility of actually carrying out this threat, Bacchus was weighing his views 
carefully. He "felt it was very important to explore the impact on the Florida 
economy", said his top aide.152 
Having sensed the sentiment m Congress, China critics, including Nancy 
Pelosi and George J. Mitchell, tried to give Clinton more room to manoeuvre. Even 
with the Christopher episode, they appeared reluctant to press for revocation unless 
China stonewalled the Administration completely. Pelosi, who had supported bills to 
revoke China's MFN status, now conceded she did not want MFN revoked. 153 She 
and other China critics were prepared to give the Clinton Administration considerable 
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leeway in an effort to avoid withdrawal of China's MFN. "I don't see how the 
president can request renewal right now, but I'm optimistic", said Pelosi. "They [the 
Chinese] might make the progress in the next two and a halfmonths".154 
Pelosi later urged the White House to retaliate surgically against goods 
produced by state-owned companies in China if the conditions required for renewal 
were not achieved. That would allow Clinton to continue MFN for Chinese goods 
produced in joint ventures with US firms, they said, while ensuring that Beijing paid 
for its intransigence.155 
On the other hand, those who had been supporting MFN for China were trying 
to find other measures to pressure Beijing to improve its human rights record. For 
example, Baucus proposed the following steps: sending more diplomats to China to 
monitor human rights, pursuing the issue at the United Nations; tightening 
enforcement of US laws against imports made with prison labour; and making 
support for World Bank loans conditional on China's progress on human rights.156 
By mid-April, Baucus suggested a majority in the Senate no longer supported 
linking China's MFN status with human rights. He planned to issue a letter 
demonstrating support for separating the issues. On 20 April, Clinton met with 
Mitchell and Pelosi and then Baucus and several other senators. Baucus then 
cancelled the plan.157 
Sentiment grew stronger as the 3 June deadline approached. A growmg 
number of Congressional members believed the United States was merely threatening 
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to shoot itself in the foot. "We basically have set up a situation where the Chinese 
have more leverage than we do'', said Robert T. Matsui. "And that's why this policy 
[of linkage] cannot continue beyond June 3".158 Former Senator James Sasser later 
revealed that "Every time that issue came up I was less and less convinced that my 
vote linking MFN to human rights in China was the correct one. On my last vote I 
voted in favor of delinking MFN" .159 
A major bipartisan effort supporting China's MFN status took place on 17 
May when 106 Representatives from both parties, led by Republican Representative 
Jim Ross Lightfoot who represented a rural district, l60 and Democratic Representative 
Jim McDermott who counted thousands of Boeing workers among his constituents,161 
sent a letter to Clinton, urging him to take a broad view towards China policy. The 
letter warned that "We have grown increasingly concerned that the multilevel policy 
of engagement with China is now being viewed by many primarily in terms of human 
rights". While supporting unconditional renewal of MFN to China, the letter also 
urged the President to consider the creation of a bilateral human rights commission 
with China.162 
Quite naturally, Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole took the opportunity and 
challenged the Democratic Administration. "He [Clinton] should candidly say what 
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most of us have known for a long time: Tying trade to human rights does not work. 
The policy has failed, the President should admit it and move on'', Dole said.163 
Senator Richard Lugar, another leading Republican in the Senate, argued the 
policy was "outdated and ill-suited" to the promotion of the totality of US interests in 
China. The policy was shaped by the image of tanks and protesters in Tiananmen 
Square. "It is geared to the events of 1989, not the China of 1994. It ignores the sum 
of our interests and the realities of 1994. It ignores China's power and potential, 
China's role as a regional and international actor, and our need to have a viable 
relationship with China in the post-cold-war period, not a cold-war relationship" .164 
Although Bob Dole and Richard Lugar had consistently supported MFN status 
for China, they might still be suspected partisan motivation. More convincing 
arguments were from Democrats. By mid-May it was no longer rare for Democrats to 
argue for China's MFN status. Indeed, their voices might well have prevailed over 
those against China's MFN status, which might have encouraged Max Baucus to 
claim that "the time has come to renew MFN [for China] permanently".165 
Reflecting the change of times, Max Baucus was no longer the only leading 
Democrat to fight for China's MFN status. Senator Bill Bradley, "a student of and 
original thinker on major issues of economics and foreign policy",166 joined the anti-
linkage faction. Bradley had consistently voted against unconditional renewal of 
China's MFN status under the Bush Administration. But like many Democrats, he 
changed his stance on the issue. On 18 May 1994, he led a bipartisan group on the 
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Senate floor calling for renewal of China's MFN status and delinking trade and 
human rights.167 Bradley believed linkage embodied two aspects of "old-think", 
"both of which should join the cold war on the dust heap of history". Firstly, Bradley 
noted, the original Jackson-Yanik requirement for yearly MFN waivers was a product 
of the United States-Soviet rivalry. The Soviet Union was gone, and Jackson-V anik 
should have gone with it. Secondly, the additional human rights obligations 
conditionally contained in Clinton's Executive Order originated in Congress' 
opposition to George Bush's early reengagement with China's dictators after 
Tiananmen Square. George Bush had left office, and the human rights-MFN linkage 
should have left with him.168 
Pelosi and her allies, however, were vowing to fight the idea of delinking 
China's MFN status and human rights and giving China permanent MFN status. 
Pelosi said, "I don't think it's going to be as easy as they think". 169 At the same time, 
George J. Mitchell said he was drafting sanctions against China,170 and Senator Paul 
Simon sent a letter to Clinton on 18 May. In his letter, Simon argued that "'De-
linking' human rights from trade only accents our vulnerabilities while missing the 
reality that China's trade surplus with the US is now roughly $25 billion". He 
suggested a tariff of up to 50 percent be imposed on goods from China.111 
Pelosi insisted that MFN was "the most effective means" to demand China 
improve its human rights record. The suggested bilateral human rights commission, 
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according to Pelosi, would be ineffective as it would allow China "to sweep its human 
rights violations under the rug". 172 However, it was clear to her it would be difficult 
to win the battle over revoking or conditioning MFN status of all goods from China. 
Pelosi therefore hoped the Clinton Administration would target specific goods, 
especially those produced by the PLA. Given the role it played in the Tiananmen 
Square crackdown, the PLA would not have many defenders in Congress. "I think it 
would be hard for Congress to resist if the president says, 'I am targeting products 
made by China's military'," said Pelosi. "If he doesn't take that initiative and 
Congress imposes targeted sanctions, they may be more inclusive than just the 
Chinese military", she warned.173 
But the idea of partial trade sanctions was opposed by Baucus and other 
opponents of trade sanctions. They advised the Clinton Administration to give China 
a clean MFN status. In a letter to Clinton, they asserted that partial sanctions were 
"likely to prove unworkable".174 
Before making his announcement on 26 May, Clinton spent much of the day 
on the phone with Congressional leaders and foreign policy experts to gauge their 
reactions to the steps he might take. 175 He had a 50-minute phone conversation with 
Nancy Pelosi. Clinton told Pelosi he intended to abandon the policy of linkage; no 
trade sanctions would be imposed against China. This surprised Pelosi. "I was not 
persuaded", she said afterwards. "I was extremely disappointed". 176 
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While separating trade policy from China's human rights record was praised 
as a policy which would "promote American prosperity" and enhance American 
ability "to advance American values and interests throughout the world",177 Pelosi 
said Clinton's policy was George Bush's policy revisited.178 Pelosi made clear she 
would challenge Clinton's decision. "We tried to cut him a great deal of slack on the 
idea of offering targeted revocation", Pelosi said. "He chose not to go along with any 
of those, therefore we will be moving with legislation".179 
The first challenge against Clinton's decision, however, did not come from 
Pelosi but Representative Gerald B. H. Solomon. Solomon sponsored a bill that 
would overturn Clinton's decision to extend MFN trade status to China and revoke 
China's MFN status entirely. In the previous year, Solomon sponsored a similar bill. 
As it had the previous year, the House Ways and Means Committee voted 
overwhelmingly against the bill in late June 1994. As the 1974 Jackson-Yanik 
amendment prevented the committee from killing the legislation, panel members 
voted 31-6 to send it to the House floor with a recommendation that it be rejected.18° 
Pelosi's efforts to challenge Clinton's China policy came on 16 July, when she 
introduced H.R. 4590 (also called United States-China Act of 1994). The bill was 
co-sponsored by more than 100 members. Pelosi and her co-sponsors were aware of a 
likely defeat in the Senate and a certain Presidential veto. Yet they hoped passage of 
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the bill would force the President to reconsider the question next year when China's 
trading status came up for annual review. 181 
The Pelosi bill placed sanctions against products manufactured or exported by 
the Chinese military, Chinese defence industrial trading companies and certain other 
state-owned enterprises. It would interrupt as much as one-half, or $17 billion of 
China's imports into the United States.182 
Congress endorsed the Administration's delinkage policy, rejecting both the 
Solomon bill and Pelosi bill in House votes on 9 August. The Solomon bill was 
rejected 75-356 and the Pelosi bill defeated 158-270. At the same time, by a vote of 
280-152, the House approved a bill sponsored by Lee Hamilton. The Hamilton bill 
was a substitute for the Pelosi bill and codified the language in Clinton's Executive 
Order extending MFN status for China for another year.183 
Although confident it would win the battle, the Clinton Administration 
lobbied hard to head off a potentially embarrassing vote on the Pelosi bill. It argued 
the Pelosi bill would prove difficult, if not impossible, to administer. The 
Commissioner of Customs, Mr. George Weise, sent a letter to members of Congress, 
indicating that enactment of the Pelosi bill would require investigation, over a very 
short period of time, of some 100,000 Chinese industries, 25,000 of them in the 
textile industry alone. Commissioner Weise noted he did not have enough personnel 
18l Keith Bradsher, "Bill to Restrict China's Imports Loses in House", New York Times, 10 August 
1994, p. A7. 
182 Congressional Record, 1 August, p. H6546; 9 August 1994, p. H7236. Heather M. Fleming, 
"House Upholds Favored Status for China, Rejects Sanctions", Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report (52:32, 13 August 1994), p. 2317. 
183 Marc Sandalow, "House Backs Clinton, Defeats Pelosi's Plan for China Sanctions'', San Francisco 
Chronicle, 10 August 1994, p. A3. 
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who could speak Chinese, nor did he know whether he would be granted access to 
Chinese plants necessary to conduct such investigations.184 
Commerce Secretary Ron Brown argued the Pelosi bill had "potentially 
devastating consequences" for US exports, for its future competitiveness in the 
Chinese market, and its global competitiveness in key high-tech industries.185 
The significance of the Pelosi bill's defeat by a vote of 158-270 (R 46-125; D 
111-145, I 1-0) lay in the willingness of many Representatives to vote for the first 
time to break the link between human rights and trade. A brief review might help 
make sense the vote result's importance. The House first voted on a conditioning bill 
(the Pease bill) on 18 October 1990. The result was 384-30. One year later, it passed 
Pelosi's US-China Act of 1991 by a vote of 313-112 and later passed the bill's 
conference report 409-21. In March 1992, it overrode Bush's veto with a vote of 357-
61. Then, in July it passed Pelosi's and Pease's US-China Act of 1992 by a vote of 
339-62 and later overrode Bush's veto 345-74. These repeated overwhelming 
majorities to condition China's MFN status and therefore establish the link between 
human rights and trade in past years highlighted the dramatic changes in 1994. 
There could be many reasons for the dramatic change. As mentioned earlier, 
not only had many Congressional members begun to doubt the effectiveness of 
linking MFN status and human rights since 1993, many had also begun to weigh the 
impact of cutting offMFN for China on the economic interests of their constituencies. 
Republican Representative James M. lnhofe explained his change of mind on the 
floor of the House. 
184 Congressional Record, 9 August 1994, p. H7236. 
185 Ibid., p. H7252. 
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Inhofe had consistently opposed MFN for China. In 1993, he visited China 
and, according to him, "have seen the boat that we are about to miss".186 Upon 
returning to his district, he found his constituents had big economic interests in 
continuing MFN for China. "Upon checking with the chamber of commerce and 
numerous business leaders in the community I was shocked and pleased to learn how 
many firms, large and small, in my district were exporting to China", Inhofe said.187 
He then continued: 
What does this have to do with human rights which seems to dominate 
the MFN issue? Very little . . . . Arn I somehow self-serving on this 
issue? Sure .... I have tried to believe that we can force China into 
submission with MFN status, that we are so important and valuable that 
China can't get along without us, ... But when I return to Oklahoma ... 
and see the layoffs, the struggling companies and industries trying to 
survive, a sober reality sets in. Maybe, just maybe we need China more 
than China needs us.188 
In the Senate, George J. Mitchell introduced a companion bill to the Pelosi bill 
in early July. But he did not push for it to move.189 
China's MFN status was not really an issue in the following two years. There 
were some challenges to the Clinton Administration, but the challenges were far from 
strong enough to get a bill passed. As pointed out by I. M. Destler, the fact was that 
"Clinton's decision commanded the political center, as Bush's similar decisions had 
not".19o By May 1995, Nancy Pelosi was a kind of "lone wolf ... baying into the 
wind" and she was believed to be "barking up a wrong tree". 191 The Republican 
186 Congressional Record, 20 July 1993, p. H4833. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, "Issue: China MFN" (52:43, 5 November 1994), p. 3155. 
190 Destler, American Trade Politics, p. 236. 
191 Marcia Stepanek, "Lonely Battle to Tie Trade to Rights'', San Francisco Chronicle, 28 May 1995, 
p. Cl2. 
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Congress and the Democratic president were ignoring her protests. Pelosi 
acknowledged in May 1995 that "The sentiment just isn't there" for linking China's 
MFN status and human rights. 192 Opposition to China's MFN status increased in 
1996 due to China's missile tests and military exercises aimed at intimidating Taiwan 
after Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's "private" visit to the United States. But the 
pressure was not strong enough to force the Administration to bend. 
Conclusion 
Congressional pressure on the first Clinton Administration on China's MFN 
status was much less a result of partisan moves. With the factor of partisanship gong, 
more members turned to the interests of their constituency, which dramatically 
weakened Congressional pressure. 
Congress controlled China policy through most of 1993. In 1993, it was 
difficult for Clinton to tum back the strong anti-Beijing momentum that had built up 
over the previous three years. Furthermore, Clinton was cornered by his campaign 
rhetoric. That rhetoric led to high Congressional expectations that Clinton would be 
tough on the issue of China's MFN status. But equally important, Clinton adopted a 
China policy different from George Bush's policy and Clinton's policy was 
overshadowed by democracy and human rights issues. In addition, Clinton was far 
from determined to fight against Congress. 
The balance of Congressional forces began to tilt towards those who 
supported MFN status for China after the signing of the Executive Order, which 
helped Clinton reverse his policy on the issue in 1994. More importantly, the Clinton 
192 Ibid. 
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Administration had realised the policy of linkage would not work and should be 
abandoned. It showed more leadership and determination in reversing its policy. 
This leadership and determination further weakened the position of those who would 
like to see China's MFN status conditioned or revoked. Clinton's decision to delink 
trade and human rights was not seriously challenged by Congress. 
Chapter 5 
Taiwan Policy under the Bush Administration 
This chapter examines US Taiwan policy under the Bush Administration. 
The first section discusses Congressional actions regarding Taiwan in 1989. 
Congressional challenges to the Administration's Taiwan policy in 1990 and 1991 
are analysed in the second section. The third and final section examines two 
dramatic changes in Taiwan policy in the last year of the Bush Administration. 
1989: Congress Engaged 
Unlike the MFN issue, the Tiananmen Square crackdown did not quickly 
result in strong Congressional challenges to Taiwan policy although Taiwanese 
officials believed that the crackdown would boost Taiwan's image in the world. Dr. 
Shaw Yu-Ming, then director-general of Taiwan's Government Information Office, 
speculated in 1989 that the Tiananmen Square crackdown "might pave the way for a 
higher standing for the ROC [Taiwan] in the international community". 1 Lien Chan, 
then Taiwan's Foreign Minister, said later that year: "It is high time for many 
Western friends to re-evaluate the situation".2 
Several issues regarding Taiwan were on the agenda of Congress in early 
1989, immediately after the inauguration of George Bush on 19 January. Taiwan 
policy was one of them, but it was not an issue much talked about. A more 
prominent issue in US-Taiwan relations in the first few months of 1989 was 
1 As quoted in Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, "U.S. Policy and Taiwan's Reintegration into the Global 
Community", Journal of Northeast Asian Studies (Spring 1992, XI:l), p. 25. 
2 Doris Jones Yang and Dirk Bennett, "The Other China Takes Wing", Business Week, 6 November 
1989, p.19. 
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Taiwan's driftnet fishing, which incurred much criticism from Congress. 
However, events which had far-reaching effect on Taiwan policy took place 
across the Taiwan Strait in 1989, beginning in April when students began 
demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. While in early June Beijing cracked down on 
the students' movement which most Americans believed to be for democracy,3 
Taipei made a big step towards political liberalisation by holding free elections six 
months later. The sharp contrast greatly strengthened Congressional sympathy and 
support for Taiwan and dashed the hope of many US lawmakers for China's 
political liberalisation. In the following three years, Congress paid increasing 
attention to Taiwan and became increasingly critical of Bush's policy towards 
Taiwan. 
In the few months prior to the Tiananmen Square crackdown, there was an 
absence of any special Congressional attention to the issue of US policy towards 
Taiwan. However, from time to time Taiwan's supporters in Congress would 
remind their colleagues of the issue. For example, on 11 April 1989, to mark the 
10th anniversary (10 April) of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Senator Claiborne 
Pell introduced for the record an open letter to President Bush from the President of 
the Centre for Taiwan International Relations. The letter, dated 17 February 1989, 
urged Bush, in his visit to China in late February, "to state explicitly to the Beijing 
authorities that the US government supports the right of the people on Taiwan to 
self-determination".4 A Mainland Taiwan expert noted this was the first time for a 
3 There is some literature which tries to have a sophisticated understanding of the movement. See, 
for example, Richard Madsen, China and The American Dream: A Moral Inquiry (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1995). 
4 The Centre for Taiwan International Relations, "Open Letter to President Bush", Congressional 
Record, 11 April 1989, p. 6055. 
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congressman to incorporate such a letter in the Congressional Record. 5 Earlier that 
year, Pell said that the "new Taiwan will be not only a major economic actor on the 
international scene, but a political actor". 6 
During that period, Congress paid much attention to fishery issues and 
economic relations with Taiwan. Targeting the problem of trade imbalance between 
Taiwan and the United States, bills were introduced in both chambers to authorise a 
free-trade agreement between Taiwan and the United States. The agreement would 
ensure US access to the Taiwanese market and make American goods more 
competitive. 7 
Taiwan policy started to attract greater attention in Congress after the 
Tiananmen Square crackdown. On 13 June 1989 Republican Representative Gerald 
B. H. Solomon, who later consistently opposed MFN for China and introduced 
several bills for that purpose, asked to put Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui's remarks 
on the crackdown into the Congressional Record. The remarks had the effect of 
making a strong contrast between Taipei and Beijing and therefore promoted 
Taiwan's image.s 
Another effort to bring Taiwan policy to Congressional attention was made 
one month later. On 12 July Republican Representative John Edward Porter, co-
chairman of the Human Rights Caucus of Congress, introduced to his colleagues 
an article written by Trong R. Chai, founder of the Formosan Association For 
5 Guo Xiangzhi, "Internal and External Political Factors That Encourage Expansion of 'Taiwan 
Independence' Forces", Renmin Ribao Overseas Edition, 16 December 1989, p. 2, carried in FBIS 
Daily Report, China, 18 December 1989, pp. 3-5. 
6 As quoted in John F. Copper, China Diplomacy: The Washington-Taipei-Beijing Triangle (Boulder 
et al.: Westview Press, 1992), p. 106. 
7 Congressional Record, 10 April 1989, p. 5894; 9 May 1989, pp. 8529-30. 
8 Congressional Record, 13 June 1989, pp. 11622-23. 
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Public Affairs, which has been trying to influence "American policy toward the 
Asian region in a way that enhances the ability of the people on Taiwan to shape 
their future". 9 Chai argued it was "time for the US to reconsider the Shanghai 
Communique and to declare Taiwan not to be part of China".IO Porter himself 
believed "the United States must look closely at how our policy toward China 
should be affected by that Government's action vis-a-vis Tibet, Hong Kong, and of 
course Taiwan". 11 
A more serious effort was made one week later by Democratic Senator 
Claiborne Pell. Pell did not publicly speak up for Taiwan's independence in April 
when he was introducing the open letter to President Bush which in effect 
encouraged Taiwan's independence. After the Tiananmen Square crackdown, 
however, Pell seemed much less concerned about the reaction of Beijing. On 8 July, 
at a symposium on "New Taiwan of the 21st Century", Pell stated that "Taiwan will 
finally enjoy real democracy and independence some day".12 
Pell also made a more formal move in Congress. On 19 July, he introduced 
Amendment No. 285 to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1990, 
to express the sense of Congress regarding the future of Taiwan. The amendment, 
in light of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, required that the future of Taiwan be 
settled peacefully. It also linked US-China relations to the Taiwan issue. The 
amendment read: 
It is the sense of the Congress that (1) the future of Taiwan should be 
settled peacefully, free from coercion, and in a manner acceptable to 
9 Congressional Record, 5 March 1992, p. E553. 
IO Trong R. Chai, "Reverse U.S. Position on Taiwan", Congressional Record, 12 July 1989, p. 
14495. 
11 Congressional Record, 12 July 1989, p. 14494. 
12 Guo, "Internal and External Political Factors That Encourage Expansion of 'Taiwan 
Independence' Forces". 
the people of Taiwan; and (2) good relations between the United 
States and the People's Republic of China depend upon the Chinese 
authorities' willingness to refrain from the use or the threat of force in 
resolving Taiwan's future.13 
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The amendment was strongly supported by Taiwan's supporters like 
Republican Senator Jesse Helms and was agreed to. In the process of passing the 
amendment, one congressman openly declared that "the Taiwan people are entitled 
to seek their political right for Taiwan independence". 14 
Indeed, Congressional sympathy and support for Taiwan had been 
overwhelming. The Tiananmen Square crackdown resulted in much more hostility 
against Beijing on Capitol Hill and further strengthened the Congress-Taipei 
relationship. 
The different feelings in Congress towards Beijing and Taipei were 
demonstrated by its completely different attitudes towards the 1st of October and the 
10th of October, the two national days celebrated respectively by Beijing and 
Taipei. The 1st of October was the 40th anniversary of the PRC and a big 
celebration was held in the Tiananmen Square. The United States boycotted the 
celebration, an act widely supported in Congress. In fact, the boycott was 
considered inadequate and Beijing's national day was used as an opportunity to call 
for a further reduction in relations with Beijing, such as economic and scientific 
relations. "If the United States wants to show support for democracy, then let us cut 
them [the economic and scientific relations] off. Let us not play games'', said 
13 Congressional Record, 19 July 1989, pp. 15164-65. 
14 Guo, "Internal and External Political Factors That Encourage Expansion of 'Taiwan 
Independence' Forces". 
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Democratic Representative Douglas Applegate, 15 whose constituents were mainly 
working-class people and might not like trade with China.16 
In striking contrast, Taipei received congratulations and respectful remarks 
from a number of US lawmakers for its national day. More than twenty lawmakers 
inserted their congratulations into the Congressional Record. What's more, some 
members took the opportunity to assure Taipei of US interest in Taiwan and warn 
Beijing against any threat to Taipei. Democratic Representative Major R. Owens 
stated: 
Just as we can count on Taiwan for steadfast promotion of democratic 
ideals and political reforms, so too can President Lee Teng-hui ... 
count on us, the American people and their Representatives in 
Congress, to give the Taiwanese support against any threat from 
anyone harmful to Taiwan's future. What's harmful to Taiwan's future 
is definitely against the interests of the United States. 17 
Representative Owens' strong support for the increasingly democratic 
Taiwan might lie in the fact that a large proportion of his constituents were 
immigrants from undemocratic countries.18 Indeed, the reason why members of 
Congress publicly voiced their support for Taiwan was not only that they believed 
Taiwan deserved the support but also that they did not have incentive not to do so. 
Taiwan has a strong relationship with many states. In 1991, it had a relationship of 
sisterhood with 34 states. Its relationship with Idaho was so strong that in 1989 the 
Governor of Idaho proclaimed that the 10 October of that year to be "Republic of 
China Day" in his state.19 
15 Congressional Record, 2 October 1989, p. 22654. 
16 Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1992 (Washington, D.C.: 
National Journal, 1991), p. 995. 
17 Congressional Record, 21September1989, p. 21365. 
18 Barone and Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, p. 861. 
19 Congressional Record, 7 October 1989, p. 23936. 
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In spite of the calls for more support for Taiwan, Congress in 1989 did not 
impose much pressure upon the Bush Administration to make significant policy 
changes towards Taiwan. On the contrary, Congress was supporting and pushing 
the Administration to punish Taiwan for driftnet fishing in the North and South 
Pacific, even it meant seriously damaging US-Taiwan relations. Driftnet fishing had 
been a major concern for the members of Congress from several states or districts, 
including Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California and America Samoa.20 
Environmentalists had been campaigning about driftnet use for a decade. It 
was brought to the attention of Congress and gathered political momentum only in 
1986 when fishermen in the Pacific Northwest began complaining that significant 
amounts of their salmon were being pirated by driftnet fleets. 21 Members of 
Congress from these areas were under pressure to take actions. The Legislatures of 
Alaska and California, for example, passed resolutions asking the President and 
Congress to pm1ish Taiwan for its high seas driftnet and gill net fishing. 22 
Driftnet fishing had been a problem for some years in US relations with 
South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. The lOOth Congress (1987 - 1988) passed the Drift 
Net Enforcement Act. However, little progress had been made in eliminating the 
use of driftnets on the high seas. A number of relevant bills and amendments were 
introduced again in 1989, some of them targeted specifically at Taiwan. 
20 Driftnets were believed very dangerous. The nets could be 30 feet deep and 40 miles in length per 
stretch. They were described as "walls of death''. Made of fine, almost invisible filament, the nets 
could catch virtually every creature in their paths, including albacore, dolphins, sharks and whales. 
Furthermore, over 600 miles of net each year were lost or discarded. These so-called ghost nets, did 
not deteriorate, but continue to drift and kill for months and, sometimes, years. See Karen Tumulty, 
"U.S. May Penalise S. Korea, Taiwan over Drift-Net Use", Los Angeles Times, 27 June 1991, pp. Al, 
A30; Congressional Record, 15 November 1989, p. S15698. 
21 Ibid. 
22 See Congressional Record, 15 June 1989, p.11897; 31October1989, p. S14421 
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The potentially most damaging sanction against Taiwan was introduced in 
the Senate. Interestingly, it came from two staunch supporters of Taiwan - Ted 
Stevens and Frank Murkowski. Both were Republican senators from Alaska, which 
had suffered from Taiwan driftnet fleet catches of Alaskan salmon.23 On 15 June 
1989, a joint resolution adopted by the Legislature of the State of Alaska was 
reported to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. The 
resolution asked the President to punish Taiwan for using gill net gear to capture 
immature salmon (especially Alaskan salmon) on the high seas and for driftnet 
fishing. 24 
In a move to protect the interests of his home state, Senator Stevens on 2 
August 1989 strongly attacked Taiwan for being "unwilling" to stop the abuse by its 
fishermen; for being "very slow" to authorise enforcement actions against its driftnet 
fishing fleet; and for failure to negotiate. Stevens declared he could not continue his 
support for US military assistance to Taiwan. He subsequently introduced 
Amendment No. 521 to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 
1990 and 1991. The Amendment reads: "No funds authorized by this Act may be 
used to prepare, propose, or implement any United States foreign military sales to 
Taiwan, or to its agents".25 
Frank Murkowski, a much more vocal supporter of Taiwan, expressed his 
support for Stevens' amendment. Explaining why he supported the amendment, 
Murkowski argued: 
23 Salmon spawn in fresh water but spend much of their lives at sea, where they are vulnerable to 
drift net fishing. Under international agreements, salmon are considered the property only of 
countries where the steams in which they spawn are located. See Tumulty, "U.S. May Penalize S. 
Korea, Taiwan over Drift-Net Use". 
24 Congressional Record, 15 June 1989, p. 11897. 
25 Congressional Record, 2 August 1989, p. 17659. 
while I recognize the significance of our relationship with the Taiwanese, 
I think we have to make the cut between diplomacy and reality .... The 
reality here, and the responsibility . . . is to maintain the oceanic 
resource. 26 
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Not surprisingly, this radical amendment was opposed by other supporters of 
Taiwan. Believing "there are larger issues at stake" and that the amendment "would 
use a cannon to kill a fly", Senator Claiborne Pell strongly opposed the 
amendment.27 Stevens consequently withdrew the amendment. However, he 
threatened to reintroduce the amendment to the defence appropriations bill in 
September if no progress was made by then. 
Given their long-time support for Taiwan, it is unlikely that Stevens and 
Murkowski were serious in their intent to cut off US military support for Taiwan. 
They might well have been making a half-hearted legislative feint under the pressure 
of their constituents. Even if they had pushed for passage of the amendment, they 
would have had little chance of getting it passed. Yet, the symbolic importance of 
the move could hardly be ignored. Taipei certainly felt the pressure from its friends 
in Congress whom they could not afford to lose. 
In the summer of 1989 the United States reached driftnet fishery agreements 
with Taiwan, Korea and Japan.28 The agreement with Taiwan aimed at, among other 
things, monitoring and collecting data on driftnet fisheries in the North Pacific. The 
agreement drew severe protest and criticism from Taiwanese fishermen and, in 
Taiwan, was widely considered a national humiliation.29 
26 Ibid., p.17661. 
27 Ibid. 
28 George Bush, "Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the 
Senate Reporting on Korean and Taiwanese Driftnet Fishing, August 28, 1989'', George Bush 
Library (http://www.csdl.tamu.edu/bushlib). CNA, "Fishery Agreement with U.S. Effective 25 
August", FBIS Daily Report, China, 29 August 1989, p. 65. 
29 Taipei (Radio) International Service, "U.S. to Discuss Trade Status, Driftnet Pact'', FBIS Daily 
Report, China, 12 March 1991, p. 69. 
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In the United States, however, while the states concerned welcomed the 
move, it did not satisfy them. The Legislature of the State of California, for 
example, passed a resolution memorialising the President and Congress to "take 
immediate action against the South Korean and Taiwanese governments" for their 
high seas drift and gill net fishing. 30 
Reflecting the sentiment of these states, members of Congress claimed the 
agreements were not enough. They made clear that the ultimate goal was not simply 
to monitor driftnets but to rid the world of their use. More bills were introduced to 
that effect, all by Congressional members from states or regions affected by driftnet 
fishing. Although not specifically targeting Taiwan, these bills had a direct effect 
on Taiwan.31 
Despite the continuous efforts of some legislators, the issue gradually lost its 
political momentum after the August agreements and, perhaps more importantly, 
after legislators concerned had postured on the issue. By mid-November 1989, 
with the passage of a bill co-sponsored by 240 congressmen (H Con Res 214), 
calling on Japan and Taiwan to "immediately cease the use of driftnets in the 
international waters of the South Pacific",32 the issue faded away from the centre of 
US-Taiwan relations in Congress. 
At the same time, Congressional interest in Taiwan quickly switched back to 
the dramatic political reforms in Taiwan. The event which highlighted Taiwan's 
political liberalisation and brought Taiwan's political future back to the centre of 
Congress' attention was the scheduling for 2 December 1989 of a variety of 
30 Congressional Record, 31October1989, p. S14421. 
31 See Congressional Record, 29 September 1989, pp. 22498-99; 19 October 1989, pp. 25231-33; 25 
October 1989, p. 26104; 15 November 1989, p. 15698. 
32 Congressional Record, 19 October 1989, pp. 25231-33; 17 November 1989, pp. H8976-8983. 
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elections. Elections were held for 101 seats in the national legislature, the 
Legislative Yuan; for 16 county executive positions called magistrates; several city 
mayors; seats on two city councils; and seats in the Provincial assembly. The 
elections were not actually fully free elections. In the Legislative Yuan elections, 
for example, only 101 seats out of 292 were contested. The majority of 162 seats 
continued to be filled with holdovers from the Mainland and 29 by people appointed 
by the ruling KMT to represent overseas Chinese.33 Despite their problems, the 
elections were important. It was the first time the ruling KMT allowed challenges 
by other legally organised political parties. 
One month before the elections, four members of the Committee for 
Democracy on Taiwan, Senators Claiborne Pell and Edward M. Kennedy and 
Representatives Stephen J. Solarz and James A. Leach, met with Chang Hsiao-yen, 
Administrative Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in Taiwan, and Ting Mao-shih, 
Taiwan's Representative to the United States. At the meeting, the congressmen 
"hailed Taiwan for its political reform and party politics".34 
Representative Solarz paid special attention to Taiwan's 2 December 
elections. On 15 November, he held a hearing in his House Subcommittee on Asian 
and Pacific Affairs on the elections in Taiwan. Solarz made it clear the hearing was 
"aimed at arousing the attention of the American media and the public towards 
Taiwan's elections".35 Mainland media pointed out that the four people invited to 
33 Congressional Record, 26 March 1990, p. 5263. 
34 Xinhua quotes Zhongguo Shibao in Xinhua "U.S. Shows Interest in Taiwan Elections'', FBIS 
Daily Report, China, 1 December 1989, p. 50. 
35 Ibid. 
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give testimony all took the position of supporting and sympathising with Taiwan's 
independence. 36 
The next day, to mark Congress' attention on the elections, Senators Pell and 
Murkowski co-sponsored a resolution expressing support for democratic reforms 
and human rights in Taiwan. The resolution urged "the authorities of Taiwan ... to 
send a strong signal of Taiwan's continued commitment to the principles of 
democracy and the rule oflaw of which a key test will be the elections on December 
2, 1989".37 
Shortly before the elections, Stephen Solarz led a five-member 
Congressional delegation to Taipei to observe the elections. He later highly praised 
the elections and said the process of the elections presented "a stark and compelling 
contrast" to what happened at Tiananmen Square. "If the method chosen on the 
Mainland requires our continuing condemnation, the approach adopted on Taiwan 
evokes our renewed commendation'', Solarz added.38 
Solarz could have spoken the minds of many of his colleagues on Capitol 
Hill. There is no doubt that political liberalisation had won Taiwan enormous 
support and sympathy in the US Congress. 
36 Tao Shian, "What Is the Purpose of Solarz's Visit to Taiwan", Renmin Ribao Overseas Edition, 15 
December 1989, p. 5, carried in FBIS Daily Report, China, 19 December 1989, pp. 2-4. 
37 Congressional Record, 16 November 1989, pp. 815875-76. 
38 CNA, "Congressman Solarz Praises Elections'', FBIS Daily Report, China, 12 December 1989, pp. 
51-52. 
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1990-1991: Congressional Challenges 
The years 1990 and 1991 witnessed a rather smooth US-Taiwan relationship. 
Although the issue of driftnet fishing was still raised from time to time, 39 it was not 
a central issue in US-Taiwan relations for Congress. Taiwan's fisheries sources said 
in February 1990 that Taiwan would ban driftnet fishing from 30 June 1992, the 
date a UN global ban would be implemented. 40 The Taiwan government made its 
official announcement to this effect on 21 August 1991. Along with the 
announcement, Taiwan introduced a series of programs to help its fishing industry 
make a smooth transition to other fishing methods.41 
US trade with Taiwan remained a major concern of Congress in those two 
years. Although Taiwan's trade surplus with the United States had been reduced 
substantially- from its peak of $16.037 billion in 1987 to $10.460 billion in 1988 
- by 1989 it had crawled back to $12.033 billion (see Table 5.1). Congress, in 
support of the Administration, kept pressuring Taiwan to open its markets and 
further reduce the surplus. At the same time, Taiwan's failure to protect intellectual 
property rights was much criticised in Congress. 
39 Representative Jolene Unsoeld (D-Washington), for example, complained that "The Senate 
continues to sit on its hands. And the administration continues to oppose my drift net 
legislation".(See Congressional Record, 28 September, 1990, p. H8318.) In early August 1991, the 
Senate adopted a bill that would authorise President Bush to ban fish imports from countries which 
continue driftnet fishing in the North Pacific. Taiwanese fishermen protested the bill. (See CNA, 
"Fishermen Protest U.S. Senate Driftnet Bill'', FBIS Daily Report, China, 8 August 1991, p. 40.) 
President Bush wrote to Congress on 18 October, saying that he had decided to defer sanctions 
against Taiwan for 90 days pending evaluation of any additional remedial and punitive measures that 
it might take regarding the 1991 violations for which it was certified and its adherence to the driftnet 
agreement. The sanctions were not imposed in the end. George Bush, "Message to the Congress 
Deferring Sanctions Under the Pelagic Driftnet Agreement", George Bush Library. 
40 CNA, "Driftnet Fishing Ban Begins June 1992'', FBIS Daily Report, China, 15 February 1990, pp. 
42-43. 
41 The programs included: 1) a buy-back offer for aged drift net vessels; 2) a low-interest loan 
program to cover the cost of converting to other fishing methods; and 3) the establishment of special 
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Table 5.1 
Taiwan's Trade with the United States 
(US$1,000) 
Year Imports Exports Balance 
1985 4,746,273 14,773,373 + 10,027,100 
1986 5,432,594 19,013,878 + 13,581,284 
1987 7,647,962 23,684,790 + 16,036,828 
1988 13,006,725 23,467,169 + 10,460,444 
1989 12,002,788 24,036,214 + 12,033,426 
1990 12,611,827 21,745,853 + 9,134,026 
1991 14,113,788 22,320,844 + 8,207,056 
1992 15,771,032 23,571,604 + 7,800,572 
1993 16,722,624 23,587,325 + 6,864,701 
1994 18,042,642 24,336,757 + 6,294,115 
1995 20,771,393 26,407,389 + 5,635,996 
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of China, Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book 1996 (Taipei, June 1996), p. 194. 
But Congress was clearly paymg more attention to Taiwan's political 
liberalisation and its efforts to play a more important role in the international 
community. This interest was intensified by reactions to the repressive political 
situation in mainland China and the dramatic changes in world politics as a result of 
the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, this increasing Congressional attention resulted in the Bush 
Administration's agreement to support Taiwan's application to join the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
Congress started its 1990 activities on the Taiwan issue with a number of 
members commending the 2 December 1989 elections in Taiwan. On 31 January 
1990, the week after the House overrode Bush's veto of the Chinese Emergency 
funds to promote catches acquired with new fishing methods. See Congressional Record, 29 October 
1991, p. E3580. 
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Immigration Act, an article by Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui was introduced in the 
House. Noting people on Taiwan "have been practising constitutional democracy in 
Taiwan", Lee reminded readers that "the mainland has been controlled by 
communism". 42 
Lee's article was introduced by Representative Claude Harris, Jr. Although 
a Democrat, Harris had his "conservative instincts" and while his district had 
Alabama's highest black percentage (30.2%), it also had Alabama's most 
Republican county. 43 
The elections were agam raised in the House with more details being 
provided on 6 February 1990 by Democratic Representative Robin Tallon. Tallon 
did not stop at simply introducing the elections. Arguing that Taiwan was "worthy 
of all international respect and courtesy", Tallon urged his colleagues on Capitol 
Hill and policy makers in the Bush Administration "to help Taiwan rejoin various 
international organizations such as the United Nations and the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade".44 
Tallon was a Democrat, yet conservative on foreign policy issues.45 More 
importantly, he had been for years a member of the House Agriculture Committee's 
Peanuts and Tobacco Subcommittee. He publicly claimed that "the tobacco farmer 
in my district and elsewhere should be the point of reference for any government 
program, domestic or export".46 It may not be coincidental that at the time when 
Tallon was calling for more support for Taiwan in February 1990, the United States 
42 Lee Teng-hui, "China Can Learn from Our Success", Congressional Record, 31January1990, pp. 
982-983. 
43 Barone and Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, p. 24. 
44 Congressional Record, 6 February 1990, p.1467. 
45 Barone and Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, p. 1131. 
46 As quoted, ibid. 
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was mounting an aggressive campaign to force developing countries to purchase US 
tobacco products. Taiwan was one of the targets.47 In fact, Tallon had just visited 
Taiwan in the previous month.48 
Support for Taiwan's rejoining various international organisations would 
later become a big issue for the Bush and Clinton administrations. Taiwan formally 
began the process of seeking membership in the GATT on 1 January 1990. Taiwan 
was almost certainly trying to take advantage of world-wide reaction against the 
Tiananmen Square crackdown, although Taiwanese officials tried to play down the 
influence of the crackdown. 49 There had been an unspoken agreement that China 
would join the GATT first, to be followed by Taiwan a few years later.5° Although 
US support would not automatically guarantee membership for Taiwan, the 
necessary consensus in the organisation would probably form quickly if the United 
States signalled its approval.51 
The Bush Administration's initial response to Taiwan's GATT application 
adopted a conciliatory tone. The State Department expressed support in principle: 
"Given Taiwan's importance in the global trading system, we look forward to the 
eventual inclusion of Taiwan on appropriate terms of membership in the GATT".52 
Taipei, however, put much store in the Congress. A commentary of Taipei 
Radio noted: 
47 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and The United States, 1945-1992 (New York: 
Twayne Publishers, 1994), p. 170. 
48 Congressional Record, 6 February 1990, p. 1467. 
49 CNA, "Preparation for GATT Membership in Full Swing'', FBIS Daily Report, China, 19 July 
1989, p. 56. Art Pine and Jim Mann, "U.S. May Back Taiwan Bid to Join World Trade Body", Los 
Angeles Times, 27 February 1990, p. A6. 
50 Pine and Mann, "U.S. May Back Taiwan Bid to Join World Trade Body". 
51 Ibid. 
52 CNA, "Further on GAIT Membership Application: U.S. Support Sought", FBIS Daily Report, 
China, 22 January 1990, p. 53. Italics added. 
Were the Bush Administration to hedge on supporting Taipei on 
GATT, it is likely that the U.S. Congress will pick up the slack. 
Lately, Bush and the Congress have been at loggerheads over U.S. 
policy toward Peking. The Congress now seems to be less worried 
about upsetting Peking, and is likely to push hard in supporting 
Taipei's membership in GATT.53 
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Indeed, not long after Taiwan's application, 23 members of the House Ways 
and Means Subcommittee on Trade wrote to President Bush, urging him to support 
Taiwan's bid. They argued the move would "not only serve US interests but also 
strengthen the trading system itself'.54 
A serious effort to support Taiwan's accession to the GATT was made by 
Republican Senator William V. Roth, Jr. On 7 June, Roth introduced to the 
Committee on Finance a resolution stating it was the sense of the Senate that 
the Government of the United States should fully support Taiwan's 
accession to the GATT by calling for the favorable and immediate 
consideration of Taiwan's request for contracting party status at the next 
GATT Council meeting, and by taking any additional steps deemed 
necessary to assure Taiwan's prompt membership in the GATT.55 
Another serious effort was made by Philip M. Crane, ranking Republican of 
the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade. On 12 July, when the 
Subcommittee was considering the Pease bill (H.R. 4939) conditioning China's 
MFN status, Crane successfully added an amendment to the bill. The amendment 
required that, to win 1991 renewal of MFN status, Beijing be certified as having 
moderated its long-standing opposition to Taiwan's participation in the GATT.56 
53 Taipei (Radio) International Service, "Commentary on Washington 'Support' for GATT Bid'', 
FBIS Daily Report, China, 5 March 1990, p. 52. 
54 Pine and Mann, "U.S. May Back Taiwan Bid to Join World Trade Body". 
55 Congressional Record, 7 June 1990, pp. 13412, S7601, S7604. The bill failed to go to floor. 
56 Ronald D. Elving, "Bill Links China's MFN Status to Human Rights Progress'', Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (48:28, 14 July 1990), p. 2201. 
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Crane's success did not come easily, however. He was initially defeated in 
offering the amendment. It was only after he had produced proxy votes from two 
Republican colleagues and lured two votes from the Democratic side that he 
prevailed, 7-5.57 But as examined in Chapter 3, the Pease bill was vetoed by 
President Bush and the veto was sustained in the Senate. 
But for Philip M. Crane, the amendment was one of his major achievements, 
at least in that year. According to Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, 
At the same time as his [Crane] beliefs-in free market economics, in a 
strong national defense, in traditional American ideals - have been 
sweeping the country and the world, his own influence has been 
woefully meagre and he continues to languish mostly unnoticed, despite 
20-plus years of seniority, on the back benches. 58 
"What does he do?" Barone and Ujifusa asked and then answered: 
As ranking Republican on the Trade Subcommittee, Crane speaks out 
valiantly for the imperilled cause of free trade, and he has worked with 
liberals and conservatives alike to use the trade lever to stop or punish 
human rights violations by China. His great achievement here was an 
amendment threatening China's Most Favored Nation status unless it 
stops blocking Taiwan's participation in GATT. Otherwise he casts 
lone dissenting votes. 59 
Congressional support for Taiwan's GATT bid was partly offset by Taiwan's 
trade practices. To win more support from the United States, Taiwan made big 
efforts to improve its trade relations with the US. Indeed, Taiwan had been 
working so hard that a commentary on Taipei radio said Taiwan was "forced to go 
out of her way to accommodate U.S. interests".60 In late 1990, a Taiwanese official 
57 Ibid. 
58 Barone and Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, p. 383. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Taipei (Radio) International Service, "Commentary Views Fishing Dispute Resolution", FBIS 
Daily Report, China, 31July1989, p. 71. 
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claimed, "We have done even more than the Americans have asked".61 According 
to the official, Taiwan's average nominal tariff rate was lowered to 9.25 percent in 
1989 and dropped further to 8.92 percent in 1990, far lower than the 10.25 percent 
and 9 .17 percent demanded by the United States. Taiwan had also substantially 
reduced non-tariff trade barriers and appreciated its currency.62 
The Bush Administration, however, was not satisfied. Accusing Taiwan of 
high tariffs, inadequate enforcement of intellectual-property protections and other 
trade barriers, in 1989 the United States placed Taiwan on the US "Priority Watch 
List" under "Special 301" - a 1988 addition to Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act 
establishing new processes for dealing with unfair trade practices by foreign 
nations. 63 Taiwan was removed from the "Priority Watch List" to "Watch List" 
later that year but the United States still believed it far from satisfactorily protecting 
intellectual property rights.64 In the 1990 National Trade Estimate Report on 
ForeignTrade Barriers, the US Trade Representative (USTR) cited issues of concern 
about Taiwan's intellectual property protection. The report stated Taiwan had 
"inadequate enforcement of existing laws protecting intellectual property rights, 
especially, computer software, which remains a serious concern to U.S. exporters".65 
There seemed to be further reason for Congressional reservation. One such 
reason could be that Congress' enthusiasm for Taiwan's economic reform and 
61 CNA, "Improved Trade Relations with U.S. Expected", FBIS Daily Report, China, 14 November 
1990, p. 40. 
62 Ibid. 
63 For more information, see Elizabeth Wehr, "U.S. Plies Uncharted Waters in Effort to Open 
Markets", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (47:20, 20 May 1989), pp. 1170-1175. 
64 CNA, "Official Criticize U.S. '301 Watch List'", FBIS Daily Report, China, 3 November 1989, p. 
69; Taipei CNA, "U.S. Urged To Remove Taiwan From Watch List", FBIS Daily Report, China, 13 
March 1991, p. 67. 
65 Congressional Record, 24 October 1990, p. E3443. 
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political liberalisation was yet to be fully mobilised. 66 It seemed the Senate was still 
rather indifferent to what was happening in Taiwan. 
The seeming indifference of the Senate angered some senators. Republican 
Senator Slade Gorton complained on 26 March 1990 that while the Senate had spent 
a great deal of time in the previous nine months discussing China policy, "almost no 
mention" had been made of Taiwan's political liberalisation. 67 
Gorton challenged Taiwan policy and strongly argued for support of Taiwan. 
Like Taiwan's other supporters, Gorton believed Taiwan's economic and political 
accomplishments should be rewarded and that "Taiwan must no longer be treated as 
an international pariah". He further argued that, "Given the bright promise of its 
political and economic future, Taiwan should no longer be considered as an 
inconvenient impediment to American foreign policy". He asserted there was 
growing realisation by Americans that China policy would "remain incomplete" 
until it recognised democratic and economic progress on Taiwan. 68 
On the same day, Senator Claiborne Pell once again drew attention m 
Congress to the elections and political future of Taiwan. He noted that twenty 
Democratic Progress Party (DPP) candidates in favour of independence had won 
election. 69 
Pell's dissatisfaction with US policy towards Taiwan was made clear when 
he introduced to the floor an article attacking one-China policy on 24 April. The 
66 During the period of celebrating Taiwan's 1989 National Day, over 20 congressmen paid tribute to 
Taiwan's economic success and political liberalisation on the House floor. In the Senate, however, 
only a couple of senators did so. See Congressional Record of 1989, p.19948, p.19951, p.20232, 
p.20422, p.20588, p.20590, p.20932, p.21354, p.21365, p.22187, p.22188, p.22190, p.22459, 
p.22775, p.23102, p.23115, p.23622, p.23936, p.23650, p.24549. 
67 Congressional Record, 26 March 1990, p. 5243. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., p.5263. 
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article, entitled "Junk the One-China Policy", argued that "The one-China policy is 
out-dated. All assumptions behind it are either outmoded or unrealistic".70 As a 
supporter of Taiwan's independence, Pell wanted changes in US policy towards 
Taiwan. This became especially imperative to him in the light of economic and 
political developments in both Taiwan and mainland China. Pell stressed: 
Taiwan's per capita income is 15 times higher than mainland China's 
with a GNP greater than that of any UN member in the Middle East or 
Africa. In China, political development has been frustrated by guns in 
Tiananmen Square but in Taiwan elections have resulted in major gains 
for the opposition.71 
Like Gorton, Pell also called for more attention to Taiwan. He noted that for the 
past year the dramatic changes occurring in Taiwan had gone "largely unnoticed".72 
Congress in 1990 did not succeed in challenging Taiwan policy. At the end 
of the year, Taiwan's Representative to the United States, Ding Mou-shih, noted that 
even though Congress and public opinion supported Taiwan's entry to the GATT, 
the Bush Administration was still considering whether or not Taiwan should be 
granted membership to the international trade body.73 
In light of the minimal action taken by both Congress and the Administration 
on Taiwan's GATT accession request, Senator William Roth on 25 April 1991 
reintroduced his resolution calling for the United States to actively support Taiwan. 
The resolution had 32 co-sponsors. In reintroducing the resolution, Roth stated 
while he "fully" understood "the political sensitivities involved in bringing Taiwan 
70 Trong R. Chai, "Jurik the One-China Policy", originally published in Christian Science Monitor of 
15 March 1990, reprinted in Congressional Record, 24 April 1990, pp. S4920-21. 
71 Congressional Record, 24 April 1990, pp. S4920-21 
72 Ibid. 
73 Taipei (Radio) International Service, "Taiwan to Apply for GATT Membership", FBIS Daily 
Report, China, 24 December 1990, p. 60. 
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under the GATT umbrella'', he believed "economic and commercial interests should 
be the driving force in this debate". He argued "National sovereignty is not and 
should not be, a requirement or condition for joining the GATT". He also pointed 
out that to avoid the sovereignty issue, Taiwan was applying to the GATT as "The 
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu". In addition, Roth 
noted, Taiwan was "expressly willing" to join the GATT as a developed economy.74 
Support for Taiwan's GATT application gathered momentum in Congress 
over the next few months. More and more influential lawmakers rose to voice their 
support, including Senator Paul Simon, who had been a 1988 Democratic 
Presidential candidate. Simon visited Taiwan in late April 1990 and met President 
Lee Teng-hui and Premier Hao Po-tsun. During his meeting with Simon, Lee called 
on the Congress to recognise Taiwan's effort to promote democracy. Hao hoped 
Taiwan's American friends would help Taiwan join international organisations.75 
After coming home, Simon argued for an adjustment in Taiwan policy. 
Noting that successive administrations since President Jimmy Carter had tried to 
maintain a balance between official relations with Beijing and unofficial ties to 
Taipei, Simon claimed the time had come "to tilt that balance more toward 
Taiwan".76 
Simon then suggested two ways to do that. The first was to upgrade the 
relationship by allowing contacts between Cabinet-level officials. He advised Bush 
to send the Secretary of Commerce or the head of the Environmental Protection 
74 Congressional Record, 25 April, 1991, pp. S5312-13. China insisted that it should be admitted to 
the GAIT as a developing economy. 
75 CNA, "Li Urges U.S. Attention to Taiwan Security", FBIS Daily Report, China, 30 April 1991, 
p. 75. 
76 Congressional Record, 20 May 1991, p. S6124. 
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Agency to Taiwan, as this would be less sensitive than a visit by the Secretary of 
State. Simon also advised Bush to support Taiwan's admission to international 
organisations in technical and economic/financial fields, such as the GATT, the 
World Health Organization and the Food and Agricultural Organization. Simon did 
not recommend a shift to a two-China policy because such a shift "would be 
disruptive and unrealistic". However, he believed the United States could do many 
things that were "short of official recognition of the Government ofTaiwan".77 
Taiwan's trade policy also won Taiwan more support from Congress. The 
trade surplus with the US fell to $9.1 billion in 1990. Estimates in May 1991 
suggested the surplus would drop below $6 billion that year, although this turned out 
to be a vastly inaccurate.78 Not only had Taiwan made efforts to "Buy American", it 
had also targeted purchases of products from companies located in the home 
districts of important members of Congress.79 In addition, Taiwan had revised its 
copyright, patent and trademark laws. One congressman even claimed that 
"Government and private-sector efforts to protect intellectual property rights have 
brought Taiwan up to international standards".80 
It was believed that by late May there was near unanimity in Congress for 
supporting Taiwan's GATT application.81 At the same time, according to Simon, the 
Bush Administration had been quietly supporting the admission of Taiwan to the 
GATT.82 
77 Ibid., pp. 86124-25. 
78 Taiwan's trade surplus with the United States in 1991 was actually $8.2 billion. 
79 Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and The United States, 1945-1992, p. 170. 
80 Congressional Record, 20 May 1991, p. 86154. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., p. 86125. 
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Taiwan's GATT application was closely linked to China's MFN status. In 
early June, Senator Max Baucus suggested Bush Administration support 
Taiwan's GATT application in return for the support of Congress for China's MFN 
status. On 13 June, Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole presented Baucus' 
suggestion to senior administration officials at a White House meeting. 83 On 19 
June, Baucus wrote a letter to the White House which reiterated the idea of linking 
Taiwan's GATT application to China's MFN status. 
One event which may illustrate the change of sentiment in Congress on the 
issue was that, unlike in 1990, Representative Philip M. Crane in 1991 easily won 
support for his amendment which required Beijing to drop its opposition to Taiwan 
becoming a signatory to GATT. On 26 June when the House Ways and Means 
Committee was considering the Pelosi bill (H.R. 2212) conditioning China's MFN 
status, Crane's amendment was adopted by voice vote.84 
In an obvious effort to win more votes for his decision on MFN status for 
China, President Bush, in his letter of 19 July to Baucus, advised Congress "The 
United States will begin to work actively with other contracting parties to resolve in 
a favorable manner the issues relating to Taiwan's GATT accession".85 
The Bush Administration's open support for Taiwan's entry into the GATT 
was a trade-off victory for Congress as Bush's decision was mainly aimed at votes 
83 Stuart Auerbach, "U.S. May End Opposition to Taiwan Joining GATT", Washington Post, 15 
June 1991, p. Dl. At a breakfast meeting with Los Angeles Times reporters on June 26, US Trade 
Representative Carla Hills made the indication again. See Jim Mann, "U.S. Considers Backing 
Taiwan Role in GATT", Los Angeles Time, 27 June 1991, p. D3. 
84 David S. Cloud, "GOP Loyalty to Bush May Be Key in Fight over China Status'', Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (49:26, 29 June 1991), p. 1741. 
85 Ray Cline, "Bush's Nod to Taiwan", Washington Times, 26 July 1991, p. F3. The decision was 
formally announced by the White House on 21 July. See Jeremy Mark, "U.S.-China Tensions Are 
Helping Taiwan'', Wall Street Journal, 2 August 1991, p. ASF. 
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for renewal of China's MFN status. The support was of great importance to Taiwan 
as other countries would follow the United States and clearly express their support. 
The concession the Bush Administration made to Congress was, however, 
not as significant as it might first appear. First of all, Taiwan had avoided the 
sovereignty issue by applying to the GATT as "The Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu" instead of as a State. The Bush Administration had 
from the very beginning not opposed Taiwan's application although it had not 
committed itself to supporting the application. In March 1991, while Germany, the 
Netherlands, Italy and Spain voiced their opposition to Taiwan's GATT bid, the US 
Trade Representative's Office stated the United States supported Taiwan's 
application "under right timing and ripe conditions".86 More importantly, Beijing 
did not object to Taiwan's final accession. In fact, early on 27 May 1990, in his 
talks with Taiwanese legislators, PRC President Jiang Zemin said GATT 
membership was not tantamount to participating in an international activity. "In 
theory, I am not opposed to Taiwan joining GATT'', Jiang said.87 And after all, the 
Bush Administration did not specify the timing of Taiwan's entry, the question 
which had concerned Beijing most. Taipei's entry into the GATT before Beijing 
would certainly meet strong opposition from Beijing, and the Bush Administration 
had no intention of allowing that. Reportedly, the Administration might have 
supported "simultaneous" entry for both Beijing and Taipei.88 This stance was 
86 Taipei (Radio) International Service, "U.S. Supports Government's GATT Application", FBIS 
Daily Report, China, 19 March 1991, p. 79. 
87 Taipei (Radio) Domestic Service, "Legislator Interviewed on CPC Head's Remarks", FBIS Daily 
Report, China, 30 May 1990, pp. 77-78; Willy Wo-lap Lam, "Jiang Zemin Views Inclusion in 
GA TT", South China Morning Post, 29 May 1990, pp. 1, 10, carried in FBIS Daily Report, China, 30 
May 1990, pp. 78-79. 
88 Reportedly, US Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger told a hearing of the House 
Ways and Means Committee's Subcommittee on Trade 12 June that the general objective of the Bush 
Administration was to get both Taipei and Beijing into GATT at the same time. But the wording 
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acceptable to Beijing as it had more technical problems than Taipei to address to 
qualify for membership. 
During this period, Congress continued to pressure the Administration on 
this issue. The pressure did not stop even after Bush's letter of 19 July. On 24 July, 
Senator William Roth once again introduced his measure supporting Taiwan's 
GATT application. The measure (Amendment No. 811 to International Security and 
Economic Cooperation Act of 1991, S. 1435) was co-sponsored by Senator 
Claiborne Pell. According to Roth, the amendment had two goals. First, it would 
demonstrate that President Bush had "the full backing of the Senate" to carry out his 
decision announced in the 19 July letter. Second, the amendment tried to specify the 
steps that should be taken to ensure that the accession of Taiwan to the GATT was 
achieved "expeditiously". The amendment was agreed to without objection.89 
Congressional support for Taiwan was strengthened by the US press. In 
1991 Taiwan was the 14th largest economy in the world and the 6th largest trading 
partner of the United States with annual trade of US$36.4 billion. With its strong 
and close economic relations with the United States and its political liberalisation, 
Taiwan commanded strong support from the American press. Many influential 
newspapers had published articles or editorials criticising the Bush Administration 
for blocking Taiwan's accession. Many of these articles and editorials were 
reprinted in the Congressional Record. 90 
given in the transcription differed from the reports. See CNA, "Commentary on GA TT Membership 
Application: Application Plans Studied", FBIS Daily Report, China, 19 June 1991, p. 62. 
89 Congressional Record, 24 July 1991, p. S10721. 
90 See, for example, Congressional Record, 4 June 1991, p. E2038; 20 June 1991, p. E2312; 27 June 
1991, pp. E2392-93; 16 July 1991, pp. S10166-67; 
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Congressional pressure did not stop at supporting Taiwan's GATT 
access10n. Prior to Roth's amendment of 24 July, Senator Claiborne Pell had 
introduced an amendment to the same bill. The co-sponsors of the amendment (No. 
810) were Taiwan's staunch supporters, Senator Jesse Helms and Senator Frank 
Murkowski. The amendment had been originally introduced and adopted by the 
Senate two years previously during debate on the State Department authorisation 
bill and adopted by the Senate. The amendment required that the future of Taiwan 
be settled peacefully, free from coercion. It also linked US-China relations to the 
Taiwan issue. Like the Roth amendment, the Pell amendment was also agreed to 
without objection.91 
As understood by Taipei, the Pell amendment itself did not signify any 
change in China policy.92 But in introducing the amendment, Senator Pell explained 
that "This measure underlines America's unique concern about Taiwan's future and 
our interest that it remain an independent nation despite its close proximity and 
historical ties to China".93 
After dealing with the GATT membership, Congress faced a more serious 
test - Taipei's new effort to rejoin the United Nations, two decades after being 
expelled from the UN.94 In June 1991, Taiwan's lower house, the Legislative Yuan, 
approved a recommendation by 86 lawmakers that Taipei seek to rejoin the world 
91 Congressional Record, 24 July 1991, p. S10720. 
92 CNA, "U.S. Senate Action on Foreign Aid Welcomed", FBIS Daily Report, China, 26 July 1991, 
p. 54. 
93 Congressional Record, 24 July 1991, p. S10720. Italics added. 
94 Taipei, representing both Taiwan and mainland China under the name of Republic of China, seated 
in the UN until 1971 when the world organisation admitted Beijing. 
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organisation.95 In September, the Foreign Affairs Ministry formed its UN Affairs 
Section.96 
Not surprisingly, the voices supporting Taiwan's UN effort were heard in the 
US Congress not long after. On 26 September 1991, Democratic Representative 
Dennis M. Hertel introduced a resolution supporting Taiwan's membership in the 
UN and other international organisations. He believed that during the Cold War it 
was in the best interest of the United States to have friendly relations with China. 
With the Cold War over, Hertel argued, the United States should "stand up for the 
people of Taiwan".97 
Most members of Congress, however, were more cautious on this issue. 
Few members publicly voiced their support in 1991. This was partly because China 
had been vehemently opposed to Taiwan's bid to rejoin the UN, based on the 
argument that Taiwan was not a sovereign state. In Taiwan, although "no other 
foreign policy issue has captured the imagination of the island's residents like the 
popular movement to gain readmission to the UN",98 the determination to join the 
UN was still "a demand of a minority" in 1991 and was yet to become a powerful 
political movement.99 
95 China Broadcasting Corporation News Network (Taipei), "Taiwan Interest in Renewed 
Application to UN: Legislative Debate", FBIS Daily Report, China, 26 June 1991, p. 65; Taipei 
Voice of Free China, "Taiwan Interest in Renewed Application to UN: Foreign Ministry Plan", FBIS 
Daily Report, China, 26 June 1991, p. 65. 
96 CNA, "Foreign Ministry Moves to Promote UN Bid'', FBIS Daily Report, China, 27 September 
1991, p. 82. 
97 Congressional Record, 26 September 1991, p. E317 6. 
98 Hickey, "U.S. Policy and Taiwan's Reintegration into the Global Community", p. 24. 
99 Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and The United States, p.164. 
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1992: Congress Surprised 
The Bush Administration's adjustment in its policy towards Taiwan's GATT 
application in 1991 was minor compared with the substantive policy changes in 
1992. In its final year, the Bush Administration broke new ground in Taiwan policy 
in two sensitive areas: official contacts and arms sale. Congress in 1992 imposed 
considerable pressure on the Bush Administration on some issues, including official 
contacts. But neither of the Administration's two major moves was an apparent 
result of Congressional pressure. 
The Bush Administration started to ease the ban on official contacts with 
Taiwan in 1992, although it was done hesitantly and with special care. At the 
beginning of the year, Assistant Secretary of Commerce Thomas J. Duestenberg 
visited Taipei as part of a US trade mission, the highest-level US official to visit 
Taiwan since 1979. Before his trip Duestenberg said he would be meeting with 
Taiwan's economic minister "on a government to government basis". This 
suggested a degree of official recognition. The State Department quickly stated that 
Duestenberg's comments were made "in error".100 In January 1992, James Soong, 
the secretary general of Taiwan's ruling KMT, had a private breakfast chat at the 
home of Vice President Dan Quayle. The meeting "barely skirted the 13-year ban 
on official US contacts with Taiwan", according to Jim Mann, a journalist 
specialising in China.101 
Taipei had been lobbying hard for the visit of senior US officials to Taiwan. 
In April 1992, noting that a number of senior government officials from countries 
without diplomatic relations with Taipei had visited Taiwan, an editorial in Express 
100 Jim Mann, "Taiwan to U.S. - We're Back!", Los Angeles Times, 26 July 1992, pp. Hl, H4. 
IOI Ibid. 
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News, an evening daily published by the official Central News Agency (CNA), said 
"we have not yet had the pleasure of welcoming senior government officials from 
the country that maintains the closest substantive relations with us, namely, the 
United States" .102 The editorial observed that although a number of US lawmakers 
had called upon the executive branch to send cabinet-level officials to visit Taiwan, 
there was no indication the Bush Administration planned to do so in the near 
future. 103 
But much to the pleasure of Taipei, US Trade Representative Carla Hills 
made a ground-breaking visit to Taiwan in early December 1992. She was the first 
cabinet-level US official to go to Taiwan since Washington normalised relations 
with Beijing in 1979. Although the Bush Administration insisted Hills' visit was of 
"private" nature and Hills refused to meet with press, Hills met with top Taiwanese 
officials, including President Lee Teng-hui. Senator Frank Murkowski, then visiting 
Taiwan, hailed the talks between Hills and Lee as a historic beginning to break the 
ice. He predicted that exchanges between Taiwan and the United States would heat 
up and increase in the future.104 
Congressional pressure for high-level official contacts between the United 
States and Taiwan had long existed. But like other aspects of US-Taiwan relations 
during the Cold War and especially before the Tiananmen Square crackdown, 
Congress had not pushed hard the expansion of official contacts. During the Bush 
Administration, there was an increase in pressure. As mentioned in the previous 
102 CNA, "Paper Calls for Visits by Senior U.S. Officials'', FBIS Daily Report, China, 30 April 1992, 
p. 52. 
103 Ibid. 
104 China Broadcasting Corporation News Network (Taipei), "Call on Li 'Minor Breakthrough"', 
FBIS Daily Report, China, 3 December 1992, p. 55. 
250 
sections, the sentiment of Congress was for a closer US-Taiwan relationship and the 
increase in official contacts would certainly work for the relationship. 
In 1992, sentiment for closer US-Taiwan relations was still developing and 
Congressional pressure for the increase of official contacts was getting stronger. 
Senator Connie Mack III, who was "Firmly identified with the right"105 and a vocal 
critic of Beijing, called on the United States to "reward democracy in Taiwan" on 
two occasions. And on two occasions he suggested the United States end "the de 
facto ban on high-level diplomatic contacts" between Washington and Taipei. 106 
Connie Mack's voice was echoed by Republican Senator Larry Pressler, 
member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As a senator from a farm state 
and an assiduous defender of home-state interests, Pressler strongly supported the 
Bush Administration's decision to give China unconditional MFN status. Pressler 
was a conservative.101 His support for China's MFN status could be purely 
motivated by home-state interests. 
Pressler' s strong support for Taiwan was more complicated. It was partly 
because of his warmth towards Taipei and his dislike towards Beijing. In 1990, 
Pressler sponsored an amendment blocking the sale of 28 US warplanes to Pakistan. 
On 23 May 1995, the day after the Clinton Administration decided to grant Lee 
Teng-hui a visa to visit the United States, Pressler proposed that 17 of the 28 
warplanes be sent to Taiwan.108 
105 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, "Profiles of the Incoming Senate Freshmen'', (46:46, 12 
November 1988), p. 3259. 
106 Congressional Record, 10 April 1992, p. S5545; 3 June 1992, p. S7496. 
107 Jon Healey, "GOP Takes the Reins of Power: Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (52:44, 12 November 1994), p. 3279. 
108 Nigel Holloway, Julian Baum and Lincoln Kaye, "Shanghaied by Taiwan", Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 1 June 1995, p. 15. 
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Pressler's support for Taiwan was also largely based on economic interests. 
He pointed out the following facts in 1992: Firstly, Taiwan was the fifth largest 
investor in US securities, owning nearly $27 billion in US Treasury bonds. It also 
held $920 million in American common stocks. Secondly, one-half of Taiwan's 
GNP came from exports - and a full one-third of those exports entered the United 
States. Thirdly, Taiwan's six-year development plan for the 1990's involved 
government and private expenditures of $300 billion for infrastructure and other 
improvements,109 which, according to Pressler, signified even greater economic 
prospects for Taiwan and trade with the United States. Fourthly, Taiwan remained 
heavily dependent on the US for both capital and agricultural goods. The possible 
benefits for the US from stronger relations were immense, both for the farmers and 
ranchers in Pressler's home state of South Dakota and workers and businesses 
across the United States. Finally, the United States still had a large trade deficit 
with Taiwan. It was necessary to increase official contacts to bring the trade deficit 
under control. Pressler argued that US policy towards Taiwan as mandated by the 
TRA was outdated. "Times have changed", he claimed. US policy regarding Taiwan 
should reflect "the new realities".110 
Congressional pressure for official contacts in 1992, however, had not 
reached the point where the Bush Administration was forced to respond. Despite 
the individual calls for more official contacts, not a single measure regarding this 
issue was formally introduced in Congress. More importantly, there was an obvious 
109 The plan, approved by Taiwan's Cabinet in January 1991, would pump $303 billion into the 
island's roads, phones, transit services and environmental facilities over the following six years. The 
779 projects of the plan covered everything from an extensive subway system to new nuclear 
reactors. For more information, see Dinah Lee and Dirk Bennett, "Rebuilding a Tiger: Who'll Get 
The Lion's Share?", Business Week, 25 March 1991, p. 20. 
110 Congressional Record, 25 June 1992, p. S8968. 
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lack of committee action. Carla Hills' visit was therefore not a result of 
Congressional pressure. 
It seemed Administration's consideration of economic necessity and political 
opportunity well outweighed Congressional pressure. As mentioned earlier, Taiwan 
in 1991 was the world's 14th largest economy and owned US$82 billion in foreign 
exchange reserve; the United States was Taiwan's largest trading partner and 
Taiwan was the 6th largest trading partner of the United States with an annual two-
way trade ofUS$36.4 billion. European countries had taken the lead in competition 
for access to the Taiwan market, with France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and 
Germany sending cabinet ministers to Taipei for "private" visits. They were 
followed by Australia and Canada. Under the pressure of growing international 
trade competition, and in considering the improvement of its domestic economy, it 
was almost inevitable the United States would change its stiff policy of avoiding 
high-level official contacts with Taiwan. 
Congress continued its pressure for Taiwan's GATT application and UN bid 
m 1992. In his February effort to persuade his colleagues to support MFN for 
China, Max Baucus urged the Bush Administration to support Taiwan's GATT 
application. Noting the Administration had been "working behind the scenes to 
prepare the way for Taiwan's application", Baucus said "it is time to now launch a 
much more public effort". He further claimed that "China cannot be allowed to 
dictate United States policy toward Taiwan" .111 
Then in mid-September, Democratic Senator Joseph I. Lieberman introduced 
a resolution relating to Taiwan's membership in the United Nations. The resolution 
lll Congressional Record, 25 February 1992, p. S2137. 
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read "It is the sense of the Congress that the 20,000,000 people of Taiwan deserve to 
be represented in the United Nations and other international organizations by 
appointees representing Taiwan's government" .1 12 
Like the issue of high-level official contacts, Congressional pressure for 
Taiwan's GATT application and UN bid did not increase dramatically in 1992. In 
the case of the GATT application, obviously it was mainly because the 
Administration had promised to support Taiwan in 1991. There were also other 
reasons. Most importantly, Taiwan still needed to win support from more members 
of Congress. Some members of Congress believed Taiwan still had "a long way to 
go" to satisfy the criteria for being a member of the GATT.113 As for Taiwan's UN 
bid, it still needed time to build up its momentum in Congress. 
The most dramatic policy change during the Bush Administration regarding 
Taiwan was Bush's 1992 decision to lift a decade-old ban on the sale of F-16 jet 
fighters to Taiwan. Yet, it was not a direct result of Congressional pressure. 
Between the end of World War II and 1982, the United States continued 
supplying Taiwan, with arms. According to a Mainland China analyst, incomplete 
statistics showed that from 1950 to 1981 the United States sold or granted $5.9 
billion worth of weapons and arms to Taiwan.114 Since normalisation of 
Washington-Beijing relations in 1979, arms sales to Taiwan has been one of the 
most sensitive issues in US-China relations. Between 1981 and 1982 the Reagan 
Administration's decision to sell arms to Taiwan developed into a crisis threatening 
the continuation of US-China diplomatic relations. The crisis was finally resolved 
112 Congressional Record, 16 September 1992, pp. S13655-56. 
113 Congressional Record, 30 September 1992, p. H9965. 
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on 17 August 1982 Shanghai. 
The communique committed the United States to eventually phase out 
arms sales to Taiwan. The United States pledged: 
its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either qualitative or 
quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and 
China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to 
Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution. 
Despite the specific US pledges on quality and quantity, the communique 
"did not resolve the underlying dispute between the United States and the PRC". 115 
A State Department legal adviser said to the Senate Judiciary Committee's 
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers in September 1982: "Certainly a 
communique of this nature cannot bind any future President of the United States" .11 6 
A 1983 study by the Subcommittee found that Beijing and Washington "publicly 
disagree on the meaning of every significant pronouncement in the document" .11 7 
Richard Bush, then a staff consultant for the Subcommittee on Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives, noted in 1989 that, "Since 1982, congressional interest a larger 
decision-making role has declined to an extremely low level". 11 8 Among the 
reasons why Congress had accepted administration dominance of Taiwan arms sale 
114 Huang Wen tao, "Pretexts Are Not Trnstworthy, Evil Consequences Are Worrisome - Criticising 
US Sales ofF-16 Fighter Planes to Taiwan", Renmin Ribao, 26 September 1992, p. 6, carried in FBIS 
Daily Report, China, 29 September 1992, pp. 3-5. 
ll5 Richard Bush, "Helping the ROC to Defend Itself' in Ramon H. Myers (ed.), A Unique 
Relationship: The United States and the Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), p. 91. 
11 6 As quoted, ibid. 
117 As quoted in Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, United States-Taiwan Security Ties: From Cold War 
to Beyond Containment (Westport and London: Praeger, 1994), p. 89. 
118 Richard Bush, "Helping the ROC to Defend Itself', p. 94. 
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decisions was the "Congress accepted balance U.S. policy". 119 
and technology was 
transferred annually to Taiwan, the US had a much more modest program 
military exchanges with China, despite the fact that US arms agreements and sales 
to China grew substantially from 1984 to 1989 (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). From 1989 
to 1991, US arms sales to Taiwan dropped well below $700 million (see Table 5.2). 
In June 1989, however, as a sanction against Beijing for its Tiananmen Square 
crackdown, the United States suspended its military exchanges with the PRC and 
arms shipments to China were frozen. It did not resume the arms shipments to 
China until December 1992, after the F-16 sales to Taiwan. 
Table 5.2 
Fiscal Year 
Year 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Value of US Arms Sales to Taiwan: FY1983-1991 
Foreign Military 
Sales Agreement 
689.0 
707.4 
700.2 
510.8 
509.0 
505.0 
526.3 
509.0 
480.0 
(US$million) 
5.0 
70.0 
54.5 
228.0 
210.0 
195.0 
4.7 
149.9 
160.0 
Commercial 
Exports 
774.0 
777.4 
754.7 
738.8 
719.0 
700.0 
611.0 
658.9 
640.0 
Total 
Source: US Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), 
Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts 
as of September 30, 1991 (Washington, D.C.: Data Management Division, Comptroller, 
DSAA, 1991). Foreign military sales concern items sold from US government arsenals. 
Commercial exports are items sold by the manufacturer after a license has been secured 
from the State Department's office of Munitions Control.120 
119 Robert Sutter, "The Taiwan Relations Act and the United States' China Policy" in Myers (ed.), A 
Unique Relationship, p. 75 
120 Hickey, United States-Taiwan Security Ties, p. 43. See also Richard Bush, "Helping the ROC to 
Defend Itself', p. 100. 
Table 5.3 
US Foreign Military Sales Agreements with the PRC and Deliveries to the PRC: 
Fiscal Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Fiscal Year 1984-1989 
(US$thousand) 
Agreements 
629 
421 
36,045 
254,279 
12,913 
416 
Deliveries 
6 
424 
547 
3,881 
39,122 
91,255 
Source: US Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign 
Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of 
September 30, 1991 (Washington, D.C.: Data Management Division, Comptroller, DSAA, 
1991).121 
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Despite the steady arms sales, Taiwan was unable to persuade the US 
government to lift the ban on the sale of F-16 jet fighters, "among the most 
advanced in the U.S. Air Force inventory". 122 Taiwan had been asking the United 
States to sell it F-16s since early 1980s. In fact, in early 1982, even before the 17 
August Shanghai communique, President Reagan announced the US government's 
refusal of Taiwan's request to purchase F-16s. 123 According to Sutter, many US 
policy makers believed Taiwan's demand for the F-16s to be excessive, as the sale 
would not only enrage the PRC but also upset the prevailing military balance in the 
Taiwan Strait. "That demand even alienated some U.S. policy makers who were 
121 Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Taiwan's Security in the Changing International System (Boulder, 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), p. 63. 
122 Sutter, "The Taiwan Relations Act and the United States' China Policy", p.53. 
123 Martin L. Lasater, "Military Milestones" in Stephen P. Gibert and William M. Carpenter (eds.), 
America and Island China: A Documentary History (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 
1988), note 8, at 37. Colin P. A. Jones, "United States Arms Exports to Taiwan under the Taiwan 
Relations Act: The Failed Role of Law in United States Foreign Relations", Connecticut Journal of 
International Law (9:51, 1993), p.61. 
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pushing to upgrade the quality of the US fighters provided to Taiwan", Sutter 
said. 124 
In the following ten years, Taiwan each year requested US permission to buy 
from 60 to 150 F-16s. 125 In June 1991, after reports about Beijing's plan to purchase 
advanced fighter bombers from Russia, 54 Taiwanese legislators urged the Taiwan 
government to seek purchase of advanced warplanes from the United States.126 .In 
1992 Taipei again approached the US government for the sale ofF-16s.127 
An indication that the decision to sell the jet fighters to Taiwan did not result 
from direct Congressional pressure was that the news took Congress by surprise. 
On 29 June 1992 General Dynamics, the maker ofF-16s, announced it would lay off 
5,800 of its 20,000 workers at its Fort Worth plant by late 1994 because of declining 
of F-16 production. The announcement coincided with Bush's trip to Texas. The 
next day, in an interview with a network of Texas radio stations, Bush said the 
United States was re-examining the sale of F-16s to Taiwan.128 General Dynamics 
then said 3,000 out of 5,800 jobs could be saved if the Taiwan sale was approved. 
Subcontractors, particularly in Ohio and Maryland, would also save several 
thousand jobs.129 
It was only after Bush's surprising announcement that members of Congress, 
especially those from warplane-producing areas, moved to capitalise on a perceived 
124 Sutter, "The Taiwan Relations Act and the United States' China Policy", p.53. 
125 Congressional Record, 10 August 1992, p. S 1198. 
126 CNA, "Legislators Urge U.S. to Sell Advanced Fighters'', FBIS Daily Report, China, 14 June 
1991, p. 54. 
127 Paul Malamud, "U.S. Aircraft Sale to Taiwan for Defensive Purposes", USIS, 9 September 1992, 
File ID: POL304, Tracking no. 242270. 
128 Jim Wolf, "USA: Bush to sell GD F-16s to Taiwan - Officials", Reuter News Service, Reuter 
Business Briefing, 2 September 1992. 
129 Eric Schmitt, "Jet Sales to Saudis and Taiwan Weighed'', New York Times, 25 August 1992, 
p.A14. 
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opportunity. On 14 August, eight members of Congress, most of them from 
warplane-producing areas, sent a letter to Bush urging him to revise US policy by 
resuming sales of American warplanes to Taiwan. They said the sale was necessary 
as Beijing had purchased Russian Su-27 and MiG-31 fighters. In addition, the sale 
would preserve jobs for American aircraft workers, was good for the US economy 
and served US national security interests. The letter did not mention which US 
planes should be sold to Taiwan.130 
However, legislators from Texas, where F-16s were built, led an intense 
Congressional campaign to pressure Bush to allow the sale ofF-16s to Taiwan. For 
example, Lloyd Bentsen, a powerful Democratic senator from Texas, strongly urged 
that the United States drop its ban on the sale of fighter aircraft to Taiwan. Bentsen 
argued that "The time has come to place our relations with the aging totalitarians in 
Beijing on a purely pragmatic basis and to develop a new relationship with the new 
Taiwan".131 Bentsen stated that with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of 
the Cold War, "United States courtship of mainland China is no longer a militarily 
strategic imperative and in Taiwan major commercial opportunities now beckon 
us".132 
To highlight the necessity of United States selling warplanes to Taiwan, 
Bentsen noted that, as the United States had repeatedly rejected Taiwan's request for 
up to 180 F-16s, Taiwan was considering a $7.2 billion purchase of 120 French 
Mirage 2000-5 jet fighters. The deal with France, according to Bentsen, would 
130 Reuter News Service, "USA: Members of US Congress Urge Warplane Sale to Taiwan'', Reuter 
Business Briefing, 14 August 1992. 
13l Amy Borrus, Joyce Barnathan and Stewart Toy, "An Arms Deal That Suits Everyone But 
Beijing", Business Week (14 September 1992), p. 17. 
132 Congressional Record, 10 August 1992, pp. S 11971-72. 
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include the tie-in purchases of high-speed railroad and nuclear power equipment 
valued at an additional $18 billion.133 
In a similar effort, Texas Republican Congressman Joe Barton, who invited 
Bush to visit the F-16 plant at Fort Worth, succeeded in getting 100 members of 
Congress (53 Democrats and 47 Republicans) to sign a letter to Bush demanding the 
sale of F-16s to Taiwan. The letter warned that "if we do not allow F-16 sales to 
Taiwan, they will buy French aircraft and will also make a commitment to purchase 
French nuclear power plants and railroad technology".134 Barton noted that "This is 
one of those funny issues where the far left and far right, for different reasons, come 
to the same conclusion".135 
Coincidentally, Taiwan in mid-August sent a "Buy American" mission to 
purchase wheat in Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, Nebraska, South Dakota 
and North Dakota.136 The mission planned to buy wheat from these states worth 
about 100 million US dollars.137 
Just before the mission left Taiwan for the United States, Senator Max 
Baucus from Montana made a brief visit to Taiwan and exchanged views with Lee 
Teng-hui "on ways to boost Taiwan-US trade". Baucus also agreed to make 
Taiwan's need for sophisticated arms better known to the Congress.138 
On 2 September, Taipei's Armed Forces Day, George Bush announced the 
approval of the F-16 sale to Taiwan. The announcement was made in a speech at 
133 Ibid. 
134 As quoted in Hickey, United States-Taiwan Security Ties, p. 82. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Taipei formulated its "Buy America" policy after Taiwan's trade surplus with the United States 
peaked in 1987. Lee and Bennett, "Rebuilding A Tiger", p. 21. 
137 CNA, '"Buy American' Wheat Mission to Depart 15 August'', FBIS Daily Report, China, 7 
August 1992, p. 51. 
138 CNA, "U.S. Urged to Review Policy on Arms Sales", FBIS Daily Report, China, 18 August 
1992, p. 66. 
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the General Dynamics factory in Fort Worth that produces the aircraft. Bush said 
the sale would "help maintain peace and stability in an area of great concern to us, 
the Asia-Pacific region". Bush also said the decision did not change "the 
commitment of this Administration and its predecessors to the three communiques 
with the People's Republic of China". "We keep our word: our one-China policy, 
our recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China", Bush 
claimed. 139 
On 4 September both Bush and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney defended 
the decision by pointing out its economic benefit. While Bush described the decision 
as a solid proposal which would create jobs, Cheney believed the sale would help 
keep the American defence industrial base going and aid aircraft parts suppliers, 
which might otherwise suffer as the US defence budget shrank.140 
While Bush and Cheney focused on the economic benefits and played down 
strategic considerations, China critics in Congress stressed China's threat to Taiwan. 
Senator Jesse Helms, for example, voiced his concern over "Red China's military 
threat". He asked the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to produce a threat 
assessment and gauge the "potential political repercussions" for US friends and 
allies in East Asia. "Certainly our long-time allies, the people of the Republic of 
China on Taiwan, must be considered on the front line of this issue", Helms said. 
He denounced the 1982 communique as "a policy blunder" which should be 
discarded.141 
139 George Bush, "Remarks to General Dynamics Employees in Fort Worth, Texas, September 2, 
1992", George Bush Library. 
l40 USIS, "White House Report, Friday, September 4", 4 September 1992, File ID: POL502, 
Tracking no. 241792. 
141 Congressional Record, 10 September 1992, pp. S13164-65. 
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September the Administration formally Congress it 
planned to sell 150 F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan for $5.8 billion. 142 Along with the 
sale, the United States would also sell 40 spare engines, 900 Sidewinder missiles, 
600 Sparrow missiles, 500,000 rounds of 20-mm cannon shells, spare parts, 
technical documentation and logistics service and personnel training. 143 Most 
members of Congress supported the deal, although some members accused the 
Administration of fuelling the arms race in Asia. 144 
Analysts believed that the importance of the sale of 150 F-16s was not 
limited to the military equipment Taiwan received. "Taipei scored an important 
symbolic breakthrough", said Nancy Bemkopf Tucker. "The decision suggested a 
new era in which virtually any weapon could be justified for sale". 145 The sale 
smoothed the way for other US arms sales to Taiwan. On 21 September, the Bush 
Administration said it would sell 12 anti-submarine helicopters to Taiwan. 146 
The Sale of F-16s: Explanations 
Congressional pressure was only a minor reason for Bush's decision to sell 
16 jet fighters to Taiwan. It is true Congress had been pressuring the 
Administration to lift the ban on the sale for a decade. But before Bush's 
142 The United States planned to sell A and B models of the F-16, which are formidable dogfighters 
but are consider inferior to the C and D models. Sensitive to Taipei's complaints, but unwilling to 
provide it with the F-16/C or F-16/D, the United States later agreed to sell updated versions of the F-
16/A and F-16/B. Hickey, Taiwan's Security in the Changing International System, pp. 77-78. 
143 Ibid., p. 78. The original deal of F-16s has been expanded by several modifications since the 
signing of the agreement. See Ibid., pp. 78-79. 
144 Senator J. James Exon (D-Nebraska) questioned the President's "surprise election year decision 
to sell F-16's to Taiwan". He stated that "My concern is that the action could be destabilising to the 
region. I also fear that the President's decision weakens our Nation's persuasiveness in encouraging 
China to abandon weapons sales when the United States is presently rearming China's neighbour". 
See Congressional Record, 1October1992, pp. Sl5925-26. 
145 Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, p. 181. 
146 Charles Aldinger, "USA: Bush Administration Announces More Arms for Taiwan", Reuter News 
Service, Reuter Business Briefing, 21 September 1992. 
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announcement Congressional pressure was not especially intense. Many ,,,.,,,,,,_,..,.. 
of Congress were actually surprised by the Administration's reconsideration of the 
sale.147 It was only after Bush's announcement Congressional pressure 
dramatically increased. 
What were the major reasons then? The most obvious reason for the sale 
was election-year politics. Although administration officials denied this motivation, 
they acknowledged that continuing military production in states with a large number 
of electoral votes was politically popular during a recession. Texas, Bush's adopted 
home state, carried 32 electoral college votes, the third largest number after 
California and New York.148 "The jobs argument has never been more powerful 
than it is now, with the economy the way it is", said one Defense Department 
official.149 Indeed, in the proceeding months the Administration had affirmed a 
directive to United States embassy workers to help American military contractors 
with their sales. Contractors had complained that diplomats helped other American 
businesses abroad, but not their industry.1so 
Few in the Administration argued against antagonising Beijing by ending the 
United States' 10-year ban on weapons sales to Taipei. "They came to me and asked 
what I thought about selling planes to Taiwan and I said to them, 'Hey, where do I 
sign?"' a senior White House official reportedly said. "I couldn't check off on it fast 
enough". 151 
147 Thomas L. Friedman, "China Warns U.S. on Taiwan Jet Deal", New York Times, 4 September 
1992, p. A3. 
148 California had 54 electoral college votes and New York had 33 votes. To win a Presidential 
election, a candidate needed to win 270 electoral votes. 
149 Eric Schmitt, "Jet Sales to Saudis and Taiwan Weighed", New York Times, 25 August 1992, p. 
Al4. 
150 Ibid. See also Friedman, "China Warns U.S. on Taiwan Jet Deal". 
l5l Friedman, "China Warns U.S. on Taiwan Jet Deal". 
263 
Another oft-cited reason was across 
Taiwan Strait. Administration officials said they had grown increasingly concerned 
about China's arms purchases from former Soviet Republics. These H"-'"·"_,,'·""' a 
purchase of 24 Su (Sukhoi)-27 high-performance fighters from Russia. The F-16s 
would be an effective counter-weight to the Su-27s. In August 1992, Brent 
Scowcroft, President Bush's National Security Advisor, revealed that the 
Administration "had decided to review its policy of not selling F-16s to Taiwan 
mainly because China had purchased advanced fighters from Russia". 152 After 
Bush's 2 September announcement, an administration official argued that the sale 
restored "a little bit of geopolitical balance at a time when the Chinese have really 
been throwing their weight around".153 
Some analysts disagreed, dismissing the argument as "blatant hypocrisy". 
Noting that 150 F-16s far outnumbered 24 Su-27s, one critic argued that "even the 
most naive of observers could tell that the F-16 deal was an election-year ploy by an 
unpopular president".154 
But others believed that viewing Bush's announcement as a hasty political 
move to gain votes in Texas was a misperception. Beginning in late 1991, 
according to one account, a small group of Bush Administration officials began 
meeting to re-evaluate Asia policy. They were concerned about China's growing 
military expenditures, its purchases of advanced Su-27 warplanes from Russia and 
its expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea. The decision to sell 150 F-
152 Daniel Southerland, "Ban on F-16 Sales to Taiwan May End'', Washington Post, 2 September 
1992, p. A25. 
l53 Friedman, "China Warns U.S. on Taiwan Jet Deal". 
154 See Jones, "United States Arms Exports to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act", p. 64. 
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16s was the first result of this policy review. The second result was Carla Hills' 
visit to Taiwan. 155 
Most analysts, however, took a middle position. They believed both political 
and strategic considerations weighed in President Bush's F-16 sales decision 
although they disagreed on the relative importance of each consideration in Bush's 
decision. 156 
There might be deeper reasons for the sale of F-16s. Chu Chi-ying, then 
KMT spokesman, could be right in saying that the key factor for the sale was 
Taiwan's political and economic development and that the other reason was the 
reduced strategic value of Beijing as a counterbalance to the former Soviet Union. 157 
Indeed, great economic, political and strategic changes had taken place since 
the last of the three communiques was signed ten years ago. Analysts agreed these 
changes played an important role in Bush's decision. Economically, despite its 
steady high growth-rate since 1950, Taiwan in 1982 was not strong and attractive 
enough for foreign countries to do business with at the risk of reprisals from Beijing. 
By 1992, however, Taiwan had evolved into an economic powerhouse with a per 
capita income of US$8,815, a gross national product of US$180 billion and foreign 
reserves of approximately US$87 billion. 158 A large number of government leaders 
from France, Germany and other European countries-some of them of Cabinet 
rank-had been visiting Taipei, aiming at securing commercial contracts despite not 
155 James Mann, "Clinton's Kissingerian Taiwan Policy: Henry Clinton", The New Republic, 
reprinted in Congressional Record, 26 January 1994, p. S198. 
156 In answering my question about Bush's F-16 decision, the US China experts I interviewed almost 
unanimously agreed that the decision was out of both political and strategic considerations. Most of 
them tended to believe political considerations carried more weight. 
157 CNA, "'Key Factor' for Sale Noted", FBIS Daily Report, China, 4 September 1992, p. 54. 
158 Hickey, United States-Taiwan Security Ties, pp. 8-9. 
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relations In 1992 alone, semor 
govermnent officials from six countries visited including Vice President of 
Bolivia, Deputy Foreign Minister and Deputy Minister of Industry of Denmark, 
Mexican Vice Minister of External Trade, Director-General of the French Industrial 
Development Bureau, and Canadian Vice Foreign Minister.159 Several months 
before Bush's announcement of the sale of F-16s, Taiwan had entered negotiation 
with France for Mirage jet fighters. Many believed this to be part of Taipei's effort 
to manipulate the Bush Administration.160 
Strategically, ten years ago China was the United States' partner against the 
Soviet Union. During the height of the Cold War, the People's Liberation Army 
(PLA) tied down an estimated 46 Soviet divisions - somewhere between 750,000 
and 1,000,000 troops - as well as mobile, multiple-warhead SS-20 intermediate 
range ballistic missiles and supersonic Backfire bombers.161 The CIA has revealed 
that the US and Chinese govermnents "went to extraordinary lengths to cooperate 
with one another against Moscow ... they regularly shared intelligence and teamed 
up devising anti-Soviet strategies". 162 The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s dramatically lowered China's geopolitical leverage over the United States. In 
late February 1992, a US Defense Department official claimed the United States 
considered its own national interests first, Taiwan's needs second, and possible 
159 CNA, "Paper Calls for Visits by Senior U.S. Officials". 
!60 Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, p. 181. The deal was delayed under US 
pressure. The White House said the Mirage was an offensive weapon and Pentagon believed that the 
sale of 150 F-16s would satisfy Taiwan's air defence requirements well into the following decade. 
But late that year, Taiwan finalised an agreement with France to purchase from France sixty of its 
newest Mirage 200-5 multi-role jet fighters. CNA, "U.S. Sees 'No Need' for Fighters", FBIS Daily 
Report, China, 19 November 1992, p. 50; France-Inter Radio Network, "Mirage Purchase Delayed 
under U.S. Pressure", FBIS Daily Report, China, 11 September 1992, p. 69. 
l6l Hickey, "U.S. Policy and Taiwan's Reintegration into the Global Community", p. 26. 
162 Jim Mann, "U.S., China Coordinated Policy During Cold War", Los Angeles Times, 13 June 
1994, p. Al. 
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reaction Beijing last.163 Experts on US-China relations saw Bush's decision as 
dramatic evidence of the reduced importance of US eyes. Noting that US 
arms sales to Taiwan had been a major issue with Beijing since the 1970s, Harry 
Harding said the answer among American officials to China's objections to the F-16 
sale could be summed up as, "Who cares?". 164 Indeed, in the eyes of many 
American officials, politicians and journalists, China had not only lost most of its 
strategic importance, but had also emerged as a possible future threat. 
Politically, Taiwan in 1982 was still an "extremely authoritarian state". 
"In political terms", Mann observed, "China seemed back then to be different 
from Taiwan more in degree than in kind". 165 Since then, and especially since 
the late 1980s, Taiwan's political liberalisation has been warmly welcomed in the 
United States while Tiananmen Square reinforced views of Beijing as a 
. . 
repressive regime. 
The sale of F- l 6s demonstrated the strength and flexibility of President 
Bush in shaping Taiwan policy and in commanding China policy general. 
Despite the very serious nature of the policy adjustment, Bush was confident the 
issue would not run out of control. And as it turned out, he successfully managed 
the fallout of the issue. 
Not surprisingly, Beijing blasted the arms sale. But its reaction was very 
much restrained. Reportedly Bush wrote to Chinese leaders about his decision to 
sell F- l 6s to Taiwan in September 1992, explaining that it had been taken for 
163 CNA, "Editorial on Shanghai Communique's Relevance", FBIS Daily Report, China, 2 March 
1992, p. 77. 
164 Don Oberdorfer, "1982 Arms Policy with China Victim of Bush Campaign, Texas Lobbying", 
Washington Post 4 September 1992, p. A3 l. 
16S Jim Mann, "Taiwan to U.S. - We're Back!", Los Angeles Times 28 July 1992, pp. Hl, H4. 
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domestic political reasons and promising that in his second term he would make 
efforts to improve US-China ties.166 Beijing had more trust in George Bush than 
Presidential candidate Bill Clinton. And indeed, Bush took steps to balance his 
decisions. In mid-December 1992, for example, Bush sent Commerce Secretary 
Barbara Franklin to Beijing to restore annual cabinet-level economic talks which 
had been suspended since the Tiananmen Square crackdown. Franklin's visit was 
considered as Bush's effort to balance Carla Hills' visit to Taiwan in early 
December.167 Later that same month, Bush decided to ship to Beijing military 
equipment already paid for but held in storage as a protest against the Tiananmen 
Square crackdown.168 
Conclusion 
In the first year of the Bush Administration, Congressional attention 
regarding Taiwan was focused on the issue of driftnet fishing instead of Taiwan 
policy. But the sharp contrast between the Tiananmen Square crackdown and the 
elections in Taiwan had a far-reaching effect in favour of Taiwan. The sea change 
in world politics between 1989 to 1992, marked by the end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, further strengthened Congressional sympathy and 
support for Taiwan. 
But changes within and outside Taiwan cannot fully explain the strong 
support of many members of Congress. In fact, their support may well be rooted in 
domestic politics. This is to be further discussed in Chapter 7. 
166 Susumu Awanohara and Lincoln Kaye, "The China Finale: Lame-duck Bush Pursues Pro-Peking 
Line'', Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 December 1992, p. 11. 
167 Ibid. 
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Taiwan's supporters on Capitol Hill imposed pressure on the Bush 
Administration over several issues, especially Taiwan's joining/rejoining 
international organisations official contacts between Washington and Taipei. 
They did score some victories. The most was the Bush Administration's 
agreement to support Taiwan's GATT application, which was the Administration's 
trade-off for winning crucial support for its policy towards China's MFN status. 
On the whole, Congress played a limited role in shaping US policy towards 
Taiwan during the Bush Administration. An important fact was that neither of the 
two dramatic policy changes in the final year of the Bush Administration, namely 
the sale of F-16s and Carla Hills' visit to Taiwan, was the result of Congressional 
pressure. 
There could be a number of reasons for the ineffective Congressional 
pressure in connection with Taiwan policy under the Bush Administration. One of 
the most important was that increasing Congressional attention during this period 
did not result in formal Congressional action to shape Taiwan policy. The above 
examination of Congressional action reveals that Congressional pressure came more 
from individual members than from committees. On the issue of official contacts, 
only a few individual Congressional members were active and there was no 
committee action at all. Committees were not active in making initiatives regarding 
Taiwan policy except passing some minor amendments. At the same time, although 
several bills specifically related to Taiwan policy were introduced in both chambers, 
their sponsors did not push for them to be passed. 
168 CNA, "Bush's 'Untimely' Decision on Arms to Mainland", FBIS Daily Report, China, 28 
December 1992, p. 60. 
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Despite the ineffectiveness of Congressional pressure, support for Taiwan 
gained momentum on Capitol Hill in those years. This momentum was fully 
unleashed during the first Clinton Administration. 
Chapter 6 
Taiwan Policy under the First Clinton Administration 
Taipei regarded the victory of Bill Clinton in the 1992 presidential election as 
good news. As Arkansas Governor, Clinton visited Taiwan four times. 1 "He is one 
of the few leaders in the US who has extensive knowledge of us", said then Foreign 
Minister Frederick F. Chien. 2 Chien hoped the Clinton Administration would permit 
more contacts between US and Taiwanese officials and would ultimately permit Lee 
Teng-hui to pay a private visit to the United States.3 Indeed, Democratic Senator 
Charles S. Robb recalled that when he was governor of Virginia and Bill Clinton 
governor of Arkansas, they once went to Taiwan together and Clinton was 
sympathetic to Robb's suggestion to grant Lee a visa.4 
However, when he entered the White House, Clinton had no intention of 
dramatically changing US policy towards Taiwan. He wanted to maintain the 
Taiwan policy set by previous administrations. But obviously, Clinton was less 
committed to defending the policy and failed to show strong leadership during his 
first administration. His weak presidential leadership encouraged an already 
assertive and active Congress and amplified the power of Congress to make Taiwan 
policy. The dramatic policy change allowing Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to 
make a "private visit" to the United States was largely due to Congressional 
pressure. 
1 Michael Chugani, "USA: Sino-US Trade Tensions to Rise under Clinton", South China Morning 
Post, Reuter Business Briefing, 8 November 1992. 
2 Nicholas D. Kristof, "Taiwan, Winning New Friends, Hopes for Another One in Clinton", New 
York Times, 18 January 1993, p. AlO. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Jim Mann, "How Taipei Outwitted U.S. Policy", Los Angeles Times, 8 June 1995, pp. Al, A16-17. 
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This US policy under first Clinton 
Administration. The section examines Congressional activism on Taiwan policy 
before Lee's visit June 1995, focusing on the issues of arms sales high-level 
visits. The second section discusses the Clinton Administration's Taiwan policy 
review. The last section focuses on the policy-making process of Lee's visit, the 
most prominent issue in US-China relations during this period. A detailed 
explanation for Clinton's decision on Lee's visit is left for Chapter 8. 
A New Congressional Activism 
In its early days, the Clinton Administration was not eager to make major 
changes to Taiwan policy. When Clinton formed his administration, two of his 
principal advisers on China policy, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and 
Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, were Henry Kissinger alums. Both Lake 
and Lord embraced some of Kissinger's underlying values, although their stances 
were completely different from those of Kissinger on some issues, including human 
rights in China. Consequently, "the new Administration quickly reverted to the old 
touchstones" of US policy towards Taiwan.s It was believed the Administration's 
general thinking on Taiwan was best summed up by one senior official, who argued 
privately: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it". 6 
Indeed, at his confirmation hearings in March 1993, Lord, in the first public 
statement of Asia policy, emphasised the importance of the three communiques. "We 
will continue to be guided by the three Sino-American joint communiques that have 
5 James Mann, "Clinton's Kissingerian Taiwan Policy: Henry Clinton", Congressional Record, 26 
January 1994, p. Sl98. 
6 Ibid. 
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provided a flexible framework for our relations", said Lord.7 In his meeting with 
President Jiang Zemin later that year, President Clinton also emphasised he was 
committed to the "three communiques". s 
Congress, however, made serious challenges to the Administration's Taiwan 
policy in Clinton's first two years. The challenges focused on two issues: the legal 
status of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) which expressed US commitment to arms 
sales to Taiwan; and the issue of high-level visits. 
Reaffirming the TRA 
Sutter wrote in 1989 about Congressional support for the TRA in which the 
United States promised to ensure that Taiwan had a sufficient self-defence 
capability: 
those in Taiwan and elsewhere who worry about the absence of any 
institutions to enforce the TRA should rest assured that the political 
support for the TRA is very likely to remain strong in Congress. 
Although such support for the TRA is not expressed explicitly when 
Congress agrees with the US policy toward Taiwan, Congress can be 
expected to respond strongly to protect its prerogatives under the TRA 
and safeguard Taiwan's interests in the event that a future 
administration shifts its policy.9 
Sutter was right. In fact, political support for the TRA has been so strong that 
Congress has from time to time reaffirmed it, even in the absence of any policy shift. 
During the first Clinton Administration, Congress tried to further strengthen 
7 USIS, "Lord Lays out 10 Goals for U.S. Policy in East Asia", 31 March 1993, File ID: EPF304, 
Tracking no. 275244. 
8 James Mann, "Clinton's Kissingerian Taiwan Policy'', p. S198. 
9 Robert Sutter, "The Taiwan Relations Act and the United States' China Policy" in Ramon H. Myers 
(ed.), A Unique Relationship: The United States and the Republic of China Under the Taiwan 
Relations Act (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), p. 76. 
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of the tussle over 
Act, which deals with funding for the State Department, Republican Senator 
H. Murkowski added an amendment in July 1993 declaring TRA "supersedes" the 
1982 Shanghai communique which concerns US arms sales to Taiwan. The Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee later accepted the amendment by a vote of 20 to 0. 10 
What should be noted is that Congress made the move despite recent large 
Taiwanese arms purchases, including, among others, a US$760 million deal for 4 E-
2t "Hawkeye" air-warning aircraft with US-based Grumman Aircraft Company in 
1989; US$6 billion deal for 150 F-16 jet fighters with the United States in 1992; 
1992 another deal worth US$6 billion for 60 Mirage 2000-5 jet fighters with France; 
1992 US$161 million deal for 12 SH-2F Light Airborne Multipurpose System 
helicopters and spare engines with the United States; an agreement in 199lto buy 16 
French LaFayette-class frigates for US$4.8 billion; and an agreement with the United 
States to lease six Knox-class frigates for US$461 million. 11 Equally important, 
there was no evidence indicating the Clinton Administration might shift US policy 
towards Taiwan. 
The amendment upset the Clinton Administration. In his 31 January 1994 
letter to Democratic Senator Max Baucus, Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
strongly opposed the amendment, believing "this amendment would risk 
undermining the foundation of the peace and stability we have helped create in the 
Taiwan Strait over the last fourteen years". 12 At the same time, Christopher argued 
that there was no need for such an amendment. "The 1982 Communique does not in 
IO Congressional Record, 31 January 1994, p. S445. 
11 For more information, see Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Taiwan's Security in the Changing 
International System (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), pp. 77-83. 
12 Congressional Record, 1February1994, p. S521. 
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detract the Relations Act to 
Taiwan's security", Christopher said. "Each Administration, including this one, has 
affirmed that Taiwan Relations Act takes legal precedence over the 1982 
Communique" .13 
Baucus was sympathetic with Christopher's argument. According to Baucus, 
Christopher implicitly stated that "while the Shanghai Communique and the Taiwan 
Relations Act do not now conflict with one another, should they ever come into 
conflict we would proceed under the act". 14 Baucus agreed that "proceeding to 
repeal the communique through legislation is a very risky step". 15 He urged the 
conference committee to seriously consider the points Christopher raised in his letter. 
Christopher also sent a letter to Murkowski. The letter reaffirmed the 
Administration's commitment to the prov1s10ns of the TRA, including 
acknowledging the TRA's legal precedence over the Shanghai communique. 16 
The Administration's objection and lobbying efforts did not have much 
effect. On 29 April 1994, the joint conference of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives accepted a substitute of Murkoswki's original amendment retaining 
the intent of the original language to specifically reaffinn the primacy of the TRA 
over subsequent US directives, including the Sino-US 17th August Joint 
Communique. 17 It meant the US government should increase anns sales to Taiwan 
instead of gradually reducing them, thus ending a 12-year commitment. The 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., p. S520. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Congressional Record, 3 May 1994, p. S5024. Winston Lord later (27 September) expressed in 
Congress: "U.S. policy toward Taiwan is governed, of course, by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. 
Three communiques with the People's Republic of China ... also constitute part of the foundation". 
See Winston Lord, "Taiwan Policy Review'', U.S. Department of State Dispatch (vol. 5, no. 42, 
October 17, 1994), p. 705. 
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amendment also urged the President to "send Cabinet-level appointees to Taiwan ... 
and to . . . take steps to show clear United States support for Taiwan both in our 
bilateral relationship and in multilateral organizations of which the United States is a 
member". 18 
The Administration did manage to tone down the language of the Murkowski 
amendment. Clinton signed a watered-down version of the measure on 30 April. 19 
Tony Lake and Winston Lord participated in the negotiation for reaching an 
agreement in conference on the language of the substitute amendment, which in the 
end became section 508 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. 
April 1994 marked the 15th anniversary of the enactment of the TRA. Senior 
congressmen who participated in the making of the TRA still resented the conduct of 
the Executive branch in normalising relations between Washington and Beijing. For 
example, the day before voting on the Murkowski amendment, Republican 
Representative Gerald B. H. Solomon, who helped write the crucial section 3(a) of 
the Act, 20 reminded his colleagues how President Jimmy Carter broke his promise. 
He said that while Carter "had given solemn assurances to Congress that any kind of 
major change in United States policy towards China would not be made at a time 
when Congress was out session ... Congress had been out of session for 2 months .. 
. when President Carter made his announcement" of normalising Washington-Beijing 
relations.21 Solomon was a congressman elect while the announcement was made. 
l7 USJS, "Congressional Report, April 29", 29 April 1994, File ID: EPF504, Tracking no. 341647. 
See also BBC Monitoring Service, "China: Official Outlines Opposition to Murkowski Amendment", 
Reuter Business Briefing, 2 May 1994; Congressional Record, 3 May 1994, p. S5024. 
18 Congressional Record, 19 May 1994, p. S6109. 
19 Irene Wu, "The Sense of Congress", Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 June 1994, p. 24. 
20 Section 3(a) of the Act reads:" ... the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense 
articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a 
sufficient self-defense capability". 
21 Congressional Record, 28 April 1994, p. H2909. 
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two weeks after taking Solomon joined a group of Congressional 
members in a to Taiwan to assure the Taiwanese "they had not last 
word from Washington". 22 
Apparently, Section 508 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act would 
limit the State Department's flexibility in explaining the relationship between the 
TRA and the three joint communiques. It would also cause conflicts between 
Washington and Beijing on issues of US official contact with Taipei and Taipei's 
participation in international organisations. Realising the amendment would be a 
hurdle in its dealing with Beijing, the State Department on 16 May issued a 
statement stating that the resolution was only a non-binding declaration of the "sense 
of Congress". 23 
In line with the State Department's statement, the Clinton Administration did 
not make revisions to address Taiwan's security concerns in its 7 September 1994 
Taiwan policy review. Administration officials reaffirmed that US policy on arms 
sales to Taiwan would remain unchanged. That is, the United States would supply 
Taiwan with enough equipment to meet its security needs in accordance with the 
TRA while at the same time any US arms sales to Taiwan would have to take into 
account the Shanghai communique. 24 
The Administration also rejected Congressional pressure in deciding not to 
sell offensive weapons to Taiwan. For instance, Taiwan wanted to buy submarines 
from the United States. Not surprisingly, Taiwan had its supporters on Capitol Hill. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Wu, "The Sense of Congress". 
24 Osman Tseng, "Taiwan: The U.S. Upgrades Ties with Taiwan", Business Taiwan, Reuter Business 
Briefing, 12 September 1994. 
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But in late October 1994, in a written reply to questions from senators submitted at a 
September Congressional hearing, Winston Lord said that providing Taiwan with 
submarines would add a new and destabilising element in the Taiwan Strait. Lord 
said Washington would not sell and equip submarines for Taiwan because the 
Administration viewed submarines as an inherently offensive weapon system.25 
Up to 1996, after Beijing had conducted a series of military exercises to 
intimidate Taiwan, Congressional efforts to challenge the Administration's policy on 
arms sales to Taiwan had been largely symbolic. Legislators mainly intended to 
show their dissatisfaction with current Taiwan policy and to reaffirm its role in 
making foreign policy. As noted by Senator Baucus, there was "no emergency" to 
require the United States "to adopt a dramatic new arms sales policy".26 
High-level Visit 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Congressional displeasure over US 
policy towards high-level governmental contact with Taiwan had existed for a long 
time. Carla Hills' visit to Taiwan in December 1992 pleased Congress for a while. 
But Congress did not see it as a long-lasting policy change and therefore continued 
to pressure the first Clinton Administration. 
Congressional members across the spectrum were critical of US policy 
towards high-level governmental contact with Taiwan. For example, in debating the 
Murkowski amendment, Senator Baucus supported the White House's policy of 
restricting arms sales to Taiwan and warned his colleagues of the risk of proceeding 
to repeal the 1982 Shanghai communique through legislation. At the same time, 
25 CNA, "Taiwan: Official Responds to Lord Statement on Sale of Submarines", Reuter Business 
Briefing, 1November1994. 
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however, Baucus supported the amendment in terms of official contact. Baucus 
believed that to avoid official contact with leaders of the Taiwanese government was 
"a damaging and irrational policy".27 "I am embarrassed that we do not meet 
President Lee and his representatives", said Baucus. 28 He believed the policy served 
neither economic nor political interests of the United States. 
As mentioned above, the final version of the Murkowski amendment, namely 
Section 508 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, urged the President, on 
behalf of the Congress, to send Cabinet-level appointees to Taiwan and to take steps 
to show clear United States support for Taiwan both in the bilateral relationship and 
in multilateral organisations of which the United States was a member. The Act was 
signed into law on 30 April 1994. Three days later, on 3 May, Murkowski again 
demanded the Clinton Administration allow Lee to visit the United States. Further, 
he demanded the Administration send Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown or US 
Trade Representative (USTR) Mickey Kantor to Taiwan. He also asked the 
Administration to allow Taiwan's Economic Minister to visit his counterpart in the 
United States and allow the Taiwanese to change the name of their representative 
office in the United States. 29 The Clinton Administration had continued to ban high-
level official visit. 
The events happened next day, however, revealed the Administration's 
dilemma. On 4 May 1994, Lee passed Hawaii on a trip to Costa Rica. Lee had 
asked permission to spend the night in Honolulu and play golf. But the State 
26 USIS, "Senator Baucus Outlines His Vision for U.S.-China Policy", 19 January 1995, File ID: 
EPF404, Tracking no. 375346. 
27 Congressional Record, 1 February 1994, p. S520. 
28 Robert F. Holden, "Sen. Baucus: We Need Action from China on (MFN) Executive Order", USIS, 
27 January 1994, File ID: EPF412, Tracking no. 324151. 
29 Congressional Record, 3 May 1994, p. S5024. 
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Department said Lee could only spend a few hours on the ground. Furious, Lee 
refused even to get off his plane.30 
Taiwan's supporters in Congress immediately took the opportunity to attack 
the Clinton Administration. The incident served as a "defining moment" on Capitol 
Hill regarding the Taiwan issue. 31 A widely cited description of the event in 
Congress concluded the decision was made to please the Chinese ambassador to the 
United States, as the ambassador had made a strong protest. It was said the Clinton 
Administration considered not allowing any stop at all; the compromise was a 90-
minute refuelling stop. No ranking official of the US government was on hand to 
welcome Lee. Even the base commander where Lee landed was not permitted to 
greet Lee. 32 The Congressional version of the story said Lee was not allowed to 
disembark in Honolulu. The administration officials said Lee could have left the 
plane, but chose not to.33 
The matter was first brought to Congress' attention by Democratic Senator 
Paul Simon, a strong supporter of Taiwan. Shortly after the event, Simon sent a letter 
to Warren Christopher, expressing his "dismay" at this "grudging" reception.34 The 
next day he sent a letter to his colleagues, informing them of the event. Citing section 
508 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Simon questioned: "Is President 
Lee's treatment 'clear US support for Taiwan'?"35 
30 Jim Mann, "How Taipei Outwitted U.S. Policy". 
31 Leon Hadar, "USA: Clinton Changes Policy Towards Taiwan, or Did He?", Business Times, Reuter 
Business Briefing, 25 October 1994. 
32 Congressional Record, 5 August 1994, p. Sl0684; 19 May 1994, p. S6014. 
33 Reuter News Service, "USA: Senate Votes to Grant Visas to Taiwan Officials'', Reuter Business 
Briefing, 5 August 1994; Reuter News Service, "Taiwan: Senior Taiwan Official to Visit United 
States'', Reuter Business Briefing, 22 October 1994. 
34 Wu, "The Sense of Congress". 
35 Congressional Record, 5 August 1994, p. S10684. 
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Not surprisingly, administration officials put a positive spin on the incident, 
portraying the stopover as an improvement in relations. "Since 1979 there has not 
been such a high-ranking official from Taiwan on American soil anywhere'', said one 
official. "I am genuinely surprised that anyone could consider what we did was 
anything but courteous treatment, fair treatment, and indeed, if anything, a step 
forward". 36 
Taiwan's supporters on Capitol Hill were not convinced. On 17 May, 
Republican Senators Hank Brown and Murkowski sent a letter to Clinton, expressing 
their "serious concerns" over this event. They "were particularly dismayed to hear 
that this decision was made to appease the PRC's ambassador who had protested the 
presence of President Lee on American soil".37 At the same time, they sent a letter to 
Lee, inviting him to visit their home states of Colorado and Alaska. 
Taiwan's supporters took advantage of Congress' resentment over the 
Honolulu event and applied more pressure on the Administration. Senator Simon, 
for example, took the opportunity to ask his colleagues to support S. Res. 148. The 
resolution had been introduced by him in October 1993. It reaffirmed the sense of 
Congress contained in section 508 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act to the 
effect that the United States should support Taiwan's participation in the United 
Nations and that the United States should be open to Cabinet-level exchanges with 
Taiwan. By the time Simon wrote to inform his colleagues of the Honolulu event, 
the resolution had 22 co-sponsors. Simon was seeking passage of the Resolution 
before 3 June, the deadline for Clinton to decide China's MFN status.38 
36 Wu, "The Sense of Congress". 
37 Congressional Record, 19 May 1994, p. S6110. 
38 Congressional Record, 5 August 1994, p. S10684. 
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As expected, the State Department lobbied against S. Res. 148. Nevertheless, 
on 25 May, the day before Clinton's announcement on China's MFN status, the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted the resolution unanimously. On 10 
June, the Senate by voice vote adopted S. Res. 148, which by then had 40 co-
sponsors. 
The fallout over the Honolulu event did not stop at the passage of S. Res. 
148. On 1 July, Senators Hank Brown and Paul Simon proposed an amendment to 
the TRA, stating that 
Whenever the president of Taiwan or any other high-level official of 
Taiwan shall apply to visit the United States for the purposes of 
discussions with United States federal or state Government officials 
concemmg: 
(i) Trade or business with Taiwan that will reduce the US-Taiwan 
trade deficit; 
(ii) Prevention of nuclear proliferations; 
(iii) Threats to the national security of the United States; 
(iv) The protection of the global environment; 
(v) The protection of endangered species; or 
(iv) Regional humanitarian disasters. 
The official shall be admitted to the United States, unless the official 
is otherwise excludable under the immigration laws of the United 
States. 
The amendment was agreed to without debate. 39 
The Brown-Simon amendment, known as "the visas-for-Taiwanese-officials 
amendment", had the strong support of influential long-time supporters of Taiwan in 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, including committee chairman Claiborne 
Pell, the ranking Republican Jesse Helms, Frank H. Murkowski and Charles S. Robb. 
On 25 July, the four senators, along with the amendment's two co-sponsors, wrote a 
letter regarding the Honolulu event to the chairman and ranking member of the 
39 Congressional Record, 1 July 1994, p. S8176. 
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House Armed Services Committee, informing them that during consideration of the 
Defense Authorization Bill for FYl 995 the Senate included the visas-for-Taiwanese-
officials amendment. They strongly urged the leaders of the House Armed Services 
Committee to include the amendment in the final version of the conference report on 
the bill. 40 
Taiwan's supporters in Congress pushed hard for the passage of the visas-for-
Taiwanese-officials amendment. On 5 August, while the Senate was considering 
Departments of Labour, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act (H.R. 4606), the amendment was reintroduced. 
Democratic Senator Joseph I. Lieberman and Senator Murkowski joined Senators 
Brown and Simon to co-sponsor the amendment. Senator Brown's argument could 
be very appealing to his colleagues. Brown stated in introducing the amendment: 
It is in this Nation's interest to at least allow contacts with Taiwanese 
officials on specific matters. What is included in this amendment are 
matters that I suspect no Member of this body will find objectionable. It 
requires that in discussions with regard to United States-Taiwan trade 
matters, and the trade deficit, we will permit them to talk with us. It also 
requires that for discussions of efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation ... 
for threats to the national security of the United States ... for discussions 
involving protection of the global environment; protection of endangered 
species; and regional humanitarian disasters-for discussions in these 
narrow, specific areas, the Taiwanese leadership will be admitted ... and it 
would be unreasonable to exclude Taiwanese officials from the United 
States to discuss these matters.41 
The Senate subsequently approved the amendment by a vote of 94-0, making a large 
step towards reversing US policy by granting visas to officials of Taiwan, including 
its President, to visit the United States.42 
40 Congressional Record, 5 Aug. 1994, p. S10684. 
41 Ibid., p. S10683. 
42 USIS, "Congressional Report, August 5'', 5 August 1994, File ID: EPF503, Tracking no. 356043. 
See also Reuter News Service, "USA: Senate Votes to Grant Visas to Taiwan Officials", Reuter 
Business Briefing, 5 August 1994. 
283 
Not the objected to 
arguing that it interfered with the .~,,·~-·~ work of the State Department. It also 
hinted it to "appropriately" accommodate Taiwanese officials' visits to the 
United States while pursuing the "one China" policy.43 Taiwan, on the other hand, 
stepped up its lobbying efforts the House of Representatives for the adoption of 
the amendment in the conference report on H.R. 4606.44 However, several days 
later, Brown complained the amendment was "strongly opposed by a few members" 
of the House of Representatives and was not retained in the conference report on 
H.R. 4606.45 It was not clear whether these members were lobbied by the 
Administration. The conference report did not provide any argument against the 
amendment. It stated: "Deletes without prejudice a provision added by the Senate 
pertaining to limited travel privileges within the United States for high-ranking 
Taiwanese officials".46 It is possible the amendment was dropped to avoid blockage 
of H.R. 4606 by the Administration. 
But supporters of the amendment did not give up in their efforts. On 10 
August, when the Senate was considering the Department of Defense Appropriations 
Act for the fiscal year ending 30 September 1995 (H.R. 4650), the amendment was 
introduced again. This time, two more supporters of Taiwan joined Senators Brown, 
Simon, Lieberman and Murkowski in sponsoring the amendment. One of them was 
Republican Senator Ted Stevens, who had once threatened to block arms sales to 
43 Kuan Wen-hang, "Can U.S.-Taiwan Relations Be 'Upgraded'?", Wen Wei Po in Chinese 17 
August 94, p. A2, carried in FB!S Daily Report, China, 22 August 1994, pp. 3-4. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Congressional Record, 10 August 1994, p. S 11117. 
46 Congressional Record, 20 September 1994, p. H9309. 
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Taiwan as believed the interests his state were Taiwan's 
fleets. 47 
As it turned out, the amendment was not retained conference on 
H.R. 4650 either. Again there was no clear sign of the Clinton Administration's 
lobbying efforts. While the amendment was dropped, the conferees explicitly 
expressed their support for giving visas to officials of Taiwan. The report noted 
The conferees agree that appropriate officials of Taiwan should be 
permitted entry to the United States for the conduct of official business. 
Amendment of the Taiwan Relations Act falls outside the jurisdiction 
of the Appropriations Committees. The conferees defer action on this 
matter to the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations 
Committees.48 
During this period, there were also two separate moves in Congress. In June, 
54 senators, led by Murkowski, sent a letter to Clinton, asking him to send a Cabinet 
member to Taiwan "as a clear signal to the Taiwanese of the importance with which 
the United States regards its relationship with Taiwan".49 In August, a letter jointly 
signed by 37 members of the House of Representatives was sent to Lee.so 
It should also be noted that during this period Taipei's lobbying efforts 
focused on two top priorities: lifting the ban on visits to the United States by ranking 
Taiwanese officials; and to allow Taiwan to rename its representative office in the 
United States.51 Meanwhile, influential newspapers, including New York Times, 
47 Congressional Record, 10 August 1994, p. S 11117. 
48 Congressional Record, 26 September 1994, p. H9616. 
49 Dwyen Ngo, "Taiwan: U.S. Senator Stands up for Taiwan", Business Taiwan, Reuter Business 
Briefing, 12 December 1994. 
50 Dennis Engbarth, "Taiwan: US Invitation to Lee'', South China Morning Post, Reuter Business 
Briefing, 13 August 1994. 
51 CNA, "Outgoing Envoy to U.S. Says Ties 'Growing Steadily'", FBIS Daily Report, China, 1 
September 1994, pp. 70-71. 
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Washington Post and Christian Science Monitor, editorialised their support for 
upgraded official status for Taiwan.52 
Taiwan Policy Review 
Against this dramatic backdrop, the Clinton Administration conducted an 18-
month long, comprehensive review of Taiwan policy. As it turned out, the review 
angered Beijing and failed to satisfy Congress and Taipei. It was criticised for 
emphasising details instead of principles and, more importantly, for lacking vision. 
The review failed to solve any problems in the Washington-Beijing-Taipei 
relationship. Instead, it further exposed the weaknesses of the Clinton 
Administration and encouraged Congress and Taipei. 
The review began in July 1993, but was delayed again and again for various 
reasons. 53 According to Senator Murkowski, he was told on many occasions that an 
announcement about the policy review was imminent. "But then something would 
come up to delay its release - and that something was usually the People's Republic 
of China", Murkowski ridiculed. "First there was the most-favored-nation debate, 
and then North Korea negotiations, and then Secretary Brown's trip to Beijing".54 
The policy review, which was drafted with consultation of only "interested 
members of Congress",55 was barely publicised. It was quietly announced in an "off-
the-record" briefing on 7 September 1994 while Congress recessed.56 
52 CNA, "Envoy to U.S. to Head National Security Council", FBIS Daily Report, China, 22 August 
1994, pp. 79-80. 
53 Congressional Record, 3 May 1994, p. S5024. For more information, see Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, 
"How Clinton Bashed Taiwan - and Why", Orbis, (Fall 1995), pp. 567-580. 
54 Congressional Record, 28 September 1994, p. S13587. 
55 Lord, "Taiwan Policy Review", p. 705. 
56 Hadar, "USA: Clinton Changes Policy towards Taiwan, or Did He?". 
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But the was it was adjustment of 
policy 15 years. According to the who briefed reporters on the 
condition of anonymity, the United States was trying to promote strengthen its 
"unofficial economic and commercial ties by lifting the level of exchanges and visits 
and changing the nature of the settings for those kinds of issues".57 
The changes included allowing high-level US economic and technical 
officials to visit Taiwan; allowing Taiwanese officials to meet some high-ranking US 
officials in official settings, such as the Commerce Department; allowing State 
Department officials at the undersecretary level who had nonpolitical portfolios to 
meet with senior Taiwanese visitors, just so long as they didn't do so in their 
Department offices at Foggy Bottom; letting Taiwanese officials enter the United 
States in transit to other countries; and changing the name of Taiwan's office in 
Washington from the Coordination Council for North American Affairs to the Taipei 
Economic and Cultural Office. The United States would also support Taiwan's entry 
into the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT)/the World Trade 
Organisation (WT0).58 
Hours after the Administration's announcement, the unofficial US 
representative in Taiwan, Lynn Pascoe, called on Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui, 
Prime Minister Lien Chan and the Foreign Minister Frederick Chien. The call was 
57 Reuter News Service, "USA: US Shifts Policy Slightly on Taiwan", Reuter Business Briefing, 7 
September 1994; Jane A. Morse, "U.S. to Expand Its Avenues for Dialogue with Taiwan", USJS, 7 
September 1994, File ID: EPF302, Tracking no. 359634. 
58 Lord, "Taiwan Policy Review", p. 706. Congressional Record, 28 September 1994, p. S13587. 
Dick Kirschten, "The Other China" reprinted in Congressional Record, 30 November 1994, p. 
Sl5267. Jim Mann, "U.S. Slightly Elevates Ties with Taiwan", Los Angeles Times, 8 September 
1994, p. A4. Carol Giacomo, "USA: US Shifts Policy on Taiwan'', Reuter News Service, Reuter 
Business Briefing, 8 September 1994. Nikkei Weekly, "USA: US's Taiwan Overture Miffs China -
Clinton Courts Island's Market, Political Lobby", Reuter News Service, 12 September 1994. Tseng, 
"Taiwan: The U.S. Upgrades Ties with Taiwan". 
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the first one smce the States to 
Beijing 1979.59 
Administration officials emphasised the new policy not change the basic 
framework of US policies towards Beijing and Taipei, but strained to strike a balance 
between Taipei's growing desire for higher-level contacts with US officials and 
Beijing's demands that the United States continue to deny Taiwan official 
recognition as an entity separate from the rest of China. 60 
Analysts observed that the review designed both to relieve the pressures for 
change from outside the Administration and to answer some questions from an 
incoming President. It was to help preserve the status quo in Washington's ties with 
Beijing and Taipei. Some analysts therefore called the review "a phony review" and 
"essentially useless". 61 
The Administration officials also used different rhetoric on different 
occas10ns to describe the importance of the review. While Winston Lord told 
Congress "a senes of changes" had been made and that the review had 
"systematically" enhanced ways to promote American interests and manage relations 
with Taiwan,62 the "senior official" who introduced the policy changes dubbed the 
changes as "refinements". 63 
Indeed, the changes did little to alter the nature of bilateral relations between 
Washington and Taipei. Washington wanted US relations with Taiwan to be limited 
59 Teresa Poole, "Taiwan: Taiwan in from Cold after Long US Freeze", Independent, Reuter 
Business Briefing, 9 September 1994. CNA, "Foreign Minister 'Not Fully Satisfied' With U.S. 
Policy'', FBIS Daily Report, China, 8 September 1994, p. 78. 
60 Lord, "Taiwan Policy Review", pp. 705-706. 
61 Jim Mann, "Taiwanese Opposition's Independence Drive Shows Need for New U.S. Policy", Los 
Angeles Times, 17 April 1995, p. A5. See also Hadar, "USA: Clinton Changes Policy towards 
Taiwan, or Did He?"; Caspar W. Weinberger, "USA: Commentary on Events at Home and Abroad-
Relations with Taiwan", Forbes, Reuter Business Briefing, 17 October 1994. 
62 Lord, "Taiwan Policy Review", p. 705. 
63 Morse, "U.S. to Expand Its Avenues for Dialogue with Taiwan". 
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to economic, fields. changes not 
break new ground. terms of official visits, US Trade Representative 
in the Bush Administration, had already visited In the case of the 
visa, Taiwan Prime Minister Lien Chan was allowed to stop over Los Angeles and 
Miami on his way to El Salvador May 1994. 64 As supporting Taiwan's entry 
into the GATT/WTO, that was what the United States had been doing since 1991.65 
Even the new name was not really new. It was the same name Taiwan gave to its 
operation Japan. 66 
Yet, in addition to boosting economic and technical ties, the policy review 
did give the impression of strengthening US-Taiwan political relations. Renaming 
Taiwan's unofficial office reflected its upgraded status. And, it was the first time the 
US government felt compelled to write a "visits" policy. Lee Teng-hui would also 
be allowed to stay in the United States for a transit stop. Lee's stop would be much 
more significant than Lien Chan's. To allow top-level Taiwanese officials visiting 
the United States to meet their American counterparts some US government 
offices was another step towards strengthening political relations. 
The policy review turned out to be a big mistake. By trying to micro-manage 
US-Taiwan relations, the Clinton Administration further exposed itself to attacks 
from critics of the Taiwan policy. Harry Harding believed the policy review was 
'just a disaster". "It was typical of the Clinton Administration - all details, no 
64 Reuter News Service, "China: China Tells US No Official Contact with Taiwan", Reuter Business 
Briefing, 31 May 1994. 
65 Caspar Weinberger said that the United States had always supported Taiwan's GATT bid. (See 
Weinberger, "USA: Commentary on Events at Home and Abroad--Relations with Taiwan".) The 
United States has been reluctant to support Taiwan to join GATT/WTO before China. 
66 Simon Beck and Beoffrey Crothall, "China: Beijing Condemns 'Interference"', South China 
Morning Post, Reuter Business Briefing, 9 September 1994. The name of Taiwan's agency in Japan 
was renamed "Taipei Economic and Cultural Office" in 1992. 
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vision", Harding pointed out.67 He argued that what was important were principles, 
not details, because details could change from time to time. Harding noted the 
review "failed to reassure the Chinese" and "It placed limitations on American 
policy which seemed so unreasonable that Taiwan was emboldened to challenge 
them".68 
Indeed, while Beijing blasted the review, members of Congress were not 
satisfied with the changes, arguing they did not go far enough. In a 27 September 
hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the review, Charles Robb 
said: "On a number of critical issues, Taiwan is outside of the tent when it should be 
inside".69 Frank Murkowski told Winston Lord, "I had hoped for bolder and more 
substantive steps".7° Claiborne Pell added, "I do not think the (policy) review has 
gone as far as it should. In many ways, it was three steps forward and two steps 
back".71 Paul Simon also complained: "I don't think it makes sense. I think in Asia 
we have an irrational policy".72 Hank Brown, alluding to US willingness to engage 
North Korea directly, branded the policy review a "slap in the face to Taiwan".73 
The main issues which made these senators unhappy included 1) the policy 
review kept America's one China policy officially intact and reiterated that the 
United States did not back Taiwan's entry into the United Nations; 2) visits to the 
United States by Taiwan's president and other top leaders were still forbidden; 3) no 
meetings were to occur between senior officials whose duties were considered to be 
67 Interview with Harry Harding on 19 May 1997. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Robert Green, "USA: Senators Urge Closer Ties with Taiwan", Reuter News Service, Reuter 
Business Briefing, 28 September 1994. 
70 Ibid. 
7l Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Kirschten, "The Other China", p. S15268. 
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primarily diplomatic, military or political; 4) senior Taiwanese officials visiting the 
United States would be barred from setting foot in such "official" sanctums as the 
White House, the Old Executive Office Building, the Pentagon and the State 
Department. 74 
Taiwan also expressed its disappointment. The policy rev1s10n "fell far 
below the expectations of Taiwan" and Taiwan regarded the long-awaited revisions 
"a dud".75 Taiwan's official response called the policy review "welcome" but added 
that "these adjustments have not sufficiently addressed the needs arising from the 
close relationship between the United States and the Republic of China".76 A 
delegation of Taiwanese legislators met with State Department officials on 21 
September to register their disappointment with the policy review, which Senator 
Parris H. Chang, a Democratic Progressive Party member, described in an interview 
as "retrograde in certain respects".77 Albert Lin, information director for Taiwan's 
Washington outpost, said his office's new title was selected from a list of acceptable 
options but was not his country's first choice, which could simply be "Taipei 
Representative Office".78 Foreign Minister Frederick Chien had hoped for even 
more. He said "We are dissatisfied that the changes could not add 'Republic of 
China' to the name".79 Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui called the changes a 
"miniature shift" that did not "live up to the U.S. role in the region". 80 
74 Ibid., p. S15267. See also Congressional Record, 28 September 1994, p. Sl3587. 
75 Chang, "How Clinton Bashed Taiwan--and Why", p.567. 
76 Kirschten, "The Other China", p. S15268. 
77 Ibid., p. S15267. 
78 Ibid. See also Tseng, "Taiwan: The U.S. Upgrades Ties with Taiwan". 
79 James Peng, "Taiwan: Taiwan Complains US Policy Adjustment Not Enough", Reuter News 
Service, Reuter Business Briefing, 8 September 1994. 
80 Margaret Dawson, "Clinton Breaks the Ice: Is the recent overture to Taiwan enough to win huge 
new deals?", Business Week (19 December 1994), p. 12. 
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Despite its expressed disappointment, · seemed encouraged by the 
policy review and thereafter doubled its lobbying efforts. Shortly the review, 
Taiwan sent a mission to the United States to lobby for Taiwan's bid to · the 
UN.8 1 Taiwan's Government Information Office Director-General Jason Hu also 
went to the United States to enlist support for the UN Hu planned to call at such 
major news organisations as the New York Times, CNN (Cable News Network), the 
Time magazine, the Newsweek, the Wall Street Journal and the New York Daily 
News. He claimed that since Taipei formally launched an international publicity 
drive for its UN bid 1993, major world news media had published more than 1,200 
articles supporting Taipei.82 At the same time, Taiwan's representative to the United 
States pledged to step up communications with the US Congress and mass media in 
the hope of using public opinion to change the US government's Taiwan policy.83 
Taiwan's UN bid did receive more support in Congress then. The Senate had 
already adopted a resolution in support of Taipei and two similar bills were pending 
in the House ofRepresentatives.84 
A more dramatic lobbying effort was revealed in early October when Taipei 
signed ,a US$4.5 million three-year contract with Cassidy and Associates, one of the 
top public relations firms in the United States. The contract cost at least l 0 times 
more than what Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs had paid for other PR firms in 
the past. The contract was also the largest recorded in the public relations field in the 
81 CNA, "Mission Leaves for U.S. to Lobby for UN Bid'', FB!S Daily Report, China, 16 September 
1994, p. 63. 
82 CNA, "Efforts Continue to Seek Support for UN Bid - Information Director Leaves for U.S.", 
FBIS Daily Report, China, 19 September 1994, p. 74. 
83 CNA, "Gives Priority to UN Bid'', FBIS Daily Report, China, 19 September 1994, p. 73. 
84 CNA, "Efforts Continue to Seek for UN Bid - Committee Urges U.S. Support", FBIS Daily 
Report, China, 19 September 1994, p. 74. 
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United States. 85 In its first letter to the Clinton Administration, Powell Tate, an 
affiliate of Cassidy, said recent policy changes of the United States had unfortunately 
done nothing to improve substantive ties between the US and Taiwan. 86 
Congress also seemed encouraged by the policy review and continued its 
activism on Taiwan policy. On 28 September, Senator Murkowski and another five 
senators (Robb, Brown, Pell, Helms and Simon) submitted S. Res. 270, calling for 
closer ties between the United States and Taiwan. The resolution required the US 
government to change its policy towards Taiwan on a range of issues: allowing 
unrestricted office calls by Taiwan's representatives in the United States to all US 
departments and agencies, including the Departments of Defense and State and 
offices in the Old Executive Office Building; sending Cabinet-level officials, 
including officials from the Departments of State and Defense, to Taiwan on a 
regular basis; supporting Taiwan's efforts to join international organisations; 
approving defensive arms sales to Taiwan based solely on Taiwan's self-defence 
needs; and of course, welcoming the visits by the Taiwan president and other high-
level government officials. 87 
Naturally, administration officials defended the Administration's Taiwan 
policy. "Our relations with Taiwan are warmer than ever", Winston Lord said. 
"Relations with the People's Republic of China are official and diplomatic; with 
Taiwan, they are unofficial but strong", he argued.88 Lord strongly opposed 
Congressional attempts, including the attempt to legislate visits by top leaders of 
Taiwan to the United States, warning it would be "a serious mistake" to derail the 
85 China Economic News Service, "Taiwan: PR Firm Contracted to Lobby U.S. Government for 
Improved Ties", Reuter Business Briefing, 6 October 1994. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Congressional Record, 28 September 1994, p. S13586. 
88 Green, "USA: Senators Urge Closer Ties with Taiwan". Lord, "Taiwan Policy Review", p. 705. 
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basic policy of several administrations by "introducing what China would 
undoubtedly perceive as officiality" in US relations with Taiwan. 89 
But reflecting the Administration's weak leadership against an assertive 
Congress, the Administration's warning was dismissed and the S. Res. 270 was 
agreed to without objection in the Senate on 5 October.90 
Encouraged by Congress, Taipei stepped up its pressure on the Clinton 
Administration to make more dramatic changes to its Taiwan policy. The day after 
the adoption of S. Res. 270, Lee Teng-hui, "in a rare burst of criticism", complained 
of US "over-tolerance" towards Beijing. In his first comment on the Clinton 
Administration's Taiwan policy review, Lee called US policy adjustments 
"negligible".91 He subsequently challenged the policy by inviting President Clinton 
to visit Taiwan.92 
In spite of its dissatisfaction, Taipei seemed careful not to lose patience and 
push too far. In late October, Taiwan's Foreign Minister Frederick Chien had a four-
day stay in the United States, two nights in Miami and one night in New York, 
during a trip to Paraguay for a meeting of Taiwan's ambassadors to Central and 
South America. Chien did not meet US officials during his stay and only visited 
Taiwan's quasi-official offices there.93 
But much was changed after the 1994 mid-term election. For the first time in 
four decades, the Republicans took control over both the Senate and the House. In 
89 Lord, "Taiwan Policy Review", p. 706. 
90 Congressional Record, 5 October 1994, p. S14234. China Economic News Service, "USA: 
Statement of Taiwan Research Institute: Senate Passes Resolution Calling for Stronger U.S. Relations 
with Taiwan'', Reuter Business Briefing, 6 October 1994. 
91 James Clark, "Taiwan: Taiwan Complains of US 'Over-Tolerance' on China'', Reuter News 
Service, Reuter Business Briefing, 7 October 1994. 
92 China Economic News Service, Reuter Business Briefing, "Taiwan: President Lee Invites Clinton 
to Visit, Slams U.S. Policy", 7 October 1994. 
93 Reuter News Service, "Taiwan: Senior Taiwan Official Leaves for United States", Reuter Business 
Briefing, 24 October 1994. 
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the Senate, the Republican Party increased its number of seats from 44 to 53 over the 
Democrats, whose seats fell from 56 to 47. In the House of Representatives, the 
Republicans went from 178 to 230 seats, while the Democrats dropped from 256 
seats to 204 seats, with one seat held by an independent. 
Along with the Republican gains, conservatives strengthened their power in 
Congress with Senator Jesse Helms becoming Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and Newt Gingrich becoming Speaker of the House. Helms, a 
well-known long-time critic of China, later said he believed the Taiwan leadership 
was the legitimate government of the Mainland and that he had "always resented 
what was done to Taiwan".94 Gingrich later angered Beijing by saying Taiwan 
should join the UN and Taiwan's president should visit the United States.95 
Some Chinese analysts also put Benjamin J. Gilman, new Chairman of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee (renamed International Relations Committee in 
late 1994), to the list of conservatives.96 In fact, Gilman was "a mild-mannered 
moderate".97 It was observed that "Conservatives in the House Republican 
Conference have never felt comfortable with Gilman's moderate views".98 In 1993, 
Gilman ranked second in voting against Republican majorities. He opposed his party 
4 7 percent of the time. 99 The reason Chinese analysts regarded Gilman as a 
conservative was Gilman's championing of human rights. Gilman had been critical 
94 Hongkong Standard, "Balance Needed on Diplomatic Tightrope" (in English), 7 February 1995, p. 
14, carried in FBIS Daily Report, China, 8 February 1995, p. 63. 
95 Lin Ling, "Refuting Newt Gingrich's Nonsense", Wen Wei Po in Chinese, 6 February 1995, p. B3, 
carried in FBIS Daily Report, China, 8 February 1995, p. 3. 
96 Lu Qichang & Zhao Shenggan, "U.S. Mid-term Elections and Political Trends", Xiandai Guoji 
Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), December 1994, pp. 26-32, in Chinese, carried in 
FBIS Daily Report, China, 27 March 1995, pp. 6-12. 
97 Amy Borrus and Richard S. Dunham, "Who Will Forge Foreign Policy? The barons of the 
Republican Congress may be too divided", Business Week (23 January 1995), p. 26. 
98 Carroll Doherty, "GOP Takes the Reins of Power: House Committee on Foreign Affairs", 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (52:44, 12 November 1994), p. 3261. 
99 Ibid. 
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of Beijing's human rights record and supported independence for Taiwan and 
Tibet.100 In the wake of Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States, Gilman said "If 
the people of Taiwan want to join the UN as an independent nation then they should 
be allowed to do so".101 
The triumphant Republicans warned that the Clinton Administration had to 
cooperate with the Congress. Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole noted that in 
foreign policy the White House "will have to bow to the opinions of Republican 
majority in Congress".102 Newt Gingrich said he did not plan "to retreat or 
compromise on Republican Party goals".1°3 Benjamin J. Gilman remarked that 
before the President carried out foreign policy it was "absolutely essential to gain 
congressional support". 104 
Pressures came not only from Congress but also from American business 
groups, who lobbied hard for upgrading relations with Taipei. It was noted that 
European countries, with ministerial visits to Taiwan supporting their trade 
promotion efforts, had been awarded more than US$5 billion in contracts for 
Taiwan's six-year national development plan, while US companies had won only 
US$1.37 billion in contracts between 1991 and 1993. 105 Not long after the policy 
review, a delegation of American businessmen in Taiwan visited Washington to try 
to convince the Administration and Congress "there is a need to further upgrade 
relations between our two countries". 106 Specifically, they requested that a Cabinet 
member visit Taiwan soon. Afterwards, William Botwick, president of General 
100 Borrus and Dunham, "Who Will Forge Foreign Policy? The barons of the Republican Congress 
may be too divided", p. 27. 
101 Nayan Chanda, "Winds of Change", Far Eastern Economic Review (22 June 1995), p. 15. 
102 Lu and Zhao, "U.S. Mid-term Elections and Political Trends", p. 11. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Hadar, "USA: Clinton Changes Policy Towards Taiwan, Or Did He?". 
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Motors Taiwan Ltd. and president of the US Chamber of Commerce in Taipei said 
"We found a very sympathetic attitude on Capitol Hill for our position".107 The US 
Chamber of Commerce in Taipei also wrote to President Clinton in late November, 
urging him to send one top official to Taiwan. "The timing is critical", the Chamber 
stressed. 108 
Congressional pressure and lobbying efforts by Taipei and American 
business groups bore fruit in early December 1994 when US Transportation 
Secretary Federico Pena visited Taiwan. Pena was there to attend a business 
conference and his visit was "unofficial". But Pena entered Taiwan's "Office of the 
President" and "Foreign Ministry" building to hold official meetings with Lee Teng-
hui and Frederick Chien, the first US Cabinet official to do so for at least 15 years. 
Pena linked his visit to the US policy adjustments. "The United States 
completed its Taiwan policy report in September this year, and the Clinton 
Administration has made a revision of its Taiwan policy .... This is helpful for my 
Taiwan visit'', said Pena. 109 Pena publicly claimed he was in Taiwan on a mission 
from President Clinton to upgrade relations.110 He told Lee he hoped more US 
Cabinet officials would visit Taiwan in the future.111 
A major driving force for upgrading the relations was American economic 
interests in Taiwan and Pena pushed hard for those interests. He brought with him a 
letter from Clinton former Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, co-chairman of 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Dawson, "Clinton Breaks the Ice", p. 12. 
109 "China: Editorial Says US-Taiwan Government Contacts Will Harm Chinese-US Relations", Wen 
Wei Po in Chinese, Reuter Business Briefing, 10 December 1994. 
l lO James Kyne, "Taiwan: US Walks Tightrope of Taiwan-China Ties", Reuter News Service, Reuter 
Business Briefing, 8 December 1994. See also Rone Tempest, "Taiwan: U.S. Gestures Leave Taiwan 
Hungry for Recognition'', Los Angeles Times, Reuter Business Briefing, 6 December 1994. 
111 Ted Plafker, "USA: Official Forced to Abort Trip to China", South China Morning Post, Reuter 
Business Briefing, 13 December 1994. 
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Economic sponsored the business 
conference. Pena read letter in front Lee Teng-hui. letter, Clinton 
explained that "Secretary Pena's presence at this meeting is ample testament to the 
interest of this Administration in improving economic relations between the United 
States and Taiwan". 112 Pena urged Taiwan to open access to its markets, singling out 
possible future transport links across the 220-km Taiwan Strait to the Mainland as an 
area of special interest. He demanded that and when air- and sea transportation 
across the straits begins, we expect that United States companies will be allowed to 
compete in providing these services".113 
The Clinton Administration was walking a tightrope with regard to 
Washington-Beijing relations. It tried to control the negative impact of Pena's visit 
on relations with Beijing. After Pena was a junior Cabinet member. And during 
his four-day visit, Pena fielded few questions and relied mainly on statements. He 
"shied away" from the key question of whether Lee Teng-hui would be allowed to 
visit the United States.114 
But it became much harder for the Clinton Administration to walk the 
tightrope. Congress and the strong Taiwan lobby were successfully squeezing the 
Administration, giving the Administration little space for manoeuvre. On the other 
hand, Pena's visit and his remarks in Taiwan angered Beijing. It subsequently turned 
down Pena's visit to Beijing which had been scheduled for January 1995. 
Taiwan's supporters in Congress, however, were demanding more 
for Taiwan. Senator Murkowski also attended the conference with a 29-person 
112 Tempest, "Taiwan: U.S. Gestures Leave Taiwan Hungry for Recognition". 
l !3 James Clark, "Taiwan: U.S. Official in Landmark Trip to Taiwan", Reuter News Service, Reuter 
Business Briefing, 5 December 1994. 
114 James Kyne, "Taiwan: US Walks Tightrope of Taiwan-China Ties". 
298 
delegation from his home state of Alaska. Murkowski assured the Taiwanese: 
"You'll see a continuation to the commitment we made to Taiwan". 11 5 He said he 
planned to reintroduce a resolution urging the Clinton Administration to allow Lee 
Teng-hui to visit the United States. "That resolution will be circulated among all 
members of the US Senate so it will have a significant, representative 
recommendation", Murkowski stated. "As a consequence of that, I think the 
Administration will have a chance to review the policy and I would hope that they 
see fit to grant President Lee the invitation".116 Murkowski was confident the 
Legislature would have more say in US policy towards Taiwan. "I think you'll see a 
continual review of our policy toward Taiwan", he asserted.117 
Lee's Visit: An Inevitable Retreat of the Administration? 
Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's "private visit" to the United States in June 
1995 was the most important issue in US-China relations during the first Clinton 
Administration. It was perhaps the most important issue since the two countries 
normalised their relationship in 1979. Lee's visit triggered serious crises between 
the two countries and across the Taiwan Strait. This section examines the decision-
making process leading to the decision to grant Lee a visa to the United States. 
As revealed in the above two sections, Congress was very active on the 
Taiwan issue in the first two years of the first Clinton Administration. At the same 
time, as examined in Chapter 4, the Clinton Administration did not have a clear 
vision for US-China relations, inevitably weakening its position on policy towards 
Taiwan. Although it had no intention to make major changes to the Taiwan policy 
115 Ngo, "Taiwan: U.S. Senator Stands up for Taiwan". 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
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set by previous administrations, it did not show much leadership and lacked the 
determination to resist Congressional pressure. Consequently, US policy towards 
Taiwan was moving in the direction determined by Congress. 
Congressional members like Murkowski were not satisfied with the speed of 
the movement. "It is not moving as fast as I would like", Murkowski said.ll8 They 
therefore launched a series of assaults on the Clinton Administration's Taiwan 
policy. In the 9 February 1995 hearing of the House Subcommittee on Asia and the 
Pacific, members of the committee accused the Administration of kow-towing to 
China and slighting Taiwan. One member called on the Administration to "reach out 
to Taiwan" and termed it an "insult" that Lee Teng-hui had been refused a visa to 
receive an honorary degree from Cornell University.119 
The Clinton Administration tried to resist Congressional pressure. In his 
testimony at the hearing, Lord said "We all share your instincts" as to "who are the 
good guys and who are the not-so-good guys". Yet he insisted "We will continue to 
reject proposals which would place at risk the peace and growth that Taiwan has 
achieved. . . . We will not reverse the policies of six Administrations of both 
parties". 120 Before Cornell University formally invited Lee in early March to come to 
the school's Ithaca, New York, campus, Warren Christopher believed that "under the 
present circumstances" he could not see Lee's visit to Ithaca happening.121 
Given the Clinton Administration's statements, Taipei at first was pessimistic 
about getting the visa. They hoped Lee might make a US stopover before the 
118 Nikkei Weekly, "Japan: China, U.S. in Collision Course over Taiwan - Japan Will Feel 
Repercussions from Outcome of Dispute", Reuter Business Briefing, 19 December 1994. 
ll 9 Patrick Worship, "USA: US Legislators Attack Policy on China, Taiwan", Reuter News Service, 
Reuter Business Briefing, 9 February 1995. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Congressional Record, 15 March 1995, p. S3993. 
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island's March 1996 presidential election.122 But as always, Taipei lobbied 
vigorously. 
The already active and assertive Congress acted swiftly after Cornell 
University formally invited Lee. As promised, Senator Murkowski on 6 March 
introduced a resolution urging Clinton to let Lee visit the United States, saying "it is 
the sense of the Congress that the President should promptly indicate that the United 
States will welcome a private visit by President Lee Teng-hui to his alma mater, 
Cornell University".123 Murkowski was not acting alone. He had 35 co-sponsors for 
the bill. On the same day, a nearly identical resolution, H. Con. Res. 33, was 
introduced in the House of Representatives by Democratic Congressman Tom 
Lantos, a vocal critic of China's human rights record. 
The two resolutions enjoyed strong bi-partisan support. On 22 March the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approved S. Con. Res. 9. Eleven 
senators on the committee had co-sponsored the legislation. In the House, H. Con. 
Res. 33 was reintroduced on 29 March as H. Con. Res. 53. The resolution had four 
co-sponsors when it was introduced; the next day, 29 more congressmen joined as 
cosponsors.124 Both resolutions expressed the sense of Congress and did not bind the 
White House to any action. 
The voting results were staggering. On 2 May, the House passed H. Con. 
Res. 53 by 396-0. One week later, on 9 May, the Senate overwhelmingly joined the 
House and approved the resolution, 97-1. 
122 CNA, "Reportage on Possibility of Li's U.S. Visit - Foreign Minister's Remarks", FBIS Daily 
Report, China, 6 March 1995, p. 95. Reuter News Se111ice, "Taiwan: Taiwan President May Make 
US Stopover- Minister'', Reuter Business Briefing, 6 May 1995. 
123 Congressional Record, 6 March 1995, p. S3539. Reuter News Service, "USA: Clinton Urged to 
Let Taiwan President Visit'', Reuter Business Briefing, 6 March 1995. 
124 Congressional Record, 30 March 1994, p. H4032. 
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The only person who spoke and voted against allowing Lee Teng-hui to make 
an unofficial visit to the United States was Democratic Senator J. Bennett Johnston. 
Johnston warned that Lee's visit risked damaging relations with China. "I hesitate to 
muddy the waters and compromise our carefully crafted, delicate relations with the 
People's Republic of China by initiating vague policies of recognition of Taiwan's 
leaders", Johnston said.125 One observer noted, "Johnston's position was not only 
exceptional, it was unique".126 
The State Department insisted there was too much at stake for the United 
States to jeopardise ties with Beijing by doing more than it had done to boost 
relations with Taiwan. In fact, Warren Christopher assured Chinese Foreign 
Minister Qian Qichen at a UN meeting on 17 April that it was the Administration's 
"fundamental policy" to refuse the visa.127 After the Senate's 9 May vote, the State 
Department claimed the Administration was not rethinking its position. A State 
Department spokesman said that allowing Lee to visit "would have serious 
consequences for US foreign policy". 128 The spokesman predicted China would not 
act kindly if the United States granted Lee a visa "because a visit by a person of 
President Lee's title, whether or not the visit were termed private, would unavoidably 
be seen by the People's Republic of China as removing an essential element of 
unofficiality in the United States-Taiwan relationship". 129 A State Department 
125 John M. Broder, "USA: Taiwan Lobbying in U.S. Gets. Results", Los Angeles Times, 4 November 
1996, p. 20, Reuter Business Briefing, 4 November 1996. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Barton Gellman, "U.S., China Nearly Came to Blows in '96'', Washington Post, 21 June 1998, p. 
AOL 
128 Steven Greenhouse, "Clinton Rebuffs Senate on Letting Taiwan President Visit U.S'', New York 
Times, 11 May 1995, p. A6. 
129 Ibid. 
302 
spokeswoman also stated that anything beyond a short stopover "would be 
inconsistent with the informal character of our relations with Taiwan" .13o 
But the pressure from Congress was enormous. One senior administration 
official acknowledged that Congress' non-binding resolution had forced the 
Administration's hand; continuing to bar Lee would give the impression that Clinton 
was bowing to Chinese pressure. Clinton had sought to shed that image since May 
1994 when he extended China's MFN trade status despite China's human rights 
performance falling far short of what he had demanded.131 
Contributing to the Administration's weak position on this issue was the 
Administration's concerns about issues potentially more important than the issue of 
Lee's visit. For example, Congress was trying to drastically cut the budget and 
downsize the structure of the State Department. With the entire budget and 
organisation of the US foreign policy apparatus in trouble on Capitol Hill, Warren 
Christopher "was of the view that this [Lee's visit] was not something we could 
confront Congress on", a State Department official said.132 
To impose more pressure on the Clinton Administration, Senator Murkowski 
warned that if strong Congressional sentiment did not persuade the Administration to 
reverse itself, Congress would force the Administration's hand by passing mandatory 
legislation.133 
The message was taken by the Administration, which no longer had the 
will to resist Congressional pressure. Administration officials told the Chinese 
130 Ibid. 
131 Steven Greenhouse, "Aides to Clinton Say He Will Defy Beijing and Issue Visa to Taiwan's 
President", New York Times, 22 May 1995, p. A6. 
132 Jim Mann, "How Taipei Outwitted U.S. Policy". 
133 Thomas W. Lippman, "Hill Urges President to Let Taiwan Leader Visit U.S", Washington Post, 
10 May 1995, p. A29. 
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ambassador to Washington that if Clinton did not soon grant a visa to Taiwan's 
President, Congress might overwhelmingly adopt a binding resolution that would not 
only require him to do so, but would also upgrade the American relationship with 
Taiwan.134 According to a senior State Department official, the Administration 
wanted to "pre-empt new binding legislation" that could hurt US relations with 
China.135 It was reported that a bill was pending in the Senate, calling for President 
Lee to be received on an official level as a head of state "with all appropriate 
courtesies". 136 
Believing Congressional pressure was irresistible, the Clinton Administration 
proposed a new solution. It would grant Lee a visa for a trip to Hawaii. Instead of a 
quick overnight stop like the one rejected in 1994, Lee could play golf and 
participate in private academic exchanges there. The Administration thought the 
compromise would be more acceptable to Beijing because it kept Lee out of the 
continental United States. But with the full support of Congress, Taiwanese officials 
turned down the Administration's offer, deciding instead to go all-out for the Cornell 
trip. 137 
Taiwan's confidence was based not only on the supportive Congress, but also 
a weak president without a clear vision on China policy. According to one story, 
Clinton once asked his aides what was the most important reason why he should not 
grant Lee a visa. The aides told him that it was because the Chinese would not like 
134 Greenhouse, "Aides to Clinton Say He Will Defy Beijing and Issue Visa to Taiwan's President". 
135 Ibid. 
136 Michael Dobbs, "Taiwan's Chief to Get Visa in Policy Shift", Washington Post, 23 May 1995, p. 
AlO. 
137 Jim Mann, "How Taipei Outwitted U.S. Policy". 
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it. Clinton then said: "The Chinese did many things I don't like". By then, the issue 
was over. 138 
Clinton finally decided to grant Lee a visa after Democratic senators 
complained to Clinton personally. On 18 May, Clinton held a meeting at the White 
House with a small group of moderate senators allied with the Democratic 
Leadership Council. The meeting was designed to discuss larger, more general issues 
other than Lee's visit. Once it began, however, Senator Charles S. Robb complained 
that the Administration was still refusing to grant Lee a visa to visit Cornell. 
According to Robb, the meeting helped Clinton overcome the "institutional inertia" 
of US foreign policy agencies seeking to block Lee's trip. By the end of the meeting, 
Clinton signalled he was ready to grant the Taiwan President a visa.139 
The next day, to signal the Administration's changed position, the State 
Department said Lee' application for a visa was "under consideration". 140 Three 
days later, on 22 May, the Clinton Administration changed the 16-year-old US 
policy of barring Taiwanese leaders from the United States and announced 
permission for Lee's groundbreaking private visit. 
The Clinton Administration's decision created crises in US relations with 
China and across the Taiwan Strait. After the decision, Beijing postponed its 
Defence Minister's visit to the United States, suspended missile control talks with 
the United States, postponed the July cross-strait talks and "indefinitely" recalled its 
ambassador to Washington. In July and August 1995, Beijing conducted ballistic 
missile tests into waters north of Taiwan in the East China Sea. In October 1995, it 
l38 A story told by a prominent China expert at the George Washington University whom I 
interviewed in May 1997. 
139 Jim Mann, "How Taipei Outwitted U.S. Policy". 
140 USJS, "State Department Report, Friday, May 19", 19 May 1995, File ID: POL502, Tracking no. 
392236. 
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staged a large-scale naval, ground and air landing operation exercise in the coastal 
areas of Fujian and Zhejiang. On 5 March 1996, Beijing announced it would stage 
guided-missile tests in the period 8-15 March. The missiles would splash down in 
two areas not far from two of Taiwan's major ports, Kaohsiung and Chilung. After 
launching the first three missiles on 8 March, Beijing on 9 March announced it 
would conduct live fire military exercises at the southern end of the Taiwan Strait in 
waters adjacent to mainland China from 12 to 20 March. The next day, the United 
States ordered aircraft carrier Independence and its task force closer to Taiwan to 
monitor tensions. The following day, the United States announced that a second 
force, aircraft carrier (Nimitz) and its battle group, was also heading for waters off 
Taiwan. On 15 March, Beijing announced that a new series of exercises would 
begin on 18 March at the northern end of the Taiwan Strait.141 
Angered at Beijing's missile tests and military exercises, Congress moved to 
reaffirm its commitment to supporting Taiwan. It passed a non-binding resolution 
expressing the sense of Congress that the United States was committed to the 
military stability of the Taiwan Strait and that US military forces should defend 
Taiwan. The resolution had 79 co-sponsors when introduced to the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, now renamed the Committee on International 
Relations, on 7 March.142 The resolution specifically stated: 
it is the sense of the Congress that ... the United States should maintain 
a naval presence sufficient to keep open the sea lanes in and near the 
Taiwan Strait ... and the United States ... should assist in defending 
141 For an analysis of the aftermath of Lee's visit, See Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy and 
Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power (Canberra: Strategic And Defence 
Studies Centre, the Australian National University, 1997). 
142 Congressional Record, 7 March 1996, p. H1985. 
them (people of Taiwan) against invasion, missile attack, or blockade 
by the People's Republic of China.143 
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Some members of Congress expressed their reservation over the resolution. 
Representative Lee Hamilton, ranking Democrat on the House Committee on 
International Relations, for example, pointed out that 
the resolution appears to push American policy further than it has ever 
gone before in a quarter of a century. It appears to increase the United 
States commitment to defend Taiwan . . . . It articulates policy in a 
different way than does the President. It could confuse the people in 
leadership of Taiwan, of China, and of our many friends in East Asia.144 
In the Senate, Senator J. Bennett Johnston, the only person to originally vote against 
Lee's visit, noted the resolution "misstates" the basis of US relations with China. 
"There is an intention in this body to shift ground to retreat from the Shanghai 
Communique, to go to a subtle recognition of Taiwan as an independent country". 145 
Despite their reservations, both Hamilton and Johnston voted for the 
resolution which passed the House 369-14 on 19 March. The Senate passed the 
resolution 97-3 two days later. But the Clinton Administration had pre-empted these 
Congressional moves by sending the two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan 
Strait. 
Conclusion 
Congress decisively shaped the first Clinton Administration's policy towards 
Taiwan. Clinton was not prepared to make substantial adjustments in Taiwan policy 
when he came to the White House. Instead, his administration intended to continue 
143 Congressional Record, 19 March 1996, p. H2342. 
144 Ibid., p. H2343. 
145 Congressional Record, 14 March 1996, p. S2080. 
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Taiwan policy set by previous administrations. Crucially, however, Clinton was not 
a strong president in foreign policy. He did not have a clear vision for China policy 
and consequently could not effectively resist Congressional pressure on the Taiwan 
issue. 
Congressional pressure regarding Taiwan policy was indeed extraordinarily 
high. On the issue of arms sales, however, the pressure was largely symbolic. 
Legislators mainly wanted to register their dissatisfaction with the Administration's 
Taiwan policy. While the resolutions they passed antagonised Beijing, the 
Administration distanced itself from Congress and Congress did not take any further 
actions. 
On the issue of high-level governmental contact, Congressional pressure was 
more than symbolic. It played a decisive role in Clinton's decision to grant Lee a 
visa. By the time Clinton made his decision, Congress was so assertive that it was 
not impossible for Congress to pass a binding resolution regarding Lee's visit. Had 
Clinton been determined not to grant the visa, he would certainly have had to pay a 
high political price in fighting off Congress and strong public opinion, much as 
George Bush had done on the issue of China's MFN. Obviously, Clinton was not 
determined. Hence the Administration's retreat and subsequent breakthrough in 
Taipei's diplomacy and dramatic setback in US-China relations. 
PART III 
Chapter 7 
Congressional Behaviour: Structural Explanations 
The chapters in Part II are largely descriptions of Congressional 
intervention in the US foreign policy-making process in four separate cases, with 
special attention given to structural factors: constituency, partisanship and 
committee. While descriptive analysis of the separate cases may give some 
indication of the influence of the three factors, such an analysis does not answer 
the crucial question: Under what circumstances and in what way do these factors 
come into play? Nor does description explain the relative weights of these 
factors or elaborate their relationship. This chapter draws together the findings in 
an effort to answer the above question. It addresses the proposition put forward 
at the outset of the thesis, namely "Among the three structural factors -
constituency, partisanship and committee - partisanship normally plays the 
most important role except on issues in which interests of constituency are 
heavily involved. Committee actions are largely determined by constituency and 
partisanship". 
Partisanship 
While reviewing US China policy from Tiananmen to the November 1992 
Presidential election, Richard C. Bush noted that "China became subject to the 
dynamics of divided government. A Democratic Congress, with support from 
some conservative Republicans, sought to use the China issue to embarrass a 
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Republican Administration for political gain". 1 Similarly, Arthur Hummel, 
former US envoy to Beijing, observed that US China policy since 1989 was 
shaped through an "irrational" partisan debate.2 
Partisanship was a major factor in George Bush's repeated victories over 
Congress. Although some Republicans joined the Democrats and wrote bills and 
amendments to condition or revoke China's MFN status, it was mainly 
Democrats who sponsored initiatives and pushed them forward. Republicans, 
especially those in the Senate, formed the basis for Bush's victory. Take for 
example the 23 July 1991 vote on US-China Act of 1991 which would have 
conditioned China's MFN status. Although Bush succeeded in persuading seven 
Democratic senators from farm states to cross party lines, other Democratic 
senators from farm states remained loyal to the party. More importantly, among 
21 states whose Senate seats were shared by both parties, 18 Republicans voted 
against the bill and 20 Democrats for it. 
Many Republicans voted for China's MFN status not because they agreed 
with Bush but because of partisanship. One such Republican was Senator Slade 
Gorton. Before the vote on the US-China Relations Act 1991, which was 
sponsored by Democratic Leader Senator George J. Mitchell, Gorton had several 
reasons to oppose MFN status for China. Firstly, Gorton had shown "a visceral 
antipathy for the communist regime in Beijing over the years". Secondly, Gorton 
was a strong supporter of Taiwan. Thirdly, Gorton had a long record of support 
1 Richard C. Bush, "Domestic Political Considerations That Shape U.S. Policy Toward China, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan" in David M. Lampton, et al. (eds.), United States and China Relations 
at a Crossroads (Lanham, MD and London: University of America, 1995), p. 149. 
2 Reuter News Service, "Hong Kong: Clinton Can Reassess China Ties, US Ex-Envoy Says", 
Reuter Business Briefing, 9 November 1992. 
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for legislation designed to promote human rights in China. He had said in 1990 
that "It seems to me very difficult to justify business as usual with as bloodthirsty 
a regime as that governing the People's Republic of China today". He was one 
of only eight Republicans who voted in early 1990 to override Bush's veto of 
legislation to protect Chinese students studying in the United States. Eighteen 
others who initially urged Bush to sign the bill changed their position to show 
Republican solidarity. On China's MFN status, Gorton said in 1991 that "Clearly 
giving them an unconditional extension last year did not seem to work". Finally, 
despite the free-trade leanings of Washington state and the fact that no state had a 
more vested interest in continued relations with China than Washington, 
opposing MFN for China was popular among voters. 3 
In the end, Gorton joined the majority of Republicans and voted against 
Mitchell's bill. Observers believe Gorton did not want to be viewed as an ally of 
Mitchell and the Democrats iftheir chief goal was to embarrass Bush.4 
Commenting on the strong partisan nature of the issue, a Democratic 
senator noted after the July 1991 Senate vote on the US-China Act of 1991 that 
"There's a tremendous amount of loyalty on the part of Republicans not wanting 
to embarrass the president". s 
At first glance, it seems partisanship had little influence on Taiwan policy 
under the Bush Administration. In fact, Congress as a whole was not very 
active on the issue in those years. It did not impose serious pressure on the Bush 
3 All quotations in this paragraph are from David S. Cloud, "Decision on China's MFN Trade 
Status ...... No Easy Call for Washington Senators", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 
(49:26, 29 June 1991), pp. 1738-1739. 
4 Ibid., p. 1739. 
5 David S. Cloud, "China MFN Vote Falls Short of Veto-Proof Margin", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (49:30, 27 July 1991), p. 2054. 
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Administration except regarding Taiwan's GATT application. Even in this case, 
it was Philip M. Crane, a Republican, who took the initiative and introduced an 
amendment which linked China's MFN status to Taiwan's participation in the 
GATT. The examination in Chapter 6 revealed that Republicans were more 
vocal and active in supporting Taiwan. More importantly, the examination also 
showed that Taiwan had strong bipartisan support on Capitol Hill and initiatives 
to change US Taiwan policy, such as Carla Hills' visit and the sale of 150 F-16s, 
were readily supported by members from both parties. 
One might argue, however, that the lack of Congressional action under 
the Bush Administration stems directly from partisanship. It is understood that 
Republicans are traditionally more supportive of Taiwan. Despite public 
statements, Republicans did not seriously challenge Taiwan policy during the 
Bush Administration. This might have been out of fear of embarrassing a 
Republican president. 
This argument is strengthened by a comparative analysis of the actions of 
Republicans under the two different administrations. While they did not 
seriously challenge Taiwan policy during the Bush Administration, Republicans 
were much more serious on the issue during the first Clinton Administration. 
Only a few months after Clinton entered the White House, Republican Senator 
Frank H. Murkowski introduced an amendment declaring that TRA "supersedes" 
the 1982 Shanghai communique. After the Honolulu event, it was Murkowski 
and another Republican senator, Hank Brown, who sent a letter to Lee Teng-hui, 
inviting him to visit their home states. Hank Brown also cosponsored the "visa-
for-Taiwanese-officials amendment". 
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The fact that Republicans took control over both the Senate and the 
House after the 1994 mid-term elections had a major impact on Taiwan policy. 
It further strengthened the hands of the Republicans. Although the demand to 
grant Lee a visa gained bipartisan support, it was mainly Republicans who 
pushed the move forward. Understandably, Republicans would not be concerned 
about embarrassing a Democratic president. In fact, to embarrass a Democratic 
president could be part of the motivation for some Republicans. 
However, partisanship may disappear under certain circumstances. It had 
little influence on the issue of China's MFN status during the first Clinton 
Administration. Shortly after the 1992 election in which Democrats controlled 
both the legislative and the executive branches, Arthur Hummel predicted that 
"The partisan factor is gone" as "No Democratic member of Congress wants to 
embarrass his own president". 6 
Indeed, in the first two years of the Administration, partisanship could 
hardly be noticed in the case of China's MFN status. Although Republicans like 
Representative Christopher Smith became more vocal and active during the 
Clinton Administration, it was Democrats, represented by Congresswoman 
Nancy Pelosi and Senator George J. Mitchell, who tried to pressure the Clinton 
Administration. Republican senators who had consistently supported Republican 
President George Bush largely continued their support of MFN for China during 
the Clinton Administration. In the House, support for China's MFN status 
became increasingly bipartisan in 1994. The 106 Representatives who sent a 
letter to Clinton urging him to take a broad view towards China policy 
6 Reuter News Service, "Hong Kong: Clinton Can Reassess China Ties, US Ex-Envoy Says", 
Reuter Business Briefing, 9 November 1992. 
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represented a bipartisan effort. By the time Republicans took control of both 
chambers, China' MFN status had already faded from the centre of US-China 
relations. 
More importantly, many Republican members in the House of 
Representatives who had opposed George Bush on the issue changed their minds 
and supported Bill Clinton. The vote of the United States-China Act of 1994 in 
August 1994 showed that a vast majority of Republicans in the House (125-46) 
supported Clinton's decision of delinking China's MFN status and its human 
rights record. A much smaller majority of Democrats (145-111) expressed their 
support. 
Constituency 
Constituency played a crucial role in both China's MFN and Taiwan 
issues because the two issues involved either strong economic interests or moral 
concern from many constituencies. On a number of occasions, constituency 
prevailed over partisanship. 
The most prominent example in which constituency out weighted 
partisanship occurred when seven Democratic senators from five farm states, led 
by Max Baucus from Montana, consistently crossed party lines and voted to 
support President Bush's decisions on China's MFN status. In fact, a key factor 
in Bush's repeated victories to maintain China's MFN status was the support of 
these seven Democratic senators. Bush needed 34 votes in the Senate to sustain 
his veto and he received 38 and 39 for his two vetoes respectively. Without the 
support of the seven Democrats, Bush's effort to sustain his vetoes would have 
failed. 
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Baucus became "a pivotal figure in a decidedly high-profile battle [over 
China's MFN status] between the administration and Senate Democratic 
leadership".7 Although Baucus "cast the first vote for Senator Mitchell as 
majority leader", he had chosen "politely, but firmly" to cross Mitchell and the 
rest of the Senate Democratic leadership on the issue. 8 Mitchell discussed MFN 
with Baucus, and concluded that "he and I disagree".9 
As Chairman of the Finance Subcommittee on International Trade, 
Baucus had been "a staunch free-trader and denouncer of protectionism".10 But 
that did not fully explain his position on China's MFN status. For much of his 
Senate career, Baucus worked "to protect and advance Montana's timber and 
agriculture interests". 11 Montana exported 70 per cent of its wheat to Pacific 
Rim countries and many farmers said denying MFN status to China would cause 
a collapse in wheat prices.12 
Republican Congressman Richard T. Schulze was another example of 
constituency prevailing over partisanship. In 1989, Schulze publicly opposed the 
Bush Administration's China policy and called for immediate revocation ofMFN 
status for China. In 1990, he sponsored amendments which would have 
cancelled China's eligibility for MFN status immediately or stiffened procedures 
for granting MFN to China the following year. 
7 Guy Gugliotta, "Baucus Pitted in Fight over China's MFN Status'', Washington Post, 14 July 
1991, p. A6. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
lO Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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Schulze was "a party loyalist" who had "worked his way up through the 
political ladder in a place where Republican machine politics is part of life".13 
Loyal to the Party as he might be, Schulze seemed more loyal to his 
constituency. It was observed: 
his [Schulze] politics is conservative more in the sense of being 
organically rooted in his community than in the sense of adhering 
strictly to free market or tradition-minded cultural standards. He is 
true to Pennsylvania's century-old protectionist tradition, introducing 
bills calling for reciprocity and fairness, mandating vigorous 
retaliation against countries that do not comply.14 
Although Schultz cited China's poor human rights record to support his 
call for revocation of China's MFN status, it is not difficult to find the influence 
of constituency politics. Kennett Square, located in Schulze's district and the 
centre of the US mushroom industry, had been hard hit by imports of cheap 
Chinese mushrooms. Schulze sought to curb the imports for years.15 
Another example in which constituency politics might well have 
transcended partisanship is that of Senator Larry Pressler, a Republican from the 
farm state of South Dakota. Pressler was famous for his assiduous defence of 
home-state interests. He was willing "to put local concerns ahead of party needs" 
and therefore "occasionally irritated his Republican colleagues but cemented his 
support in South Dakota". 16 Pressler once led a fight against stopping grain sales 
to the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan.17 In the early 1980s, in 
response to the Soviet invasion, President Carter imposed an embargo on US 
13 Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, Washington D.C.: 
National Journal, 1991), p. 1060. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Jon Healey, "GOP Takes the Reins of Power: Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (52:44, 12 November 1994), p. 3279. 
17 Barone and Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, p. 1135. 
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grain sales to the Soviet Union in 1979 and 1980. In the end, Soviet policy did 
not change and American farmers suffered a severe blow. The embargo 
contributed to a 5 per cent recession in the farm belt.18 
In the case of China, Pressler was not shy of admitting he was "beating 
the drums" for his own state when he called for renewal of MFN status. Along 
with many manufacturing and merchandising concerns, Pressler was concerned 
about his state's potential loss in wheat sales to China.19 
The relationship between constituency and partisanship is not necessarily 
a zero-sum game. Very often they strengthen, rather than weaken each other. 
Many Republicans cited the economic interests of their constituents to 
explain their support for China's MFN status. For example, Senator John H. 
Chafee noted that Hasbro, the world's largest toy company and located in his 
home state Rhode Island, had a big stake in trade with China. Similarly, 
Republican Senator Bob Packwood from Oregon noted that China was one of 
Oregon's largest export markets and that trade with China meant more exports, 
more jobs, and more income for Oregonians. 
It can be argued that Chafee's concern for the economic interests of his 
constituents might be position taking and an excuse for partisanship; it is unlikely 
Hasbro was important enough to determine a senator's position on China's MFN 
status. Nevertheless, constituency could have strengthened Chafee's and, 
perhaps, Packwood's partisan position. 
For some Republicans, concern could be genuine and constituency would 
have much strengthened partisan positions. Unlike Chafee and Packwood, 
18 Congressional Record, 21May1991, p. S6178. 
19 Ibid., 3 June 1991, pp. 86906-07. 
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House Republican leader Robert H. Michel's personal stake in maintaining 
China's MFN status was not hard to recognise. His determination to support 
MFN for China was based on his experience with US Soviet policy. In the early 
1980's, when the United States was criticising the Soviet Union's human rights 
policy, the US government prohibited Caterpillar Tractor Company, the single 
most important manufacturer in Michel's district, from exporting ditch diggers to 
the Soviet Union to be used in digging the Trans-Siberian natural gas pipeline. 
The Komatsu Company of Japan, Caterpillar's major world competitor, stepped 
in and picked up all the business for that pipeline. Caterpillar was squeezed out 
of the Soviet market and never regained its position there, a loss costing tens of 
thousands of US jobs in subsequent years. 2° For that, Michel almost lost his re-
election campaign in 1982.21 
Indeed, for Republicans from farm states, noticeably Republican senators 
from these states, it would be hard to tell whether constituency or partisanship 
had determined their consistent support for China's MFN status. These farm 
states had big economic interests in China, one of the largest importers of US 
wheat, buying as much as 20 per cent of total US wheat exports in some years. 
A telling example is Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole, who 
consistently supported President Bush and voted against attaching conditions to 
China's MFN status. There is no doubt that Dole's support for President Bush 
and for China's MFN status was partly due to partisanship. Equally importantly, 
20 US Congress, United States-China Trade Relations, Hearing, before the Subcommittee on Trade 
of Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives (1st Sess. 103rd Congress, 8 June 
1993), p.106. 
21 Congressional Record, 18 October 1990, p. H10511. 
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his home state of Kansas had a big stake in China trade.22 Kansas had been a 
leading US wheat producer and led US wheat exports to China in 1991. 
Dole's consideration of his home state's economic interests became 
apparent in September 1992 when China vowed to stop wheat purchases 
completely in retaliation for Bush's decision to allow the sale of F-16 fighters to 
Taiwan. Dole subsequently halted his all-out effort to support MFN for China 
and announced he might reverse his position and vote for the MFN restrictions 
unless Beijing agreed to resume buying US wheat. "If (the Chinese) want normal 
trade relations ... don't start telling some of us who've been your supporters 
you're going to sock us in the eye. Maybe some of us who've supported them ... 
these last two or three years will take a walk", Dole wamed.23 In his 25 
September 1992 letter to Chinese ambassador Zhu Qizhen, Dole warned: 
Let us be very clear. If your Government follows through on those 
recent threats and retaliate for our decision on F- l 6s for Taiwan by 
halting or reducing wheat purchases, the strongest argument we 
have been able to make on the Floor of the Senate for continuing 
MFN . . . goes into the trashcan. Candidly, under those 
circumstances, it will be extremely difficult for the President to 
muster the votes he will need to sustain a veto of legislation 
terminating or conditioning MFN.24 
After rece1vmg assurance from Chinese officials that their wheat purchases 
would continue, Dole stuck with Bush.25 
On the other hand, many of those who had been active m opposmg 
China's MFN status might also have been largely influenced by constituency. 
22 Kansas was a leading US wheat producer and led US wheat exports to China in 1991. See 
Congressional Record, 25 February 1992, p. S2172. 
23 Reuter News Service, "USA: US May Lose Some Money on Russia Credits - Dole", Reuter 
Business Briefing, 17 September 1992. 
24 Congressional Record, 1 October 1992, pp. S15920-21. 
25 Congress and the Nation, "Trade: 1991-92 Chronology" (Vol. VIII, 1989-1992), p.192. 
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A prominent figure in Congressional efforts to condition China's MFN 
status was Representative Donald J. Pease. Pease was a leading Democrat in the 
Ways and Means Committee. But equally important, he was from a constituency 
that felt "beleaguered by foreign imports". 26 
The most prominent figure in Congressional efforts during the two 
administrations to condition or revoke China's MFN status was Congresswoman 
Nancy Pelosi. Given the special role Pelosi played on the issue, it is worthwhile 
to examine her behaviour in more detail. 
Pelosi's stance on the issue actually ran counter to the economic interests 
of her district in San Francisco. Few cities across the United States might have 
more to lose from a US-China trade war than San Francisco. Most economists 
agreed that China trade presented San Francisco with an enormous opportunity. 
"China is the future for San Francisco", said a San Francisco city official in 1994: 
San Francisco as a gateway to the Pacific Rim does not happen unless 
we have the ability to freely exchange technology and goods with 
China. If we break off MFN, or have a trade war with China, I 
believe the most severely impacted city in the United States will be 
San Francisco.27 
Pelosi was in a dilemma. On the one hand, she acknowledged that it was 
difficult for her to support moves against China's MFN status because she 
represented an area which benefited from trade with China.28 On the other hand, 
she tried to play down the potential damage San Francisco might suffer in a US-
China trade war. Pelosi "flatly" rejected the notion she was jeopardising the 
economic well-being of her district. She argued that with or without MFN status, 
26 Barone and Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, p. 983. 
27 Marc Sandalow, "Pelosi's High-Stakes Stance on China", San Francisco Chronicle, 9 May 
1994, pp. Al, A13. 
28 Congressional Record, 3 March 1992, p. H915. 
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"we will have a brilliant future with China- economically, politically, culturally 
and diplomatically".29 She said revocation of MFN would only make a small 
dent in US-China relations.30 
Pelosi's constituency consisted of 30 per cent Asian-Americans.31 This 
may partly explain her special interest in China. But an interesting fact is that the 
Chinese in San Francisco, many of whom had business of their own in China, 
might be among the strongest defenders ofMFN for China. A poll conducted by 
a Chinese-language newspaper found that 79 percent of its readers in the San 
Francisco Bay Area, mainly immigrants from Hong Kong and southern China, 
were in favour of renewing MFN for China without conditions. 32 
Despite these conflicting facts, it is still not hard to see the influence of 
constituency politics in Pelosi's active role in China policy. 
Firstly, the Chinese community was not a monolith and many in it were 
solidly behind Pelosi. Even those who wanted to see renewal of China's MFN 
status might still have supported Pelosi's stance on human rights. Pelosi's 
Congressional identity was forged by the Tiananmen Square crackdown. She 
had not been active on China policy before and immediately after the crackdown. 
It was under pressure that she later started to act and subsequently became deeply 
involved in China policy. 
The story began not long after the Tiananmen Square crackdown. Having 
noticed that Pelosi had actively supported Central American refugees, her 
29 Sandalow, "Pelosi's High-Stakes Stance on China". 
30 Ibid. 
3l Marilyn Greene, "Democrat Wants Reform Tied to China Trade Deal", USA Today, 12 June 
1991, p. 2A. Nancy Pelosi cited the figure herself in 1994. See Congressional Record, 21 March 
1994, p. Hl 773. 
32 Sandalow, "Pelosi's High-Stakes Stance on China". 
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Chinese constituents called on her to do something to help Chinese students in 
the United States. Members of Pelosi's staff contacted immigration lawyers with 
whom they had worked on the issue of Central American refugees and wrote the 
Chinese Emergency Immigration Act to give Chinese students protective 
immigration status. After learning the content of the bill, Chinese students 
became "an unbelievable effective lobby". Over a matter of days, the bill gained 
250 cosponsors.33 
Secondly, Pelosi's firm stance in criticising China's human rights 
violations received strongest support from San Francisco liberals. It was 
believed the liberals "have often endorsed idealistic causes even if they come at 
the expense of the business community".34 
Finally, "The human rights issue gave some members of Congress an 
important opportunity for national attention".35 Nancy Pelosi was an outstanding 
example. 
Pelosi was elected to the House only in 1987. She attracted national 
attention in her first full term by sponsoring the Chinese immigration act and by 
opposing President Bush on China's MFN. By the time this issue was settled, 
she had been appointed chairperson of a new informal Congressional committee 
on China policy, the Congressional Working Group on China. In the following 
years, Pelosi became the most vocal Congressional advocate for conditioning 
China's MFN status. China's MFN status defined Pelosi "in the minds of the 
33 David Zweig, "Sino-American Relations and Human Rights: June 4 and the Changing Nature 
of a Bilateral Relationship" in William T. Tow (ed.), Building Sino-American Relations: An 
analysis for the 1990s (New York: Parago House, 1991), p. 76. 
34 Sandalow, "Pelosi's High-Stakes Stance on China". 
35 Zweig, "Sino-American Relations and Human Rights", p. 77. 
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national media and many of her colleagues", and it earned her "countless 
appearances on talk shows and numerous references in the pages of national 
newspapers".36 By 1992, Pelosi had become so prominent that she co-chaired the 
Democratic Party's Platform Committee. 
If Nancy Pelosi found a dilemma regarding China's MFN status, some of 
other Congressional members were in a much more difficult position. One good 
example was Democratic Senator Brock Adams of Washington state in 1991. 
Understandably, it is difficult for members of Congress to make decisions 
when their constituents are divided and when their policy preferences do not 
necessarily represent the majority of their constituents. Brock Adams was in 
such a situation. 37 
On the one hand, no state had a more vested interest in continued 
relations with China than Washington, which did $3.1 billion worth of trade with 
China in 1990. The Boeing Company, a major pillar of the state's business 
community, counts China among their leading foreign customers. China had 
threatened to retaliate by ordering no more planes from Boeing, a potential loss 
to the company of billions of dollars. 
Personally, Adams had close contacts with China. His interest in China 
began in the 1970s when he, as Secretary of Transportation in the Carter 
Administration, worked to normalise US-China relations. Later, while he was a 
Washington lawyer, one of his clients was a state-run Chinese shipping company. 
36 Sandalow, "Pelosi's High-Stakes Stance on China". 
37 The following five paragraphs are largely drawn from David S. Cloud, "Decision on China's 
MFN Trade Status ...... No Easy Call for Washington Senators", Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report (49:26, 29 June 1991), pp. 1738-1739. 
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Although Adams was a harsh critic of China's human rights abuses, he 
was one of the few Congressional Democrats sympathetic to Bush's arguments 
that revoking MFN was the wrong tool. "We must recongnize the significant and 
negative repercussions MFN cutoff would have on the Chinese people", Adams 
said in a 1990 letter to a Washington business group. 38 
On the other hand, Washington is a state "where issues of trade, 
communism and human rights have intertwined for many years". 39 It is true that 
the two legendary senators from the state, Senator Warren G. Magnuson (1944-
81) and Henry M. Jackson (1953-83) were known as the "senators from Boeing" 
for their tireless attention to the interests of the state's most lucrative export -
aircraft. It is equally true that both Magnuson and Jackson backed a stridently 
anti-Communist foreign policy. The very law which forced US presidents to 
return to Congress each year to renew China's MFN status, the Jackson-Yanik 
amendment, was co-authored by Jackson and Representative Charles A. Vanik. 
On the issue of China's MFN status, although many blue-collar workers 
would suffer ifMFN was cut off, the Washington State Labor Council, an arm of 
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO), itself opposed to China's MFN status, pushed Adams to vote against 
Bush. It was observed that support from organised labour in this state of heavily 
unionised blue-collar workers would be crucial to Adams, who was considered 
the most vulnerable Democrat in the Senate. In 1989, Adams received a perfect 
score from the AFL-CIO. In 1990, his support for labour's position on 
legislation dipped to 78 percent. The AFL-CIO therefore intensified its lobbying 
38 Ibid., p. 1738. 
39 Ibid. 
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effort and pressure on Adams. Not long before the vote on the US-China 
Relations Act of 1991, a bill conditioning China's MFN status, union officials 
said Adams thought they were his main constituency. And indeed, Adams voted 
for the bill. 
The influence of constituency politics was reinforced after the 1992 
election when partisanship became less prominent after Democrats won control 
of both Congress and the White House. Weaker partisanship and stronger 
constituency politics contributed to weaken Congressional challenges to the 
Clinton Administration's decision to delink China's MFN status and human 
rights in May 1994. After the 1992 election, more and more members of 
Congress started to weigh the impact of revoking China's MFN status on the 
interests of their constituencies. This became more imperative in mid-1994; in 
the past the Democratic Congress could score points for high-mindedness by 
demanding MFN withdrawal, confident that Republican president George Bush 
would veto the idea. Pelosi, an advocate of revoking China's MFN status, 
conceded in 1994 she did not want MFN revoked. 
In the case of Congressional activism in US policy towards Taiwan, 
constituency politics was influential in the sense that members of Congress saw 
little electoral risk in supporting closer ties between Washington and Taipei. In 
fact, they might well benefit from their support. 
The relationship between constituency and partisanship on the Taiwan 
issue was less clear. There was neither clear sign of partisanship nor visible 
conflict of constituents' interests. Relatively speaking, constituency was more 
important. 
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The importance of constituency lies in the fact that for most freshmen 
elected to the House of Representatives after the Cold War, constituents were 
more important than think tank experts in shaping foreign policy views. 40 Strong 
Congressional support for Taiwan reflected public sympathy for Taiwan. 
American public opinion regarding Taiwan was shaped by historic US-
Taiwan relations, the close US-Taiwan economic relationship, Taiwan's political 
liberalisation, and Taiwan's lobbying efforts. Historically, Taiwan's ruling 
Kuomintang (KMT) had been a staunch ally of the United States. Economically, 
Taiwan was a leading trade partner and prominent investor in the United States. 
Politically, Taiwan had made substantial progress in its political liberalisation 
since the 1980s. In its lobbying efforts, Taiwan paid attention not only to 
Congress, but also to states and the American public in general. Taiwan had 
sisterhood relationships with most states. 
Supportive of Taiwan as they might be, members of Congress protected 
the interests of their constituents first. When constituent interests conflicted with 
Taiwan's interests, Congressional members postured against Taiwan. A good 
example was the issue of driftnet fishing. Members of Congress from states or 
districts whose economy was hurt by driftnet fishing were most active on the 
issue. These states and districts included Alaska, Washington, Oregon, 
California and America Samoa. The most telling examples were the two 
Republican senators from Alaska, Ted Stevens and Frank Murkowski. Both were 
strong supporters of Taiwan. Yet it was Stevens who sponsored a potentially 
4° Carroll J. Doherty, "The Road Less Traveled'', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (54:5, 
3 February 1996), p. 307. 
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damaging bill to impose sanctions on Taiwan for its driftnet fishing; Murkowski 
supported the bill. 
Given that Stevens was a firm supporter of Taiwan, the bill he introduced 
might have been legislative chaff, intended solely to placate insistent 
constituents, or a non-serious bill.41 Most likely, Stevens and Murkowski were 
warning Taiwan without intending to push the bill forward. 
The economic interests of their constituents were one of the reasons 
Stevens and Murkowski strongly supported closer relations between Washington 
and Taipei. Alaska's economic interests in Taiwan were clearly demonstrated 
when Alaska sent a 29-person delegation to Taiwan in December 1994 to attend a 
business conference sponsored by the Republic of China (Taiwan)-USA 
Economic Council. Before that, in July 1994, the Alaska State Legislature 
adopted a joint resolution stating "the Republic of China on Taiwan deserves to 
be allowed full membership in the United Nations".42 
Constituency politics has always influenced Congressional support for 
arms sales to Taiwan. US economic interests provided a powerful argument for 
arms sales to Taiwan. According to testimony submitted by the American 
League for Exporters and Security Assistance to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, it was estimated that defence sales lost to the Taiwan defence sales 
policy could potentially reach $20 billion in revenue and cost 456,000 jobs.43 
41 Regarding legislative chaff, one senator stated, "You never expect those bills to go anywhere. 
They are just a printed piece of paper to send out to the constituents to mollify them. You 
introduce a bill and that is the end of it". [Randall B. Ripley, Power in the Senate (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1969), p. 173.] According to Oleszek, most bill introductions are simply attempts 
to calm constituents or claim credit rather than efforts to enact policies. Walter J. Oleszek, 
Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process, 3rd ed., (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly Press, 1984), p. 90. 
42 Congressional Record, 14 July 1994, p. S903 l. 
43 Congressional Record, 28 September 1994, p. S13587. 
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In the specific case of the sale ofF-16s, although the sale had wide-spread 
support on Capitol Hill, it was the members from warplane-producing areas such 
as Texas who were most active. Coincidentally, while the final decision about 
the sale was being made, Taiwan sent a "Buy American" mission to purchase US 
wheat worth about $100 million from seven states. The visit of Senator Max 
Baucus to Taiwan just before the mission left Taiwan for the United States might 
not have been coincident. Baucus' home state of Montana was one of these 
seven states. During his visit, Baucus visited Lee Teng-hui and agreed to make 
Taiwan's need for sophisticated arms better known to the US Congress. 
Constituency also played its role in Lee's visit, in the sense that to vote 
for Lee's visit would not have had any adverse impact on the re-election efforts 
of members of Congress. Congressional members' enthusiasm for Lee's visit 
was partly fanned by overwhelmingly sympathetic public opinion for Taiwan. 
The US mass media almost unanimously supported the trip. Unlike the issue of 
China's MFN status, Americans saw no threat to any practical American interests 
in Lee's visit. For members of Congress, to vote for Lee's visit might well have 
benefits, including campaign contributions and votes of blocs of Taiwanese-
Americans. 
A final point regarding constituency: While it is right to emphasise 
economic interests of constituency as a determinant of Congressional members' 
foreign policy decisions, it is important to note the American people will 
sometimes make sacrifices for moral issues. After watching the bloody 
crackdown on the students-led movement in Beijing, many voters might well 
have been ready to support sanctions against China at the cost of their own 
economic interests. This partly explains why so many members of Congress 
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voted against unconditional renewal of China's MFN status. This point therefore 
further strengthens the argument about constituency. 
Committees 
The study about the relationship between committee actions and chamber 
voting results on China's MFN status and Taiwan policy shows that committee 
actions are central to Congressional actions. This is not only because measures 
normally need the approval of the relevant committee to reach the floor, but also 
because strong support of the relevant committee is crucial for a measure to be 
passed on the floor. 
By using its virtual power of life and death over bills, the committees 
decide which issues go to the floor and when. On the issue of China's MFN 
status, the two committees with jurisdiction, namely the House Ways and Means 
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, were initially slow to act. 
In June 1989, shortly after the Tiananrnen Square crackdown, the first 
two bills revoking China's MFN status were introduced to the Senate Finance 
Committee by Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Alan Cranston, 
respectively. The committee, however, did not take up the bills. Congress' 
major efforts were to impose broad sanctions on China. Without the support of 
the committee, the two bills and other similar bills could not reach the floor. 
In July 1990, the House Ways and Means Committee accepted the Pease 
bill conditioning China's MFN status. The committee turned back three 
amendments which would have cancelled China's eligibility for MFN status 
immediately or stiffened the procedures for granting MFN to China the next 
year. 
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At the same time, the Senate Finance Committee did not move on the 
issue except to hold a full committee hearing in late June. Most committee 
members doubted the efficacy of cutting off MFN for China. Committee 
chairman Lloyd Bentsen was also reserved about sanctions against China. As a 
result, the Senate did not have a vote on China's MFN status in 1990. 
When bills did reach the floor, the voting results closely followed 
committee votes. In 1991, the House Ways and Means Committee passed 
several amendments toughening the US-China Act of 1991 which would 
condition China's MFN status. The committee even approved a resolution 
disapproving of China's MFN status. Reflecting changes in the committee, the 
House passed the US-China Act of 1991 by a vote well above the two-thirds 
majority needed to override the veto. 
Unlike the House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance 
Committee largely maintained its position in 1991. It reported its version of the 
US-China Act of 1991. But noticeably, the committee was divided in reporting 
the bill. The vote was 11-9 along party lines. Equally important, the bill did not 
have the endorsement of the committee. It was reported without 
recommendation. The committee also unfavourably reported a resolution to 
revoke China's MFN status by voice vote. The Senate later failed to get the two-
thirds majority for the China Act. 
There was a similar story in 1992. The Ways and Means Committee 
approved the United States-China Act of 1992 to condition China's MFN status. 
The House passed the bill by a vote well above the two-thirds majority. But the 
Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee unfavourably 
reported to the full committee a bill disapproving China's MFN status. The 
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House later passed the bill by a vote which would not be able to override a 
Presidential veto. 
Again, the Senate Finance Committee reported its United States-China 
Act of 1992 by a party-line vote and without recommendation. The Senate later 
passed the bill by a voice vote. It is unlikely the Senate would have had two-
thirds majority for the bill if a roll-call vote had been conducted. 
During the first two years of the first Clinton Administration, the two 
Democrat-controlled committees were generally supportive of the 
Administration's policies on the issue. In 1993, before Clinton issued the 
Executive Order, there were few committee actions regarding the issue. After 
Clinton issued the Order, the Committee on Ways and Means voted 35 to 2 to 
adversely report Solomon's bill revoking China's MFN status. The committee 
reported the bill only because the sponsor could demand a floor vote whether or 
not the committee reported the measure. The bill subsequently failed to pass the 
House with a vote of 105-318. 
In June 1994, after the Clinton Administration delinked China's MFN 
and human rights, Representative Solomon sponsored a bill to overturn Clinton's 
decision. The Ways and Means Committee supported Clinton by voting 
overwhelmingly against the Solomon bill. As they were prevented from killing 
the legislation, committee members voted 31-6 to send it to the House floor with 
an unfavourable recommendation. The House subsequently rejected the bill 75-
356. 
Committee inaction was one major reason for ineffective Congressional 
pressure in connection with Taiwan policy under the Bush Administration. 
Committees were relatively active on the issue of Taiwan's GATT application, 
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the most noticeable and successful Congressional effort during the Bush 
Administration. In July 1990, the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on 
Trade barely passed an amendment requiring Beijing drop its opposition to 
Taiwan joining the GATT for the renewal of its MFN status. The amendment 
won more support in 1991 and the Bush Administration subsequently agreed to 
support Taiwan's GATT bid. Apart from the GATT issue, there was no 
effective committee action regarding Taiwan policy. As examined in Chapter 5, 
only a few Congressional members raised the issue. The House Foreign Affairs 
Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were inactive and often 
divided in challenging Taiwan policy. 
In the two major policy adjustments during the Bush Administration, 
namely Carla Hills' visit and the sale of F-16 jet fighters, there was an obvious 
lack of committee action. Despite individual calls for more official contacts, no 
measure was introduced in Congress during that period. Neither the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee nor Senate Foreign Relations Committee acted on the 
issue. It was a similar story in the case of F-16 sales. 
The fact that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did not play an 
active and important role in both China's MFN status and US Taiwan policy 
during the Bush Administration was in accordance with the "widespread image 
of Foreign Relations as a committee adrift".44 Committee Chairman Claiborne 
Pell was criticised as an ineffective leader and the committee's stature had 
slipped since he took chair in 1987.45 It was observed in 1994 that despite the 
44 Congressional Quarterly, Players, Politics and Turf of the 103rd Congress (5 March 1994, 
Supplement to 52:9 of Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report), p. 32. 
45 Janet Hook, "Senate Changes Affect Key Economic Panels", Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report (46:46, 12 November 1988), p. 3257. Phil Kuntz, "Organization of the New Senate Will 
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profound changes sweeping the world after Communism's demise, the panel had 
not played a leading role in setting an agenda for a post-Cold War foreign 
policy.46 
The committee's performance regarding US Taiwan policy during the 
first Clinton Administration might have changed that image to some extent. In 
striking contrast to their performance during the Bush Administration, the House 
Foreign Affairs (International Relations) Committee and Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee were assertive and active in challenging Taiwan policy 
during the first Clinton Administration. 
The relationship between committee actions and Congressional actions 
on the Taiwan issue was similar to that on China's MFN status. In the first year 
of the first Clinton Administration, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
accepted, 20 to 0, Senator Frank H. Murkowski's amendment declaring that the 
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) "supersedes" the 1982 Shanghai communique 
concerning US arms sales to Taiwan. A watered-down version of the 
amendment later passed Congress. In May 1994, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee unanimously adopted a resolution reaffirming the sense of Congress 
that the United States should support Taiwan's participation in the United 
Nations and that the United States should be open to Cabinet-level exchanges 
with Taiwan. The Senate subsequently adopted the resolution by voice vote. 
Reflecting the strong support of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
for the "visa-for-Taiwanese-officials amendment", the Senate approved the 
Look Like the Old One'', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (50:44, 7 November 1992), p. 
3568, James M. Lindsay, Congress and The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy (Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 55. 
46 Lindsay, Congress and The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 55. 
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amendment by a vote of 94-0. The amendment was originally sponsored by 
Senators Hank Brown and Paul Simon, both Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee members. The measure was strongly supported by influential 
committee members, including committee chairman Senator Claiborne Pell, the 
ranking member Senator Jesse Helms and Senators Frank H. Murkowski and 
Charles Robb. 
The two committees also greatly strengthened Congressional pressure 
regarding Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States. Eleven senators on the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee cosponsored the resolution urging Clinton 
to grant Lee a visa and the Committee unanimously approved the resolution. In 
the House, the International Relations Committee strongly supported a similar 
resolution. With the extraordinary support of the two committees, resolutions 
supporting Lee's visit passed the House 396-0 and the Senate 97-1. 
The influence of committee as a structural factor also rests in the fact 
that, for members, the effectiveness of their committee work largely decides 
their opportunity to receive local or national attention. The case studies found 
that leadership on both sides of a debate were normally members of relevant 
committees. On China's MFN status, Representatives Donald Pease sat on the 
Ways and Means' Subcommittee on Trade, Representative Christopher Smith on 
the Human Rights and International Operations Subcommittee of the Foreign 
Affairs (International Relations) Committee, and Senators Mitchell and Baucus 
on Finance's Subcommittee on International Trade. On the Taiwan issue, 
Senators Murkowski, Pell, Helms, Brown, Simon were all from the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. One might point out that Nancy Pelosi was on 
neither Ways and Means Committee nor Foreign Affairs (International 
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Relations) Committee. Still, she headed an informal Congressional committee 
on China policy, the Congressional Working Group on China. 
Furthermore, committee members usually served as cue-givers to other 
members. Members of Congress "have more than a fulltime job."47 While most 
Congressmen specialise in one area or another, "they cannot be expert, or even 
well informed, about most issues on which they vote. "48 After conducting case 
studies, Crabb and Holt found that: 
only a minority of legislators has shown any real desire to receive 
and to assimilate detailed information about the activities of 
intelligence agencies-although legislators are legally entitled to it. 
Similarly, few legislators are inclined to read and digest 
voluminous reports from executive officials regarding human rights 
problems in more than 160 independent nations.49 
For this reason, when legislators vote on issues about which they have no 
particular expertise, they "look to peers they regard as informed and like-
minded, or support colleagues who will return the favor on other issues, or 
support the interest group whose feelings seem most intense or whose 
spokesmen first win their commitment."50 This is especially the case in foreign 
affairs "where distance and secrecy limit regular access to some information."51 
No wonder a congressman said that "Congress is a collection of 
committees that come together in a Chamber periodically to approve one 
another's actions". 52 
47 Graham Allison and Peter Szanton, Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection 
(New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 106. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and 
Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1992), p. 290. 
50 Allison and Szanton, Remaking Foreign Policy, p. 106. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Clem Miller (ed.), Member of the House: Letters of a Congressman, with additional text by 
John W. Baker, (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1962), p. 110. 
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Despite their central role in Congressional actions, committees do not 
function in a vacuum. They consist of individual members and these members 
are subjected to the influence of various factors. As a result, committee actions 
may largely be determined by the other two structural factors, namely 
partisanship and constituency. 
Sponsors of bills can be motivated by either constituency politics or 
partisanship or both. For example, Representative Donald Pease, a Democrat, 
came from a constituency that suffered from foreign imports and Senator George 
J. Mitchel was a "more partisan leader" than his predecessor.53 Nancy Pelosi was 
a champion of human rights in China and became a national figure on China 
policy. 
Once a bill is introduced, it is subjected to the influences of constituency 
and partisanship during committee deliberations. 
Strong partisanship existed even in the Senate Finance Committee which 
"has a history of bipartisanship".54 In June 1991, the Committee reported the 
Senate version of the US-China Act of 1991, sponsored by George Mitchell, to 
the floor with a strict party-line vote. Although several committee Republicans 
had previously expressed doubts about Bush's position, not one voted for the bill. 
They dismissed the bill as an effort to embarrass Bush. Even Max Baucus joined 
in the party-line vote to send the bill to the floor, although he balked at giving the 
bill a favourable recommendation. Had he voted no, the bill would have died on 
a tie vote. This party-line vote was repeated in 1992. 
53 Barone and Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics, p. 531. 
54 Alissa J. Rubin, "GOP Takes the Reins of Power: Senate Committee on Finance'', 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (52:44, 12 November 1994), p. 3282. 
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Partisanship was also evident in the House Ways and Means Committee. 
Although most Republican members were ready to support the House version of 
US-China Act of 1991 sponsored by Nancy Pelosi, they were against tough 
conditions. The committee Democrats, however, passed several amendments 
toughening the bill. Voting on an amendment sponsored by Republican Bill 
Archer also revealed strong partisanship in committee. Archer proposed giving 
Bush wide discretion to decide whether to continue MFN in 1992. All but two 
of the 13 committee Republicans voted for the amendment. Among the 15 
committee Democrats, however, only two joined the Republicans. 
As mentioned at the outset of this thesis, other factors may also influence 
members of Congress in foreign policy. This will be discussed further in the 
next chapter. 
Conclusion 
Evidence suggests partisanship was more influential than constituency on 
China's MFN status during the Bush Administration. Although the seven 
Democratic senators from farm states played a key role in sustaining Bush's 
vetoes over bills conditioning China's MFN status, it was the Republicans who 
formed the basis for Bush's victory. This was highlighted by the fact that in the 
23 July 1991 vote on the US-China Act of 1991, among 21 states whose Senate 
seats were shared by both parties, 18 Republicans voted against the bill and 20 
Democrats for it. 
It could be argued that partisanship influenced Congressional actions on 
Taiwan policy to a considerable degree although it was not a key factor. While 
Republicans largely deferred to President George Bush, they initiated a series 
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challenges to Taiwan policy during the first Bill Clinton Administration. The 
Republicans were partly motivated, or did not feel restrained, by a desire to 
embarrass a Democratic president. 
Partisanship played little role in China's MFN status during the first two 
years of Clinton's first term when Democrats controlled both Congress and the 
White House. Most Republicans did not make the status an issue in 1994 when 
Clinton decided to delink the status and human rights. 
Constituency played a prominent role in both China's MFN status and 
the Taiwan issue during this period, mainly because the two issues involved 
either strong economic interests or moral concerns of many constituencies. This 
supports the proposition that constituency plays a more important role on issues 
where the interests of constituencies are deeply involved. Congress' deep 
division regarding China's MFN status was, to a considerable degree, rooted in 
the economic interests of many constituents. The extraordinary solidarity of 
Congressional support for Taiwan in President Clinton's first term was partly 
because that members of Congress saw no electoral incentives or restraints not to 
support Taiwan. 
The relationship between partisanship and constituency is not necessarily 
contradictory. They may strengthen rather than weaken each other. The 
decision-making behaviour of a number of Congressional members supported 
this argument. Representative Robert H. Michel and Senator Bob Dole, 
Republican leader of the House and the Senate respectively, were determined to 
support MFN for China. The determination was rooted in not only partisanship 
but also the benefits of their constituencies. 
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The importance of committees was clearly demonstrated by the close 
relationship between the level of committee support and floor voting results: 
when committees were active and united on a bill, the bill would normally be 
passed on the floor. But committee actions can be strongly influenced by 
constituency and partisanship because committee members are subjected to the 
influence of these two factors. This was demonstrated in voting results of the 
Senate Finance Committee on US-China Act of 1991 and US-China Act of 1992. 
Chapter 8 
The Role of Congress: Beyond the Structural Explanations 
This thesis initially put aside ideology and interest groups, two most 
important influences on Congressional behaviour identified in the literature, in 
order to concentrate on the three structural aspects. These aspects previously had 
not been systematically analysed. As was expected, these structural factors could 
not satisfactorily explain all aspects of Congressional behaviour. For example, 
why did some Republican senators, whose constituencies were not adversely 
affected by US trade with China, consistently vote against Bush's decision on 
China's MFN status when partisanship suggests they should have voted for Bush. 
Similarly, why did most Republicans support Clinton's positive approach to 
China's MFN status since 1994 rather than make it a partisan issue? Structural 
factors certainly do not account for the most successful example of Congressional 
intervention in China policy against the wishes of the administration in the eight 
years studied: the case of the visit by the Taiwan President, Lee Teng-hui. 
This chapter returns to those non-structural influences to place the analysis 
m a broader policy-making context, with the main aim of making some 
predictions about future Congressional influence on foreign policy in general, and 
on China policy in particular. In looking briefly at ideology and interest groups, 
the chapter offers tentative conclusions on how influential the structural factors 
have been relative to the non-structural. The chapter employs the example of 
Lee's visit to demonstrate the relative weights of structural and non-structural 
factors in a certain case. It argues that non-structural factors, especially ideology 
and Presidential leadership, played a key role in the Lee visit. 
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Two Non-structural Factors: Ideology and Interest Groups 
Ideology and interest groups are destined to play a prominent role in the 
struggle over China policy between Congress and the Executive for two reasons. 
Firstly, in the eyes of American leaders and public opinion, what happened on 4 
June 1989 at Tiananmen Square was simply the cruel crackdown of a democratic 
movement by the authoritarian regime in Beijing; for that Beijing should be 
punished. I US public opinion reacted dramatically to the crackdown. "The 
romantic view that China was 'facing West' had been rudely smashed; and 
American opinion swung round abruptly", the Economist observed.2 
The crackdown sharply contrasted with drastic changes in Eastern Europe 
and, perhaps more importantly, political liberalisation in Taiwan. It dashed the 
hopes of many Congressional members that China would deepen its political 
reform. These members subsequently demanded tough sanctions against China, 
partly in the hope of bringing down its "repressive regime". 
Secondly, with the end of the Cold War, China's strategic importance to 
the United States declined. Also, in the post-Cold War era, domestic politics 
plays a more important role in making US foreign policy. China policy is no 
exception. 
Ideology 
Ideology was perhaps the most powerful factor influencing US policy 
towards China in the 1950s and 1960s. It surrendered its prominence to strategic 
1 See David Zweig, "Sino-American Relations and Human Rights: June 4 and the Changing Nature 
of a Bilateral Relationship" in William T. Tow (ed.), Building Sino-American Relations: An 
Analysis for the 1990s (New York: Parago House, 1991), pp. 57-92. 
2 The Economist, "How America Sees China", 25 October 1997, p. 22. 
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considerations with Nixon's visit to China in 1972. But the Tiananmen Square 
crackdown and the end of the Cold War restored ideology to prominence, although 
of less importance than in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The recovered influence of ideology on members of Congress was 
demonstrated in several voting results on both China's MFN status and the Taiwan 
ISsue. For example, while a majority of Republican senators voted for China's 
MFN status, about 10 conservatives, led by Jesse Helms, consistently voted 
against MFN for China. These Republicans were more vehemently opposed to 
renewing China's MFN status than many Democrats. 
Ideology played a more important role in Taiwan policy. As one analyst 
observed, strong support for Taiwan partly reflected "the enduring strength of anti-
communism in the unsettled post-Cold War era".3 In March 1996, when the 
House was considering a resolution regarding US defence of Taiwan, 
Representative Gerald B. H. Solomon, a combat veteran of the Korean conflict, 
noted "It gets emotional. The Republic of China on Taiwan was a bastion against 
international communism. "4 
Ideology is often integrated into some structural factors. For instance, 
while we can argue that partisanship played an important role in Republican 
senators' consistent support for Bush on China's MFN status, this position had 
much to do with ideology. The argument is that the Republican party has a "free-
trade ethos"s and a "historical commitment to free trade".6 Table 8.1 shows that 
3 Carroll J. Doherty, "Lawmakers Press White House for Firm Defense of Taiwan", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (54:11, 16 March 1996), p. 712. 
4 Ibid. 
5 David S. Cloud, "GOP Takes the Reins of Power: House Rules Committee", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (52:44, 12 November 1994), p. 3266. 
6 Carroll J. Doherty, "U.S. Agonizes over China Policy: Engagement or Confrontation?", 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (55:17, 26 April 1997), p. 971. 
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Republicans are more pro-business and conservative than 
While the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
lS largest group, Chamber of Commerce represents 
many business groups. Americans for Democratic Action is a liberal organisation 
and American Conservative Union (ACU) is conservative as the name suggests. 
Table 8.1 
Party Scores 
Average scores for members of each party each chamber 
in 1990, as computed by four interest groups 
AFL-CIO 
Democrats 
Republicans 
Chamber of Commerce 
Democrats 
Republicans 
House 
82% 
17 
34 
75 
Americans for Democratic Action 
Senate 
71% 
31 
26 
Democrats 71 72 
Republicans 19 20 
American Conservative 
Democrats 
Republicans 
20 
73 
20 
75 
Source: Paul Nyhan, "Interest Groups Count Heads, Take Names in 
Survey: There were lots of tests for business and labor but relatively 
few ideological confrontations", Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report (49:13, 30 March 1991), p.789. 
In some cases, a lawmaker's ideology preference for revoking or 
conditioning China's MFN status might coincide with the economic interests of 
his/her constituents. A good example is Senator Jesse Helms. Helms introduced 
and consistently supported bills revoking or conditioning China's MFN status. His 
home state of North Carolina had been particularly affected by a surge in textile 
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imports from China; revoking China's MFN status would benefit his constituents 
in this regard. As well, Helms is an extreme conservative, strongly anti-
Communist and has been a well-known and long-time arch critic of the Chinese 
government in Congress. He is a staunch supporter of the ACU. According to a 
1991 article, the ACU had given Helms a score of 100 percent since his second 
year in office in 1974.7 It is likely he would have voted against China's MFN 
status even if his home state were not adversely affected by China's textile 
products. 
Similarly, ideology could have determined Republican Senator Slade 
Gorton's support for Taiwan. Senator Gorton's home state of Washington had a 
large trade account with Taiwan. In 1989, trade between Washington state and 
Taiwan equalled more than $4 billion, more than that between the state and 
mainland China.s Equally important, Gorton had "a conservative's affection for 
Taiwan".9 
The Helms and Gorton cases raise the question of policy preference. 
Policy preference is often neglected because it is believed members of Congress 
must ultimately be responsible to their constituents. But even constituency theory 
suggests electoral incentives do not inevitably run counter to members' policy 
preferences as members share many policy attitudes with their constituents. In the 
case of China's MFN status, voting to punish China was politically safe and 
popular for many members of Congress. On the other hand, many members of 
7 Paul Nyhan, "Interest Groups Count Heads, Take Names in Survey'', Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report (49: 13, 30 March 1991), p. 789. 
8 David S. Cloud, "Decision on China's MFN Trade Status ...... No Easy Call for Washington 
Senators'', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (49:26, 29 June 1991), p. 1739. 
9 Ibid. 
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Congress were genuinely concerned about human rights violations in China. And 
ideologically, they were against the Communist government in Beijing 
Interest Groups 
Apart from ideology, interest groups represent another important non-
structural factor influencing members of Congress on foreign policy issues. It is 
often alleged that Capitol Hill is improperly responsive to "special interests" in 
those areas where Congress shows particular concern. Analyses of public 
sentiment towards Congress often lead to such an image: Congress is driven by 
special interests and by lawmakers' own concerns, rather than the interests and 
concerns of the people who elected them.10 
As pointed out by Lindsay, "interest groups have always been part of 
American politics. Foreign policy is no exception."11 The number of interest 
groups has also increased dramatically. In 1929, a political scientist counted 500 
organisations with direct political interest. 12 A study in 1978 found that Congress' 
385 standing committees and subcommittees were "pursued" by more than 1,300 
registered lobby groups. 13 By the early 1990s, more than 15,000 groups were 
represented in Washington.14 
Foreign policy has attracted increasing interest group lobbying efforts since 
the 1970s, due in part to the greater importance attached to Congressional foreign 
10 Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign 
Policy (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1992), p. 289. 
11 James M. Lindsay, Congress and The Politics of US. Foreign Policy (Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 28. 
12 G. Calvin Mackenzie, The Irony of Reform: Roots of American Political Disenchantment 
(Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), p. 55. 
13 Crabb and Holt, Invitation to Struggle, p. 275. 
14 Mackenzie, The Irony of Reform, p. 55. 
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policy making and the increased decentralisation of Congress during the 1970s.I5 
Other reasons include the lack of public consensus in the United States on foreign 
policy issues and the decline of party identification by citizens.16 
While economic and ethnic interests remain most visible in foreign policy, 
there also has been tremendous growth in the number of groups championing 
values such as human rights and the environment. In addition, since the mid-
1970s, as legislators became more active on foreign policy, foreign governments 
took a sudden interest in attitudes on Capitol Hill. They not only rely on their 
embassies but also hire lobbyists and public relations firms.17 
With the growth of interest group activity on foreign policy issues, 
members of Congress find themselves under greater pressure to address foreign 
policy issues. At the same time, however, members also find that it is politically 
beneficial to undertake detailed legislative work on foreign policy. Therefore, 
Congressional activism in foreign policy making may partly result from the growth 
of interest group activity regarding foreign policy.ls 
Not surprisingly, US policy towards China's MFN status was a maJor 
battleground for interest groups with conflicting interests. While human rights 
groups lobbied hard against China's MFN status, economic interest groups fought 
doggedly for renewal as they were afraid that they might lose the huge China 
market. Economic interest groups made an impressive lobbying effort on 12 May 
1993, when 298 large companies and 37 trade groups sent a letter to Clinton urging 
an unconditional extension of MFN. The letter carried such names as AT&T, 
l5 Dumbrell, The Making of US Foreign Policy, p. 119. 
16 Crabb and Holt, Invitation to Struggle, p. 275. 
17 Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy, pp. 28-29. 
18 Ibid., p. 29. 
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American Express, Boeing, General Electric, General Motors, I.B.M. and Xerox. 
The list of corporate signers was the longest on such a trade policy letter to the 
President since a similar group of companies called in 1991 for Congress to grant 
President Bush the legal authority to negotiate the North American Free Trade 
Agreement.19 
Business lobbyists worked hard in 1994 to encourage efforts to delink 
China's MFN status from human rights. They also changed their tactics. In 
previous years, lobbying activity focused on preventing Congress from overriding 
Bush's veto of China MFN legislation. For that reason, lobbyists primarily worked 
the Senate; it was easier to find the votes to prevent an override there. In 1994, 
business lobbyists targeted House members.20 
In the case of Taiwan issue, few people would disagree with the argument 
that in the United States, Taiwan has "an influential, well-heeled domestic 
constituency, which has become an important source of financing for U.S. political 
campaigns".21 A good example in this respect is Representative Stephen J. Solarz. 
Solarz had special interest in Taiwan. He even did a "Taiwan Survey" by sending 
out 12,000 questionnaires to Taiwanese residents in the United States.22 One of the 
important reasons for Solarz's special interest in Taiwan was that Taiwanese-
Americans were a major source of his campaign funds. Back in 1982, one year 
after Solarz assumed the chair of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, 
19 Keith Bradsher, "Pressure from Companies", New York Times, 13 May 1993, p. AlO. The letter 
was later sent to the House of Representatives. See US Congress, United States-China Trade 
Relations, Hearing, before the Subcommittee on Trade of Committee on Ways and Means, House 
of Representatives (1st Sess., 103rd Congress, 8 June 1993), p. 105. 
20 David S. Cloud, "As China Deadline Approaches, Many See No Win on MFN", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (52:17, 30 April 1994), p.1056. 
21 Doherty, "Lawmakers Press White House For Firm Defense of Taiwan", p. 712. 
22 He Shan (Zhongguo Xinwen She), "The United States and Taiwan Echo Each Other in Creating 
Atmosphere for 'Taiwan Independence'", FBIS Daily Report, China, 17 August 1989, p. 50; Tao 
Shian, "What Is the Purpose of Solarz's Visit to Taiwan'', Renmin Ribao Overseas Edition, 15 
December 1989, p. 5, carried in FBIS Daily Report, China, 19 December 1989, pp. 2-4. 
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representatives the went to Solarz's fund-raisers and 
expressed concern about losing Solarz. They volunteered to raise $50,000. The 
Taiwanese community remained active supporting Solarz since 
By focusing on foreign policy issues, Solarz succeeded in gaining campaign 
contributions. In 1989, he had the second-largest campaign war chest the 
House, nearly $1.2 million.23 
Taiwan had been skilfully providing financial support to its influential 
supporters on Capitol Hill, either for their re-election efforts or for other causes. 
For instance, Taiwan once legally donated $225,000 to the Jesse Helms Centre, a 
foundation run by Taiwan's staunch supporter Senator Helms.24 
To illustrate the relationship between structural and non-structural factors, 
the following section makes an in-depth analysis of the factors which led to the 
decision of granting Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui a visa to visit the United 
States. 
Congress Triumphant: Exceptional Case of the Lee Visit 
Congressional intervention China policy during the period studied in this 
thesis reached its climax when the Clinton Administration reversed its policy and 
decided to grant Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui a visa to visit the United States. 
This is a typical case which shows how domestic politics can have substantial 
influence on US foreign policy. In this case, the dominant factors which 
influenced Congressional behaviour were not structural ones, but two non-
structural factors - ideology and Presidential leadership. 
23 Chuck Alston, "Solarz Looks Abroad to Find Election Cash at Home", Congressional Quarterly 
WeeklyReport(47:lO, 11March1989),pp. 501-504. 
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Congressional pressure Lee's visit was 
momentum which gathering strength previous years, especially in the 
It initially appeared the Clinton 
Administration demonstrated more resistance to Congressional pressure on the 
Taiwan issue than on China's MFN status. It objected to, and lobbied hard 
against, Senator Frank H. Murkowski's amendment declaring that the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA) "supersedes" the 1982 Shanghai communique about US 
arms sales to Taiwan. It was a watered-down version of the measure that finally 
passed Congress and was signed by President Clinton. The State Department 
subsequently stated that the resolution was only a non-binding declaration of the 
"sense of Congress". 
The Clinton Administration was actually passively reacting to 
Congressional pressure as no administration would want to be bound by the 
Murkowski amendment. On the other hand, Congressional efforts to challenge 
the Administration on arms sales to Taiwan had been largely symbolic. 
Legislators intended primarily to show their dissatisfaction with Taiwan policy 
and to reaffirm Congress' role in policy making rather than demanding a dramatic 
new arms sales policy. 
In retrospect, the Clinton Administration's decision not to permit Lee 
Teng-hui to stop over in Honolulu on his way to Costa Rica in May 1994 marked 
a turning point in Congressional activism. The Administration did not expect such 
a strong reaction from Congress over its handling of the issue. The 
event provided Taiwan supporters on Capitol Hill with powerful ammunition to 
24 Lee San Chouy, "No Irregular Donations to Clinton Campaign: KMT", The Straits Times, 30 
October 1996. 
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bombard policy, especially policy towards official contacts with 
Taiwan. The strong sentiment resulted a Senate resolution requiring US 
for Taiwan's UN bid, as well as Cabinet-level exchanges Taiwan. 
The 94-0 vote on "the visas-for-Taiwanese-officials amendment" was a clear 
indication that official contacts with Taiwan was an issue deserving special 
attention from the White House. 
The White House did notice Congressional dissatisfaction and tried to 
address it by reviewing Taiwan policy. the same time, the Administration tried 
to preserve the status quo in Washington's ties with Beijing and Taipei. Although 
the Administration consulted with "interested members of Congress" while 
drafting the review, no one in Congress expressed satisfaction. Prominent 
Taiwan supporters, such as Frank Murkowski, Claiborne Pell, Paul Simon and 
Hank Brown, were all critical of the review. 
Not only did the Taiwan policy review fail to satisfy Congress, it 
encouraged Congress to challenge the Administration on the Taiwan issue. A 
resolution calling for closer ties between the United States and Taiwan passed the 
Senate against the objection of the Clinton Administration. Taiwan supporters on 
the Capitol Hill received another big boost in the 1994 mid-tenn election, when 
the Republicans took control of both the Senate and the House and conservatives 
strengthened their power. 
The first Clinton Administration did not grow stronger from its friction 
with Congress in its first two years. Instead, it continued losing ground as 
Congress became more and more assertive on the issue. It was not without reason 
that Senator Murkowski assured the Taiwanese in early December 1994 that 
Congressional commitment to Taiwan would continue. 
By the issue of Lee's came 
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the Clinton Administration 
was fighting from a weak defensive position. The Administration wanted to ban 
the visit. It even assured Beijing Lee would not be able to make his trip to the 
United States. However, the Administration soon found it could not control 
development of the event and subsequently bent to Congressional pressure. 
As noted above, structural factors played an important role in pressuring 
the Administration to grant Lee's visa. Supporting Lee's visit could not hurt 
members of Congress in terms of constituency politics. Republican 
Congressional leaders were not restrained by fear of embarrassing a Democratic 
president. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International 
Relations Committee were unanimous in voting for resolutions supporting Lee's 
visit. 
Important as it is, the structural explanation is only one part of the story. 
A series of other factors combined with the three structural factors contributed to 
the exceptional effectiveness of Congressional pressure. These factors included 
interest groups, an ignorant Congress, unbalanced public opinion, an extremely 
strong and effective Taiwan lobby and changing Taiwan, and weak Presidential 
leadership. 
American business wanted US diplomatic concessions to Taiwan in the 
hope of winning juicy infrastructure contracts in Taiwan's huge six-year 
development plan for the 1990's. Business groups worried that Taipei was 
growing impatient with American sensitivity to Beijing and felt they were losing 
ground to European companies in Taiwan market. Shortly before the Clinton 
Administration made the decision to grant Lee a visa, US business leaders in 
Taiwan said European companies had won 83 infrastructure projects valued at 
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$18.2 compared to 65 contracts worth $8.5 for American 
companies. 25 
ignorance of Congress strengthened the power effectiveness of 
interest groups. As emphasised by some observers, "Congress frequently behaves 
in the ways it does because it does not know the consequences of what it is 
doing".26 The fact was that by 1995 over two decades had passed since Nixon's 
visit to Beijing 1972. A vast majority of Congressional members, especially in 
the House of Representatives, were elected after 1972. In the 104th Congress 
(1995-1996), only 36 Representatives, out of 435, were elected before or in 
1972.27 Many did not fathom the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue in US-China 
relations. Also, a large number of members (approximately half of the House in 
the 104th Congress) were elected after the Cold War.28 It was believed that over 
half of Congressional members elected in 1996 had never been issued passports. 29 
These new comers had little interest in foreign policy.30 This was reflected in the 
fact that most freshmen elected in 1994 were not interested in seeking a seat on 
the House International Relations Committee and "tended to rely less on think 
tank experts than their constituents to help shape their foreign policy views".31 
Many members later acknowledged that Beijing's harsh response to Lee's visit 
25 Margaret Dawson, "Taiwanese Ties That No Longer Bind'', Business Week, 15 May 1995, 
p. 21. 
26 Interviews with some American China experts in April and May 1997. 
27 Jon Healey, "Jubilant GOP Strives to Keep Legislative Feet on Ground'', Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (52:44, 12 November 1994), p. 3214. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Interview with an American China expert. In his informal talk at the Australian National 
University on 17 February 1998, Congressman Tom Lantos believed that the number of those who 
had not had passports was even higher. 
30 Carroll J. Doherty, "New Generation Challenges Established Orthodoxy", Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (54:5, 3 February 1996), pp. 306-8. 
3l Carroll J. Doherty, "The Road Less Traveled", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (54:5, 3 
February 1996), p. 307. 
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took them surpnse believed United States needed to exercise greater 
care in dealing with Taiwan-related issues.32 
Congressional members' enthusiasm Lee's visit was also fanned by 
public opinion, which was overwhelmingly sympathetic towards Taiwan. Here 
was an elected president, a friend of the United States and a graduate of an 
American university, who wanted to make a private trip to his alma mater for a 
reumon. The values embodied in this issue were so central to US domestic 
political ideology that a vast majority of Americans believed there was no reason 
to block the trip. Moreover, there was already "a body of opinion" in the United 
States that thought China was the enemy. 33 
American media almost unanimously supported the trip. Unlike the issue 
of China's MFN status, Americans saw no threat to any practical American 
interests in Lee's visit. Instead, it would help American business. 
Members of Congress would lose nothing by supporting Lee's visit. 
Chances were they would benefit. As summarised by Sutter and Mitchener, 
Politically, economically and in other ways, closer U.S. relations with 
Taiwan are seen to give particular and often concrete benefits to a 
wide range of Americans. Taiwan has strategic values in the long 
term, worthy of preserving. Other benefits include trade and 
investment opportunities, campaign contributions, votes of blocs of 
Taiwanese-Americans, and others.34 
Lee's visit was also a reward for decades of effective lobbying efforts by 
Taiwan. For years, since the late 1940's, Taiwan has fostered good feelings on 
Capitol Hill and in the US public.35 It was observed that the "stalwart" in 
32 Robert Sutter and Peter Mitchener, China: Interest Groups and Recent U.S. Policy - An 
Introduction, CRS Report 97-48F, December 30, 1996, p. 46. 
33 Nayan Chanda, "Winds of Change'', Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 June 1995, p. 16. 
34 Sutter and Mitchener, China: Interest Groups and Recent U.S. Policy, p. 49. 
35 In 1986, while there were 33 organisations lobbying for Taipei, only 10 organisations were 
lobbying for Beijing. See Crabb, and Holt, invitation to Struggle, p. 300, note 19. 
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Taiwan's public was Government Organization 
(GIO), "probably one of the biggest propaganda organs the democratic world" 
and "its 49 worldwide offices - eight of them in the United States - have 
wined and dined, published pamphlets, press releases and protests to get their 
point across".36 Articles supporting Taiwan frequently appear in US newspapers, 
including local newspapers. Taiwan's office in the United States, Coordination 
Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA) which was renamed the Taipei 
Economic and Cultural Office after the Clinton Administration's 1994 Taiwan 
policy review, also worked hard promoting Taiwan. In the mid-1980s, the 
CCNAA distributed more than $750 million to paid lobbyists for liasing with the 
press and Congress as well as paying for trips to the island. 37 
the late 1980s, with the success of its economy, Taiwan stepped up its 
lobbying efforts. It used "some of its newfound wealth to win friends through 
scholarly philanthropy". 38 The now quite influential Chiang Ching-lrno 
Foundation was launched in 1989 to provide research funding, conference 
support, institutional enhancement, and subsidies for publications.39 Taiwan also 
increased its investment in US public relations firms. A prominent example is the 
above-mentioned US$4.5 million three-year contract with Cassidy and 
Associates. Even the invitation from Cornell University did not come without 
price. In 1994, a fund called "Friends of Lee Teng-hui" donated $2.5 million to 
Cornell University. The Taiwan authorities donated another $2 million to the 
36 James Kynge, "Taiwan: Victory at Last for Taiwan Propaganda Machine", Reuter News Service, 
Reuter Business Briefing, 24 May 1995. 
37 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992 (New York: 
Twayne Publishers, 1994), p. 186. 
38 Ibid.,p.187. 
39 Ibid. 
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1995.40 Observing effectiveness of lobbyists, Chas 
former Assistant Secretary of Defense the Bush and Clinton administrations, 
complained that "The Lee Teng-hui visit proves you spend enough money 
on Washington lobbyists you can accomplish wonders, but it does not speak well 
for the clarity, vision and strategic purpose of U.S. policy".41 
Like many other issues regarding Taiwan policy, ideology played a key 
role in Congressional support for Lee's visit. Two factors account for ideology's 
dominant influence. The first was, "a changing Taiwan" - "economically 
advanced, better educated, more cosmopolitan, and politically democratic".42 
Changes in Taiwan produced two important results. Firstly, more and more 
people in Taiwan wanted to end Taiwan's status as an "international pariah" and 
Taiwan's leaders were prepared to take chances to achieve greater international 
recognition and respect.43 Secondly, an increasing number of countries had eased 
their policies towards Taiwan to advance their commercial interests. From 1992 
to November 1994, European countries had sent approximately 70 cabinet-level 
and vice minister-level officials to visit Taiwan. During this same period, only 
one US official with cabinet rank, US Trade Representative Carla Hills, visited 
Taiwan. 44 
Not only had Taiwan changed, but those changes followed the American 
model. As noted by a Taiwanese analyst, "over the last generation, the people of 
Taiwan have adopted attitudes toward politics and economics that closely reflect 
40 Zhang Wei, "A Golden Key Will Open Any Door", Renmin Ribao in Chinese, 8 June 1995, p. 6, 
carried in FBIS Daily Report, China, 12 June 1995, p. 15. 
41 David Schlesinger, "Hong Kong: Former Official Blasts U.S. China Policy'', Reuters News 
Service, Reuter Business Briefing, 25 May 1995. 
42 Sutter and Mitchener, China: Interest Groups and Recent US. Policy, p. 41. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, "How Clinton Bashed Taiwan--and Why," Orbis (Fall 1995), p. 575. In 
early December, Federico Pena visited Taiwan. 
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American attitudes".45 This helped Taiwan win more sympathy and support from 
American politicians, media and consequently, the American public. 
The second reason for the dominance of ideology in the Lee visit was that 
Congress was not only pro-Taiwan, it was also "predominantly anti-China". 46 
Representative Benjamin Gilman summarised the feeling of Congress: "The 
bipartisan consensus is that our China policy needs to be overhauled. It has failed 
us on trade, human rights, [arms] proliferation and security matters".47 
Sutter and Mitchener correctly pointed out: 
From the point of view of American ideology and values, Taiwan's 
free market enterprise and recent democratisation have attracted a 
great deal of support. In contrast, many of these U.S. observers are 
sceptical of any significant movement of the PRC toward political 
pluralism or international interdependence. 48 
Similarly, Doherty observed "Taiwan is widely regarded as an emergmg 
democracy and an engine of free-market capitalism, while China is viewed as a 
communist bully, despite its extensive economic relationship with the United 
States".49 Senator Connie Mack III represented the voices of many members of 
Congress when he called on the United States to reward democracy in Taiwan and 
suggested the United States to end the de facto ban on high-level diplomatic 
contacts between Washington and Taipei in June 1992. 
Even with all these reasons, the decision to allow Lee to visit the United 
States cannot be properly understood if another factor is missed. That factor is 
weak Presidential leadership. 
45 Ibid., p. 580. 
46 Chanda, "Winds of Change", p. 15. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Sutter and Mitchener, China: Interest Groups and Recent U.S. Policy, p. 49. 
49 Doherty, "Lawmakers Press White House for Firm Defense of Taiwan", p. 712. 
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Scholars tend to treat Presidential leadership lightly, partly because it is 
hard to measure influence and partly because scholars do not think leadership is 
important at all. 50 But these case studies reveal the striking contrast between 
George Bush and Bill Clinton in terms ofleadership on China policy. 
Bush was a "born natural" in foreign policy while Bill Clinton had little 
experience in this area when he entered the White House in 1993. More 
importantly, Bush had a much better understanding of Congress and maintained a 
positive relationship with many members. He had served not only in the House of 
Representatives (1966-70) but also in other positions which enabled him to meet 
and know members of Congress and to foster strong relations with many of them. 
After leaving the House, Bush served as US Ambassador to the United Nations, 
Chairman of the Republican National Committee (RNC), US envoy to Beijing, 
CIA Director and then Vice-President for eight years. So when Bush was elected 
president in 1988, "The long-standing relationship [with Congress] is already 
there".51 In contrast, Bill Clinton had little contact with Congress before he 
became President. 
Before his term as President, Bush said that one of the biggest lessons he 
learned from watching President Ronald Reagan was that a certain political 
stubbornness paid off in dealing with Congress. Reagan had been effective, Bush 
said, because he took a principled position and fought for what he believed. 52 Bush 
50 Some studies seem to confirm the leadership is unimportant, see Eileen Burgin, "The Influence 
of Constituents: Congressional Decision Making on Issues of Foreign and Defense Policy" in 
Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay (eds.), Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy 
on Capitol Hill (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993), p. 78. 
51 Ronald D. Elving, "Bush Hopes for a Little Help from Hill Friends'', Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report (46:53, 31December1988), p. 3599. For more information, please see this article, 
pp. 3599-3603. 
52 Robert W. Merry, "Status Quo May Really Be Calm Before Storm", Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report ( 46:46, 12 November 1988), p. 3240. 
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had been "intimately involved in the day-to-day management of U.S.-Chinese 
relations" and was "the most influential participant in U.S. China policy".53 
Bush's strong leadership rested not only on his commitment to China 
policy, but also on his skill dealing with Congress: 
Although it [the Bush Administration]ultimately certified China's 
emigration policy and approved of MFN status for Chinese exports, 
rather than 'apply political muscle' or argue the case for trade 
relations on strategic grounds, it insisted that it would not wage a 
veto battle and that it was the responsibility of members of 
Congress and groups in the private sector with an interest in U.S.-
Chinese trade to fight the battle for retaining MFN.54 
By doing so, the Administration succeeded in maximising support. 
Clinton, however, "practically allowed Congress to steer China policy", a 
former US official noted.55 While some analysts believe the White House's 
failure to devise a coherent strategy for managing relations with Beijing created a 
policy vacuum that hard-liners in Congress rushed to fill, 56 a former senior US 
official noted that a resulting vacuum was left to be filled by Washington interest 
groups which increasingly sought to set policy through Congress.57 In fact, Chas 
Freeman argued that foreign policy had become hostage to interest groups. 58 
In his first term, Clinton's China policy was largely different from his 
predecessor's. Sutter and Mitchener noted that 
The Bush Administration was able to protect the broad guidelines 
of policy toward the PRC and Taiwan despite heavy pressure from 
the media, Congress and interest groups. But the Clinton 
53 Robert S. Ross, "National Security, Human Rights, and Domestic Politics: The Bush 
Administration and China" in Kenneth A. Oye et al. (eds.), Eagle in a New World: American 
Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era (Harper Collins Publishers, 1992); p. 288. 
54 Ibid., p. 305. 
55 Nayan Chanda, "Free Fall: China-US Ties Are Paralyzed by Politics", Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 10 October 1995, p. 18. 
56 Amy Barrus et al., "Itching to Jab Beijing: With Congress spoiling for a showdown, trade may 
suffer", Business Week, 12 February 1996, p.15. 
57 Lu Ning, "China: Stormy US-China Relations Caused by Weak Leadership'', Business Times, 
Reuter Business Briefing, 10 July 1995 
58 Schlesinger, "Hong Kong: Former Official Blasts U.S. China Policy". 
Administration was not as strongly fixed in its direction on China 
policy. . . . it entered office on a platform decidedly critical of 
China.59 
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As demonstrated in Chapter 4, in his first year in office, Clinton did not 
pay much attention to China policy and largely followed Congress. Realising the 
policy of linking China's MFN status and human rights record would not work, 
Clinton decided to abandon the policy and delinked MFN status and human rights 
in his second year. China, however, did not make a significant corresponding 
gesture, which frustrated Clinton.60 As observed by Lu Ning, a journalist and 
China specialist, while Bill Clinton was not interested in foreign policy, "the 
embarrassing policy retreat over the renewal of China's most-favoured nation 
status has distanced him further from China policy".61 
Meanwhile, Secretary of State Warren Christopher was not in a position to 
strengthen Presidential leadership in China policy. Christopher's personal view on 
China was overshadowed by his trip to China in March 1994. Enraged by US 
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck's meeting with 
China's most prominent dissident, Wei Jingsheng, in a Beijing hotel, the Chinese 
government rounded up dissidents on the eve of Christopher's first visit to China 
as Secretary of State. Christopher was then lectured in Beijing by Chinese leaders. 
It was observed that "Christopher never quite got over his indignation over that 
trip".62 Lu Ning noted that Warren Christopher and National Security Adviser 
59 Sutter and Mitchener, China: Interest Groups and Recent US. Policy, pp. 42-43. 
60 Barton Gellman, "U.S., China Nearly Came to Blows in '96", Washington Post, 21June1998, p. 
AOL 
61 Lu "China: Stormy US-China Relations Caused by Weak Leadership". 
62 Gellman, "U.S., China Nearly Came to Blows in '96". 
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Anthony Lake chose "to stay away from this [China policy] contentious and 
difficult area". 63 
It is believed Clinton's mixed feelings and Christopher's animus "led to a 
prolonged period of drift".64 Lu pointed out that although the policy of 
constructive engagement was introduced in late 1993, the Clinton Administration 
had no overall strategy or policy coordination at the White House. "Various US 
government agencies are left to determine themselves what the policy means and 
how to pursue it", Lu observed.65 Consequently, the Taiwan crisis grew out of "an 
erratic, often frayed policy" marked by "a lot of confusion on China". 66 
Is China a Special Case? 
This study intends not just to understand Congress' role in China policy 
during the particular period of 1989 to 1996 by focusing on three structural 
factors. A more important aim of the study was to shed light on Congress' future 
role in China policy and in US foreign policy in general by examining the 
influence of domestic politics. 
The study of Congress' role in China policy during this period was 
necessary due to dramatic changes in the US foreign policy-making environment, 
in the nature of the US-China relationship and in US perception of China. These 
changes are likely to have a long term effect on the making of China policy. 
Firstly, China policy during this period was overshadowed by the 
Tiananmen Square crackdown. Following the crackdown, American public 
opinion about Beijing changed from positive to negative and remained negative 
63 Lu, "China: Stormy US-China Relations Caused by Weak Leadership". 
64 Gellman, "U.S., China Nearly Came to Blows in '96". 
65 Lu, "China: Stormy US-China Relations Caused by Weak Leadership". 
66 Gellman, "U.S., China Nearly Came to Blows in '96". 
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for the rest of the period. Largely as a result of the crackdown, some issues rose 
to an ever more prominent position in China policy during this period. Foremost 
issues included human rights and political reform. These issues dominated the 
conditions some members of Congress tried to attach to China's MFN status. 
The crackdown was in striking contrast to Taiwan's substantial progress in 
political liberalisation and highlighted the importance of Taiwan issue in China 
policy. The issue became further complicated by the ignorance of members of 
Congress who increasingly follow the preferences of their constituents on foreign 
policy issues. 
Secondly, the Cold War ended in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the end of the Cold War had two 
consequences for US China policy. One is the dramatic decrease in China's 
strategic importance to the United States. During the Cold War, China was a card 
the United States could play against the Soviet Union. The strategic importance of 
China restrained Congressional criticism of China. With much of that strategic 
importance gone, Congress became much more assertive in China policy. 
The other consequence of the end of the Cold War is that domestic politics 
is more involved in China policy. To be sure, China policy had always been 
influenced by domestic politics. But the end of the Cold War and the consequent 
decrease in concerns about external threats strengthened the influence of domestic 
politics. 
Finally, with US foreign policy driven by "econopolitik",67 trade disputes 
emerged as a major issue in China policy. China's trade with the United States 
barely existed during most part of the Cold War and the United States maintained 
67 Amy Borrus et al., "Peddlers in Pinstripes", Business Week, 1 May 1995, p. 43. 
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a trade surplus with China until 1983.68 From 1983 to 1988, the US trade deficit 
with China increased from $71 million to $3.49 billion.69 An even more dramatic 
increase took place between 1988 and 1996. In 1997, the US trade deficit with 
China stood at $49. 7 billion.7° The trade deficit was only one of many problems 
in US-China trade. Other trade problems included trade barriers, intellectual 
property rights disputes, China's entry into GATT/WTO and so on. 
In terms of understanding Congress' role in US foreign policy in general, 
the contribution of this thesis lies in the fact that it explored areas which have 
been understudied. Much of the existing influential literature in this field was 
published between 1950 and 1975, the era of almost absolute Presidential 
dominance in foreign policy - the "imperial presidency". Consequently, 
potential foreign policy actors like Congress "drew scant attention".71 Since the 
debacle in Vietnam, members of Congress have fought "to reclaim the powers 
they lost to the executive branch". 72 In spite of this, according to Repley and 
Lindsay, scholars continued to pay relatively little attention to Congress and most 
published literature during this period focused on the legal and normative aspects 
of Congress' role. As a result, Ripley and Lindsay observed: 
while we have had a rich debate over the constitutional and practical 
issues raised by a resurgent Congress, we have relatively little 
systematic knowledge about what that resurgent Congress does and to 
what effect 73 
68 Sino-American trade was only $5 million in 1971. By 1974, it reached $900 million. The trade 
balance was heavily in the United States' favour, with US exports amounting to over $800 million. 
Robert G. Sutter, The China Quandary: Domestic Determinants of U.S. China Policy (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 21. 
69 Source: Department of Commerce, as quoted by David S. Cloud in "Sentiment Grows in 
Congress to Reject MFN for China" in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (49:17, 27 April 
1991), p. 1044. 
70 John F. Harris and Johm Pomfret, "Summit Debate Buoys U.S. Hopes", Washington Post, 28 
June 1998, p. AOL 
71 Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, "Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress: An 
Overview and Preview" in Ripley and Lindsay, Congress Resurgent, p. 5. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., p. 6. 
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This study will contribute to the "systematic knowledge" crucial to 
understanding Congress' role in foreign policy. The attempt is strengthened by 
the nature of the cases studied. The cases in this thesis fall into categories of 
strategic and structural policy, instead of crisis policy to which scholars have 
devoted "too much attention".74 
The China case may be different from other cases m some important 
aspects. Firstly, China is a rising power and a competitor of the United States. 
Despite the fact that its strategic importance to the United States has dramatically 
decreased, China is still a major player in world politics. This special status has 
gained her special attention from the US government, including Congress. 
Secondly, China is a market with huge potential. As revealed in the study, the 
China market could be a very influential factor for members of Congress. 
Thirdly, China is one of the few remaining Communist countries, although it has 
largely discarded Marxist economic doctrines. Fourthly, the China case is more 
complicated than other cases due to the Taiwan issue. On the top of all these 
factors, as noted at the outset of this thesis, is the fact that domestic politics has 
historically been more deeply involved in China policy than in other foreign 
policy issues. 
While it is necessary to bear in mind the special features of the China case, 
the effect of these features should not be exaggerated. After all, it is unlikely any 
two issues will be exactly the same in US foreign policy. 
The most important question regarding the relationship between the China 
case and other cases should be "Is China policy the only US foreign policy in 
74 Ibid., p. 7. 
364 
which domestic politics is deeply involved?". The answer is a definite "No". 
Domestic politics has deeply influenced many US foreign policy issues. One 
example is US policy towards the Middle East. 75 
The Israeli lobby decisively influenced US policy towards the Middle 
East, according to Mitchell G. Bard's study. Bard believes the lobby's influence 
is "best explained" by Mayhew's theory that Congressmen are single-minded 
seekers of re-election. He notes there was "little countervailing pressure to inhibit 
the congressional response to the Israeli lobby" and that Congressmen had "no 
political incentive to oppose the Israeli lobby, and significant electoral and 
financial incentives for supporting its interests".76 
Bard argues that Congressmen's perception of US policy towards the 
Middle East was deeply influenced by domestic politics, especially constituency 
politics. The United States pursued at least five interests in the Middle East: 1) 
protection of oil supplies, 2) containment of the Soviet Union, 3) maintenance of 
regional stability, 4) expansion of economic and diplomatic relations with the 
Arab world, and 5) assurance of Israel's security. Congressmen recognised these 
interests. However, maintaining the security of Israel was "the one with a 
significant domestic constituency".77 
Bard further points out that the effectiveness of the Israeli lobby also 
largely depends on the President's position. If the President supports the lobby, 
75 Mitchell Bard, The Water's Edge and Beyond: Defining The Limits to Domestic Influence on 
United States Middle East Policy (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transactions Publishers, 1991). 
76 Ibid., pp. 22, 24. 
77 Ibid., pp. 3, 24. 
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the lobby wms virtually every time. Otherwise, the lobby can achieve its 
objectives 27 percent of the time.78 
Prospects for Congress in China Policy 
The best way to look into the future role of Congress in China policy is to 
first consider future influence of Congress in foreign policy. Congress was active 
in foreign policy during the 1970s and 1980s. By the early 1990s, Congressional 
activism had developed to such a degree that public officials and commentators on 
US foreign policy warned that Congress had gone too far.79 Most scholars, 
however, believe Congressional activism will continue. The most important 
reason is the dramatic change in world politics, namely the end of the Cold War. 
For example, Ripley and Lindsay assert: 
With the momentous changes in the world in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, all the governing institutions of the nation are faced 
with major new challenges. Congress, newly self-confident in the 
foreign and defense arena after the Vietnam War, will - for good 
or for ill - play a major part in shaping the US response to the 
new challenges. 80 
Peterson made it even clearer. Noting that "the extraordinary transformation of the 
international system complicates efforts to define the national interest", Peterson 
argues: 
When the national interest gives little guidance, domestic politics is 
allowed freer rein. If the recent past is any guide to the near future, 
the president will decide these questions with a keen eye to 
the domestic consequences of his actions. Voices in Congress will 
78 Ibid., p. 23. 
79 Crabb and Holt, Invitation to Struggle, p. 264. 
80 Ripley and Lindsay, Congress Resurgent, p. v. 
remain constantly, if not consistently, critical - especially when 
presidential mistakes are apparent. 81 
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Sustained Congressional activism will inevitably impact China policy. It 
is expected Congress will remain active in shaping China policy in the near future. 
Indeed, Congress was active in China policy in the first two years of the 
second Clinton Administration, challenging the White House's policy. 
Human rights remained a top issue in Congressional moves against China 
in 1997 and 1998. In early November 1997, shortly after Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin paid a state visit to the United States, the House of Representatives 
approved nine China-related bills. It voted overwhelmingly (366-54) to deny 
visas to Chinese government officials involved in implementing policies 
persecuting religious minorities and officials of Chinese government-sanctioned 
religious groups. It also voted 415-1 to approve a similar visa ban on Chinese 
officials involved in forced abortion and sterilisation. To express its concern 
about China's human rights record, the House passed a measure to increase 
sixfold the number of US diplomats monitoring Chinese human rights 
violations. 82 
In March 1998, Congress reacted strongly to the Clinton Administration's 
decision to change US policy and not seek a UN resolution censuring China 
for human rights abuses. Both chambers voiced strong opposition to the policy 
change. By a 397-0 vote, the House passed a non-binding resolution sponsored 
by Representative Christopher Smith, urging the Administration to reverse its 
81 Paul E. Peterson (ed.), The President, the Congress and the Making of Foreign Policy (Norman 
and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), p. xii. 
82 James Robinson, "USA: US Vote to Ban Chinese Imperils Ties", Australian, Reuter Business 
Briefing, 8 November 1997. 
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decision. The Senate passed a similar resolution by a vote of 95-5 before the 
Administration announced its policy.83 
For much of the first two years of the second Clinton Administration, the 
Republican-controlled Congress tried to link the Clinton/Democratic National 
Committee (DNC) campaign finance scandal to China's threat to the national 
security of the United States. In May 1998, the scandal was directly linked to US 
national security. Reportedly, the Chinese military made a $100,000 contribution 
to Clinton's campaign. That contribution may have resulted in an illegal 
technology transfer from American aerospace company, Loral Space & 
Communications Ltd., to China's military establishment. The Republican-
controlled House of Representatives quickly passed an amendment to ban sales of 
satellite technology to China in May 1998. One hundred fifty two law-makers, all 
Republican, signed a letter, urging Clinton to cancel his trip to China scheduled 
for late June 1998.84 In addition, the House formed a select committee to 
investigate allegations of improper influence. All eight committee members were 
Republicans. 85 Republican Congressional leaders intended to broaden their 
criticism of President Clinton from this single issue to a broad denunciation of 
Clinton's policies regarding exports to China.86 
One major factor distinguishing the China policy in Clinton's second term 
from that of his first term is Presidential leadership. While Clinton exercised little 
83 Lateline News, "US Congress Urged Clinton to Condemn China'', 18 March 1998. 
84 John F. Harris and Juliet Eilperin, "House Rebukes Clinton on China Satellite Deal", 
Washington Post, 21 May 1998, p. AOl; Thomas B. Edsall, "GOP Angers Big Business on Key 
Issues: China Stance, Export Curbs Harm Trade, Groups Say'', Washington Post, 11 June 1998, p. 
AOL 
85 Congress Daily, "USA: Senate Probe of China Fundraising Allegations Begins'', Reuter 
Business Briefing, 2 June 1998. 
86 John Mintz, "Signs of Chinese Arms Sale Dismissed, Ex-Official Says - White House Called 
Insistent on Averting Sanctions'', Washington Post, 12 June 1998, p. A20. 
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Presidential leadership on China policy during his first term, he later demonstrated 
his strong commitment to the policy and his willingness to pay domestic political 
costs accompanying China policy. 
Analysts believe March 1996 marked the turning point from escalating 
conflict to "strategic partnership". "The lessons learned in the crisis resolved the 
president's ambivalence about the kind of ties he sought with China and set him 
firmly in pursuit of an 'engagement"', noted an analyst.87 That pursuit took him 
to Beijing in late June 1998. 
With regard to China's MFN status and Taiwan policy, Clinton was 
determined to resist continuous Congressional pressure. Not only did he renew 
China's MFN status unconditionally in 1997 and 1998, he also expressed his 
support for giving permanent MFN trade status to China. "I think it would be a 
good thing if we didn't have to have this debate (in Congress) every year", 
Clinton said in June 1998.88 
Taiwan policy remained a major source of conflict between the Executive 
and the Legislature. For the Presidential summit of October 1997, Beijing and 
Washington negotiated a statement by the State Department which announced that 
the United States did not support Taiwan independence, did not support a "two 
China" or "one China, one Taiwan" policy, and would not back Taiwan's 
admission to any international body based on statehood. 89 Clinton articulated the 
"three no's" policy while he was visiting China. He was the first US president to 
87 Gellman, "U.S., China Nearly Came to Blows in '96". 
88 Reuter News Service, "USA: Clinton Wants Permanent MFN Status for China - Report'', 
Reuter Business Briefing, 20 June 1998. 
89 Barton Gellman, "Reappraisal Led to New China Policy", Washington Post, 22 June 1998, p. 
AOL 
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do so.9° 
Angered by Clinton's statement, Republican leaders in the Senate pushed 
for a non-binding resolution which urged President Clinton to seek Beijing's 
renunciation of the use of force against Taiwan, to reaffirm the 1979 Taiwan 
Relations Act, and to assure Taiwan there had been no date set for an end to arms 
sales. The resolution passed the Senate by a vote of 92-0. The Senate also passed 
a resolution supporting Taiwan's entry to the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank.91 
In terms of future policy-making context, the following two points, should 
be noted. 
Firstly, while it has been widely accepted that China is a rising power with 
the potential of competing with the United States in the 21st century, there remains 
a question as to what kind of power China will be. In the United States, a deep 
distrust of Beijing exists among politicians, officials, academics, journalists and 
the public. A survey conducted in October 1995 by the Chicago Council on 
Foreign Relations showed a substantial increase in concern about the development 
of China as a world power. Over half of the public saw this as a possible critical 
threat to the vital interests of the US (57%), an increase of 17% over a similar poll 
conducted in 1991. Slightly under half of US leaders viewed China as a critical 
threat, a 30-point jump (from 16% to 46%) over four years. For both the public 
and leaders, China represented a greater threat than the military power of Russia. 
90 John Pomfret, "Clinton Declaration on Independence Irks Taiwan", Washington Post, 1 July 
1998, p. A26. 
9l Helen Dewar, "Lott Faults Clinton on Taiwan", Washington Post, 8 July 1998, p. A24; Reuter 
News Service, "USA: Senate Votes to Reaffirm US Support for Taiwan", Reuter Business Briefing, 
10 July 1998. 
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economic competition with Japan as an issue of concern. And among leaders, the 
threat of China's power far exceeded that of economic competition from Japan. 92 
In 1995, six years after the Tiananrnen Square crackdown, 69% of 
Americans still regarded China either as enemy or unfriendly (See Table 8.1 ). 
Table 8.1 
How the U.S. Public Views China 
Close ally Friendly Not friendly Enemy Not sure 
3% 25% 45% 24% 3% 
Source: The Harris Poll 1995: "Canada, Britain and Australia Top the List of 
Countries Which Americans Think of as Allies and Friends", 2 October 1995. 93 
Joseph Nye noted as late as June 1998 that "Both the liberal New Republic 
and the conservative Weekly Standard call China 'totalitarian', though today's 
market communism is a far cry from the real totalitarianism of Chairman Mao".94 
So long as the Chinese Communist Party is reluctant to carry out dramatic political 
liberalisation, this distrust is unlikely to disappear. 
Secondly, as revealed by this study, the United States found it difficult to 
tum away from the huge China market. One important reason was that the United 
States could not persuade its allies to impose similar sanctions against China. It is 
unlikely the United States will be able to do so in the future. Therefore, the US 
will not have much choice but to compete with its allies in the China market. This 
will strongly influence Congress, although economic interests could be sacrificed 
in some cases. Thus, many members of Congress may find themselves in a 
92 John D. Rielly (ed.), American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995 (The Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), pp. 23-26. 
93 Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Taiwan's Security in the Changing International System (Boulder, 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), p. 64. 
94 Joseph S. Nye, "As China Rises, Must Others Bow?" Economist, 27 June 1998, p. 21. 
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policy, especially those directly linked 
to American economic interests. 
With regard to China's MFN status, renamed trade relations (NTR) 
status 1998, the focus of the issue is likely to remain whether the United States 
should give China permanent NTR status, rather than whether China's NTR status 
should be revoked or conditioned. Many members of Congress may remain 
opposed to giving China permanent NTR status and may continue to use it as a 
tool for various purposes the near future, such as human rights, political 
liberalisation, Taiwan issue and trade disputes. 
As for the Taiwan issue, Congress will maintain its strong interest in the 
foreseeable future. However, having experienced the crisis after Lee Teng-hui's 
US visit, all sides, including Congress, learned a lesson and will be more cautious 
in dealing with the issue the near future. 
In general terms, Congress may play a major or even decisive role on 
issues which do not involve military forces fighting each other, such as it did on 
Lee's visit. But instead of dragging and pushing towards the same direction, 
China policy-making process usually involves forces heading for different 
directions, such as in China's MFN status. On these issues, the President has 
more space to manoeuvre and Congress' power can be limited, although it is 
expected Congress will try to keep the President accountable. 
Conclusion 
The influence of domestic politics on China policy is even more prominent 
m non-structural factors influencing Congressional members' foreign policy 
decisions. Therefore, the influence of structural factors on Congressional 
can be best understood only a context 
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considers non-
structural factors such as ideology, interest groups and Presidential leadership. 
These factors need to be combined to provide an accurate picture of how domestic 
politics affects Congressional members' foreign policy decisions. the cases of 
China's MFN status and the Taiwan issue, ideology, interest groups and 
Presidential leadership were indispensable non-structural factors influencing 
Congressional behaviour. 
What makes it more important not to exclude non-structural factors in 
explaining Congressional behaviour is that structural factors could have integrated 
some elements of non-structural factors. While the Republicans who consistently 
supported Bush on China's MFN status might have been partly influenced by the 
party's free-trade ethos, Senator Max Baucus' firm stance of crossing party lines 
on the issue was partly contributed to the lobby of Montana farmers who were his 
important constituents. 
The close examination of the Lee visit demonstrated that Congress' 
decisive role in Lee's US visit occurred largely because no formidable opposition 
force, structural or non-structural, acted to restrain members of Congress. This 
case, therefore, offered a striking contrast to the case of China's MFN status in 
which Congressional initiative was contained by factors such as constituency, 
partisanship, Presidential leadership and business groups. Given that Congress is 
normally checked by some factors, especially the Executive, it could be argued 
that Congress' role in Lee's visit was an exceptional case and should be treated 
with caution. 
The findings of this thesis may contribute to a better understanding about 
Congress' role in not only China policy but also US foreign policy in general. 
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One major factor strengthening the contribution of this thesis is that the period 
studied was the beginning of the post-Cold War era. The China case may be 
different from other cases in some aspects. But the bottom line is that China 
policy is not the only US foreign policy issue in which domestic politics is deeply 
involved. 
Members of Congress may find it hard to make some decisions on China 
policy in the future because China policy often represents conflicting interests. 
On the issue of China's NTR status, on the one hand, members of Congress will 
find it hard to tum away from the huge China market. On the other hand, they 
may remain critical of China's human rights record, political repression, Beijing's 
policy towards Taipei and other issues. Although Congress is unlikely to be able 
to make the renewal ofNTR status a central issue in China policy, many members 
will try to block permanent NTR status for reasons such as ideology, constituency, 
partisanship and so on. 
As for the Taiwan ISsue, m terms of domestic politics, members of 
Congress will maintain their strong interest in the issue not only for moral reasons 
but also for partisanship, ideology, constituency and other domestic consideration. 
However, as all sides have learned from the crisis in the Taiwan Strait following 
the Lee visit, members of Congress might restrain themselves on the issue. More 
importantly, as demonstrated by Clinton in the past two years, the President will 
show more leadership and pay the political costs necessary to check Congress' 
intervention into the issue. 
In the 970s, Australian Minister Malcolm Fraser reportedly 
told Chinese leaders in Beijing that the United States was unreliable because of 
the influence of Congress on foreign policy. 1 Fraser was proved right some 
twenty years later. In 1995, Congress forced the Administration to reverse its 
policy after US Secretary of State Warren Christopher had assured Beijing that 
Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui would not be permitted to visit the United States. 
Beijing had believed Christopher and expected that the Clinton Administration 
would persuade Congress to accept the Administration's position and follow its 
leadership. 
Congress' role China policy has not been consistent. In some periods, 
such as in the late 1940s and early 1950, and on some issues, such as the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA), Congress played a key shaping China policy. At 
other times, and on other issues, such as President Nixon's visit to China, 
normalisation of US-China relations and the 17 August 1982 joint communique 
on arms sales, Congress was hardly involved in shaping US China policy. 
Despite the huge body of literature on US-China relations, Congress' role 
in China policy has not been adequately studied. While introductory works on 
US-China relations seldom mention Congress, studies of specific periods or issues 
focus more on perspectives other than Congress. A few detailed studies do pay 
attention to Congress and have provided some insight on Congressional 
intervention in China policy. Examples include studies by Nancy Bernkopf 
I John Rourke, Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policymaking: A Study of Interaction 
and Influence, 1945-1982 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983), p. 288. 
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Tucker Thomas J. Christensen on towards the 
years around 1950 and the 1950s. Few studies delve into the detail of what 
happened inside Congress. Scholars have long noted the influence of ideology 
and interest groups on Congressional behaviour China policy or have identified 
focal points of decision making Congress, such as the committees or 
constituencies of members. Few have made detailed investigation of the influence 
of these factors on the outcome of China policy. 
This thesis investigated Congress' role in China policy with reference to 
three factors or focal points that can loosely be identified as structural: 
constituency, partisanship and committee. The thesis does not assume 
Congressional intervention in foreign policy is the result of only these factors but 
seeks to investigate how outcomes of Congressional intervention are shaped by 
each of these three structural factors relative to each other. The thesis focuses 
primarily on who does what in Congress and how that relates to their electoral 
distinct (constituency), their political party, and their position in the committee 
system of Congress. This thesis does not investigate the role of interest groups 
outside Congress or the general role of ideology. 
The study demonstrated that the rational-actor model, so dominant in 
international relations theory, is quite weak in explaining US foreign policy. The 
US government is not a unitary, monolithic actor as assumed by the model. 
Therefore, the "state", here represented by the US government, should not be 
treated as a 'black box", responding with one voice to the challenges and 
opportunities confronting it. 
There are other problems with the rational-actor model. Based on realists' 
belief that the first and most difficult task of government is to ensure the survival 
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of the state in a hostile, violent, Hobbesian environment, the model takes 
"external" rather than "internal" factors as the important determinants of state 
behaviour. But because government comprises various decision-makers, and 
these decision-makers define situations differently, realists ignore a principal 
determinant of state policy. 
The study, especially the case of China's most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
status, demonstrated that it is misleading to treat Congress as a unitary, monolithic 
entity as suggested by the interbranch politics model. The model believes 
Congress' "internal will" is able to offset the institution's characteristics of 
decentralisation and fragmentation. As this study revealed, Congressional 
members' views on China issues can be vastly different not only from that (or 
those) of the administration but also among themselves. On the issue of China's 
MFN status, some members of Congress supported the Bush Administration's 
position of renewing MFN status unconditionally for reasons like partisanship and 
constituency, while many others insisted the United States should revoke or at 
least condition MFN status as a way to express US position on issues like human 
rights, arms sales, nuclear proliferation and so on. 
The study does not dismiss the existence of Congressional "internal will". 
In fact, on the issue of China's MFN status, strong anti-China sentiment had a 
strong impact on some members of Congress and many of those who did not 
support sanctions against China kept their heads down because of the Congress' 
"internal will". In the case of Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States, 
overwhelming sympathy for Taiwan and the anti-Beijing sentiment in Congress 
made it impossible for members of Congress not to follow the mainstream. 
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study, can be easily 
outweighed by the fact that Congress is very fragmented, decentralised and 
uncoordinated. This state of affairs can be understood by reference to the three 
structural factors identified: partisanship, constituency committee. For 
instance, partisanship and constituency were far more powerful than 
Congressional "internal will" in explaining Congressional actions on China's 
MFN status during the Bush Administration. Although Congress was 
overwhelmingly against the Chinese government after the Tiananmen Square 
crackdown and a vast majority of Congressional members did not agree with the 
Bush Administration's China policy, the Senate more than once sustained Bush's 
vetoes over bills attempting to condition China's MFN status. Among those who 
supported Bush, many were Republicans who disagreed with Bush but did not 
want to embarrass the president of their party. Others wanted to keep normal 
trade relations with China to protect the interests of their constituencies, even if 
that meant crossing party lines. No wonder Tip O'Neill, Speaker of the House 
from 1977 to 1987, claimed that "All politics are local".2 
Partisanship played a major role during the Bush Administration, most 
prominently on China's MFN status. The support of Republican senators was the 
basis for Bush's victory over Senate attempts to override his vetoes. A vast 
majority of those who came from states whose Senate seats were shared by 
Republicans and Democrats, and who needed to protect their electoral position, 
voted along party lines. On the Taiwan issue, partisanship was an influential 
factor in that Republicans did not launch a serious challenge to Administration's 
2 Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call 
Voting (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 3. 
378 
policy under Bush while they did so aggressively and forcefully in Clinton's first 
term. But partisanship may disappear under some circumstances and on certain 
issues. It was almost non-existent on the issue of China's MFN status in the first 
two years of Clinton's first term when the Administration and the Congress were 
controlled by Democrats. 
Congress can be deeply divided on issues in which interests of 
constituency are heavily involved, with the line of division varying from issue to 
issue rather than according to party lines. In the years immediately following the 
Tiananmen Square crackdown, when Congress was dominated by anti-China 
sentiment, seven Democratic senators from farm states with big stakes in China 
trade consistently supported Bush's decision to renew China's MFN status. Their 
support was a key factor in Bush's victory over the Senate's override attempts, 
given that ten conservative Republican senators crossed party lines and voted 
against Bush. 
When their policy preferences are not in line with the interests of many of 
their constituents, members of Congress are still likely to take into consideration 
their support base in the constituency. That is, they need to make a judgement 
about the electoral benefits their position may result in. Support may not come 
from the majority of their constituents, but nonetheless be important. Therefore, 
they may side with their key constituency groups or posture in support of them. 
Senator Adams sided with labour unions to vote against MFN for China even 
though he believed a trade cut-off with China would be the wrong tool. Senators 
Stevens and Murkowski, whose home state of Alaska was hurt by Taiwan's 
driftnet fishing fleet, suggested cutting off arms sales to Taiwan if Taiwan did not 
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make efforts to stop driftnet fishing - even though the two senators were staunch 
supporters of Taiwan. 
While the interests of constituencies are mainly represented by economic 
benefits, constituents' concerns over moral and value issues also strongly 
influence members of Congress. On some occasions, moral concerns may prevail 
over economic benefits and members of Congress need to enunciate and reaffirm 
these concerns. This may partly explain why the House overwhelmingly 
supported bills conditioning China's MFN status. On the occasions where 
economic benefits are not in conflict with moral concerns, support for the latter 
can be maximised. Congress' support for Taiwan during the first Clinton 
Administration is a good example. 
The relationship between constituency and partisanship can be either 
contradictory or complementary. It is not unusual for members of Congress to 
find themselves crossing party lines to protect the interests of their constituencies, 
as the Democratic senators from farm states did on China's MFN status during the 
Bush Administration. On the other hand, Congressional members can often 
satisfy both their party and their constituencies. 
As a result of the powers of Congressional committees in the legislative 
process, their actions are central to legislative actions. Committees have life and 
death power over bills because their approval is essential for the bills to be passed 
to the floor of each house for deliberation. The thesis revealed a close relationship 
between the level of committee support and floor voting results for China related 
bills. Those bills which did not command strong committee support usually met 
strong opposition on the floor. On the other hand, those bills with strong 
committee support normally passed the floor without much debate. 
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Important as they are, committees consist of individual members whose 
decision-making behaviour is subjected to the influence of various factors, 
including constituency and partisanship. The influence of these factors largely 
decides committee actions. Two good examples are the Senate Finance 
Committee's votes on the US-China Act of 1991 and US-China Act of 1992 to 
condition China's MFN status. Twice the vote split on party lines. In this sense, 
the committee factor is a subcomponent of the partisanship or constituency 
dimensions. 
The influence of structural factors on decision-making behaviour of 
members of Congress can be best understood only in a context which includes all 
possible influential factors, structural and non-structural. A narrow focus on 
partisanship, constituency and committee without considering other factors, such 
as ideology, interest groups and Presidential leadership would be misleading. In 
many cases, non-structural factors can play an equally important, or even more 
important, role in influencing Congressional members' foreign policy decisions. 
This appeared to be the case in Congress' intervention in the visit of Taiwan's 
President in 1995. 
Yet case of the Lee visit should be treated with caution. While 
Congressional behaviour in China's MFN status was restrained by factors like 
constituency, partisanship, Presidential leadership and business group lobbying, 
Congress' decisive role in the visit was largely due to the lack of formidable 
opposition, structural or non-structural, to restrain members of Congress. Given 
that Congress is normally checked by some factors, especially the Executive, it 
could be argued that Congress' role in Lee's visit was an exceptional case. 
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Structural factors do integrate some non-structural elements, making it 
particularly important not to exclude non-structural factors in explaining 
Congressional behaviour. Republicans who consistently supported Bush on 
China's MFN status were largely influenced by partisanship. But this aspect often 
stands as the superficial manifestation of non-structural interests, such as 
ideology. The Republican party has a "free-trade ethos". 
The thesis studied its subject over a period of time distinctly different from 
previous decades - the post-Cold War era. The impact of dramatic changes 
during this period is likely to remain for some years to come. The most direct 
impact of the changes on Congressional behaviour is that members of Congress are 
now much less restrained from treating foreign policy issues as domestic politics. 
The purpose of this study was to examine the influence of domestic politics 
on China policy with special reference to structural factors. In this sense, the 
findings may have much application to other areas of US foreign policy. The 
thesis noted that in US policy towards the Middle East, domestic politics is even 
more deeply involved; so this study may have some relevance to that area of US 
policy. Yet the China case differs from other cases in some important aspects: 
China is a major power; possesses a huge market; is run by a Communist 
government; is complicated by the Taiwan issue; and historically receives special 
attention. 
This thesis suggests that Congress' future role in China's normal-trade-
relations (NTR) status will largely be decided by two forces: members of Congress 
will feel more pressure to gain a fair share of the huge China market for US 
companies; they will also feel pressured to act on China's poor human rights 
record, political repression, Beijing's policy towards Taipei and other issues. It is 
Congress 
policy. 
be to 
many members will 
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to block permanent NTR status for 
reasons of ideology, constituency, partisanship so on. 
Domestic politics, including partisanship, ideology, constituency and 
interest groups, 
the Taiwan issue. The effect of intervention, however, is unlikely to match the 
success of the Lee visit in the near future because intervention will not go 
unchecked. If China forces the Administration and Congress into common 
positions through extreme actions, such as the 1996 military pressure on Taiwan, 
then the two branches will be harder to deal with from China's point of view. In 
the absence of extreme measures, China is likely to continue to benefit from its 
current approach to the Congress of "divide and rule" - a strategy purpose-made 
for a body characterised more by fragmentation than cohesion. 
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